A German Worldview: Historical, Philosophical and Religious Influences that Shaped a People and a Nation

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Abstract

How did elements of a German worldview in the 19th century influence the development of the German State? This thesis examines a historically situated and dynamic German worldview, presented as the dominant worldview of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to illuminate how intellectual, cultural, philosophical, and religious influences contributed to the formation of the German nation-state in 1871. While focusing on dominant intellectual and cultural currents, the study acknowledges the internal heterogeneity of the German population, including regional, religious, class-based, gendered, and ideological differences that shaped and at times contested the formation of a German worldview. This worldview is understood as a historically evolving construct, collectively expressed by those who identified as German and participated in the project of nation-building, with its boundaries defined and redefined by the events and intellectual currents of the period. Rather than treating worldview as a timeless essence, the thesis analyzes it as a fluid interpretive framework shaped by the specific intellectual, cultural, and political conditions of eighteenth and nineteenth century Germany. A worldview acts as a heuristic lens, offering a wider focus of analysis by identifying influences that span multiple fields of inquiry. This interdisciplinary study draws on history, philosophy, political theory, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Specifically, it identifies four components of a German worldview: German Intellectualism: German Idealism and Liberalism; A Particular Ontology – a German concept of the human expressed through a societal vision; the German *Mythos* of the *Volk* as self-identification; and Religion and Spirituality: traditional Christianity. By examining these components together, the thesis demonstrates how philosophical ideas,

ontological assumptions, mythic narratives, and religious traditions converged to influence the intellectual foundations of the German State. This worldview lens provides a broader interpretive framework revealing how deeper cultural and intellectual forces shaped the development of the German nation-state and the identification of its people.

Dedication

To my family: the foundation of everything I have become, and the quiet encouragement that carried me forward with the wind at my back and the love that guided my steps.

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Introduction:

A Beneficial Perspective

How did elements of a German worldview in the 19th century influence the development of the German State? The history of the German people continues to intrigue researchers and scholars. What began as a loose amalgamation of tribes would become the custodians of the Holy Roman Empire, and eventually a leading power in Europe. Yet for centuries, the German people existed as a group unified by an idea, without one unified state. The idea, myth, politics, and philosophy of a people identifying as German would have a long and tumultuous struggle towards unification in 1871, and this period would codify these elements within a powerful cultural, economic, and military nation-state. Following the horrors of World War II, even more attention has been paid to determining whether something unique existed within German society, German culture, or tradition prior to the reign of Nazism. Even today, as Germany rose from the rubble to ascend to a position of power within the EU as the dominant economic nation, researchers and analysts attempt to understand the actions of the German government, German industry, and the German electorate. What appears to be absent from their work is an examination of a German worldview, a worldview that underlies the history, culture, society, politics, and religion of the German people. Have founding elements of a German worldview been ingrained within the state from the events and influences leading up to unification?

The term worldview is becoming increasingly prevalent in our lexicon. Yet an ambiguity remains concerning its definition and use. Sometimes the term is used to denote a consensus of a society referring to a way an individual or a people view

themselves, or alternatively the way outside societies, or cultures, view them. Worldview has entered scholarly discourse in the last centuries and the field of study and analysis is rapidly increasing across numerous fields of research, suggesting the application of this tool, or lens, may provide new insights on this topic. Specifically, it has also been used to denote specific facets of society, including history, culture, and so on. This thesis will begin with a brief evolution of the term and its developing field of study, to highlight the elements comprising a worldview of a people, in this case on a national, state level.

This thesis argues that the worldview lens offers a uniquely interdisciplinary approach to understanding the formation of the German State and the identification of the German people. By examining the historical, philosophical, intellectual, cultural, and religious influences that shaped 19th-century Germany, this study seeks to identify components of a German worldview, understood here as the dominant worldview of the period. These components, once abstract ideas, became embedded within the institutional and ideological foundations of the German State realized in 1871. Through this lens, the thesis explores how worldview functions as a heuristic device, revealing how multifaceted influences converged to produce a coherent national identity. The central focus of this study is to examine the elements of a German worldview, understood as the dominant worldview of the 19th century, and how they became ingrained within the realized German State in 1871 and the immediate events that followed.

This thesis also engages with the evolving tradition of German historiography, particularly the intellectual and cultural dimensions of national development. By situating German Idealism and Liberalism within broader historiographical debates, from the grand narratives of the Prussian school to post-1945 reinterpretations and examples such

as the Fischer Controversy, the study adds perspective to potential assumptions and contributes to a more interdisciplinary understanding of Germany's political and philosophical foundations.

To structure this inquiry, the thesis is organized around four core chapters, each dedicated to a distinct component of a German worldview: German Intellectualism, a particular German ontology, the mythos of the *Volk*, and religion/spirituality. These components were selected for their recurring presence in the intellectual, cultural, and political development of the German people during the 18th and 19th centuries. Together, they form a cohesive framework that reflects how philosophical ideals, societal visions, cultural narratives, and spiritual traditions converged to shape a German worldview. This structure allows the thesis to trace how these elements evolved, interacted, and ultimately became embedded in the institutional foundations of the German State.

This study is designed to examine key components of a German worldview as an interpretive framework often overlooked in modern national analysis. Conventional approaches tend to isolate political or economic factors, but this thesis incorporates deeper historical, philosophical, and intellectual currents that shaped German society. By identifying these underlying influences, the worldview lens enables a broader understanding of how cultural and ideological elements became foundational to the German State and its people. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the development of a German worldview during the 19th century and its manifestation in the political unification of Germany in 1871. It also considers how these worldview elements continued to influence national identity in the immediate aftermath of unification.

Contemporary analyses of Germany's political development often rely on conventional ideological frameworks, liberal versus conservative, progressive versus reactionary. These models, while useful in comparative politics, tend to obscure the deeper historical, philosophical, and cultural influences that shaped Germany's national identity. Unlike many of its European counterparts, Germany's political ideology has historically resisted reduction to short-term economic interests or popular political trends. Instead, it reflects a more complex constellation of intellectual traditions, religious heritage, and cultural narratives. This thesis addresses the problem of this analytical gap by proposing a worldview-based approach, one that captures the multifaceted influences that contributed to the formation of the German State and the identification of its people.

This thesis seeks to fill a gap in existing scholarship by offering an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the German State. Drawing from history, philosophy, political theory, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, it identifies and analyzes the components of a German worldview that emerged during the 19th century, presented as the dominant worldview of the period. By doing so, it enhances our understanding of how cultural and intellectual forces shaped Germany's political identity and national character.

It is important to emphasize that the worldview examined in this study is not ahistorical or timeless. Rather, it is a historically situated and dynamic construct, shaped by the specific intellectual, cultural, and political conditions of 19th-century Germany. The period of inquiry has been deliberately chosen to reflect the convergence of these influences, and the worldview identified here is understood as a response to its historical context. While certain elements may persist over time, others evolve or dissipate in

response to changing events and societal pressures. This thesis therefore treats worldview not as a fixed ideology, but as a fluid framework through which a people interpret and shape their national identity.

The study of worldview inherently demands an interdisciplinary approach. Because worldviews are shaped by historical events, philosophical traditions, cultural narratives, and religious beliefs, no single discipline can adequately capture their complexity. An interdisciplinary framework allows for the integration of multiple perspectives, each contributing unique insights that might otherwise be excluded. This approach is particularly well-suited to intellectual history, which depends on both the breadth of disciplinary coverage and the depth of understanding within each field.

A foundational principle of interdisciplinary research is the need to specify how disciplinary expertise is drawn upon and how insights are integrated. The breadth of disciplines selected, whether closely related or more distant, determines the scope of analysis, while the depth of disciplinary understanding shapes the precision and relevance of interpretation. In this thesis, disciplines such as history, philosophy, political theory, anthropology, sociology, and psychology are engaged not only for their content but for their methodological contributions. This dual emphasis on breadth and depth ensures that the defining elements of each discipline are applied meaningfully to the problem at hand.

The significance of this thesis lies in its use of the worldview lens to interpret the formation of the German State and the identification of its people. By identifying and describing a German worldview, presented as the dominant worldview of the period, one rooted in historical, philosophical, intellectual, cultural, and religious traditions, this study offers a more holistic understanding of Germany's development. The concept of

worldview has gained increasing attention across disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and political theory. As a framing device, it allows scholars to explore how societies construct meaning, identity, and purpose. Applying this lens to German history provides new insights into how intellectual and cultural forces shaped national consciousness, insights that may be overlooked by traditional political or economic analyses.

The Theoretical Framework

The word *Weltanschauung,* composed of the German words for world, *Welt*, and view, *Anschauung*, refers to a philosophy or concept of the world. Kant is widely credited with introducing the term *Weltanschauung* in his 1790 work *Critique of Judgement*.[1] It was in this seminal work that Kant made a somewhat obscure reference when he wrote of an ability found within the human mind, to recognize a sensibility beyond our base faculties that unites us, an innate "intuition of the world."[2] Kant suggests that this intuition expands the mind beyond mere sensory limits. Prior to his introduction of the word *Weltanschauung* (Worldview), Kant had been working towards how this intuition helped us to ground our knowledge within the realm of what is understandable. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*[3], first published in 1781, Kant differentiates between pure and practical reason. He sets out the position that our knowledge is inherently tied to our experience and registered through the objects that act upon our senses. This form of

[1] David K. Naugle, *Worldview "The History of a Concept,"* (W. N. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2002), 58.
[2] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*. trans. Nicholas Walker (Oxford University Press, 2007), 85, eBook
[3] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason (Annotated)*, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (Digireads.com Publishing, 2018) Kindle.

empirical knowledge could, however, be from a further knowledge that does not depend on experience or sensory input.[4] The inquiry into this distinction of knowledge, questions that which is knowable through our form of understanding, or reason, and the senses available to our minds. Kant, therefore, clarifies that pure reason, or Transcendental philosophy, is "a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason." Consequently, practical reason is limited to containing, or involving motivation, emotion and the "to empirical sources of cognition."[5] From this distinction, Kant presents to us the cosmological principle "not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as a problem for the understanding." From this understanding, Kant argues that we must continue our inquiry by assuming a mental idea of totality and by tracing the conditions of any given object back through the series of prior conditions.[6] The principles Kant presents are prescribed to highlight the conditions or context, that is the elements an object is exposed to in its space and time. These objects are recognizable by our senses, or our own conditioned intuition, to achieve a necessary level of understanding of any object or phenomenon. This process represents a widening of experience to the limits of human capability.[7] To the degree that we through our senses can sufficiently understand an object follows, Mudd stated that "By showing several distinct claims to be grounded in the same fundamental condition, reason can create limited unities in our knowledge."[8] Similarly, Kant described our ability to comprehend an object, due to conditions, context and our learned sensibilities, or intuition. We can comprehend one's possible worldview,

[4] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* Loc. 830-837.
[5] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Loc. 1122.
[6] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Loc. 6310.
[7] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Loc. 6325.
[8] Sasha Mudd, "Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant," *European Journal of Philosophy* 24:1, (2013): 80.

not in the absolute sense, but instead extrapolating several conditions or elements an individual or group may be exposed to in their own space and time.

Later, Hegel would expand on Kant through his use of the term by presenting a "moral outlook on the world", said to be formed through a relationship between nature and one's moral outlook and actions.[9] Next, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*[10], in a presentation of India's religious beliefs, amongst a larger presentation of historical and cultural elements of nations, he concludes with the statement "This gives us a general idea of the Indian world-view."[11] From the progression of this expanded but still limited use, Hegel saw worldviews as shaping both personal identity and collective cultural, or national, outlook.[12] For Hegel, the concept of worldview starting with a moral sense or moral view of the world, grew to entail that we learn from our specific surroundings, specifically the nation. It was in that setting that the potential good of nature and that which our pre-existing morality innately tells us should happen, is encapsulated by the duty specific to our lived surroundings and compels us to act to realize positive outcomes. Thus, this vision of a worldview incorporates moral evaluations of the good and is devised in relation to national elements and duty to its people.

It was through the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) that the term was analyzed to a deeper degree. Dilthey argued that any attempt to understand a worldview must begin with historical awareness, lived experience, and the concrete realities of

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[9] Georg W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind)*, trans. J.B.Baillie (Digireads.com Publishing, 2012), Loc.157-158, Kindle.
[10] G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. Ruben Alvarado (WordBridge Publishing, 2013), Kindle.
[11] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, 128.
[12] Naugle, *Worldview*, 69-70.

human life.[13] Dilthey's conclusion that "World views develop under different conditions, climate, races, nationalities, determined by history and through political organizations,"[14] represents an important development in the evolution of the field.

Beginning with the second half of the 20th century, the term worldview was applied to disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology. In 1952, anthropologist Robert Redfield wrote that worldview was an "outlook upon the universe that is characteristic of a people." He said that the term allows us "to describe a way of life and to compare ways of life with one another." Redfield found the notion of worldview useful in identifying the core and enduring "values of a people", especially concerning their "idea of the good life."[15] Redfield described worldview as the internal picture a community has of itself and its place in the world. He distinguished it from national character, which reflects how outsiders perceive a people, whereas worldview reflects how a people understands its own reality.[16]

Today, the concept of worldview extends beyond the social sciences and returns to the field of philosophy. In *Naming the Elephant,* James Sire acknowledges "that the search for definitive statements about worldview is difficult." His two-part definition of worldview begins with the assertion that,

> A worldview is a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set presupposition (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously,

[13] Naugle, *Worldview*, 85.
[14] James W. Sire, *Naming the Elephant, "Worldviews as a Concept,"* (InterVarsity Press, 2004), 26.
[15] Robert Redfield, "The Primitive World View," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 96, No.1, (Feb, 29, 1952): 30.
[16] Redfield, "The Primitive World View," 30.

consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being.[17]

A worldview can be as diverse as the person or group proposing it and can incorporate a number of disciplinary perspectives. For instance, one such interdisciplinary approach suggests that a worldview is at least one aspect of the human consciousness: according to Schlitz, human development research demonstrates that we learn to sort, interpret, and make sense of our experiences as we develop.[18] The concept of worldview can even be utilized today in empirical science research, for according to Cobern, it provides a underlying structure for how people think, feel and act. When analyzing any action, Cobern states that a person starts with "presuppositions about what the world is really like and what constitutes valid and important knowledge about the world."[19]

It must also be noted that the concept worldview has real world implications, for according to Valk, "it recognizes that all peoples have particular perceptions of the world, are rooted in particular ways of thinking, hold particular metaphysical beliefs, and act out of particular moral convictions."[20] One final point, stressed by Opstal and of particular interest to the historical upheavals represented in any study of Germany, "Worldviews

[17] Sire, *Naming the Elephant,* 122
[18] Marilyn Mandala Schlitz, Cassandra Vieten, and Elizabeth M. Miller, "Worldview Transformation and the Development of Social Consciousness," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 17, No. 7-8, (2010): 19.
[19] William W. Cobern, "Worldview Theory and Conceptual Change in Science Education," *Science Education* 80 (5), (1996): 584.
[20] John Valk, "Knowing Self and Others: Worldview Study at Renaissance College," *Journal of Adult Theological Education* 6 (1), (01/2010): 70-71.

are unfinished and dynamic, incorporating the possibility of change and collaborative action towards shared worldview transformation."[21]

This deeper examination of the concept of worldviews reveals that the interdisciplinary approach can account for the many influences of multiple factors. Factors possibly missed within a single-discipline approach can be better incorporated within an interdisciplinary scope. Opstal identifies a wide range of influences, including cultural, religious, non-religious, and psychological that shape how worldviews form. Worldview construction is, according to him, "collective work that is not identifiable with only one individual person," but it can be uncovered through identifying the influence of historical individuals, political state actors, major philosophical and religious tenets, or representative groups. This thesis will connect shared aims with the particular perspectives held by groups or individuals.[22] Further, it affirms that worldviews are, according to Valk, "as much 'ways of life' as they are 'visions of life,' for humans live out their beliefs and values."[23]

Moreover, the worldview lens enables a distinction between dynamic and stable elements within German identity. Some aspects, such as philosophical idealism or cultural mythos, have evolved over time, while others, like the emphasis on unity and spiritual heritage, have remained present in varying forms. Understanding this interplay helps explain how certain ideas became embedded in the German State's foundations and continue to influence its trajectory.

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[21] Maarten Van Opstal, Jean Huge, "Knowledge for sustainable development: a worldviews perspective," *Environ Dev Sustain* 15, (2013): 691.
[22] Van Opstal, and Huge, "Knowledge for sustainable", 703.
[23] Valk, "Knowing Self and Others", 70.

By exploring a German worldview, this study seeks to provide a more holistic understanding of the historical, intellectual, philosophical, cultural, and religious forces that influenced the development of the German State. This perspective moves beyond traditional political or economic analyses, which often isolate surface-level trends, and instead highlights the deeper ideological and cultural foundations that shaped the German people and their national identity.

This is not to say, however, that one's worldview, let alone that of a group, is necessarily perceptible, even if it is pervasive. A worldview can be influential in one's development and actions, but, according to Schultz, "while everyone possesses a worldview, relatively few have a coherent worldview or are able to articulate it clearly."[24] Almost no one wakes up in the morning, and before starting their day, proceeds through a formula to fully identify or comprehend their worldview and how it will affect their lives that day. It can be a conscious or, to varying degrees, subconscious view of their reality that guides how one views others around him or her, their moral decisions, and the decisions that dictate what priorities are important to them and their society. Worldviews then, again according to Schultz, are composed of these "kind of (often unconscious) mental habits, frames and assumptions."[25]

Based on the extended evolution of the term, a worldview approach can highlight influential intellectual elements of a nation. Following in the example of the originator of this term, Kant, this study will seek to reach an understanding analogous to practical reason, an informed knowledge based on identifiable components of a possible

[24] Katherine G. Schultz, and James A. Swezey, "A Three-Dimensional Concept of Worldview," *Journal of Research on Christian Education* 22 (2013): 229.
[25] Van Opstal, and Huge, "Knowledge for sustainable", 688.

worldview. As presented initially by Hegel, these components could exert influence on individual citizens, but even more so collectively on a national consciousness. As such, a worldview approach involves a process of historical examination, for a worldview is defined as the views of a people and a nation and their ways of being. Such an examination must identify the components that are deemed most influential in encompassing a worldview. These components may endure and influence to greater or lesser degrees the citizens of a nation over time. Permanent ideologies within a nation are difficult to define, for worldviews are dynamic and can change over a defined period.

Scope of Research: What is meant by a "German Worldview"

This thesis seeks to identify and describe a German worldview that will shed light on the climactic events that occurred in Germany during the latter 18th century and 19th century. In so doing it will highlight the need to identify which, to use the words of Schlitz et al., "aspects of worldviews are dynamic" and which could potentially be "stable over time."[26] Discovering a German worldview that has been consistent over time requires one to ascertain whether over the historical evolution of the German people and the state, certain events led to a dramatic shift within this worldview or were a deviation from it. More specifically, it will seek to identify a German worldview on the national level. The unification of Germany in 1871 was an event that represented the culmination of decades, if not centuries of philosophical, political, and societal aspirations, and one that would set into action the turbulent course of the 20th century. While this thesis

[26] Schlitz, Vieten, and Miller, "A Three-Dimensional Concept", 19.

focuses on dominant intellectual and cultural currents, it acknowledges the internal heterogeneity of the German population, including regional, religious, class-based, gendered, and ideological differences, which shaped and sometimes contested the formation of a German worldview. This worldview is collective, ascribed to those who identified as German, participated in the formation of the state, and ultimately became its citizens. This process of identification throughout the project of nation-building inherently excludes those outside this national conception. This exclusion was not fixed or predetermined, as the boundaries of this worldview were historically constructed. Identification of who was included and who was excluded is defined by the events and intellectual currents examined in this thesis, during the period leading up to and culminating in the unification of the German State.

In this study, the term German refers not to a single, fixed category but to a historically evolving collective shaped by overlapping cultural, linguistic, geographic, and political elements. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "German" denoted a people connected by shared language, geographic proximity, religious and spiritual traditions, cultural memory, and developing political structures. This cultural-linguistic community did not initially form a unified political entity, rather, it developed through intellectual, philosophical, and cultural narratives that encouraged individuals and communities to imagine themselves as part of a broader German people. Over time, these shared elements interacted with political movements for national unity, producing successive layers of self-identification, from a growing cultural community, to a polity organized around emerging states structures, to more ethnically inflected understandings of the nation. In this period, "German" reflects a dynamic process of collective self-

definition, one that both shaped and was shaped by the development of a German worldview. The components of a German worldview to be examined represent the very forces through which individuals and communities came to understand themselves as "German." As these elements developed and interacted, they reinforced a sense of belonging among populations linked by geographic proximity, linguistic affinity and common historical experience. Over time, these shared influences supported successive stages of self-identification, from a loosely defined cultural community to a polity seeking national unity and, ultimately, a nation-state. In this way, the development of a German worldview both reflected and propelled the evolving identification of the German people during the period under study, those who would come to support the formation of the German state and ultimately, participate in it as citizens. The scope and focus of this thesis therefore will follow the development of the German nation-state and the events most impactful in its creation. Throughout numerous attempts and iterations, there remained a call, a desire, or a recognition by the citizens of this state, or states, to identify as members of a German polity.

Today, nation is defined as "a large aggregate of communities and individuals united by factors such as common descent, language, culture, history, or occupation of the same territory, so as to form a distinct people." More generally, it is referenced to mean a "people forming a political state."[27] This word has drastically evolved in both use and meaning through multiple periods of history. From Latin, the word *natio* "was understood to be a group of men who belonged together in some way because of similarity of birth." In Roman culture *natio* would ultimately refer to members who

[27] Oxford English Dictionary, "nation (n.1)," (March 15, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5925687675.

"were born in the same city or the same tract of land", but the word always retained a foreign focus as it was never used by the Romans as a means of self-identification.[28] Centuries later, in examples of the Italian language such as Dante's writings "*nazione*" referred to men who shared a common origin within the same province or city.[29]

In the Middle Ages, universities were established in remote towns, where foreign students would come to form groups organized by their shared geographic origin and they were called "*nationes*."[30] This, however, is not the direct connection to our modern use of the word we are looking for, as the nations that existed within these university communities still only represented the outsiders. The universal nature of the Roman Catholic Church to some degree negated the motivation for groups to distinguish or define themselves. Eventual issues of divisions, such as the Great or Western Schism, a dispute concerning papal power and succession, would mandate council be convened in the town of Constance in 1414. The attendees formed together in groups known as "*nationes*."[31] It was the societal upheaval of this period that the word nation came to refer to the delegates who were in fact "*proxies, deputies, representatives*" for the princes, universities, or the local places they represented. The word nation would grow in recognition referring to a "representative body, whose chief characteristic was that it was assumed that a certain loose bond of territorial origin", but there still existed an elite emphasis to its use, rather than a populist appeal. Mirroring this development, the 13th century French kings would regularly host meetings with the members of the landed elite.

[28] Guido Zernatto and Alfonso G. Mistretta, "Nation: The History of a Word," The Review of Politics 6, No.3 (Jul.1944): 351-352.
[29] Zernatto and Mistretta, "Nation:", 353.
[30] Zernatto and Mistretta, "Nation:", 353-354.
[31] Zernatto and Mistretta, "Nation:" ,355-357.

These meetings grew to include regional estates that were also designated by the term "'nation'."[32] Our modern concept of the word does not begin to fully emerge until the 18th century. Within the developing connection between the people as a majority and nation, it was in the French Revolutionary Parliament, the "*assemblee national*", in which ordinary citizens assumed positions once reserved for the elite. The elevation of different classes within this house of power represented the process by which the term nation slowly became recognized as "all the citizens of the state – even those who were previously plebs."[33]

E.J. Hobsbawm has stated, nations are not, "'as old as history'" as the "modern sense of the word is no older than the eighteenth century."[34] It is important then to approach this evolution of the word with a focus to the historical and cultural developments of the era by focusing on the national question. The nation, viewed through the context of nationalism, is a result of this ideological force and a culmination of events leading up to its recognition or established state. The most obvious examples of this national trend can be identified during the events of the 1800s and their direct ramifications within the 20th century. According to Hobsbawm, nationalism is "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent." From this national focus then, nation can be further understood not as a fixed or timeless social unity, but as one that gains relevance specifically within the framework of the modern territory state, the "'nation-state'."[35] Stemming from the increased focus and interest in

[32] Zernatto and Mistretta, "Nation:", 361-362.
[33] Zernatto and Mistretta, "Nation:", 365-366.
[34] E.J.Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780, "Programme, myth, reality"*, (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 8.
[35] Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism,* 14-15.

the modern perceived importance of the nation, Adrian Hastings represented the further expanding considerations to follow the work of Hobsbawm and others in the 1980s. Social and cultural developments were increasingly gaining academic attention equal to a solely political focus. Hastings would conclude that nation, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion each represent distinct forces in European and global history, their interconnections are so profound that any meaningful account of one inevitably requires engagement with the others.[36]

The interconnected nature of multiple elements within a national focus, such as a subject of the German nation, demands that we add to the political and governmental structures, that of "state" and subsequently "nation-state." A state is defined as a "Community of people living in a defined territory and organized under its own government; a commonwealth, a nation."[37] Nation-state, then is "An independent political state formed from a people who share a common national identity (historically, culturally, or ethnically)."[38] So, from this evolution we know that the ultimate or most widely accepted or adopted form of the word nation and its impact was inherently tied to the notion of national political, intellectual, and cultural forces. The identification of scope and research framework, as well as the course of this inquiry will focus not only within the nation, but specifically the evolution and goals of the national culture of a German people caught up in the ideological wave of nationalism. From this, the focus of this study will be the historical unfolding of this nation-state and its numerous iterations.

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[36] Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*, *"Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism,"* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1.
[37] *Oxford English Dictionary*, "state, (n.25)," (March 21, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/7334571210.
[38] *Oxford English Dictionary*, "nation-state, (n.)" (March 15, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1178723327.

For the German people, as Helmut Walser Smith stated, nationalism "transformed the existential categories that had previously defined the nation in almost every fundamental way." In the 1500s, those who sought to describe a German nation, according to Smith, "evoked the distant past of Tacitus but projected virtually no idea of the distant future. By 1800, in contrast, nationalism infused nation thinking with a new sense of possibilities, especially with respect to the future."[39] It is specifically, the period of post 18th century use of the nation, referring to the historical, philosophical, cultural, and religious elements of a people who identified as a collective society, a distinct people. Continuing from this definition, and with a recognition of the era that bore the term nation as we know it today, it incorporates the ideological force of nationalism which utilized these long existing elements of a people towards a singular political focus of unity within a state, the nation-state, the German State, that will be of primary focus when referring to the nation within this work.

Worldview Framework

The thesis will focus on four elements or components identified by this author as central to a German worldview: German Intellectualism; a particular German concept or notion of the human; the mythos of the *German people*; and German Christianity or spirituality.

[39] Helmut Walser Smith, *GERMANY, A NATION IN ITS TIME*: *Before During and After Nationalism 1500-2000,* (Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020), 88.

The starting point for this framework is based on the work of John Valk, *Worldviews: A Comprehensive Approach*.[40] Building upon this base is a comprehensive review of the literature and the use of the worldview concept as it has been used in various disciplines, and especially in the field of policy analysis. From this informed base, components of a German worldview will be highlighted that can be historically identified as forces central to the initial unification of the German nation, culminating in 1871. This German worldview will culminate from these components and their place within the history of the German State and will shed light on those that have played a significant part in the nation and its culture, its society. The four components comprising a German worldview derive from components that encompass worldviews emerging from studies in various academic disciplines. A thorough review of these worldview components will be presented in chapter one of this thesis.

The Research Design

In describing and analyzing the four components of a German worldview, this thesis will focus primarily on insights gained from the disciplines of history and philosophy, and largely from the overarching field of intellectual history, which Peter E. Gordon broadly describes as the study of "intellectuals, ideas, and intellectual patterns over time." Intellectual history draws upon various disciplines and, according to him, "recognizes the protean nature of thought itself: its boundlessness, and its refusal to

[40]John Valk, *Worldviews: A Comprehensive Approach to Knowing Self and Others,* (Palgrave Macmillan), 2021.

confine itself to any one discipline."[41] This work will also draw on insights from political science, anthropology, sociology and psychology in discerning components used to describe this German worldview.

This worldview analysis is an English language project, intended for an English-speaking audience. While engaging deeply with German intellectual traditions, the thesis has been designed based on the utilization of English sources and translations of German language primary sources. The interdisciplinary approach adopted prioritizes breadth of analysis across history, philosophy, political theory, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, while acknowledging the limits of disciplinary depth. This broad historiography is necessary to address persistent assumptions about German political history and ideology. The researcher possesses a sufficient grasp and recognition of the German language and materials, but due to scope, capacity and accuracy determinations, the research design and the conclusions concerning a German worldview are based on an English language historiography.

A generally accepted foundation of interdisciplinary studies is, according to Repko, the "need to specify, at least to some extent, how to draw on disciplinary expertise and, especially, how to integrate disciplinary insights and theories."[42] He states that the breadth to which a researcher chooses the disciplines, subdisciplines, and interdisciplines, whether they are "epistemologically distant" or close, determines the level of insight which will be applied to the problem.[43] Furthermore, beyond the

[41] Peter E. Gordon, "What is Intellectual History? A frankly partisan introduction to a frequently misunderstood field," accessed March 12, 2015, http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/history/files/what_is_intell_history_pgordon_mar2012.pdf
[42] Allen F. Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Power and theory, 2nd Edition*. (SAGE. 2011), 73.
[43] Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research*, 279.

utilization of multiple disciplines, the "Disciplinary Depth" in which a researcher understands the overarching perspective of the discipline predicates how he/she adequately applies the essential concepts and methods of each discipline to the issue under investigation.[44]

Intellectual history inherently depends on a vast breadth of disciplines and requires a solid depth of understanding in each. It can rely on the use and knowledge of numerous fields, including, but not limited to, philosophy, political theory, cultural history, sociology, psychology, and economics. According to Darton, this expansion of disciplinary methods does not weaken the resulting analysis for the selected disciplines, for example, history and anthropology have benefited from the specialty of cultural history as they "provide complementary ways of reaching the same goal: the interpretation of culture."[45] Historians and most researchers of the social sciences and humanities adhere to many similar and shared procedures allowing for natural collaboration. According to Megill, historians in all specialized areas and "intellectual historians in particular adhere to a common set of procedures and rules of thumb that are particularly adapted to the investigation of that absent reality that is the past."[46]

In 1936, Arthur O. Lovejoy's 1933 series of William James lectures at Harvard University resulted in *The Great Chain of Being*[47]. In this work, Lovejoy presents the history of ideas as "something at once more specific and less restricted than the history of

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[44] Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research,* 278.
[45]Robert Darnton, "Intellectual and Cultural History," in *The Past Before Us*: *Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States,* ed. Michael Kammen (Cornell University Press, 1980), 347.
[46] Allan Megill, "Five questions on intellectual history," Rethinking history 15, No.4, (December 2011): 498.
[47] Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, (Harvard University Press, 1936).

philosophy. It is differentiated primarily by the character of the units with which it concerns itself."[48] These ideas were thought to be units of sorts, ones which were generally heterogeneous and consist of several general principal types. First, and of particular note to this thesis, there are, in the words of Lovejoy, "implicit or incompletely explicit assumptions or more or less unconscious mental habits, operating in the thought of an individual or a generation."[49] What would become a key point of criticism, Lovejoy advocated for the eventual generalization, or expansion of these unit ideas beyond areas of context, specifically national or linguistic lines, for as he argues that these conceptual units often cross national and linguistic boundaries.[50] Whereas the history of ideas would later be criticized as elitist or focused only on the highest levels of a society, it is important to note that Lovejoy stresses that the study of these identified units should focus on prevailing thoughts shared by large groups of people, not only elite intellectuals.[51]

In 1969, Quentin Skinner published a paper entitled "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas."[52] His stated intention was to consider "the basic question which necessarily arises whenever an historian of ideas confronts a work which he hopes to understand."[53] The work continues, however, to be a clear statement of critique against the position of Lovejoy as Skinner challenges the notion that ideas can be understood in isolation, arguing instead that their significance depends on how they functioned within a

[48] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain*, 3.
[49] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain*, 7.
[50] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain*, 18.
[51] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain*, 18.
[52] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, No.1 (1969).
[53] Skinner, Meaning and Understanding", 3.

broader intellectual framework.[54] The general criticism to follow from Skinner and others committed to a method which sought to understand texts historically, is according to McMahon, by "situating them in relation to broader discursive contexts that would highlight their particularities and illustrate their reliance on conventions."[55]

With the rise of social history in the latter 20th century, a critique of intellectual history was its focus on the elites. What began with the rise of Social History, and a fear that intellectual history was being surpassed, or replaced, was seemingly only heightened with the focus on cultural history. While not wishing to cast needless separation between the areas of historical inquiry, it can be helpful to understand the differences or "relationship" between intellectual and cultural history. A particular view may say that, according to Kelley, the "first of these deals with old fashioned 'ideas' (in Lovejoy's sense)" while the latter with "social and political context and the sociology and anthropology of knowledge."[56] From a point of view, according to Kelley, the intellectual "'inside' of history treats the words, and so presumable thoughts, of historical agents," while the cultural "'outside' deals with political, economic, social and cultural environments."[57] As most, if not all, would agree, whether speaking of intellectual or cultural history, both necessitate an interdisciplinary approach, and therefore the relationship between intellectual and cultural history can be viewed as an "Inside-Outside Duality." The central focus becomes the intellectual space, the historical subject itself,

[54] Skinner, Meaning and Understanding", 38.
[55] Darrin M. McMahon, "The Return of the History of Ideas?" in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 17.
[56] Donald R. Kelley, "Intellectual history and cultural history: the inside and the outside," *History of the Human Sciences* 15, No.2, (2002): 1.
[57] Kelley, "Intellectual history",15.

while the surrounding context includes the conditions, influences, and interconnections that shape cultural activity across disciplines.[58]

Today there are some who still think the term or designation, intellectual history, too high minded, or high focused, choosing instead for the term cultural history. With the increased standing of the new cultural history, according to Wickberg, "much of what was once called Intellectual History has passed into the sphere of cultural history."[59] So the question then becomes whether there is a clear or important distinction between the study of intellectual history and that of cultural or sociocultural history.[60] In answer to this question, Annabell Brett believes that intellectual history today still has a "distinctive character" retaining a unique disciplinary identity, not merely as an abstract reflection on ideas but as a field with its own substantive questions and methodological priorities.[61] Through various interpretations and executions, the field has moved far from the original history of ideas, or the separation of thought from the action of agents in human history. We do not have to think of intellectual activity as "somehow 'above' the rest of human activity" and we work with the understanding that "thought as involved in action and production has been with us for a long time."[62] One incarnation of this modern mentality is the focus on language as the embodiment or expression of thought. This was most famously championed by the 'Cambridge School', which investigated the "relationship between language, thought, agency and time."[63] But as is vital to the work of this thesis,

[58] Kelley, "Intellectual history",15.
[59] Daniel Wickberg, "Intellectual History vs. the Social History of Intellectuals," *Rethinking History* 5:3, (2001): 383.
[60] Annabell Brett, "What is Intellectual History Now," in *What is History Now*, ed. David Cannadine (Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 113.
[61] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 114.
[62] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 115.
[63] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 116.

modern intellectual history cannot be "divorced from cultural history and indeed from social and political history, for in all its forms it accepts the mutual involvement of the conceptual and the material dimensions of human beings."[64] As Jan Muller points out, despite numerous examples of criticism to the larger study of intellectual history "the precepts of the Cambridge School have never made it very clear what exactly is to count as context."[65]

If total adherence to context is a result of critique of previous forms of intellectual history, the broader predecessor incorporating the history of ideas, of philosophy and of politics, is known as "*Begriffsgeschichte* (the history of concepts or conceptual history)."[66] *Begriffsgeschichte* emerged from longstanding German academic traditions, including philology, philosophical inquiry, hermeneutic interpretation, legal scholarship, and historical analysis. Of note from this school of thought is the attention to "conceptualized thought to structural changes in government, society, and economy" along with the "effort to determine which concepts were used or contested by determinate groups, strata, orders, and classes both before and during periods of crisis, conflict and revolution."[67] Beyond studies in Germany, conceptual history projects have been undertaken through Europe and beyond, but certain concerns persist concerning the approach. Though sometimes argued as "intellectual sniping from members of the Cambridge School", sincere questions have been raised as to whether "concepts can actually change, or whether all that can be investigated is the 'changing usage of

[64] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 127.
[65] Jan-Werner Muller, "European Intellectual History as Contemporary History," *Journal of Contemporary* History 46, No.3 (July 2011): 583.
[66] Melvin Richter, "Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, No.2 (Apr-Jun. 1987): 247.
[67] Richter, "Begriffsgeschichte", 248.

words.'"[68] It is conceptual history's claim to connect the broader field of social history to the defined linguistic research that both offers promise and questions concerning the field.

Due to political reasons, or accusations, *Begriffsgeschichte* has faced criticism for its perceived ties to antimodernist thought, particularly due to its association with figures like Carl Schmitt and Otto Brunner, both of whom were implicated in National Socialism.[69] Muller argues, however, that conceptual history need not be tethered to problematic assumptions about modernity and can be reinterpreted through more flexible frameworks. It has actually been the role of conceptual history to remain "somewhat indeterminate" and to bridge social structures and subjective understanding, or language and lived experience, "without it ever becoming fully clear how that mediate can be carried out coherently."[70] From this view and focus on the scholarly benefits, Muller advocates for the redeploying certain methods from the Cambridge School and a revised version of conceptual history. The actual steps for this to occur within historical research include conceptual history taking seriously "the insight that concepts can always be contested and relocated in new conceptual contexts – even if such attempts are subject to historical-cultural constraints."[71]

The need then, amongst any philosophical view of history and thought, is some degree of historical context, but it is also true that what intellectual historians are

[68] Jan-Werner Muller, "On Conceptual history," in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 75.
[69] Muller, "On Conceptual history," 75.
[70] Muller, "On Conceptual history," 76.
[71] Jan-Werner Muller, "European Intellectual History as Contemporary History," 586.

concerned with is more than just language, imagery, or how these reflect a person's social or cultural setting. Intellectual history's aims are higher and according to Brett is

> interested in those ways of speaking as ways in which people in the past made sense of their world: and therefore it must concern itself with the internal coherence and logic of the structures of mental reference or the languages which it studies.[72]

This area is particularly a philosophical aspect to the practice of intellectual history, it occupies a conceptual space where philosophical reflection and historical analysis converge, shaping the discipline's distinctive character.[73]

The issues concerning the validity and the contextual focus of historical study can also be presented within the critical movement of Historicism. The term Historicism today can generally be defined, as offered by William Sweet, as a position of "historical relativism." Within this "there can be no understanding of events or the actions of agents as events or actions of a certain type unless they are within a particular context – the present." Broadly, Historicism questions whether historians can truly understand the past or offer reliable explanations of it.[74] Paul Hamilton further highlights the anti-Enlightenment feature of Historicism which argues against Enlightenment's claims to universal human nature. According to him, because "human nature is too various" to extrapolate how people should or will live, ideas and cultural expressions must be

[72] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 127.
[73] Brett, "What is Intellectual History", 127.
[74] William Sweet, "The Philosophy of History: Today, Yesterday and Tomorrow," in *The Philosophy of History: A Re-Examination*, ed. William Sweet, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004,) 3.

interpreted within their specific historical context.[75] It is equally important to question the extent to which "any historical enterprise inevitably reflects the interests and bias of the period in which it was written."[76] Highlighting the breadth, or ambiguity, of this term, New Historicism began, according to Gina Hens-Piazza, in the 1980s at UC Berkeley as a literary-critical movement with "possible other names such as 'the new history,' 'historical materialist criticism,' 'cultural materialism,' and 'critical historicism'." Within these loose sets of assumptions, there exists the same relativism holding that our interpretations of the past are shaped by present day values and experiences and thus, previously held distinctions between the "past and present begin to erode in the New Historicist's view."[77] The trends of Historicism do not always totally disregard the merits of historical exploration, however, as explained by Hens-Piazza, "Historicism and New Historicism both view the past as irreplaceably valuable in affording us insight and knowledge about how we live in the present."[78]

As this thesis will seek to identify knowable truths from numerous periods of the German State, or states, it is necessary to recognize the possible positions of bias or hindsight, and to use the criticisms of Historicism to keep the research of any era as sound as possible. In doing so, it is crucial for this work to avoid confusion with another form of historicism concerning the perception of utilizing historical and philosophical study for the purposes of grand projections. In 1957, Karl Popper spoke of Historicism as "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim." These predictions were based on supposedly "discovering the 'rhythms'

[75] Paul Hamilton, *Historicism (2nd Edition)*, (Routledge, 2003), 2, eBook,
[76] Hamilton, *Historicism* 3.
[77] Gina Hens-Piazza, *The New Historicism*, (Fortress Press, 2002), 6-7.
[78] Hens-Piazza, *The New Historicism*, 24.

or the 'patterns', the 'laws', or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history."[79] To this prediction interpretation, this thesis does not propose to predict or extrapolate ultimate evolutions within German society based on historical patterns. Much to the contrary, the goal of this work is to ascertain the importance and ramifications of historical events within their time, to illustrate the consequence and importance the history of a people may hold within current events. Historical events, actors and outcomes certainly have ramifications within a society or nation and therefore have a place within any form of current event or policy analysis. The role of the historical perspective is to inform based on research and understanding of past events, not to postulate a continuous trend or grand narrative.

Generally, most intellectual historians would accept, to varying degrees, the statement of Gordon that "for any given idea we can only understand the meaning of that idea if we reconstruct the unique sphere of meaning to which it once belonged."[80] The degree to which this is true, or necessary, however, most likely exists between two guiding ideals. Are we to think that a period of study and its ideas are to be completely isolated merely to that time, or do we see the ideas as a linear movement through time associated with those before and after the period of study? Seemingly, what is required is an understanding of both entrenched positions, with an appreciation for balance in practice. For if the practice of the ideal of movement is followed too heavily, according to Gordon, "we may lose any sense for the condition forces that help to explain why an idea is not merely invariant." If we overly apply the "idea of containment without

[79] Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 19, iBook.
[80] Peter E. Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas," in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 32.

restraint", he states, the study may result in "imagining a context as self-stabilizing unity inside of which there is no history whatsoever."[81] Yes, history looks in context to the time of study, but worldview analysis does not negate this important method, because one can still apply the historical method to each individual time, space, society, what have you, but with a slight eye to the movement, to understand what thought or concept informed the next era, or society.

Contextualism, according to Gordon, "need not imply the exhaustion of an idea."[82] This understanding, or appreciation for moderation between theories, breaks down potentially harmful barriers, much in the way an interdisciplinary approach can aid in a field of research. The contextualist imperative has made great advancements in the field of intellectual history by making it more aware of its own methods. At the same time, however, it has sometimes distanced the field from philosophy, political theory, and other critical approaches.[83] In the words of Jens Hacke of the *Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung*, "'intellectual history' or the 'history of ideas' are concepts that cover a wide range of methods and approaches." He suggests it is unnecessary to draw sharp distinctions between text focused intellectual history and approaches that emphasize biography. The historian should seek to "attend to both – the context and quality of ideas on the one hand, and their historical, political and sociological relevance on the other hand."[84]

[81] Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism",35.
[82] Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism", 51.
[83] Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism", 52.
[84] "Forum, The Intellectual History of the Federal Republic," *German History* 27, No.2: 257.

Based on the advancement of intellectual history, this thesis will utilize the full range of tools available to the discipline thanks to its interdisciplinary nature and the development of closely related sub-disciplines including social history and cultural history. Of course, the main priority is to provide a sound historical study based on solid research and arguments resulting from primary sources and bolstered by the valued insights of secondary sources.

Chapter Outline

This thesis will comprise six chapters. The first chapter will survey the field of worldview as a form of analysis. The following chapters will describe a German worldview responsible for the formation and development of the German State in the 18th and 19th Century. The unification of Germany in 1871 was not merely a political milestone, it was the culmination of centuries of philosophical, cultural, and societal events and aspirations. This thesis traces the development of the German nation-state through the lens of worldview, revealing how repeated calls for unity and identity coalesced into a realized polity. These aspirations, expressed through intellectual movements and cultural narratives, laid the groundwork for both the triumphs and tensions that would shape Germany's path into the 20th century.

The first chapter, focusing on worldview analysis as a branch of study, will first present an extensive review of the literature and use of the worldview concept as a tool for analysis. The components used to explore various worldviews will be highlighted from studies that employ worldview analysis in numerous academic fields. The second

section of this chapter will further explicate the components used to describe a German worldview.

The second chapter will present the first component – German Intellectualism: German Idealism and German Liberalism. It will begin with an examination of the impact of German Idealism in the formation of a German worldview. This will focus on the writings and oratory of the German intellectuals, artists and philosophers of the 18th and early 19th century that helped progress, or possibly codified, the concept of the *Volk*. During a period when a people without a unified nation-state sought answers, the scholars of German Idealism philosophized on what united the people, and how their evolution should, or would, unfold. The intellectual forces of the Enlightenment and Romanticism that emerged and took hold during this time period resulted in climactic political repercussions across the European continent. Within the loosely defined body of the German people, however, these theoretical forces had unique practical expressions and ultimately represented the defining influence of unification, laying the groundwork for a German worldview. This chapter will focus on a time period spanning the 18th and 19th century and culminating with the German unification in 1871. Attention will also be devoted to the particular role and evolution of German liberalism as it began to take shape and the role it played in the development of the nation-state and a German worldview. This includes a section engaging with the modern German scholarship in which liberalism's role is situated within broader historiographical debates about Germany's national development. The primary resource of this section will be the writings of the German philosophers and politicians of the time, as well as the aid of secondary sources.

The third chapter will focus on a second component – the concept of the human (ontology). This element will investigate the 18th and 19th centuries beginning before the German people were a unified nation-state. It will trace how this period, and the culmination of efforts to achieve a unification of the German people through political calculations in 1871, shaped emerging German conceptions of the human. An examination of the institutions and designs of the state which they envisioned and strove for will reveal a German concept of the human, and the rights, values, and expressions accorded to the human within society. It is through the structure and operation of a society and the inherent consent of an electorate that we can see the realization of the philosophical nature of the ontological element. How do the highest of intellectual beliefs concerning the nature of what it is to be human and the sanctity of life translate in the design and regulation, or enforcement, of a functioning society? The political and historical heritage of philosophical and ideological forces and German unification all served to give shape to and influence a particular concept of the human and hence a German worldview. This chapter will focus primarily on the major events spanning the 18th and 19th centuries in German states and ultimately the German nation-state. Primary sources including government documents, personal memos, and speeches, as well as secondary sources as analysis will be utilized.

The fourth chapter will focus on a third component – the German mythos of the *Volk* as self-identification – and investigate the degree to which it shaped, or shapes, a German worldview. As previously mentioned, the concept of a German people was a driving force of both self-identification of the people and as a collective community. This chapter also historicizes the concept of the *Volk*, tracing how its meaning evolved over

time and how it came to reflect contested boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the German national identity. In what form did this narrative transmit amongst the people, and what ideas did it prioritize? How do these ideas transmit and reach an audience? The focus of the first section of the chapter will primarily be the influences and power of the German myth from the 18th and 19th century. Both primary sources, including writings, speeches and secondary sources from previous researchers will be utilized.

The fifth chapter will explore the fourth component – the spiritual and religious nature of the German people – to ascertain to what degree these give shape to and influence a German worldview. Religion and spirituality encompass, among other things, ultimate or existential questions such as the meaning of life, the moral justifications of right and wrong, or belief in a higher power. It is historically certain that German Christianity was a major tenet of the *Volk*, and therefore a German worldview. The roles of the two major Churches, Catholic and Protestant, through shifting societal forces firmly entrenched themselves in German society during the 19th century and their political activity during the unification period remained consequential. This chapter will examine this worldview element as ingrained through state functions during the 18th and 19th century. Sources for this chapter include primary sources and secondary source.

The sixth chapter will conclude with a summary of the unique historical, cultural, and philosophical experience of the German people comprising the four components highlighted in this presentation of a German worldview. Greater knowledge and awareness of the central elements of a German worldview and how they influenced the formation and development of the German State will provide a beneficial perspective into

the actions of the German nation, and may elucidate a new understanding of these influences and their role in the state.

Moving Forward

The greatest challenge in describing a German worldview is the sheer breadth of the subject. This would be true for any national historical survey of most Western nations, but of the tumultuous, impactful, and dare we say dramatic histories of European nations, Germany is perhaps unique in its experience. From its formation, Germany was a society and people yearning for a unified nation-state which resulted in a devised compromise between the autocratic power and the verging liberal aspirations. The most immediate challenge from this breadth is the viability in terms of capacity of this study. This problem is effectively managed much in the same way many of the studies that will be presented in the next chapter have dealt with their areas of research, by refining the scope via the research question, parameters of study, and the analysis framework, so as to best facilitate sound research.

Next, the great challenge that remains is trying to analyze individual and contextualized periods of historical study, to ask if any degree of continuity exists. The question of continuity within German history is not a new area of discussion. Continuity from the historical view, according to Kershaw, "clearly implies something beyond the mere chronological progression of events in a time continuum." It in fact goes deeper to suggest, in his words, "explanation and causality."[85] The search for such an explanation

[85] Ian Kershaw, "1933: Continuity or Break in German History," *History Today*, (January 1983): 13.

or element of a society's development does not suggest the existence of one sole or all encompassing "single thread of continuity." Continuity, as explained by Ian Kershaw, is "the historian's abbreviation for the persistence, survival, or retention of the dominant strains and features of a social and political system."[86] Post WWII, for example, great resources and attention has been paid to the precursors of Nazism in Germany to try to explain the horrors and abuses which occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. The existence of National Socialism and the actions of Adolf Hitler, and the subsequent total defeat of the nation, however, appears to stand as a total schism in continuity.

The daunting scope and troublesome barriers should not deter investigation. It should highlight the importance of continual evaluation and denote the necessity of new approaches in addressing this persistently important nation in world affairs and the role intellectual history, and a German worldview, played. It also denotes the importance of establishing a firm understanding of the period assigned to this research thesis. For future potential study, following the focus of this thesis, the actions and effects of the Allied powers, and the new Western German government, both in design and operation, can be addressed to determine if a complete separation from Germany's past did indeed occur. Further complications include the consideration of the East German State, under foreign direction, and the next potential schism point for examination, German re-unification. This era was also a time of greater European integration, again by design in efforts of economic and societal reconstruction, but most importantly, assured protections for the Western nations against the military threat of ideological perversions experienced in the past.

[86] Kershaw, "1933:", 14.

Fueling the academic appeal to continually address this challenge, in *A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany*[87], Jurgen Habermas presents an intriguing perspective concerning the break between old and new German cultural and intellectual lineage. He believes that in post WWII Germany in the West, his postwar generation was the first to distance itself from elitist intellectual traditions that had long shaped German academic life. This break was attributed to the direct contact with the "Anglo-American spirit."[88] In Habermas's view of German history, German philosophy and this break in continuity of the German identity allowed Germans to reject fascism decisively "without an equally radical break with the German cultural tradition: that is, without a radical break with our own cultural identity."[89]

[87] Jurgen Habermas, *A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany*, trans: Steven Rendall, (University of Nebraska Press, 1997).
[88] Habermas, *A Berlin Republic*, 90.
[89] Habermas, *A Berlin Republic*, 103.

Chapter 1:

Worldview Analysis as a Branch of Study

The term worldview has a long and varied history. As has been stated, the word is readily available in our lexicon and can appear frequently in everyday conversations, ranging from personal statements to repeated reference in professional political commentary. Sometimes the term is used to denote a general consensus of a society. It can refer to how individuals or groups view themselves, or how outside societies or cultures view them. It has also been used to denote specific facets of society, including history, culture, and so on. In a more political realm, a worldview can be attached to a political group, or leading political figures, to ascribe a certain political disposition to said person or group. "Contemporary American politics is about worldview,"[90] says philosopher, linguist, and political analyst, George Lakoff. Lakoff argues that worldviews structure political reasoning, shaping how conservatives and liberals each make sense of issues within their own internal logic.[91] Today many political or policy publications present the term worldview in a title, referring quite literally to the political perspective of a nation, government or politician. This form of presentation often lacks qualification or methodological grounding to support the use of the term. The use of the term by political journalists, correspondents and pundits does not seem to routinely involve or require formulaic research, rather the ultimate determination of one's worldview relies almost primarily on, for example, a journalist's professional observations of a subject's actions or statements. What follows from this form of critical or observational inquiry is

[90] George Lakoff, Moral Politics, "What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don't," (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1.
[91] Lakoff, "What Conservatives Know", 28.

undoubtedly a simplified form of worldview, what can be referred to as worldview-lite. This label does not imply a derogatory identifier, in fact its repeated use works to establish the word in our everyday lives and creates additional opportunities to ground and further its application in scholarly research.

A survey of academic fields provides valuable insight into the potential benefits of the term's usage. This once novel application of academic study has developed sporadically and incorporated new facets concerning research design and methods to better illustrate its effectiveness. In fact, the growing recognition of the term has also led to the growth of more casual applications in which some studies simply present the word to mean one's political or religious beliefs or entrenched positions concerning geo-politics, without delving deeper into the influences or connections of those beliefs.

As this thesis strives to provide a sound and research-based analysis, this chapter will first seek to further illustrate how the term worldview has been used in various interdisciplinary fields as an increasingly applied method of analysis. Through the examples offered, the chapter will indicate which elements, or new approaches may be helpful, or alternatively noticeable areas that may require further refinement. Following this review, the chapter will next present the elements of the worldview framework to be utilized in this study.

Historical and Philosophical Analysis of the Use of the Concept Worldview

The increasing use of the word worldview whether in general conversation, or in the professional presentations that have been identified as worldview-lite, helps to

increase the recognition of the term, but such a prevalence of the word in modern vernacular may be responsible for the corresponding effect of obscuring the intent of the user. Without a clear definition and intended use, the term worldview used in a general manner, though still useful, acts mostly to communicate broad positions and oversimplifications. This section will instead focus on the term worldview as it is used in more detail in various fields of research and scholarly inquiry.

As a review of the modern era beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, some of the most prevalent uses of the term worldview as an analytical tool can be found in the field of psychology. Psychologist Mark E. Koltko-Rivera defines worldviews as "sets of beliefs and assumptions that describe reality. A given worldview encompasses assumptions about a heterogeneous variety of topics, including human nature, the meaning and nature of life, and the composition of the universe itself, to name a few issues."[92] In broad reference to the field of psychology, the significant ramification is the recognition of worldview as a phenomenon to study, and an applicable tool for social research, especially wide recognition from within the social sciences. Closely related, Rachel M. Goldberg, defines the term as it has been employed in the field of conflict resolution, as "the cognitive, ethical, and perceptual frames of an individual."[93]

This review will begin with an early contribution of this modern era, one that would have long reaching influence in its specific field and beyond. Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn, an anthropologist, "provided an intricate model of the worldview construct

[92] Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, "The Psychology of Worldviews," *Review of General Psychology* 8, No.1, (2004): 3.
[93] Rachel M. Goldberg, "How Our Worldviews Shape Our Practice," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 26, No.4 (Summer 2009): 405, https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.241.

that has had influence on contemporary thought and research in this area."[94] In 1961, Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck's *Variations in Value Orientations*[95] focused on how societies and subgroups differ in their fundamental value orientations.[96] From this the authors refine their purview of inquiry by making basic assumptions concerning the small number of universal human challenges that all societies confront, resulting in a universal aspect of value orientations. The five problems which reveal this framework are presented as fundamental across cultures. From the total range of resulting variations, five orientations next deemed plausible and necessary to begin their study are: Human Nature Orientation, Man-Nature (Supernature) Orientation, Time Orientation, Activity Orientation, and Relational Orientation.[97] From these assumptions the orientations theory is tested against five communities for their study. This study the Variations in Value Orientations presents the framing of cultural patterns as structured systems, including "'systems of meaning,' 'unconscious canons of choice,' integrative themes,' 'ethos' or 'configurations'." Next, it states that every society exhibits a consistent, ordered variation in how it approaches core human challenges. These value orientations are defined as deeply embedded principles that shape human behavior.[98] Kluckhohn's approach, in what has subsequently been accepted as the field of worldview analysis, is one of the most articulated theories presented in the mid-to-late twentieth century. The model has been critiqued, however, for omitting key dimensions such as epistemology, ontology, and life-meaning. Despite critiques, scholars agree that the dimensions included remain

[94] Koltko-Rivera, "The Psychology of Worldviews," 10
[95] Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations*, (Row, Peterson and Company, 1961).
[96] Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations*, 3.
[97] Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations,* 11-17.
[98] Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations,* 340-341.

central to the presentation of worldview analysis.[99] Kluckhohn's definition introduces the precedent to focus on a whole society, but within the same study, isolates certain subgroups or individuals as representatives of the culture of that society. As introduced in the previous chapter, culture is one of the contributing research areas for this thesis. The identification and research of historically impactful individual actions and sub-groups as indicative of the larger society, or nation, will be a primary concept in the design of this thesis. Further, the general recognition for the use of a framework, or value orientations, is significant in the development of this field, but the subsequent criticism which highlights dimensions omitted from the assumptions of basic human experience is equally as valuable.

James W. Sire states that the intent in his book, *The Universe Next Door*: *"A Basic World View Catalog"*[100], was to "outline the basic world views that underlie the way we in the Western world think about ourselves, other people, the natural world and God or ultimate reality."[101] He defines a "world view" as a "set of presuppositions (or assumptions) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously) about the basic makeup of our world."[102] His framework includes existential questions about morality, death, and human history, which he uses to categorize major worldviews such as theism, deism, naturalism, and postmodernism.[103] Simply by making the decision to explicitly search for our answers to these questions, or equally choosing not to, we inherently adopt a worldview. Sire then identifies the answers to these questions, or elements, to the major

[99] Koltko-Rivera, "The Psychology of Worldviews," 13.
[100] James W. Sire, *The Universe Next Door*, "*A Basic World View Catalog*", (InterVarsity Press, 1976).
[101] Sire, *The Universe Next Door*, 15.
[102] Sire, *The Universe Next Door*, 17.
[103] Sire, *The Universe Next Door*, 18-19.

worldviews which he outlines in his chapters: Christian theism, deism, naturalism, nihilism, existentialism, pantheistic monism, the new age and postmodernism. Of note, these major worldviews are identified as existing and necessary for the study by the author himself, arguably based on centuries of ultimate and existential questions which have engaged philosophers. In *Naming the Elephant*[104], Sire presents a cultural analysis of the worldviews of others, and that of other nationals. This points to the distinction between analyzing an individual's worldview and examining broader cultural patterns shared by large populations over a period of time.[105] The first part of Sire's intent stands as an example to identify influential forces and is a valuable predicate. Of even greater importance is the continued declaration that carries through in his definition: that these worldviews underlie and influence how we think about ourselves and our reality, therefore noting the possible unconscious nature of the effect of worldviews on an individual. It was Sire's subsequent jump which presents the example to this thesis as moving from an analysis of an individual's worldview as a specific endeavour, to that of a broader enterprise of cultural analysis looking at various philosophical positions from numerous conditions. This thesis will indeed seek to identify the actions of individuals and large numbers of people across time and space to potentially allude to a "cultural analysis" or more specifically, national analysis, isolating and connecting the influences through the assistance of this term, worldview.

Advancing the tool of worldview analysis into the field of policy analysis or evaluation, David M. Buss and Kenneth H. Craik presented "Contemporary Worldviews:

[104] James W. Sire, *Naming the Elephant*, "Worldview as a Concept", (IVP Academic, 2004).
[105] Sire, *Naming the Elephant*, 153.

Personal and Policy Implications"[106] in 1983. Originally intended as an analysis of positions on energy policy issues, they broadened their scope to "the measurement of sociotechnological orientations" using presupposed worldview beliefs as their analysis tool.[107] From the designated goal, to "develop reliable measures of worldviews that embody distinctive perspectives on world responsibility, economic growth, regulation, decentralization, societal goals and decision making," the findings demonstrated that contemporary worldviews can be meaningfully conceptualized and empirically measured.[108] The inherent benefit of a recognized work in the field of Social Psychology specifically stating the influence of worldview, or worldviews, on international, national economic and societal policy issues is a foundational step. Buss and Craik recognized the influence of this term, worldview, on the decision making of presumably national electorates and thereby governments. This provides formative substantiation in support of the potential influence of worldview in the study of social sciences and specifically in current policy analysis. As the presupposed worldviews put forth have been presented as holding a potential degree of influence on a society, government and policy, one could infer that the reciprocal nature of this position would allow for historical research of government actions and policies to stand as evidence or indicators alluding to the influence of a possible worldview on that society.

That same year from the field of religious analysis Ninian Smart, in *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations of Human Beliefs,*[109] Smart argued that English lacks a single

[106] David M. Buss and Kenneth H. Craik, "Contemporary Worldviews: Personal and Policy Implications," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 13, 3, (1983), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1983.tb01739.x.
[107] Buss and Craik, "Contemporary Worldviews:" 261.
[108] Buss and Craik, "Contemporary Worldviews:" 276.
[109] Ninian Smart, *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations of Human Beliefs,* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983).

term that captures both traditional religious and secular ideologies. He presented that perhaps the most useful term is worldviews, and specifically includes "secular ideologies."[110] Smart understands "worldview analysis" as the attempt to 'describe and understand human worldviews."[111] As a starting point to this form of analysis, Smart devised a model of six dimensions, which he felt formed a "rounded picture of a religion": Doctrinal, Mythic, Ethical, Ritual, Experimental, and Social.[112] Smart believed the six dimensional model helped scholars understand a tradition at a specific historical moment. Comparing specific moments presents a "synchronic" picture. Trying to accurately isolate, or 'contextualize', something such as religion in a specific point of time in a society is a difficult venture, yet the results can be revealing. Historians, for example, examine how contemporary religious structures emerge from complex historical interactions.[113] Smart highlights the potential benefit and reach of the term worldview. His worldview analysis goes beyond the mere listing of beliefs. It attempts to enter the world of religion from the viewpoint of believers and he advocated using multiple research methods rather than relying on a single discipline.[114] This account points to the strength of Smart's work, specifically that of presenting worldview as a better approach to research and presentation than that of a singular field of study, even his own of religion, which limited the scope. Smart connects and compares separate holdings of faith or lack thereof, based on culture, or otherwise. The recognition of the strength of worldview as benefiting from polymethodic, or as this thesis presents, interdisciplinary

[110] Smart, *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations,* 1-2.
[111] Smart, *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations,* 4.
[112] Smart, *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations,* 7-8.
[113] Smart, *Worldviews*, *Crosscultural Explorations*, 27-28.
[114] Stephen Ainlay, "Reviewed Work(s): Worldviews: Crosscultural Explorations of Human Beliefs by Ninian Smart", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 23, No.4 (Dec.1984): 427, EBSCOhost.

studies, has been widely recognized as a primary benefit of the term. The contribution to the field and the strength of Smart's work highlighted in this thesis does not, however, position it as a total adoption of his approach. Numerous critiques argue that Smart overlooks significant empirical research in the modern study of religion. The ability to widen perception of forces or connected influences thanks to the gaze of this polymethodic or interdisciplinary study, should not permit diminished adherence to, or recognition of, sound foundational research from any of the individual fields utilized. Whereas Smart's approach may at times appear lacking in empirical or qualitative justification for his stated dimensions, this thesis does not purport to summarily assign or present a limited number of existing worldviews. Instead, the chosen elements of study, potentially comprising a German worldview, will be historically accurate and qualitatively presented in the chapters of this thesis as verifiably important entities or contemporary factors in the unification of a German nation-state. These elements, therefore, and their strength as elements of the proposed worldview framework, will rest on the presentation of analysis guided by historical facts and proven research. Smart's conceptual approach and recognition of the term's usefulness then, remains the most important example as "his attempts to look into the structure of worldviews from within a variety of cross cultural perspectives are lucid (while, at times, frustratingly scant) and for each dimension, he weaves together illustrative materials and theoretical insights."[115]

From the field of psychology and risk assessment, a work that would act as an important step to future studies spanning numerous fields, Karl Dake's "Orienting

[115] Ainlay, Reviewed Work(s):" 428.

Dispositions in the Perception of Risk"[116] states that, "an understanding of who fears what and why requires serious attention to the political, historical, and social context in which risks are framed and debated." This understanding, from these stated fields, further asserts, according to Dake, that "mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual cognition, but also correspond to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding society, its functioning, and its potential fate."[117] This reveals a recurring pattern emerging in which individual results concerning potential influences of a worldview, can be extrapolated and in fact most likely represent that of the greater society.

The following year, in "Myth of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk", Dake argues that although it is obvious that "individuals perceive risks and have concerns", it is in fact the "culture that provides socially constructed myths about nature – systems of beliefs that are reshaped and internalized by persons, becoming part of their worldview."[118] This conceptual point will be of key importance to this thesis and the designation of a core component of a German worldview, that being the mythos of the German people and how it would be internalized, abused, and the ramifications within a specific period of social construction. Dake argues that cultural theory accounts for the social construction of risk in terms of three linked domains that constitute a way of life: "cultural biases, social relations, and behavioral strategies."[119] Dake proposes five

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[116] Karl Dake, "Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk, An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 22, No.1, (March 1991), https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022191221006.
[117] Dake, "Orienting Dispositions", 62.
[118] Karl Dake, "Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk", *Journal of Social Issues* 48, No.4, (1992): 21, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1992.tb01943.x.
[119] Dake, "Myths of Nature", 28.

cultural patterns as part of his theory: Hierarchically arranged groups, Egalitarian groups, Individualists, Cultures of Fatalism, and the fifth cultural pattern, Autonomy.[120] Empirical findings support the predictions of this cultural theory, for example, people with egalitarian worldviews tend to see technological risks as more severe.[121] The key conclusion from Dake, especially for the purpose of this study and review of the literature, is that "worldviews provide powerful cultural lenses, magnifying one danger, obscuring another threat, selecting others for minimal attention or even disregard."[122] These lenses would be specific to the cultural group based on the specific history and context of the people, which would in turn demand a refinement of scope to those sharing the same conditions. The assertion of Dake's work, that the study of what people fear or perceive as risk, requires attention and specifically research into said peoples' political, historical and social context is directly impactful in the design and method of this thesis. The current policy decisions and the decision-making process of a specific group of people today, for example the people of Germany, demands an account of the political, historical and social context be taken into account. One key difference between the work of Dake, or perhaps a level of analysis that this thesis will not engage with, is that this thesis does not attempt to predict future perceptions. Instead, this worldview context or lens, will provide a better understanding of what previous events, intellectual influences, or cultural and social constructs may be affecting current actions.

Few topics in Western thought have been "subjected to as much investigation, speculation, analysis and theoretical scrutiny as the phenomenon of race", begins Audrey

[120] Dake, "Myths of Nature", 29-30.
[121] Dake, "Myths of Nature", 30.
[122] Dake, "Myths of Nature", 35.

Smedley in *Race in North America*: *Origin and Evolution of a Worldview*[123]. Smedley set out to use the term worldview to address this topic and defines her tool as "a culturally structured, systematic way of looking at, perceiving, and interpreting various world realities, a society's 'weltanschauung'."[124] Smedley argues that race is itself a worldview "composed of specific ideological components." It is one that in many countries and areas of the world divides people into distinct groups. Smedley's use of the term worldview "depicts the deep seated nature of this essentially folk vision of the human species and the often unconscious processes of perception or imagery that it generates."[125] The author emphasizes that racial worldview, like most, is a "dynamic one", and subject to varying degrees of intensity and change.[126] The specific scope or framing for this research is defined by Smedley as beginning in a timeframe of the early nineteenth century. Moving forward within this scope of inquiry, five core ideological components that historically structured racial thinking would be isolated, and when presented together, reveal the structure of racial thinking. Those ideological ingredients, or components, are: "a universal classification of human groups as exclusive and discrete biotic entities"; the imposition of an inegalitarian ethos that required the ranking of these groups vis-a-vis one another"; "the belief that the outer physical characteristics of different human populations were but surface manifestations of inner realities"; "the notion that all of these qualities were inheritable"; and finally, "the belief that each exclusive group (race) so differentiated was created unique and distinct by nature or by

[123] Audrey Smedley, *Race in North America*: *Origin and Evolution of a Worldview*, (Westview Press, 1993), 1.
[124] Smedley, *Race in North America*, 17.
[125] Smedley, *Race in North America,* 18.
[126] Smedley, *Race in North America,* 26.

God, so that the imputed differences, believed fixed and unalterable, could never be bridged or transcended."[127] Smedley is helpful in that she focuses on a timeframe and a national context and from them highlights specific ideological elements. These ideological elements are important aspects of a worldview, one that is both influenced and recognizable through a folk culture of a people, but also one that changes and is dynamic.

Thomas S. Mowle of the United States Air Force Academy acknowledges the difficulty of directly observing a worldview, whether individual, or of a group or nation.[128] Mowle focused his approach to frame the inquiry within the scope of the research and limits his analysis to worldview elements that shape how states interpret external conflicts. Mowle's study "assumes that this partial worldview could align more or less with realism or liberalism," which seems reasonable as the focus should be on "foreign policy decision-makers." National decision makers, Mowle asserts, understand broad outlines, leading to a further framing statement that "worldviews do not spring randomly from each individual's unique experiences, but are learned through a combination of formal study and socialization with other policy makers."[129] As stated, Mowle's method "evaluates problem representations to infer a worldview that can be compared with realism and liberalism."[130] From this refining of scope and focus, a formula, framework or "criteria" emerges as "being most likely to distinguish a problem representation of an external conflict that flows from a realist worldview from one that

[127] Smedley, *Race in North America,* 26-27.
[128] Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict," *Political Psychology* 24, No. 3, (2003): 563.
[129] Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy", 563.
[130] Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy", 564.

flows from a liberal worldview." The five elements, or "criteria", are: "Concern for relative versus absolute gains accruing to different actors as a result of the external conflict", "A primary concern with one's own interest versus collective norms and interests", "Emphasis on protection of one's own state versus protection of others in an international community", "Viewing the conflict's ramifications in terms of the combatants only, versus in terms of the lessons that might be taken by others states", and "Viewing alliances and multilateral institutions as a tool for the state versus as the good of the state."[131] The research can then apply this criteria to a timeframe of its choosing, a Cold War period "1978-1994", and select nations of its choosing, "the United States as a great power, Canada as a lesser power ally of a great power, and India as a lesser power that is not an ally of a great power."[132] This design is said to offer a new approach for "assessing the worldviews that motivate the decisions of state leaders" and concludes that state behaviour ultimately reflects the perceptions of the individuals who shape policy.[133] Important observations from this research highlight the significance of refining the scope so as to allow achievable analytical outcomes. Added to this goal, however, should be the requirement of a sound and thorough analysis. Although the researcher offers mitigating reasons for the criteria and scope ultimately decided upon, the ungrounded assumptions, offering insufficient justification or argument as to ideological views of Western nations, and its leaders, is a step beyond the intent of this thesis.

[131] Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy", 568-569.
[132] Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy", 576.
[133] Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy", 585.

Obasi et al., developed the Worldview Analysis Scale (WAS) in 2009 to measure how individuals perceive, interpret, and experience the world.[134] Building upon the previous century's research in the fields of anthropology and psychology, specifically cultural psychology, they recognized that "Conceptions of worldview in psychology have also been grounded in the discipline of philosophy." They organized worldview into "five philosophical constructs: cosmology (nature of the universe), epistemology (theory of knowledge), ontology (connection of psychological facts with reality), axiology (science of values), and teleology (theory that things act for an end purpose)."[135] The WAS is a tool "based on the philosophical conceptualization of worldview", designed to "operationalize measurable dimensions of worldview associated with an African and European worldview orientation." From this base, Obasi et al., held that "Individual perceptions of these dimensions exist in the fabric of culture and are believed to influence cognition, decisions, and behaviors."[136] Their study is helpful in revealing that philosophy or intellectual forces have direct impact on a worldview. This lends considerable support to reflecting on the philosophical or intellectual forces occurring in Germany and their impact on shaping a German worldview.

Hedlund-de Wit continued to advance this notion and developed the Integrative Worldview Framework (IWF), in an effort to "support (survey) research exploring worldviews and their complex relationships to sustainable lifestyles,"[137] as he explored

[134] Ezemenari M. Obasi, Lisa Y. Flores, and Linda James-Myers, "Construction and Initial Validation of the Worldview Analysis Scale," *Journal of Black Studies* 39, No.6 (Jul.,2009): 937, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934707305411.
[135] Obasi and James-Myers, "Construction and Initial Validation", 939.
[136] Obasi and James-Myers, "Construction and Initial Validation", 939.
[137] Annick Hedlund-de Witt, "Exploring worldviews and their relationships to sustainable lifestyles: Toward a new conceptual and methodological approach," *Ecological Economics* 84, (2012): 74.

policy issues concerning the global debate on sustainable ecological development. After conducting a historical and philosophical review of the term worldview and its use in academic research, Hedlund-de Witt constructed a framework designed to systematize and operationalize the concept of worldview so that it can be measured more reliably in research. This framework consisted of five components, or "aspects", the first three of which correspond to major branches of philosophy. These aspects frequently appear across interdisciplinary studies, indicating broad scholarly agreement.[138] Those three aspects are; ontology: "the fundamental assumptions concerning the nature, constitution and structure of reality"; epistemology: "a perspective on what knowledge is and how knowledge can come about"; and axiology: "concerns ideas about what a good life looks like." The fourth aspect presented is "anthropology", referring to "assumptions about what kind of creature the human being is and what his role and purpose is in existence." The fifth and final aspect, "societal vision" demonstrates the importance of an ontological element and refers to "fundamental assumptions about how society should be organized and how societal problems should be addressed."[139] The addition of the 'societal vision' as connected specifically to the ontological element in how a society views the importance of human life, etc. and as a result influences the design and function of a society. Hedlund-de Witte is helpful in indicating the importance of identifying and connecting the climactic periods of German history, by examining the vision or will of German society through the design, function and mechanisms of the German State. It will be helpful in pointing to influences in current policy analysis.

[138] Hedlund-de Witt, "Exploring worldviews", 79.
[139] Hedlund-de Witt, "Exploring worldviews", 79.

Xui et al. further expanded the use and application of worldview analysis in a study investigating the association between cultural worldviews and climate change risk perceptions in China. They utilized Dake's cultural theory scale (CTS) to highlight "cultural worldviews" as one of three main sections of their survey. The other two were "demographics" and "climate change risk perceptions, policy preferences and mitigation behaviour."[140] They observe that most prior research focused on Western populations, leaving non-Western contexts understudied.[141] To address this "'suitability' issue", they conducted two confirmatory factor analyses amongst said Western studies and which produced a four-factor solution more "suitable for Asian samples."[142] Their research resulted in a new four-factor scale to assess cultural worldviews in Chinese samples. Building on Dake's work, the scale related to "individualism, hierarchism, egalitarianism and fatalism." The study concluded that "certain cultural worldviews were significantly associated with climate change risk perception, support for climate friendly policies and climate change mitigation behaviour." These relationships were different than "those reported in studies using Western samples."[143] The researchers indicate that cultural worldviews function differently in China compared to Western societies. The authors argue that in Western societies, individualism and hierarchy may reduce environmental risk perceptions due to resistance to regulation, whereas China's political history makes these factors less influential. This stemmed from a possible result "that individualism and hierarchism may blunt environmental risk perceptions in Western societies owing to

[140] Wen Xue, Donald W. Hine, Anthogy D.G. Marks, Wendy J. Phillips and Shouying Zhao, "Cultural worldviews and climate change: A view from China," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 19, (2016): 136, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12116.
[141] Xue, et.al., "Cultural worldviews", 135.
[142] Xue, et.al., "Cultural worldviews", 135.
[143] Xue, et.al., "Cultural worldviews", 141.

distaste for regulations (which are often perceived to impede individual freedoms)" whereas in "China, with its long history of top-down regulations and one-party rule, beliefs about individualism and hierarchy appear to be less relevant to environmental risk perceptions."[144] This specific conclusion lends support to the notion that the history of a nation may have long lasting ramifications on the intellectual interpretations of a specific people or citizenry. Of further importance is the tailoring of foundational literature and method to the national level. The issues noted by the researchers, however, concern applying previously developed frameworks or framework components to a foreign culture outside of its base literature. Xue et al. open up the possibility of defining components of a nation's possible worldview throughout a historical period of study, after firmly establishing their principal involvement or documented existence at the initial period of investigation. This provides substantial standards of suitability.

In 2018, Simone Ruane applied a worldview lens in examining the evolution of bushfire management practices in the South West of Australia.[145] Ruane organizes an Integrative Worldview Framework around seven historically grounded worldview types. They included "A traditional Western worldview", "An Aboriginal worldview", "A modern worldview", "A settler-colonial worldview", "A postmodern worldview", "A late modern worldview", and "An integrative worldview for sustainability."[146] These worldviews are identified and "distinguished by differences in epistemologies (what is truth and how is knowledge created?)", ontologies "(what is real and how did the universe come into being?)" and axiologies "(what constitutes a good life and what is

[144] Xue, et.al., "Cultural worldviews", 140.
[145] Simone Ruane, "Using a worldview lends to examine complex policy issues: a historical review of bushfire management in the South West of Australia," *Local Environment* 23, No.8, (2018): 777.
[146] Ruane, "Using a worldview", 780-782.

valuable?)."[147] By analyzing the history of bushfire management in the Southwest, Ruane concludes that "societal worldviews that dominated in particular time periods in Australia influenced both the perception of fire in the landscape and the related bushfire policy and management responses."[148] Ruane emphasizes that these categories emerge from Australia's specific historical and cultural development, because the specific history of Australia contains "distinctive historical and cultural influences of colonisation." She added the categories of the "additional Aboriginal and settler-colonial worldview categories" to the categories developed and utilized from previous studies.[149] Ruane tailored the worldview framework to the most impactful historical periods of Australia, suggesting that this might be helpful in discerning a possible worldview for other nations.

"This book is about a framework that assists in raising the questions while at the same time discovering new ones" writes John Valk in the preface of *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, "*Religion in a Modern, Secular and Democratic State*"[150]. This research project, continues Valk, is

> about *an* Islamic worldview. It is not about *the* Islamic worldview, if such indeed exists anywhere. It does not pretend to speak for Islam, only about Islam, and then only from a particular perspective in time and place.[151]

[147] Ruane, "Using a worldview", 780.
[148] Ruane, "Using a worldview", 790.
[149] Ruane, "Using a worldview", 783.
[150] John Valk, Halis Albayrak, Mualla Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, "Religion in a Modern, Secular and Democratic State," (Pelgrave Macmillan, 2017), ix.
[151] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey,* ix.

This is of key importance for also discerning a German worldview. Doing so would not seek to generalize elements of Germany, but instead specifically highlight intellectual influences identifiable through historical and philosophical actors a specific period of German history. Valk et al. gathered material from numerous workshops conducted over four years at Ankara University in its Faculty of Divinity. Workshops proceeded over numerous days in groups of seven to seventeen scholars of varying ages. In the workshops "a particular worldview framework served to guide the discussion" and notes were recorded.[152] The framework draws on multiple disciplines, including religious studies, theology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and more. It consisted of "four sub-frameworks." The "Cultural Dimensions" sub-framework aims to describe, rather than prescribe, how individuals or groups respond to cultural influences.[153] The Ultimate/Existential Questions sub-framework is a philosophical exploration of some of "life's ultimate or existential questions."[154] The "Ontology" sub-framework, "largely philosophical in nature", explores the nature of being, including that of theo human.[155] The "Epistemology" sub-framework "concerns itself with the nature of our knowing."[156] The Universal/Particular sub-framework focuses "beliefs and values held in common by most if not all people", yet expressed differently in particular situations.[157] The framework is a foundational model from which to emulate for this thesis while tailored to the field of research and requirements of this project. Whereas the framework data is gathered through systematic discussion observations, this thesis will research the

[152] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey,* x.
[153] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, 17.
[154] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, 20.
[155] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, 23.
[156] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, 25.
[157] Valk, Albayrak and Selcuk, *An Islamic Worldview from Turkey*, 27.

specified components of its framework through historical, philosophical, and other interdisciplinary research methods. The framework will be applied as a tool to connect these components and their influences within the term worldview. This provides a wider gaze to help identify new perspectives and possibly reveal new questions, within the subject of study.

In *Boundless Dominion*, "Providence, Politics, and the Early Canadian Presbyterian Worldview,"[158] Denis Mckim states,

> The Presbyterians' worldview invigorated a divided, diffuse denomination, and imbued them with a compelling synthesis of distinctiveness, duty, and destiny. Illuminating this worldview's characteristics is the objective of *Boundless Dominion*, a thematic intellectual history of early Canadian Presbyterianism.[159]

This historical work focused on the provinces with the largest nineteenth-century Presbyterian populations: Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia (including Cape Breton which was its own British North American colony between 1784 and 1820), New Brunswick, Lower Canada/Canada East/Quebec, and Upper Canada/Canada West/Ontario.[160] McKim also notes that these provinces differed significantly from one another in culture and development "both before and after Confederation." Yet he found many commonalities between the early Presbyterians of these different provinces, particularly "when it came to the realm of ideas."[161] "The arguments articulated in

[158] Denis McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, "Providence, Politics, and the Early Canadian Presbyterian Worldviews," (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017.)
[159] McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, 5.
[160] McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, 6.
[161] McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, 7.

Boundless Dominion spring from the conviction that ideas matter", declares the author. Though not oblivious to the "importance of such non-ideological factors as demography and environmental change," McKim argues that "intellectual abstractions are, or at least can be, consequential historical phenomena."[162] McKim draws on the intellectual fields, in addition to exploring themes such as providence, politics, nature and history, to map out a Presbyterian worldview.[163] McKim's approach is helpful in discerning a German worldview by focusing on a number of elements within a specific geographical region. The refinement of a geographic area based on a connecting theme, specifically that of a shared idea or intellectual theory, is certainly an important foundation to this thesis. This thesis will similarly introduce the German people to be a loosely united society in a geographic sense, but identifiable prior to political classification through the commonalities of cultural ideas and shared goals. This thesis, likewise, will explore the connecting intellectual forces of a specific group of people during a set period of history. Whereas in this specific example, the connecting idea or worldview is a strong Presbyterian belief set connecting the populations of defined provinces during the early Canadian period, this thesis's defined scope will be an equally identifiable intellectual force, or forces, influencing the event of, and exhibited following, the unification of the German nation in a unified state.

[162] McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, 14.
[163] McKim, *Boundless Dominion*, 23.

Conflict and the Formation of Worldviews: Insights from a German Development of the Term

The work of Elena Paola Alessiato, in "What is a Worldview? Some Suggestions from the History of the Concept"[164], has recently emphasized the distinctly German intellectual genealogy and the conceptual depth that emerged, beginning with the formative works of Kant, further developed by Hegel and the progression of Wilhelm Dilthey later in the nineteenth century, as presented in the introductory chapter. The end of the nineteenth century is pointed to as the period in which the term in the German speaking world "reached a crescendo of popularity." Due to this prevalence, many German thinkers "felt the need to address the meaning of a worldview."[165] Alessiato situates Dilthey within a broader group of German thinkers, including Edmund Husserl, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel, Paul Natorp, Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. In the early twentieth century, these thinkers would seek to clarify the use of worldview as a concept. The major works of this time reveal a shared recognition that worldviews are composite, existential, historically conditioned, and inherently conflictual.[166]

On the question of truth of consciousness, Jaspers argues that if objective truth always aligned with personal, existential truth, then human beings would experience no inner conflict. Yet, as history repeatedly demonstrates, this is not the human experience. As he notes, "if knowledge of this universally valid truth always also had beneficial consequences in existence, there would be no division, and thus no possible conflict,

[164] Elena Paola Carola Alessiato, "What Is a Worldview? Some Suggestions from the History of the Concept," *Negotiation Journal* 38, no. 3 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12404
[165] Alessiato, 399.
[166] Alessiato, 399-400.

between the truth of existence and the truth of universally valid knowledge."[167] Instead, individuals often resist objective truth when it threatens their self-understanding or worldview. It is this conflictual dynamic that Alessiato highlights as the paradox of worldviews, the stronger the worldview becomes, the more likely it is to encounter competing interpretations and seek to defend against them. Jaspers argues that existence often conceals or suppresses objective truth when it threatens self-understanding. From this threat of eventual conflict, individuals become aware of the plurality of possible meanings of truth and are forced to confront the possibilities of weaknesses in their own assumptions. This confrontation with objective truth can destabilize worldviews or individual identity perceptions and is why worldviews become conflict prone.[168]

In Towards the Definition of Philosophy[169], Martin Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures delivered in 1919 are presented as another point in the development of worldview as a concept, during a time after the peak popularity of worldview in German society in the late nineteenth century, as noted by Alessiato. By this time, the term and its popularity had become so widespread in use that it reached a level of triviality. Heidegger distinguishes between two dominant interpretations, one that treats philosophy as culminating in a worldview, treating philosophy as the construction of a comprehensive metaphysical system, and another shaped by Kantian critical philosophy, that regards worldview as the limit of philosophical inquiry, as this stance insists that philosophy as a critical science cannot itself produce a worldview because it requires a personal stance

[167] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Richard F. Grabau (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), Kindle, 41.
[168] Jaspers, 42.
[169] Martin, Heidegger, and Ted Sadler. *Towards the Definition of Philosophy.* (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2008). https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5309474.

that scientific method must exclude.[170] Heidegger identifies then that philosophy appears both connected to and incompatible with worldview. This tension leads him to reframe the argument that the problem of worldview ultimately forces philosophy to interrogate its own nature.

Georg Simmel pointed to this modern understanding of worldview through his analysis of the deep structural tensions that characterize modern life. In "Kant and Goethe: On the History of the Modern Weltanschauung"[171], Simmel argues that modernity is defined by a dualism between subject and object, nature and spirit, individual freedom and social constraint and mechanistic science and the realm of meaning. He states that within this modern development, "humans are fundamentally dualistic beings: that separation and opposition represent the basic form through which they comprehend constituents of their world."[172] Simmel presents worldview as arising from this fragmentation, assigning a form of order to what modern life has fractured. He presents both the cognitive structures used by individuals to interpret their experience and the role of nature distinct from the structures of modern man. Simmel then, positions worldview as a cultural and philosophical response to the lived tensions, or conflicts, of modernity.

In the context of this thesis, the political, ideological, religious, and cultural conflicts which are present and abundant in the period of study are practical examples of a developing worldview. Equally, the development and adopted identification of a

[170] Heidegger and Sadler, 8-10.
[171] Georg, Simmel, "Kant and Goethe: On the History of the Modern Weltanschauung." *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 6 (2007): https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407078717.
[172] Simmel, 159-160.

German worldview, through the development of a German polity and ultimately a unified nation-state, could inherently entail that a German worldview would become a point of conflict with other identities and competing claims to truth. The identification of a need to manifest worldviews through historical development is reinforced by Alessiato who notes that, "the more individuals identify themselves within the content of a worldview, the stronger is their attachment to such content." This then highlights the need of frameworks that provide "an order of meaning and a set of beliefs."[173] This insight is particularly relevant to the present study, which examines how historical events, developing and competing ideological forces, political tensions, and divergent religious visions contributed to the development of a German worldview leading up to the unification of the German State in 1871.

Insights Gathered from Preceding Worldview Analysis Research Projects

A number of important observations can be made from the above studies utilizing the term worldview as an analysis tool that are helpful in discerning a German worldview.

First, it is important to clearly define the area of study and its scope in order to make sound conclusions possible. In any worldview study an unbounded scope can become too daunting; too many elements make it difficult to form conclusions. The term worldview can be applied to an almost limitless extent, from a very specific to a broad, wide-ranging area. It is vital therefore to define specifically the area of research involving

[173] Alessiato, 402.

worldview. Who or what will be studied and for what intent, and what information or outcome is sought through this specific branch of research must be clearly understood. While it has been argued that everyone has a worldview, such a generality can make it difficult to draw specific conclusions. As the preceding studies have highlighted, whether dealing with potentially universal issues such as race, religion, environmental matters and more, the scope of the research should be refined within specified criteria. This can be a regional or national focus for instance. A review of the literature from this developing field, highlights that some of the earliest examples indicated a predilection to be applied to a study on a large group or sample size, eventually being explicitly identified as representative of a culture, a society, and yes, a nation. Many of the works cited describe the ability to identify examples of an individual's worldview, or that of a sub-group and extrapolate through numerous examples the larger worldview of the society that these smaller examples represent. This form of analysis, or more specifically the insight this analysis reveals, has been increasingly applied to regional and national issues, such as climate change, natural disasters, race relations, and more. Perhaps, a national focus inherently evolves from the increasing tendency of the worldview term applied in the fields of policy, societal and cross cultural studies, offering revealing glimpses into these areas, while also presenting new questions to ask. From risk assessment to national strategy issue areas, to international policy analysis isolating the tendencies of a nation offering insight as to internal beliefs influenced by a worldview, or in comparison to other international views, there exists an evident precedent of research projects refining the scope to a societal or national level.

Second, multiple projects further support the use of a framework to assist in the identification of a worldview and the subsequent use of that conceivable worldview in the field of analysis. Specific elements or components become fundamental to the worldview in question, and most sound, when supported by strong evidence. A framework structure is best constructed, therefore, on the research and supporting evidence available from the engaged fields utilized, most often representing the reach of multiple disciplines which the term worldview helps to encapsulate. The worldview presented in this form of analysis is thus defendable as evidence based, rather than completely subjective observations. The degree as to the soundness of this evidence obviously varies and is debatable throughout the evolution of this field of research, but through the adoption of a framework the work can distinguish itself from commentary to the academic world as it can be judged and stands on the strength of the evidence and merit of the argument presented.

Finally, the addition of the philosophical and cultural fields denotes the importance of ideas and intellectual concepts to worldview analysis. This can also be viewed as a consistent element as the initial use of the term began within the field of philosophy and intellectual endeavors. Throughout the progression of these modern studies, a recognizable advancement to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative influences resulted. Further, as many of the definitions of the term worldview presented involved an individual or groups qualitative senses, the resulting studies incorporated wide ranging evidence of intellectual expressions.

Framework Components Explained

Both consistent strengths and potential gaps from the works reviewed above lead to a better grasp of how to best present a sound argument concerning a worldview and its structure. From the above, a worldview analysis with a national level focus, specifically that of the nation-state, is warranted. Historical elements selected from within this scope, such as the events leading to and during the unification of the German State in 1871, makes sense. An interdisciplinary historical research method to identify and comprehend how historical events and intellectual forces impact our world adds to the study. Isolating historically proven components as present or contributing to the historical event of German unification in 1871 explores their foundational existence and influence in highlighting a possible German worldview. Incorporating intellectual/philosophical and cultural elements in worldview analysis will further add to discerning a German worldview. As has been stated, worldview is a heuristic lens or framing device, offering a wider gaze than an individual field's focus, able to pull in research and identify influences spanning multiple fields of research. It connects these influences, resulting in a potentially new understanding for the resulting events.

It will be argued that German Idealism and liberalism shaped a German worldview. German Idealism encompassed a period in which some philosophical ideals conflicted, and which had also clashed in numerous places across Europe. Amongst the German intellectuals, however, these forces of social thought and change, informed one another, thus creating a new field of thinking, German Idealism. The influence of this period of thought and prolific hypothesizing concerning both the goals and proper formation of a German people, would directly impact the introduction of another major

force sweeping across the European continent, liberalism. The unique application of this political philosophy amongst the German people would eventually decide the formation of the long sought German State and undoubtedly shaped a German worldview.

Perhaps what most characterized a German worldview was a particular notion of what it meant to be a people: the *Volk*. It is the notion of the *Volk* as an idea of German self-identification that developed centuries ago. The stories of a German community, the *Volk*, the writings of the *Volk*, those elevated to even the mythos of the *Volk*, unified, strengthened, and propelled a German people together generations before the hopes of political unification were ever realized. There existed a people first, and states second, while the people elevated their vaunted national unification to the primacy of their concerns. For this reason, the mythos of the *Volk* is undoubtedly an important element of a German worldview. Something so intrinsic, grand and yet abstract was undoubtedly vulnerable to abuses. Nazism utilized the notion of the *Volk*, but a question remains as to whether it strayed from the true mythos of the *Volk.* Such an impactful question will be addressed within the exploration of this element.

In discerning a German worldview, a necessary component to consider is Germany's particular concept or notion of what it meant to be human, a particular ontology. A German view of what it means to be human is an aspect of a larger German worldview. German history provides numerous examples of abuses against human beings, especially in the Nazi period. But after such a horrific experience, a new Germany emerged, which for a time was divided by outside forces but was ultimately re-unified. This Germany entered a larger international community. The way a collective of people identify their society and highlight primary concerns, in turn reflects its notion of

what it means to be human. The design, structure and unfolding of a Germany that emerged from the ruins of WWII will serve to reveal the ontological element of a German worldview.

Finally, religion and spirituality are aspects of all nations and cultures to greater or lesser degrees. In Germany, Christianity, with its two dominant forms, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, has been a traditional and defining element of the German people well before the time of unification. For generations these two forms of Christianity quite evenly represented the majority of the German population. As a crucial political and social actor during unification, revolutions and two world wars, religion in Germany was undoubtedly a key element to a German worldview. Since the end of World War II, many claim religion has declined and its place within European society diminished. Germany has not been spared this assertion. Yet today organized religions remain state-supported and strong components of religion and spirituality continue as distinct elements of German daily life.

Conclusion

A review of the developing field of worldview analysis makes clear that the application of the term and its use within multiple fields of study has opened up new possibilities of scholarship. Yet, it clearly highlights the need to firmly ground the work. The scope of the research, the determining factors of inclusion must be stated and adequately explained, and the elements of the proposed worldview presented in a clear case based within the rules of a discipline or interdisciplinary methods.

As stated in the introduction chapter, this worldview term, used as a framing device is an additional perspective to be added to today's research and policy analysis fields. Through this, the recognition of a nation's history, its philosophical or intellectual influences are taken into account as contributing elements of current affairs. As has been exhibited through the progression of the emerging field of worldview analysis, past studies have highlighted new insights gained and an ever-growing recognition of the role of worldview, which takes into account the influence of historical, cultural, and intellectual forces of a nation or society or group of people.

This thesis seeks to describe a German worldview defining its scope as on a national state level in order to understand better what unites a people, what informs their most basic thinking, their philosophical ideals, their religious and spiritual positions, and indeed, what may shape or influence their actions. This thesis will seek to describe a German worldview ascertaining the influence on a national level, during the period of unification in the 19th century and contributory events from the latter half of the 18th century. The proceeding chapters will continue, to this end, to present the worldview elements identified as specific and necessary to this study.

Chapter 2:

German Intellectualism: German Idealism and German Liberalism

Idealism and liberalism shaped a German nation to a degree that mandates their inclusion as a specific component within a German worldview framework presented by this thesis. The two movements must be examined together, for both are inherently connected in the context and timeframe of this inquiry. The emerging force of liberalism, as a form of political belief and social goals most essentially concerning individual rights, spread across the traditional nations of Europe at key points of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This force exhibited distinctive formative events indicative of the powerful intellectual foundations already present in German society and culture. The convergence of these two elements played a critical role in the unification of the German nation-state and play a large role in identifying a German worldview.

Whether the liberalism that eventually took hold in Germany represented a capitulation or a special path from more common forms of the political has been debated for decades. What is not in question is that this political force developed differently than contemporary examples, due in part to the intellectual traditions that preceded it. How did German philosophy, artistic intellectualism, and the period referred to as German idealism influence the conceptions of a people and the development of liberalism in Germany? If German intellectual thought had indeed influenced Germany by developing its own specific path, inspired by multiple forms of objectives, passions and historical considerations, would the philosophical arguments and teachings that resonated in German society influence those also embracing the political ideology of liberalism?

Equally important is the manner in which this philosophical school of thought was influenced and shaped by the real world events occurring around its contributors. German Idealism arose amid Europe's armed conflict and intellectual clashes, ushering in revolutions and innovative political thought. Amongst many German philosophers and intellectuals, however, these forces of radical social thought merged with centuries of cultural tradition and together they informed one another, thus creating a new field of thinking, of philosophy, referred to as German Idealism. The influence of this period of prolific thought concerning both the goals and proper societal formation of a German people, would directly impact the introduction of another major force sweeping across the European continent, liberalism. Both play important roles in the formation of a German worldview.

Connecting Philosophical Movements Within One Component

This chapter examines the influence and impact of German Idealism and liberalism as a component within the framework of a German worldview. It will focus on a period spanning the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, culminating with the German unification in 1871. While the chapter focuses on German Idealism and liberalism as dominant intellectual forces, it also acknowledges the broader ideological landscape of the period, including Metternichian conservatism, the emergence of labour radicalism, and early socialism. These competing movements shaped alternative visions of German society and contributed to the evolving national identity and the emerging German worldview. Treating these traditions here as one developing worldview component clarifies how abstract ideas migrated into social imagination and institutional design,

thereby shaping its place within a German worldview, linking personal freedom to communal order.

Idealism broadly represents a philosophical concept which suggests that reality is fundamentally shaped by ideas, thoughts and consciousness rather than material or physical things. For the purposes of this thesis, German Idealism refers to the philosophical movement initiated by Immanuel Kant and developed by his successors, including Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. German Idealism emerged as a cultural and philosophical movement spanning the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. German scholars often refer to this period simply as classical German philosophy. This period of German philosophy is characterized by a blending of distinctions between "classicism and romanticism." It also generated debates about how sharply to distinguish Kant's transcendental idealism from the absolute idealism of his successors.[174] It is characterized by the belief that reality is fundamentally shaped by ideas and consciousness, and that reason and autonomy are central to moral and political life.

A philosophical movement inaugurated by Kant and developed by his successors, German Idealism was also a result of the influence and impact of major cultural figures whose work helped popularize idealist themes, including composers such as Mozart and Beethoven and writers like Schiller and Goethe. The contributions of the intellectual philosophers and the artists who interpreted and perpetuated their theories within a German culture represented a cooperation rather than antagonistic relationship.[175]

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[174] Karl Ameriks, "Interpreting German Idealism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, Second Edition*, ed. Karl Ameriks, (Cambridge University Press, 2017,) 1, Kindle.
[175] Richard Kroner, "The Year 1800 in the Development of German Idealism," *The Review of Metaphysics* 1, No 4, (Jun.1948): 2.

Beginning in the 1780s, at the end of the eighteenth century, German philosophy became the dominant intellectual force in Europe even before a unified German state existed.[176] The positive interpretation of idealism during this period would hold that "the status of many things that are thought to exist at a common-sense level" also must include the recognition of "a set of features or entities that have a higher, a more 'ideal' nature."[177] Idealists argued that beyond ordinary empirical objects, reality includes a higher, more meaningful dimension accessible through reason. The cultural, artistic, and philosophical implications of the period of German Idealism shaped both conservative nationalism and the liberal movements that erupted within German States in the 1840s.[178] The importance of these assists us in identifying them as crucial to a German worldview.

What is identified as a classical form of liberalism emphasized limited government and free markets. Liberalism, as used in this thesis and throughout components of this German worldview, generally refers to the moral and political philosophy, "a liberalism in which the notions of justice, fairness, and individual rights play a central role."[179] Exhibiting the connection to the influence of German Idealism, many scholars argue that modern liberalism draws heavily on Kant's philosophical foundations. A major epicentre of the diffusion of philosophical teachings and the impact on society was the university. German universities developed a distinct cultural mission and became major centers of intellectual life, employing figures such as Schiller, Hegel, Schlegel, Schelling, and Fichte. The blending of philosophical thought with artistic and

[176] Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism*, (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801846.
[177] Ameriks, "Interpreting German Idealism," 9.
[178] Ameriks, "Interpreting German Idealism," 2.
[179] Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Second Edition), (Cambridge University Press, 1998,) 1.

popular expressions turned the intellectual into practical applications. German culture increasingly associated artistic creativity with political freedom, treating writers and thinkers as central agents of democratic aspiration. The apparent climax of this growing movement appeared in 1848 as a politically and culturally altering failure of a bourgeois revolution representing the "bid of the German middle class for political and social equality."[180] The intellectual influence throughout German culture resulted in a practical political interpretation and a form of liberalism rooted in Romantic ideas and idealist philosophy recognized as the Vormarz tradition. The Vormarz period would be defined as from 1815 to the events of 1848 and the National Assembly in Frankfurt. German liberalism appeared to have been propelled by traditional demands including free trade and constitutional protection of societal rights, but after 1849 it appeared as if "liberalism in Germany ceased to be concerned with democratic government" and succumbed to nationalism.[181]

This chapter will examine the influence and impact of German Idealism and German liberalism as a component within the framework of a German worldview, beginning with the writing, oratory and artistic expressions of German intellectuals and philosophers from 1760 onward. Specific attention will be paid to the progression from Kant to Hegel and the arguments envisioning the ideal structure of society and government. Next, the development and role of German liberalism and subsequent interpretations of its assumed failure will be examined. The interconnected philosophical

[180] Eva Kolinsky and Wilfried van der Will, "In search of German culture: an introduction," *The Cambridge Companion to Modern German Culture*, Eva Kolinsky and Wilfried van der Will editors, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.
[181] George S. Williamson, *The Longing for Myth in Germany*, "Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche," (University of Chicago Press, Ltd. 2004), 211.

and political forces of this period and will reveal their importance as a significant aspect of a German worldview.

A Period of Ideas & Revolutions

Pre-Unification and the Development of German Thought

Beginning in the eighteenth century, German philosophers envisioned a special path for the Germanic people as articulated within the intellectual discourse of the period. In centuries prior, the German people were identified through collected historical elements and the myth of a people destined to rise together and become a state of the highest guiding principles. This mythos will be examined later as another component of a German worldview. This also speaks to a broader cultural sense beyond the empirical notion of societal theory which denotes a metaphysical aspect. The latter concept would reach beyond Rousseau's idea of a general will of the polity to encompass more universal ideas, such as "a sense of right, a will and character traits."[182] Evidence of this belief can be found in the works of Immanuel Kant. Many philosophers to follow during the 19th century would expand upon this idea, from the post-Kantian idealists to naturalistic philosophers of the German Romanticism and figures influenced by both currents, including Hegel.[183] The intellectual writings of this period would influence the populace of the time, and equally serve to denote the issues important to that society of which the philosophers were an integral part. These works would ultimately influence a form of

[182] Markus Dirk Dubber, "The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology," *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 43, No.2 (Spring 1995): 243, https://doi.org/10.2307/840515.
[183] Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism*, *1914-1945* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 51.

liberalism and the founding of a long-awaited German nation-state in 1871, representing the manifestation of ideological forces observed in other nations, but in its own distinct interpretations through the development of German culture and society, and ultimately an important component of a German worldview. Kant's legacy supplied a German worldview with a grammar, including autonomy, publicity of reason, and lawful order, within which later appeal to unity and a rights-based state could be intellectually legible.

As a starting point for the inquiry to this period and an intellectual force indicative of many nations across the European continent, the Enlightenment was a "particular vision of modernity", one which held a belief in human potential "in an intellectual world characterized by the rise of instrumentalism, individualism, and skepticism."[184] Enlightenment thinkers believed that education, secularization, reform, and open debate could expand human freedom.[185] As a leading figure and ardent defender of Enlightenment thinking, Immanuel Kant can be viewed as having a place in two worlds. Kant's writing would become an inciting point with his contemporary German intellectuals and those who succeeded him within German Idealism. Kant's basis for pure reason would certainly supply a starting point for the contributors of German thought and mythos, but in many cases their work would counter the assertions of this instigating figure. Kant was viewed as championing a politics grounded in reason rather than national sentiment.[186] Despite this opposition to a national or cultural sentiment of the time, his work continually highlighted his "love for local things" as he recognized them

[184] Russell Arben Fox, "On Metaphysics and Nationality: The Rival Enlightenments of Kant and Herder," *American Behavioral Scientist* 49, (2006): 716, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764205282220.
[185] Fox, "On Metaphysics and Nationality", 716.
[186] Fox, "On Metaphysics and Nationality", 721.

as "indispensable for a moral life."[187] Due to these perceived contradictions, philosophers to come would seek to associate the essential tenets of his work to their own theories and bring his perceived high minded or ambiguous theories into the realm of the practical and local. The teachings of Kant and their reinterpretations illustrate the evolving intellectual focus of the German people. This group demonstrated the ability to assimilate the philosophy and define the teaching through its own lens, which would ultimately be centered on one goal, unity of the people, and reveal how that philosophy became a significant component of a German worldview.

German Idealism

Kant

The work of German philosopher Immanuel Kant, famous for its specific assertions while leaving a degree of ambiguity, seemed to blend perfectly with the pre-existing German myth as it was used to fulfill theoretical areas left unanswered. Metaphysics had been a traditional area of inquiry for German philosophers since the 17th century. Kant's foundation for metaphysics between 1746 and 1759 is important to understand, for it would be a seemingly ever-changing relationship in his work. The term "Metaphysics" had many meanings for Kant, ranging from definitions of "a science of the limits of human reason, an ontology of the first predicates of being, speculation about God, providence, and immortality" and "a study of the first cause and most general laws

[187] Fox, "On Metaphysics and Nationality", 722.

of nature."[188] Rather than focusing the attention of the German people towards individualism, Kant's writings in the mid eighteenth century drew German attention toward the need for civil liberty under a strong absolute leader. Within this absolute state, certain liberties should be asserted, but not to the detriment of the state. Further complementing traditional German ideas, Kant advocated for the free use of what he called public reason, while he recognized the need for possible restrictions on private reason.[189]

To understand the intent of these concepts beyond general assumptions, the potential for a public reason is described by Kant in his 1784 essay "What is Enlightenment?"[190] He describes "a scholar addressing the real public (i.e. the world at large)" who through the "public use of his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person."[191] Kant distinguishes between public reason, which addresses society at large, and private reason, which operates within institutional roles and may reinforce authority structures.[192] By assuming these starting points then, it becomes reasonable to assume the use of private reason supports positions of power or even control. He warned that private reason often reinforces institutional authority rather than independent judgement.[193] Kant, speaking about a progression instead of an earned or achieved status, certainly would provide a progressive goal for a society as enlightenment was presented as a gradual process. This could read also as a

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[188] Frederick C. Beiser, "Kant's intellectual development: 1746-1781" in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992), 27.
[189] Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, (Beacon Press, 1957), 91.
[190] Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Penguin Group Ltd., 2013), Kindle.
[191] Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, 5-6.
[192] Onora O'Neill, "Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism," *The Philosophical Review* 106, No.3 (July. 1997): 424, https://doi.org/10.2307/2998399.
[193] O'Neill, "Political Liberalism", 425.

warning, however, as he adds that too hasty or reckless actions conceivably resulting in chaos, such as a revolution, could equally risk any amassed achievements. Kant warns that revolutions might end despotism, but rarely reform ways of thinking, often replacing old prejudices with new ones. Focusing attention to the issue of freedom and the intentional balance required to achieve this inherent right, Kant contends that for a true enlightenment to be reached, "all that is needed is freedom" and that the form of freedom "is the most innocuous form of all – freedom to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters."[194] This distinction enters a German worldview by normalizing two complementary expectations. First, that critical discourse should be public and universal in scope, while concurrently that, obedience within roles sustains institutional stability.

The goal of securing an assured freedom of a man's reason is achieved through the process instilling this ideal and does not necessarily negate the application or benefit of private reason, as the restrictions on private reasoning within institutional roles do not necessarily impede society's overall progress. The assurance of "the public use of one's own reason" is said to rest in free access as "anyone may make of it as a *man of learning* addressing the entire *reading public*." Alternatively, Kant defines the potentially beneficial private use of reason as "that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted."[195]

For those who would be in the position to utilize private reason, such as a leader in government, Kant argues that rulers do not endanger their authority by permitting citizens to use public reason freely, even if they use it to offer proposals for improving

[194] Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, 3,
[195] Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, 3-4.

legislation. This speaks to the rational application of state control by a just leader, but through it the assurance of man's freedom. Kant thinks it obvious that "only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no fear of phantoms, yet who likewise has at hand a well disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public security, may say what no republic would dare to say." This then, Kant believes, exposes a paradoxical pattern within political life. Within this pattern, a "high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's *intellectual* freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it." Alternatively, a lower degree of civil freedom may give intellectual freedom greater space to prosper. For the people in a society, this can influence the growth of said society by instilling not only the ideal, but the recognition of the goal and the necessary balance to achieve it slowly. This balance ultimately "influences the principles of governments, which find that they can themselves profit by treating man, who is *more than a machine*, in a manner appropriate to his dignity."[196] In the present identification of intellectual worldview component, Kant's teaching does not reduce freedom to mere non-interference, instead, it frames freedom as a civic practice cultivated under protective institutions, presenting an idea within a German worldview of the nineteenth century, and oriented political thought toward a safe, lawful, unified polity.

Kant's moral philosophy places primary focus on the issue of autonomy. It is autonomy which forms the center of his famous ethical theory, as Kant held that adults possess the capacity for full moral self-governance.[197] In the *Groundwork of the*

[196] Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, 9-10.
[197] J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy" in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992), 309.

Metaphysics of Morals[198], printed in 1785, Kant presents the principle of autonomy as "'Always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law'."[199] This followed that autonomy represents the capacity of the will to legislate moral law independently of external influences. Because of this autonomy, he argued that individuals require a protected sphere of freedom to act autonomously. This then mandates that freedom should not and cannot be limited to a "privileged class." Within his theoretical base for a society, there are still the recognizable teachings of the Enlightenment identifiable in other nations of Europe, speaking specifically to a mandate of traditional liberal individual rights. Kant hoped that "eventually all states will be organized as republics, in which every citizen can express his moral freedom publicly in political action."[200]

Kant's political philosophy, following the previously presented moral obligations, illustrates the interconnected nature of political structures and moral obligations. Speaking directly to the political elements of his philosophy and the theory of self-legislation of pure practical reason, Kant rejected separation or division between politics and morality, insisting that political authority must be grounded in moral principles.[201] Kant's argument and justification for the construct of a society, or state, would expressly concern the political rights and obligations of individual citizens. As will be recognized and addressed continually in this chapter, Kant advocates a division of legislative and executive power, in which actual laws will be legislated in "accordance with universal

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[198] Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, (Dancing Unicorn Books, 2016) page 83 of 86, Kindle,
[199] Kant, Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 83 of 86.
[200] Schneewind, "Autonomy, obligation," 310.
[201] Wolfgang Kersting, "Politics, freedom, and order: Kant's political philosophy" in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer, (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992), 343.

law expressed by the idea of a social contract."[202] In his later works, such as the *Metaphysics of Morals*[203], Kant presents the design and authority of this state as mandated by the nature of men and the categorical rights. "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the *original contract*" and through this act, according to Kant, "everyone (*omnes et singuli*) within a people gives up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a people considered as a state (*universi*)."[204] These three levels of authority are the mechanisms through which the state maintains its independence and for Kant it is necessary to align in "accordance with laws of freedom." The strength, security or well-being of a state ultimately resides in the people, or the united citizens. Though we today may think of the well-being of a state to include the "welfare of its citizens and their happiness", Kant is clear that this level of achievement is insufficient for it could be practically accomplished by happenstance, whether in a state of nature or under an authoritarian government. The highest form of political well-being is said to occur when a state's constitution fully embodies the principles of right, a condition that reason obligates citizens to pursue.[205]

Many recognize the confusion within Kant's ideal for a state's function that seems far more conservative than the ultimate principles he espouses. Kant, in the mid 1780s, conceivably aware of the palpable instability in France, relied on the structure of the state and the people's commitment to laws of reason and morality, to remedy any potential issues of abuses. Whereas the levels of a state, its ministers and deputies were to reflect

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[202] Paul Guyer, *Kant*, (Routledge, 2006), 282.
[203] Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Kindle.
[204] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Loc. 3134-3140 of 7195.
[205] Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, loc. 3179-3185 of 7195.

the peoples' freedom and rights, Kant concluded that citizens have no legitimate right to rebel against a lawful sovereign. As long as this manner of the state was consistent with the right, there could be "no right to *sedition* (*seditio*), still less to *rebellion* (*rebellio*), and least of all is there a right against the head of a state as an individual person (the monarch)." We know that these conclusions for Kant are based on the contract of the state's adherence to the law and principle of autonomy. The key conclusion to the audience of the day, however, may have been that any intent referring to rebellion or especially an attack upon the individual head of state, would be viewed as "*high treason* (*proditio eminens*)" synonymous to "attempting to *destroy his fatherland* (*parricida*)."[206] Hence, within this worldview component, the implication existed that political legitimacy rests less on insurrection than on rational law and institutional continuity.

The question of temporal influences on a philosopher such as Immanuel Kant is an important issue to address. One may recognize the metaphysical aspects of Kant and his pupils, such as the presumption of eternal focus as proof of Kant's work and assume an ahistorical approach. For example, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he declares that there exists within the "faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience."[207] A new perspective emerged in the eighteenth century, that of a historicist position. This historicist position was a direct result of eighteenth-century thinkers who became increasingly aware of cultural diversity and skeptical of the idea that modernity represented a universal standard. Johann Gottfried Herder would also stress in his writing the "spirit of the age" and "the thought of its own distinctive era."[208] German philosophy

[206] Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Loc. 3224-3229 of 7195.
[207] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Loc. 9254 of 9871.
[208] Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical Turn*, "Philosophy as Critical Interpretation," (Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.

could be viewed loosely from the period of Kant to Hegel as defined by two positions: "the classical and largely ahistorical tradition, which culminates in Kant's (1724-1804) system of 'pure reason'" and the post-Kantian tradition, "which is defined by an insistence (for example in Schelling, Hegel and Friedrich Schlegel) on very close attention to history and the limitations of so called pure reason."[209] Karl Ameriks notes, however, that within Kant's final system there did exist a historical turn, acknowledging cultural progression while maintaining systematic philosophical claims.[210] Kant's categories or concepts of understanding, may be ahistorical, but as noted in his "Enlightenment" essay, the philosopher does recognize and speak to the historical progression of a society. Kant believed society was progressing towards enlightenment, though much work remained. He commented on this progress that there existed "distinct indications that the way is now being cleared for them to work freely in this direction."[211] Ameriks contrasts historicism's relativism with Kant's evolving recognition of cultural progression, which he calls a "historical turn." The historical turn signifies a late shift in Kant's thinking, in which he acknowledged a cultural development while still defending the universal claims of reason.[212]

The culmination, or progression, of the individual aspects of Kant's sprawling work, leads to the ultimate area of his philosophy for the purposes of this thesis, his theory of the state and the inclusion of the moral and historical aspects. For Kant, the state exists as a necessity because of the "empirical circumstances arising from man's selfish or appetitive nature." Kant argues that people seek social cooperation to satisfy

[209] Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical,* 3.
[210] Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical,* 4.
[211] Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'* 8.
[212] Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical,* 6.

their needs and desires, but they also require the security that only a political authority can provide. The "constraints imposed by political authority" are the agreement we enter into, giving up our "unlimited natural liberty" to enjoy the "security and protection" we desire.[213] The realization is defined as,

> A *state* (*civitas*) is a union of a multitude of human beings under laws of right. Insofar as these are *a priori* necessary as laws, that is, insofar as they follow of themselves from concepts of external right as such (not as statutory), its form is the form of a state as such, that is, of the *state in idea*, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right.[214]

As to the authority within the state, he assigned three specific authorities of which the united will consisted; the "sovereign authority in the person of the legislator; the executive authority in the person of the ruler; and the judicial authority in the person of the judge."[215] Kant seemingly detested democracy as a condition of confusion in which everyone leads and although he also specifically denounced despotism, he recognizes the need for a strong authority figure to "rule autocratically."[216] A democracy, "in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism" according to Kant, for it "establishes an Executive power in which All resolve about, and, it may be, also against, any One who is not in accord with it." Any such disenfranchisement would be a "contradiction of the

[213] Gunnar Beck, "Immanuel Kant's Theory of Right," *Ratio Juris* 19, No.4. (December 2006): 379, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00336.x.
[214] Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Loc. 3085 of 7195.
[215] Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Location 3090 of 7195.
[216] Kreiger, 119.

Universal Will with itself and with liberty."[217] Kant evidently viewed that in a democracy anyone, presumably not in the majority, could dissent and a democracy inherently entailed the potential to dissolve into chaos.

From the adherence to the ethical and reasoned rights stemming from autonomy, what form of government or treaty structure can assure these rights? The "Republican Constitution is the only one which perfectly corresponds to the Rights of man" writes Kant in one of his last publications, potentially denoting a progression or culmination of previous allusions to government and constitution in this statement.[218] The need of a social, or original, contract exists because the lofty goal of attaining a fully realized republic would require a level of moral perfection that human beings, with strong self interests, cannot achieve. It is this mistrust of the nature of man that could easily be misconstrued in the previous mentions of the protection of the state and the resulting penalties for rebellion. Kant seemingly recognized that the protection of individual rights could not be ensured if the priority was misrepresented as lesser ideals. It is through his elevation of "A Republic Constitution" that we can point to his commitments as this constitution is to be established first "according to the principle of the *Liberty* of the Members of a Society, as Men", second "according to the principle of the *Dependence* of all its members on a single common Legislation, as Subjects" and third, "according to the law of the *Equality* of its Members as Citizens."[219] The republican maxims supplied the socialized core which a German worldview developing during this period could reconcile

[217] Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Essay* in *Collected Works of Immanuel Kant: Complete Critiques, Philosophical Works and Essays*, trans. J.M.D Meiklejohn, T.K.Abbott, J.H. Bernard, William Hastie, Thomas De Quincey, Paul Carus, W.J. Eckoff, Emanuel F. Goerwitz, R.B. Haldane, (e-artnow ebooks, 2015) Kindle, Page 1768-1769 of 1822.
[218] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Page 1779 of 1822.
[219] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Page 1766/1767 of 1822.

moral universalism with concrete national unification. As to other raised critiques of Kant, like that of conservative devotion to a monarch, in his argument for the republican constitution, he argues that concentrating administrative authority in fewer hands increases the likelihood that a state can gradually reform itself toward republican principles.[220]

Kant is often regarded as the progenitor of a new school of German philosophy, and equally as a student of the preceding Enlightenment period. Taken together, Kant's moral autonomy, socialization of reason, and juridical state design delineates one axis of the nineteenth-century within a developing German worldview. Freedom is to be realized through public reason and state law rather than through chaotic upheaval. This influence within the specific and developing component of a German worldview would become a definitive hinge on which later German liberalism acted towards democratic and nationalistic aspirations. Within this developing component, it is necessary to next look to the myth or mysticism, recognized as a cultural element within his metaphysics. This cultural element would aid in the formation of German Idealism and help make accessible the intellectual theories of German philosophers to the people.

The Romantic Influence

The term Romanticism originated in the seventeenth century and became increasingly common during the eighteenth century.[221] If the Enlightenment was the "first

[220] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace", 1769 of 1822.
[221] Marsha Morton, "German Romanticism: The Search for 'A Quiet Place'", *Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies* 28, No. 1, Negotiating history: German Art and the Past (2002): 11.

intellectual movement to sweep Europe as a whole", then the response, or perhaps "revolt" to this wave, was the Romantic Movement.[222] It was at the beginning of the nineteenth century when romanticism, stemming from the French Revolution, would have a major impact upon German ideology. In a response to the views of the Enlightenment perceived by many as narrow, and the often chaotic events following the social upheaval in France, romanticism blended with the German speaking peoples' traditional elements of "mysticism and faith."[223]

German Romanticism as a distinct form may have started as poetry, but it developed as a more expansive medium of expression. It represented original thought and expression encompassing life, nature, and history gave German Romanticism a philosophical depth that set it apart from other national variants.[224] Romanticism amongst the German speaking people, rather than conflicting with enlightenment thinkers and polarizing liberalism, blended with liberal movements throughout the German states, resulting in a liberalism whose power was rooted in both tradition and nationalism.

The German people, or *Volk* (understood as a culturally defined community of people, rather than merely a legal citizenry), absorbed and reinterpreted both the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement as they sought to define their social and political aspirations. The interpretation and the resulting expressions of romanticism helped to popularize through artistic prose the German idea of the unifying state. Whereas German Idealism represented some of the greatest students of the Enlightenment who conceptualized the rights of man, and the priorities of universal laws,

[222] Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*: *The Education of a Nation*, (MACMILLAN, 1965), 49.
[223] Marsha Morton, "German Romanticism" 9.
[224] Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 49.

it also included the expressions of Romanticism, by espousing the profound intellectual and emotional character of the German people. This artistic influence generated mass attention towards a new "consciousness of German uniqueness and to the belief that a nation may be a law unto itself."[225] Within a component of a German worldview framework, Romanticism presents the active expression or content through which idealist concepts were socialized as a shared national self-understanding, thereby orienting freedom toward the developing cultural polity.

It can be viewed that "classical German idealist tradition has made freedom its principal value" but the general understanding of freedom is not specific enough. German idealists conceived of freedom in a way that differed from the more individualistic notions common in English and French thought. In place of a creator or mythical "moral hero", the necessary "transcendental subjectivity" or reason had become the "absoluter Geist; and it is this Spirit that carries this distinctive freedom within itself as a cosmic force."[226] The romantics across the numerous forms of artistic expression may not have all identified with "Kant's transcendental reason in its pure form, or his critical attitude" but they seemingly adopted a form of transcendental imagination and a heightened sensitivity to the sublime. Within the fantasies or dramatic expression of the Romantics, Freedom "took on a new form and power."[227]

Johann Gottfried Herder's impact during the latter half of the eighteenth century is often noted for his philosophical writing and his devotion to linguistics. Due to this

[225] Kohn, The Mind of Germany, 50.
[226] Kenneth L.Schmitz, "The Idealism of the German Romantics", in The Emergence of German Idealism, ed. Michael Baur and Daniel O.Bahlstrom, (The Catholic University Press, 1999), 188, eBook.
[227] Schmitz, "The Idealism of the German", 196-197.

notoriety, his other contributions to the foundations of "family sociology with political science, psychology, and human ecology" have been overlooked.[228] His efforts sought to harmonize Christian belief with Enlightenment rationalism and represented a separation from the pure reason of Kant. Herder expressed the idea of a socially binding force greater than simply the modern "bureaucratic state." Whereas this social construct binds individual members together through formal arrangements, first there must exist the community, the *Volk*, understood as an evolving and relational form of community. The nature of this group, however, is not predetermined as merely a shared tradition, or a "glorious past"; both are not enough to permanently bind a group of people together. Instead, "the coherence and solidarity of the *Volk* community depends on the shifting relationships of its members."[229] Thus Herder inscribes into a German worldview a communal identification in which persons are intelligible through historically formed practices.

Herder's conception was not confined to one size, or geographic area, instead he spoke of a constant choice, or act, of a people to continually recognize their connections, for the benefit of all its members. As opposed to the new waves of intellectualism, namely liberalism as seen in contemporary France and Britain, Herder rejected the idea that political authority must be divided into separate branches. His "idealistic concept" assumed that abuses of power or conflicts of interest were unlikely. Again, Herder

[228] Howard M. Bahr, et. al. "On Diversity, Empathy, and Community: The Relevance of Johann Gottfried Herder", Rural Sociology 73 (4), (2008): 502-506.
[229] Bahr, et. al., "On Diversity," 509.

viewed the *Volk* as a single organism, and therefore did not distinguish between the individuals or their rights within it.[230]

For certain, Herder's writing further developed the idea of a German people, and their hopes for a unified nation. He wrote on "expressionism" concerning the "relationship between language and human thought and culture", but his work equally revolved around the concept of "pluralism" meaning that "there is no one universal path to human fulfillment."[231] Herder presented a model of nation "consisting of people bound by common ethnicity and worldview", but as will be further developed in this chapter, the overarching tones of community and unity have been incorrectly attributed as "early promotion of German nationalism."[232] If Kant and Herder represented somewhat opposite positions, then philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) would try to bridge the "rationalist stance of Kant and the nationalist and political concepts of Herder, having been profoundly influenced by both."[233] This mediation matters for a German worldview as it aligns autonomous reason with national community, preparing the intellectual ground on which liberal rights discourse could be engaged with through political activity.

Hegel, Temporal Influences, the People and the State

To properly highlight Hegel's importance in the linear and theoretical development of German Idealism, Charles Taylor actually points to Herder as a starting point to understand the true progression to Hegel's work. As opposed to the mainstream

[230] Hahn, 65.
[231] Bahr, et al. "On Diversity," 506.
[232] Bahr, et. al., "On Diversity," 507.
[233] Hahn, 66.

Enlightenment which was "utilitarian in its ethical outlook, atomistic in its social philosophy", Herder looked to a culture, as the propelling mechanism of man. This is what Taylor presents as "the point of origin of modern nationalism."[234]

Published during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the German philosopher Hegel added his philosophy to the ever expanding German heritage. Hegel both respected and agreed with Kant's conception of philosophy as reason's explication and "defence of its own constitution", but Hegel viewed Kant as having "separated the rational from the sensible so thoroughly that he has no chance of bringing them back together."[235] Hegel, therefore, sought a dialectical conception. He argues that rationality depends on and is expressed through the sensible world. Hegel's view entails that Kant obtains the moral content from within the categorical imperative by "presupposing a reasonable social world in the background, and thereby ignoring the philosophically crucial question of the structure of such a world." From this view, Hegel thought it obvious that the political sphere and ethical sphere must be joined together. Whereas Kant wrote that we have two distinct forms of practical reason: pure and empirical, Hegel's work argues that in "a social world that realizes the autonomy of reason, empirically conditioned motives have an important role in the reproduction of our ethical life."[236] The dialectic method presented by Hegel "entails the movement of thought 'back and forth' between concrete particular judgment and general principle."[237] Hegel, as opposed to Kant, believes this dialectic review of both spheres offers immediate and

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[234] Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (The Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, 1979), 2.
[235] Julius Sensat, "Classical German Philosophy and Cohen's Critique of Rawls," *European Journal of Philosophy* 11:3, (2003): 328, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00189.
[236] Sensat, 329, 330.
[237] Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. "Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism," *Political Theory* 19, No. 4 (Nov. 1991): 546.

transcendent solutions for reason. The "indeterminacy, impotence and confined inwardness" of the Kantian perspective represent a social solution that was not considered. What is required is a "system of well-ordered institutions rather than transcendental synthesis."[238]

A major hurdle when presenting Hegel as an element for analysis, and significance in highlighting a German worldview, is the wide range of interpretation to which readers of Hegel must avail themselves. By the late-twentieth century, research concerning Hegel aligned mostly with one of two schools, both endeavouring to highlight Hegel's continued relevance. The first school is labelled as "the traditional historical approach" and accepts Hegel's metaphysics by "describing its relations to its historical antecedents." Conversely, a "modern positivistic approach" often dismisses the presence of metaphysics "as a form of mysticism or speculation, but which values him for his many ideas in the fields of epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics."[239] In critique of this second approach, the unique conglomeration of philosophical trends including metaphysics, has been noted already regarding the influence of major German philosophers. To cast aside Hegel's metaphysical or romantic influences would negate that which makes Hegel and his teachings specific to his time and place in the history of the German people.

If Kant's critical nature separated his views from Herder, it was Hegel who sought to amalgamate the two. Hegel's synthesis argues Charles Taylor, "can be seen as a realization of the fundamental ambition of the Romantic generation," despite the fact that

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[238] Sensat, 330.
[239] Frederick C. Beiser, "Introduction: Hegel and the problem of metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1993), 2-3.

we know him today to be one of "the sharpest critics of the Romantic generation."[240] Taylor claims that the very "ambition of combining the fullest rational autonomy with the greatest expressive unity" was central to Hegel and similar to his romantic contemporaries. Whereas these contemporaries, however, largely doubted the ability of reason to reach such an understanding or "synthesis", Hegel's certainty in rational thought marks the clear line of distinction.[241] This insistence on achieving the two, the opposing sides of "radical autonomy" and "expressive unity with nature and within society", is what Taylor points to as one of the most enduring and applicable aspects of Hegel's teachings in our world today.[242] Hegel, though clearly not a romantic, was certainly influenced by the field and the power of artistic expression, as evident in his recognition of its expressive unity. His commitment to the central importance of reason firmly placed him within the Enlightenment tradition, yet we recognize the synthesis with the importance of a unity in nature and society, that today for us defines Hegel. The future development of German society would encompass a very similar development trend combining political reason and cultural passions. Here the implication within a German worldview developing in this period is clear, the ethical life becomes identifiable as belonging to a cultural and institutional whole, and in doing so the state is not the subjugation of freedom, but instead its realization.

A historical and biographical analysis of Hegel's intellectual growth places significant importance on both the form of education the young Hegel was exposed to, but most importantly the historical events during this time. Undoubtedly the most

[240] Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, 11-12.
[241] Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, 12.
[242] ibid, 69.

disruptive event during this period, even to a student in a German State, would be the outbreak of the French Revolution. Reports of the events in France were said to have caused considerable excitement within the seminary, where students reportedly divided into factions through identification as either royalists or patriots. H. S. Harris offers that "Hegel was both an impassioned and an effective orator in the 'patriotic' cause."[243] Hegel's conception of freedom represents a progression of the period as it "is derived from Kant's conception of autonomy and Fichte's conception of absolute self-sufficiency."[244] His ethics and the design of a free society both converge within the state only "because the state is 'the actuality of concrete freedom'."[245] As he wrote first in 1820, "The state is the realized ethical idea or ethical spirit. It is the will which manifests itself, makes itself clear and visible, substantiates itself."[246] Indeed, as the progression from the theoretical to the absolute of reality, what sets Hegel apart from most modern social theorists, argues Allen W. Wood, is the absolute contention that "the state is fundamentally an ethical institution, hence founded not on coercion but on freedom."[247] Accordingly, Hegel's influence within a German worldview identifies personal rights within an ethical state that secures them, as the institutions are the mechanisms of one's freedom.

Naturally, Hegel would go on to write on the achievement of state-power as the highest success of the individual. It is only under the umbrella of the absolute state that

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[243] H.S. Harris, "Hegel's intellectual development to 1807," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1993), 26.
[244] Allen W. Wood, "Hegel's ethics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1993), 218.
[245] Wood, 229.
[246] G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, trans. S.W.Dyde, ed. Dr. Chandran Prasad, (Chandran Prasad and Lexicos Publishing, 2012,) Loc. 5613 of 7959.
[247] Wood, 230.

the individual could truly enjoy liberty. We find this a continuing assertion in the *Philosophy of Right*, one of his defining works,

> The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom. In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their complete development. In this concrete freedom too, the rights of personal individuality receive adequate recognition. These interests and rights pass partly of their own accord into the interests of the universal. Partly, also, do the individuals recognize by their own knowledge and will the universal as their own substantive spirit, and work for it as their own end.[248]

Hegel continued by applying his philosophy to the two stages of German freedom. His analysis of the first stage focused on the traditional German nature. Traditionally, Germans identified their freedom with the independence of their individual German state, autonomous from the other states. This misunderstanding of the proper autonomy was due to the royal or noble leader of the state and his hunger for power. This was a false freedom and prevented the actualization of the true German freedom. This freedom would be realized only when the individual states joined together to form a new national state. This state, according to Hegel, "is the nation's spirit" and the "law which permeates all its relations, ethical observances, and the consciousness of its individuals."[249] The full state therefore, must include the political state consisting of the "civic community", but Hegel previously noted that it must also include a stage

[248] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 5722 of 7959.
[249] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT* Loc. 6301 of 7959.

constituting the "ethical observance or spirit, in which both individual independence and universal substantivity are found" together in union.[250]

In the specific case of Germans and their amalgamated society, through the progression of world history it seemed rational that the former states and its rulers would join together under one empire and one emperor. Through this, laws could be passed down to all its citizens equally. Only if the state is strong and ruled with a steady hand, can the citizens experience true freedom.[251] In trying to ascertain the key aspect of Hegel's philosophy as it pertains to German centrism, emphasis is placed on the need for a hereditary monarch to ensure the security of the state. It is once again important to take into account the era in which Hegel was writing. Just as in the time of Plato, a strong statesman who understood the "art of kingship" was looked upon, in Hegel's time, as a leader who embodied the "concrete universals" and could institute them.[252] In the early nineteenth century, following a period of revolution resulting in governmental collapse and perceived anarchy, a strong monarch in the guise of Napoleon had apparently brought peace to chaos. Even in foreign kingdoms of archaic social structures, such as the German States, this singular power imposed modern governing infrastructures. To someone such as Hegel, the state could only be guided away from anarchy and weakness, by a monarch. His perspective presented that civil society alone could not create lasting political stability.[253]

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[250] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT* Loc. 1251 of 7959.
[251] Kreiger, 136-137.
[252] F.R.Cristi, "Hegel's Conservative Liberalism", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No.4 (Dec. 1989): 727.
[253] Cristi, 732.

It must be noted, however, Hegel, in words reminiscent of English or French liberalism, added that under the monarch, citizens of the state must be given a free hand and be allowed to participate in the functions of the state.[254] Hegel also advocated that the power of the individual leader or statesman be compensated by the branches of the political state. First, Hegel begins with the legislation, presented as the "power to fix and establish the universal" through "legislation." Next, he speaks of the "function of government" which "brings particular spheres and individual cases under the universal." Finally, with these protective or diverse mechanisms in place, Hegel assigns the "function of the prince, as the subjectivity with which rests the final decision." This leadership role then unites the two other branches "into an individual unity" and the three as presented by Hegel as combining within the definition and action of the "constitutional monarchy."[255] This latter point is essential to correctly understanding the intent of Hegel's reason, for while conservatives and liberals alike try to lay claim to his reasoning, Hegel spoke of real-life principles which do not accept such hypothetical absolutes. Hegel disputes the liberal absolute of universal freedoms, for in such a world, in which every citizen freely follows their basic wants and desires, the needs of some citizens are bound to infringe upon those of others. For Hegel, the state should represent the "synthesis of the internal privileges and claims of freedom and the external constraints that necessarily determine its demands."[256] To summarize then, only when the state is strong, and its leaders act in the best interests of the citizenry, can the individual freedoms of every citizen be guaranteed and established. In this chapter's account of the

[254] Krieger, 138.
[255] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 6217 of 7959.
[256] Christi, 732.

intellectual component, this identification of the synthesis, socializes a political structure in which plurality is articulated through the state rather than against it.

Failure to take these presented distinctions into account creates a general antithetical assumption concerning what would emerge in German society, that the authority of the state suppresses the freedom of an individual. This assumption fails to recognize that within this argument, the state is obligated to provide to its citizenry political and legal foundations which secure their freedoms. With the State providing such essential foundations to its citizenry, each individual makes the choice to support the governing body. Such "Patriotism" as Hegel describes is an "attitude toward these institutions which sees them as guardians of the individual's fullest freedom."[257] Individuals give their allegiance, trust, even certain liberties to the state, willingly as a choice because such individuals recognize that the state is acting in their best interests and providing their freedoms. This is not a call for unaccountable, authoritarian rule, as Hegel stipulates that leaders who fail to uphold freedom do not deserve citizens' loyalty.[258] Through this choice, we are bound to the state within our duties and obligations. It is only with such obligations that we are liberated "from impulses to which we are otherwise enslaved."[259] The organizational structure within the state, between the monarch, the government and the people, provides a "mediatorial function" and it assures representation in the mind of the monarch as it "neither isolates the princely function as an extreme, causing it to appear as a mere ruling power acting capriciously, nor does it

[257] Rupert H. Gordon, "Modernity, Freedom, and the State: Hegel's Concept of Patriotism", *The Review of Politics* 62, No. 2 (Spring. 2000): 299.
[258] Gordon, 300.
[259] ibid, 205.

isolate the particular interests of communities, corporations, and individuals."[260] As German Idealism seems to continually remind the society at its time of prominence, those who are influenced by and act upon surrounding influences, such as material concerns, cannot recognize the pre-ordained path towards the principle of freedom that the German people are destined to follow.

History plays a foundational role in Hegel's understanding of philosophy. For him, philosophy expresses the self-consciousness of a culture by articulating, defending, and examining its essential values and beliefs.[261] From a historian's standpoint this would seem obvious, especially when exploring the past as the lineage of a philosophy, contributing to a society and culture through the efforts of numerous philosophers. The real-world ramifications, especially in the realm of politics, to Hegel's historicism lies in the critique that has often portrayed Hegel as politically conservative, even reactionary. This argument, often advanced by left-leaning observers, labels Hegel as an intellectual defender of the Prussian Restoration regime.[262] Modern academics such as Beiser, respond to this critique by providing historical context as Hegel's philosophy espouses many of the ideals of the French Revolution. In practical and historical terms, however, Hegel recognized that these principles could not be achieved by sweeping away the historical traditions and institutions of Germany, but by "gradually adapting them to the historical conditions prevalent in Germany."[263]

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[260] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 6926 of 7959.
[261] Frederick C. Beiser, "Hegel's Historicism" in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1993), 270.
[262] Beiser, 292.
[263] ibid, 294.

According to Hegel, the recognition and influence of history is isolated to a general principle of sorts, but one that we can infer means the way in which the temporal events of a nation influence a people. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*[264], we are presented the influence of history as recognition of "the spirit, which has the history of the world for its theater, property, and field of its realization."[265] This is an important view into the ultimate principles established by Hegel and the recognition of the role of history. Throughout his writings, Hegel insists that philosophers must grasp historical facts with precision.[266] In what may seem contrary to the study of a historical German cultural lineage, Hegel asserts that only broad, enduring principles survive from earlier civilizations.[267] These general principles are what is passed to each individual and which Hegel identified as the "spirit." Though the finite details of an individual in a nation may fade away, these lesser elements of the time give way to the overall spirit. Each nation's spirit acquires a distinctive character through historical development. As Hegel said, "this is the soul, that which is distinguished in the philosophical comprehension of history."[268] Frederick Neuhouser stated that the ultimate end of this passing common character or heritage is the security of the ideal state and the protection it offers. Current civilizations that have inherited the principles of freedom, instituted by previous generations, would view any system lacking them as incomplete or irrational.[269]

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[264] G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. Ruben Alvardo, (WordBridge Publishing, 2011) Kindle.
[265] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* Loc. 1077 of 8705.
[266] Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History, An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy*, (Routledge, 1991), 5.
[267] Houlgate, 14.
[268] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Loc. 1496-1501 of 8705.
[269] Frederick Neuhouser, "The Idea of a Hegelian 'Science' of Society in *A Companion to Hegel*, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2011), 291.

The functions of the state within Hegel's ideals concerning the rights of individuals are very intricate and have been stereotyped over time as representing points across the political spectrum, from extremely conservative to very liberal.[270] In summary of the state, Hegel wrote that the strength of the state is through the actions of its individuals. The members of the state comprise its status and function and to these members, the state availed their rights:

> its natural features, its mountains, air, and waters, are their country, their fatherland, their external property; the history of this state, their deeds; what their ancestors have produced belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their substance, their being. Their imagination is filled with this, and their will is the will of these laws and this fatherland. It is this matured totality which is one essence, the spirit of one people.[271]

The aesthetic rhetoric presented to a general public through the availability of mass publishing allowed the oratory of the philosopher's reason to be presented as compelling arguments for a united German society. The interpretation of Hegel's work and his assumed political leanings have been discussed for nearly two centuries. Despite the wide range of influence and the schools of thought indebted to his work, a general criticism cited his conservative leanings and insinuates his actions could have been intended to bolster the Prussian government. Conservative critics, meanwhile, point to the stated core

[270] Allen W. Wood, "Hegel's Political Philosophy", in *A Companion to Hegel*, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2011), 304.
[271] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Loc. 1035-1040 of 8705.

of Hegel's work, individual freedom, as matching the fundamental principle of liberalism. Despite criticisms based on political perception of the time, or group, from his earliest works to the end of his career, a continual theme called for the ideal form of protection of this freedom.[272]

Certainly, Hegel could have held conservative principles, or perhaps the events of his day discouraged the philosopher concerning the destructive force of rebellion. Another consideration was the practical maneuvers of his career and the field of philosophy during a time when the individual conservative German states imposed tight censorship on printed materials.[273] Hegel did in the preface of the POR, effectively praise these governments, stating that the "methods of teaching philosophy" had been "reanimated by the government" and that state support for philosophy was significant.[274] Despite this, the continual refinement or clarification of the mechanisms of a society assuring the protections of ultimate and ethical individual freedom quite obviously "did not mean to justify the status quo."[275] As has long been mentioned in defense of Hegel, the ideal government structure presented emphasized that the state was not modeled on any contemporary government. Hegel even repudiated philosophers, such as Jakob Friedrich Fries, who advocated direct action in a society of their time, as Hegel declared it was "the last degree of shallowness, because in it science is looked upon as developing, not out of thought or conception, but out of direct perception and random fancy."[276] As a philosophical standard of the field, Hegel stated that he and the field must not write to

[272] T.M. Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," *Philosophy* 15, No.57 (Jan.1940) 53.
[273] Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," 52.
[274] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right,* 307 of 7959.
[275] Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," 55.
[276] Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Loc.249 of 7975.

argue for "a state as it ought to be" because philosophy explains the nature of the state rather than prescribing political programs.[277] It is the intent of presenting what it should be that particularly troubled Hegel, in that "Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process."[278] Although Hegel presented these accounts in his published work to take the place of oral explanation to guard against misinterpretations, they may not have been inferred by the public in this manner. Hegel's work was impactful and resourceful to all who had access to it, including the students and readers of the day, the interpretation of artists transmitting these concepts through the arts and the growing public audience who engaged with it.

Certainly, there existed in Hegel's work a mistrust that the moral and reasoned individual freedom could be assured if the protection rested on the temporal whims of the day. Obviously, this notion draws from the tradition of Kant, Rousseau and the state of nature, and potentially identifies directly the more radical interpretations of liberalism. For while most important is the "fact that man thinks, and seeks freedom and a basis for conduct in thought", Hegel warned that while of course man's right to act is moral "it becomes a wrong, when it takes the place of thinking."[279] Perhaps through this absence of thought, he was commenting on failed, or short-sighted, self-destructive rebellions witnessed during his lifetime.

If indeed the strongest, most persistent emphasis and dare we say conclusion of Hegel spanning the development of his many works, conveys that the ideal form and protection of individual freedom is through the strong state, we can indeed move forward,

[277] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Loc.336 of 7975.
[278] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Loc.400 of 7975.
[279] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Loc.214 of 7975.

decades later, to see if the maturity of those ideals, those reasoned philosophical conclusions, can be recognized in the practical events of history. Hegel provides another point, or axis, of a German worldview in which the state is clearly presented as the actualization of freedom and autonomy. This recognition within the component of a German worldview provides necessary context as the philosophical currents of German Idealism did not remain abstract. The theories presented provided the intellectual foundation upon which German liberalism developed, linking cultural creativity with emerging political demands.

German Liberalism

Having identified the philosophical and intellectual forces within German society, and how the ideals disseminated to an increasingly educated and artistically engaged public, this chapter must next determine how the theoretical force influenced the political ideologies of the German people as demonstrated through their political actions. Specifically, this section will focus on the development of German liberalism. Due to the identified goal of the German people, that of unity within one nation, there is a general belief that during the development of German liberalism "the idea of unity began to separate from the idea of freedom."[280] This section will explore if this identifiable devotion to unity truly represented a separation from the liberal ideals of freedom and individual rights. Within the component of a German Worldview identified in this chapter, this section examines German liberalism as one of the primary political

[280] Volker Schmidtke, "Liberalism and Nationalism," *European Education* 32, no. 2. (2000): 50, https://doi.org/10.2753/EUE1056-4934320248.

expressions, revealing how the intellectual influences of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shaped the impactful political conflicts that accompanied the emergence of a German nation-state, and the development of a German worldview.

European Context

For the liberalism which developed in most West European states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the goal of emancipation and inclusion held the political state in higher importance than the ethnic nation. In comparison, it appears an example like French nationalism, "with its roots in revolution (commitment to the universality of ideas) is diametrically opposed to German nationalism."[281] Liberalism rooted in the nation or the *Volk*, while in support of some of the same liberal policies, i.e., constitutional freedoms and open economy, appears to have advocated liberalism only when in the best interest of an ethnic group or nation.[282] For what would appear to develop as *Volk* liberals, the entire scope of what it was to be German, "language, culture, history, religion, looks to the nation-state as its bedrock."[283] This alignment signals a German worldview in which the nation is the ethical community within which liberal norms gain binding force.

In nations such as France and England, national identify had deep historical roots, "that extended back into the Middle Ages, or as in Italy and Greece, at least a geographical reality."[284] Certainly, the forms of liberalism traditionally established in

[281] Schmidtke, 49.
[282] Eric Kurlander. *The Price of Exclusion, Ethnicity, National Identity, and the Decline of German Liberalism, 1898-1933,* (Berghahn Books, 2006.) 5-6.
[283] Schmidtke, 49.
[284] Schmidtke, 50.

England and France were mirrored to degrees, and even influenced the introduction of liberalism in Germany. It has been generally accepted "that German liberals in the first half of the nineteenth century were geographically divided" as in the North, German liberals tended to admire English political models.[285] Northern examples of attractiveness from the English model included connection to the administrative system, while other "liberals outside north Germany ascribed" to England's exhibited "flexibility and pragmatism of public opinion."[286] The major criticism against the English form of liberalism, however, "stemmed from the conviction that because the political system of England had developed slowly over a long period of time it had resulted in certain anomalies, anachronisms, and abuses."[287] As for the French influence and reaction in Germany, typically associated with the South and Western areas, influences can be traced to the impactful eras of French history and political philosophy, including the "age of the Enlightenment; the French Revolution and the Napoleonic empire; the era of Bourbon restoration, and the July monarchy."[288] Some German liberals were drawn to French ideas about popular sovereignty and direct political accountability, while the French Revolution divided many liberals between "those who criticized it in one or more of its phases, and those who supported or at least sympathetically explained its different stages."[289] Despite regional influences, whether North or South preferences, or direct connections or devotion to English or French models, German liberals can be said to have been, to varying degrees, demonstrated an openness to the political influence of Western

[285] F. Gunther Eyck, "English and French Influences on German Liberalism before 1848," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 18, No.3, (Jun.1957): 313, https://doi.org/10.2307/2707796.
[286] Eyck, "English and French", 320.
[287] Eyck, "English and French", 323.
[288] Eyck, "English and French", 324.
[289] Eyck, "English and French", 326-327.

European traditions. Perhaps due to the historic results of the multiple stages of the French Revolution, and direct observances of its consequences, it has been proposed that an English style of governance would have been installed in a German State had a revolution led to permanent changes. From this critical perspective, the results of the German liberal development and events of the early nineteenth century however, "fell prey to the intensive nationalism" which has often been viewed to have "marred Germany history for the better part of a century."[290]

Without presuming a critical perspective as to why German liberalism did not establish following models similar to Western European examples, this section will consider how the German people assimilated the teachings of their philosophers and poets alike, to first recognize their defining and unifying ideals, and used this cohesion to fuel their ultimate goal of a unified nation-state. Ironically, it was through foreign conquest and the intervention of outside forces which spurred the modernization of the German bureaucratic work force within the German States and mandated the expansion of education beyond the traditional upper class. The expanded access to education and the increased availability of published works due to printing technologies can be pointed examples of the increased penetrability of philosophy into German culture. Within the focus of this thesis, it is a certainty that the ideological force as an element of unity amongst the German people, or *Volk,* had practical ramifications on the foundation of the German State. With the nation-state, elevated to the highest importance to Germans even amongst most liberals, we must perhaps expand the perspective and ask what do the

[290] Eyck, "English and French", 341.

attempts and ultimate unification of the German people within one nation-state tell us about the nature of German liberalism?

1848 – A Liberal Revolution?

Though there were some signs of optimism on the part of the emerging middle class and trepidation on the part of the Prussian ruling class, it was clear that the ideals of the French Revolution which resulted in social upheaval for the apparent rights of the citizenry, did not take root in Germany. Instead of forming specific groups within the German States, the influence from France and Western Europe dispersed into the German culture. Stemming from the second French Revolution, or July revolution, in France of 1830, political group meetings arose throughout many of the German States. Protests and the fear of sizable revolts caused the local princes to grant citizen representation within functions of the state, ultimately resulting in constitutions.[291] It appeared as if liberalism was growing by leaps and bounds in Germany and would steadily equal that of examples in Western Europe. Most liberal movements within the German States, however, were pleased with increased representation in local government. Meanwhile, the absolute control of the Austrian and Prussian monarchs continued as they evaded the demands of liberal protesters. The Prussian King, Frederick William III, continually bought time through promises of a constitution, but these promises were never fulfilled. The death of King Frederick William III in 1840 created hope that his son Frederick William IV would finally make good on his father's promises, but he too had no such intentions. To quell

[291] Richard K. Ullmann and Sir Stephen King-Hill, *German Parliaments,* (Hyperion Press, Inc., 1954,) 42.

this force of liberalism, the new king executed a social program that enforced a rigid conservative orthodoxy elevating the role of the orthodox Protestant Evangelical Church and even some functions of the Catholic hierarchy.

The call for a unified German Parliament arose across the individual German States. A German Parliament, freedom of the press, and extended privacy rights were some of the identifiable liberal demands of the looming revolution of 1848.[292] An excess of five hundred delegates convened on March 31st in Frankfurt at what was to be called a pre-parliament. Even within this liberal delegation, however, the members were largely moderate and middle class and still influenced by the German ideology advocating a primary of the state. So, were these liberals who revolted also *Volkisch* liberals? The liberal revolt in 1848 was in fact a representation of the numerous class strata that had emerged; an upper middle class, an ever-growing lower middle class, and the new industrial proletariat.[293] The new lower class consisted of artisans, employees, servants, workers, peasant-farmers, and small business owners. In many other nations they would certainly have represented a broad base firmly united for democratic gains.[294] The German (*Volkisch*) nationalism, however, which permeated the German citizenry prevented such a political consensus, and instead resulted in individual particularism varying by class, occupation, but most importantly by state. In South Germany, for instance, democracy was seen as too drastic a political change and the potential democratic groups were replaced by the "People's Party", and in states such as Baden,

[292] Ullmann and King-Hill, *German Parliaments,* 47.
[293] Friedrich Meinecke. "Lack of Unity Among Disaffected Classes." in *The Unification of German, 1848-1871.* ed. Otto Pflanze. (Holt Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1968.) 29.
[294] Velt Valentine. "Contradictions Within the Movement", in *The Unification of German, 1848-1871.* ed. Otto Pflanze. (Holt Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1968.) 12.

Saxony, and Hesse, the "Social Democrat" denoted that the unifying ideal of liberals only existed towards a strong German nation presumably in the form of empire.[295] The philosophical idea of liberalism that advocated increased freedoms for the people was agreeable and consistent with the polity and ideology of the *Volk*, but democracy was a political reality, and a complete upheaval from their monarchical states. It was feared such a drastic change would hinder the goal of a unified Germany. This fear reflects a historically and philosophically developed worldview priority that unity and legality function as preconditions for secured freedom.

On May 18th, 1848, the first official meeting of the Frankfurt parliament convened in St. Paul's Church. Though it was hoped that between 600 and 700 representative members elected from within each individual German speaking state would arrive to the parliament on May 1, the lack of conformity among states, and confusion delayed the event, as only approximately 300 members attended the first meeting 18 days later.[296] Although afforded the ability, it is estimated that "less than half of the adult males in the population took advantage of their right to vote."[297] The members had the unenviable task of combining two conflicting philosophies which permeated the revolution. One call echoed the "antistatist impulse of western European liberal thought", while the other major conviction shared by many liberals was "that the state remained an indispensable ally in a society."[298] Most of the liberals present were ultimately wary of the extremes they saw in other nations caused by full, or unchecked,

[295] Valentine, "Contradictions Within", 12-13.
[296] Frank Eyck, *The Frankfurt Parliament 1848-1849*, (The University Press, 1968.) 103.
[297] James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1978,) 54.
[298] Sheehan, *German Liberalism,* 43.

reactionary rebellion.[299] The lack of political will to implement sweeping changes led to a gradual decline in both support and interest for the parliament through the end of 1848. The "September Crisis" saw the monarchies of both Vienna and Berlin reassume control from the revolutionary forces, all the while, the Frankfurt parliament appeared paralyzed by indecisiveness. Ultimately, this would lead to moderate representatives from the smaller states and Prussia to support the idea of unification under the King of Prussia as "hereditary emperor of the Reich."[300] Into 1849, President Heinrich von Gagern attempted to solidify the parliament through the creation and implementation of a German constitution. Born in 1799 to a distinguished family with a long history of service within the German State of Hesse, von Gagern was the preferred choice to lead the parliament by the vast majority of moderate liberals. Receiving 297 out of 305 votes cast, his election to president of the parliament was a key indication of its moderate foundations.[301] The first line in the parliament's constitutional draft prepared by a Constitutional Committee declared the desire for a "common German citizenship." Unfortunately, however, the individual states could not agree on what such a citizenship would entail.[302] Disagreements led to conflicts within and between the states, even resulting in two civil wars within the Kingdom of Saxony and in the Rhine Palatinate of Bavaria.[303] Following such outbreaks, and a growing radicalization of the parliament, Heinrich von Gagern resigned as President on May 21, followed by a number of moderate members. The resignation of such moderate members, and the outright recall of

[299] Sheehan, *German Liberalism,* 47.
[300] Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 72-73.
[301] Eyck, "English and French", 106-108.
[302] Eyck, "English and French", 66.
[303] Eyck, "English and French", 384-385.

others by member states, caused a mass decline in numbers. The original mandate of 200 members required within parliamentary votes was reduced to 150 on April 30th, 1849, only to be dropped to 130 members a month later. The parliament would not meet again, as by a vote of 71 to 64, the remaining members transferred the group's location to Stuttgart.[304]

To liberal critics of the time, a general opinion formed in the following decades attributing the liberal revolution's failure to the partial political changes and a lack of commitment to enact a permanent democratic state. Whether or not this critique holds merit, it seems apparent from both their words and actions that the majority of the revolutionaries still believed in the good of the people through the security of the state. They did not want the social upheaval which had spawned the terrors in France following the French Revolution.[305] In this specific example, the German liberals remained committed to incremental political change as the Frankfurt Parliament immediately cast off the foreign garb of revolution and sought to assume the role of orderly government rooted in the strong sense of German national identity.[306] The development of liberal ideas as representation of internal German ontological theory will be examined within another component of this worldview analysis, but it has been commonly held that when the liberals rose up against the monarchical state, it was mainly in efforts for ethnic unification, instead of truly liberal goals.[307] Within the bourgeoisie existed the upper and the lower middle class and separate again existed the peasantry and the agricultural

[304] Eyck, "English and French", 385-386.
[305] Valentine, "Contradictions Within", 14.
[306] Louis Miller, "Between Kulturnation and Nationalstaat: The German Liberal Professoriate, 1848-1870," *German Studies Review* 15, German Identity (Winter, 1992): 34, https://doi.org/10.2307/1430639.
[307] Meinecke, "Lack of Unity", 35.

labourers who together represented the majority of the German people. By 1848, the demands of this majority group entailed nothing more than the removal of feudal laws still imposed upon the peasantry. The aristocracy saw this as an easy and inevitable concession which would calm, even pacify the largest percentage of the revolt. With this group appeased, they would later act as a key group in the counter-revolution, for they were accustomed to obeying their superiors.[308] The lack of tangible accomplishments stemming from the revolution also caused resentment from the lower classes towards the men leading the movement. The revolutionaries, who seemingly longed for action, feared that a liberal revolution resulting in equality for all German people was never going to be achieved.[309] At the same time, the old system of order appeared attractive in comparison to the inaction of the Frankfurt Parliament. The revolutionaries thought they could radically change the German nature with the attainment of personal liberties, but instead, through their disorder, they inadvertently advocated for the peace and security the pre-revolution system had once offered.[310] The conservatives saw this as an opportunity to express to the common people the fear that these extremist groups would destroy their precious traditional culture, and all hopes for future achievement. The liberal movement had turned against itself, while the gulf between the middle-class moderates and the oppressed working class was rapidly widening.[311] The opportunity existed for King Frederick William IV to dissolve the assembly, which he did on December 5th, 1848. In a final act to quash the revolution, he enacted his own constitution and retained almost all of his absolute power. Following this, the liberals were left defeated and fractured. In

[308] Meinecke, "Lack of Unity", 35.
[309] Valentine, "Contradictions Within", 15.
[310] Valentine, "Contradictions Within", 16.
[311] Valentine, "Contradictions Within", 55.

some cases, the German States retaliated harshly as liberal leaders of the curtailed revolution were tried and executed by military courts.[312]

The failure of the 1848 revolution highlighted a liberalism in Germany ingrained by tradition rather than one seeking a radical new society and a steadfast idealism assured of the continual progress of history, empowered by the unity of the German people. The devastating failure of the liberals' attempt instituted a crisis of faith amongst the liberal professoriate. Before 1848, many liberal scholars assumed that German national aspirations naturally aligned with German cultural traditions.[313] Whereas the "modernizing liberals of the 1840s had still operated in a largely historicist, romantic cultural context," those who emerged as the disillusioned veterans of the failed revolution operated in an intellectual climate dominated by materialism, positivism, and realism.[314] Within this disillusioned group existed an exposed need for liberals to adapt their strategies to the practical requirements of national unification. The concern devoted to the history, philosophy and literature, steeped in the myth of a German people's assent to unification, had been proven out of touch with the modern political maneuvers of the conservative class. The liberals resolved to be better equipped to "respond to the concrete needs and prospects of unification" should the opportunity arise again.[315] The liberals would move beyond the defeat of 1848 resigned to the belief that the eventual unification would justify their previous intent.[316] This singular focus, supposedly bolstered by a new respect for modern politics and material concerns, would remain guided by a traditional

[312] Michael B. Gross. *The War Against Catholicism.* (The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 96.
[313] Miller, "Between Kulturnation", 33.
[314] Brian Vick, "The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Germany", *German Studies* Review 26, No.2 (May 2003): 249, https://doi.org/10.2307/1433324.
[315] Miller, "Between Kulturnation", 45.
[316] Miller, ""Between Kulturnation", 48.

ideal, only serving to further elevate the ultimate goal of German unification to an almost "mystical significance."[317]

Removing the "Middleman" – Otto von Bismarck

When Otto von Bismarck was appointed to the office of Prussian Chancellor in 1862, he possessed a hatred for the forces of liberalism. He recognized the revolutionary nature of the ideology and the threat it represented to the Prussian State. Bismarck was a member of the landed nobility of Prussia, the "Junker" class, and sought to protect the power of the Prussian State.[318] A victory by the liberals and a constitutional parliament achieved in 1848 would have meant the end of absolutism in Prussia and the total loss of power of the Junker class. Bismarck recognized that forces were moving toward German unity, and a power struggle was already in effect between the two most powerful German empires, Prussia and Austria. Rather than seek allies amongst Western nations, Bismarck recognized the need to control unification. To do this he needed to gain the support of the masses, effectively steal it away from the popular ideologies of the day. Bismarck identified the weakened state of liberals after the failure of 1848 and was quick to take the upper hand. The liberal supporters equally appeared ready to sacrifice the goal of popular sovereignty for the achievement of national unity. Bismarck had to steal liberalisms' most valuable weapon to gain popular support, and that weapon was nationalism. The national cause would be cemented through war, as in 1863, he achieved his victorious war against Denmark with the cooperation of Austria. Then, in 1866, he

[317] Miller, ""Between Kulturnation", 50.
[318] Otto Pflanze, "Bismarck and German Nationalism", *The American Historical Review* 60, No.3. (Apr, 1955): 550, https://doi.org/10.2307/1845577.

ordered Prussian troops to advance upon Austria. During this time, Bismarck negotiated with the liberals an acceptance of some liberal procedures in return for increased power in regard to foreign affairs and war.[319]

These steps would result in the emergence of the North German Confederation, a military and ultimately federal alliance of 23 of the northern independent sovereign German States. Although it only existed for four years, the subsequent German Empire adopted the institutional structure first developed in the Norther German Confederation.[320] Bismarck had little concern for contemporary constitutional theories and instead focused on his goal of ensuring that Prussia, and he himself, retained decisive control in the new political order. He specifically targeted the parliament to include universal suffrage, in effect mirroring the constitution of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849. This was an intentional strategic decision on Bismarck's part to bind the population directly to the state and circumvent the power of the "existing three-tier Prussian franchise, which favoured the prosperous middle classes, the mainstay of liberalism." Under Bismarck's design, the parliament had no authority to remove or direct the executive. The legislature consisted of two bodies, including the Reichstag (parliament) and the Bundesrat, the federal council made up of delegates appointed by the rulers of the of the individual German states. The constitution presented to the constituent Reichstag of the North German Confederation elected in February 1867 stated that the "chancellor was made responsible to the Parliament of the Federation." Unlike a British prime minister, the chancellor did not depend on parliamentary confidence to remain in office.

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[319] W.N. Medlicott. *Bismarck and Modern Germany*, (Lawrence Verry Inc., 1965) 65.
[320] Jenny Gesley, "150-Year Anniversary of the Adoption of the Constitution of the North German Confederation," Library of Congress, accessed April 17, 2017, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/04/150-year-anniversary-of-the-adoption-of-the-constitution-of-the-north-german-confederation/

In this case the "chancellor could be interrogated and asked to give an account of his politics in the Reichstag, but he was neither appointed nor could he be removed by the Reichstag."[321] The Reichstag approved the constitution by 230 to 53 votes on April 16th, 1867. It was elected only two months prior with the National Liberals representing "the largest party with 80 out of 297 seats."[322]

The German National Liberal Party emerged in 1866-67 to back Bismarck's unification strategy. This did not denote complete agreement from all members identifying as liberal, as the progressive party fractured over its stance toward Bismarck. The left wing would keep the previous name and continue to oppose Bismarck's policies, while the right wing agreed to support Bismarck's national program despite earlier conflicts. The National Liberal Party would comprise these latter members in "combination with many non-Prussian liberals" and would represent "the mainstays of Bismarck's parliamentary support during the formative years."[323] Allied to Bismarck after 1867 and in the minds of many, more national than liberal, the National Liberal Party would become the most powerful, yet optically ineffective party in the new German empire. Despite any political realities, optically, they had declared their support for the ultra-conservative Bismarck.[324]

The subsequent Franco-Prussian war saw the Prussian army, with the help of Northern and Southern German States, defeat the forces of Napoleon III of France. While German Idealism and liberalism provided the intellectual foundation for a modern

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[321] Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany 1850-1918*, (Routledge, 2001), 44-45.
[322] Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany,* 46.
[323] Gordon R. Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation' of German Liberalism", *The Journal of Modern History* 43, No. 1, (March, 1971): 59.
[324] John F. Flynn, "At the Threshold of Dissolution: The National Liberals and Bismarck 1877/1878," *The Historical Journal* 31, No. 2. (Jun.1988): 319, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00012905.

German worldview, and state, the forces of nationalism, included militarism and imperialism. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was not merely a military conflict, it was a pivotal moment in the transformation of German political culture as well. With the Prussian Army further bolstered by Northern and Southern German States, a decisive victory was achieved against Napoleon III of France. The military victory represented a culmination of the decades of strategic political maneuvers, ideological development and the widespread growth of nationalism. Following the victory, on January 18, 1871, Kaiser William I declared the formation of the German Empire of which he would become Kaiser and Bismarck would become Chancellor. Militarism then, played a central role in this transformation. Bismarck utilized Prussia's military strength and the decades of French aggression to further unify the German states against a common enemy. The Franco-Prussian War was a crucial, potentially final act in the presented progression of ideological and political development, which fused militarism and nationalism within the presentation of realized idealism and the unified strong state.

The German Reich became a hereditary monarchy with the King of Prussia simultaneously acting as the new German emperor.[325] The new unified empire from which Austria was excluded maintained practically the same fragile constitution as had the former alliance of German States, with a few more approval rights given to the new Reichstag. Within the new empire Bismarck saw the opportunity to bypass the liberal bourgeoisie and connect the monarchy to the working class. This was achieved by granting universal male suffrage; effectively meaning the working class would not be made dependent on the middle class for parliamentary gains.

[325] Dietrich Orlow. *A History of Modern Germany, 1871 to Present.* (Prentice-Hall, INC. 1987), 44.

This new constitution became famously referred to as the "Bismarck Compromise" for three major reasons; firstly, it assured almost complete power in the hands of Bismarck, secondly, and most importantly, it retained full conservative political authoritarianism by merely accepting the already agreeable liberal economic precepts, thirdly and finally, Bismarck was unmoving in the exclusion of future groups from political power that had not been party to the original compromise, specifically the emergence of new Catholic and Socialist groups. Bismarck had obtained his goals within the constitution, and he viewed any new political group as a threat to his power. The power within both the Reichstag under Bismarck and the *Bundesrat* or federal council, composed of state delegates consisting of twenty-six Prussian delegates of the fifty-one seats, was firmly under Prussian control.[326] Bismarck's success reveals that while nationalism and unity had become central driving elements of a developing German worldview, only certain liberal elements were selectively incorporated into this broader goal. Whether this selective adoption, and the perceived subordination of liberal aspirations to the priority of unity, represented a failure to integrate core liberal constitutional principles remains a question requiring further evaluation.

Historical Interpretation – Did Liberalism Fail in Germany?

In comparison to its European contemporaries "German liberalism was more moderate. It was a movement to change the state of princely absolutism, of clerical and noble privilege, and of social and economic restrictions, into the *Rechtsstaat.*"[327] It seems

[326] Orlow, *A History of Modern Germany*, 44.
[327] Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation'", 60.

clear that the practical goal, flowing from a theoretical idea, was a German society under the rule of law and of reason. Long before unification was realized, Bismarck had seized the ideal as his own, and many liberals realized this long-pursued goal would be achieved with or without them. The "future National Liberals" who would come to support Bismarck would base their arguments around two central points. First, that "a nationalist believes that personal freedom can be realized fully only within a unified national state free of foreign domination." This, as has been offered in the earlier section of this chapter, is a clear indication of the teachings of the era of German Idealism, and historically speaks to centuries of fear of foreign invaders imposing their will upon the disconnected German people. The second argument also spoke the fear of insecurity, in that only a strong, unified state could guarantee liberty.[328] This argument represented the theory prevalent in society and reinforced by the observed chaos in France during multiple revolutions, manifestations of government, and the instability that resulted. This is precisely this period's context for a German worldview and its identification of means to an end. Here unity and state capacity are valued as necessary structure for a liberal agenda to develop safely.

Despite the popular convention that the National Liberals conceded to Bismarck completely for the pursuit of national unity, the party voters "did not support Bismarck unequivocally" and even in the years leading up to 1871 with unification and his victory assured, they "led the fight for a number of liberalizing amendments to Bismarck's constitution."[329] These constitutional voting fights resulted in expanded parliamentary

[328] Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation'", 63.
[329] Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation'", 65-66.

authority with the most important amendment successfully providing the Reichstag real powers over taxation and budgeting. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly in the design of the new German Empire, the wider protections securing freedom of debate, association and the press.[330] These gains corroborate the identification of this component within a German worldview, and highlights that participation within a national framework accomplished concrete liberal protections.

The National Liberal Party was of another use in Bismarck's internal war against the German Catholic Church. Bismarck rallied the original supporters of the "Bismarck compromise" against those who posed a threat to his balance of power, labeling those not under his control as "enemies of the Reich."[331] By 1879, the "National Liberal Party's cooperation with Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* legislation further weakened the liberals' position and political power" when "Bismarck ended his alliance with the National Liberals by working out an agreement on tax reforms with the Center party."[332] Despite previous achievements, the act of political miscalculations had exposed the National Liberal Party as a majority symbol of political liberalism and threatened the progress and the perceived development of liberalism in Germany. In this development of German liberalism, "1878-79 marks the caesura that irreversibly and definitively closed off previous developments." The practical political power of an ideological movement had been directed towards the ultimate cause of statehood and unity, and it would appear to some liberal supporters that most liberals capitulated completely to authoritarian

[330] Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation'", 67.
[331] Orlow, *A History of Modern Germany*, 46.
[332] Mork, "Bismarck and the 'Capitulation'", 74.

conservativism.[333] But was this the case? Are the achievements of liberalism only cemented or fully achieved if realized in a total revolution of society or a complete upheaval of the previous political institution? Obviously neither was the case in the creation of a new German State and the unification of a cultural and intellectually unified people, but such criteria for success may speak to a misunderstanding of the true influences of German liberalism. Perhaps while the goals remained similar to those of liberal movements in other nations, the design and conception as to how those goals are truly achieved were influenced by a different series of theoretical inspirations and the results of those influences put into action have been judged too narrowly. We must then review the dominant schools of study as to the success, failure and the ramifications of German liberalism.

Lachs - German Connection with American Philosophy & Concern for the Individual

Publishing consistently since 1959, John Lachs is specifically notable to this work for highlighting the connections between German Idealism and American philosophy. Classical "American philosophy is deeply indebted to German idealism" explained Lachs, as philosophers such as "Peirce, Royce and Dewey acknowledge the influence on their works of Kant and Hegel." One area in which the philosophical traditions are opposed, however, as viewed by Lachs, does potentially stand in contrast with the position of this thesis. Lachs believes that the philosophers of German Idealism, such as Fichte and Hegel, "announce the insignificance of individuals, holding persons and their

[333] Gabor Erdody, "Unity of Liberty? German Liberalism Founding an Empire (1850-79)", in *Liberty and the Search for Identity*, ed. Ivan Zoltan Denes, (Central European University Press, 2005), 105.

happiness in very low esteem." Even within Kant's philosophy, Lachs asserts, "persons do not acquire much significance."[334]

To Hegel in particular, Lachs declares, "he thinks that the lives and happiness of individuals are of no ultimate significance and are therefore properly crushed by the juggernaut of history."[335] Lachs puts forth examples from the preface of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, as he reads Hegel as subordinating individuals to history, or spirit, citing passages that minimize the "share" of any single person. Hegel is highlighted for having written that "the individual must all the more forget himself," and in doing so he should, "expect the less from himself, and may ask the less for himself."[336] Speaking to the role of the individual and their contribution from within the universal or ethical community, Hegel suggests that individuals find their identity by giving themselves over to the ethical community.[337] From this perspective regarding the role of the individual, Hegel proceeds that "an action compared with which the action of a particular individual as such is something altogether so trifling that it is hardly worth talking about."[338] From these statements, Lachs's position holds that within Hegel's writing "Individuals have no business making demands on the state; they are to do what little they can for the large whole." Lachs interprets that Hegel fails to acknowledge that individuals may see things differently from the state or community, and that what seems insignificant from the state's perspective may be of profound importance to the person

[334] John Lachs, "The Insignificance of Individuals," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 38, No.1/2, Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin, (Winter-Spring, 2002): 79.
[335] Lachs, "The Insignificance of Individuals", 80.
[336] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind)*, 22-23.
[337] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit,* 92.
[338] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit,* 110.

living it.[339] In summation, Lachs concludes that "The stress on faceless consciousness makes it easy to denigrate living individuals; they lack, after all, the momentousness of the history-filling self-development of Spirit." He does not mean to imply that German Idealists have disregard for what "humans have accomplished" for in fact they actually "love and admire humanity; it is only human individuals they cannot abide."[340]

The wide and varied breadth of interpretations of Hegel, and German Idealists in general, is so common as to be stereotypical today. This thesis recognizes the multiple examples within German Idealism and Hegel's writing in particular that contribute to an anti-democratic or anti-individual interpretation. In fact, it is the general assumptions and stereotypes versus the reality of complex and often contradictory positions that this thesis seeks to understand. This analysis has highlighted evidence offsetting the position that Hegel does not provide considerations for the individual. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel follows from his definition and focus of Spirit or *Geist*, to framing his endeavour concerning practical philosophy to access "pure spirituality as the universal." From this assumed position on the part of Hegel as a truth or goal of the work's endeavour, he equally assigns the perspective that "Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into this high ether, in order to be able to live with science." This lofty goal assigned to the individual equally entails that the "individual has the right to demand that science shall hold the ladder to help him to get at least as far as this position, shall show him that he has in himself this ground to stand on."[341] This does not then seem to be a flagrant disregard or lack of perspective concerning the individual, but

[339] Lachs, "The Insignificance of Individuals", 81.
[340] Lachs, "The Insignificance of Individuals", 91.
[341] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind)*, 9 of 211.

instead a reciprocal understanding within his practical philosophy that if an individual wishes to achieve the fruits or potential of the mind through reason, one must strive for the level of the universal or the spiritual. This is not simply a demand placed on the individual, but an identified reward for this action, as Hegel states, "His right rests on his absolute independence, which he knows he possesses in every type and phase of knowledge; for in every phase, whether recognized by science or not, and whatever be the content, his right as an individual is the absolute and final form."[342]

As mentioned earlier, in his *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel presents a commitment to the individual, but this commitment is framed within the highest form of individuality in which the fulfilment is possible only through the community, what would be specified as the state. Through this the universal is attainable, but crucially not at the expense of individuality. Referencing again the reciprocal nature of the agreement, "neither is the universal completed without the assistance of the particular interest, knowledge, and will, nor on the other hand, do individuals, as private persons, live merely for their own special concerns."[343] As Axel Honneth notes, Hegel's Philosophy of Right "so conspicuously lost its appeal to the present" due to reservations or "stereotypes" which help explain "why doubts about Hegel's political philosophy are so dominant today."[344] In a modern context, there are numerous examples in which this work can be perceived as anti-democratic, or having been utilized by totalitarian forces citing examples which subordinate individual freedoms to the authority of the state. Beyond these stereotypes or preconceptions of the work, it is also recognized that Hegel's position put forth principles

[342] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind)*, 9 of 211.
[343] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 57 of 7959.
[344] Axel Honneth, *The Pathologies of Individual Freedom, "Hegel's Social Theory,"* trans. Ladislaus Lob, (Princeton University Press, 2001), 2-3, Kindle.

that "would legitimize those social conditions under which each subject is able to perceive the liberty of the other as the prerequisite of his own self-realization."[345]

For Hegel, to develop a theory of the individual and community, we look to a central point of interpretation, both positive and negative, concerning the individual, the ethical system devised by Hegel as the "idea of freedom"[346],

> The ethical framework is not abstract like the good, but in a special sense real. Spirit has actuality, and the accidents or modes of this actuality are individuals. Hence as to the ethical there are only two possible views. Either we start from the substantive social system, or we proceed atomically and work up from a basis of individuality. This latter method, because it leads to mere juxtaposition is void of spirit, since mind or spirit is not something individual, but the unity of individual and universal.[347]

From this idea it can be understood that "one can 'proceed atomistically and move upward from the basis of individuality (*Einzelheit*)' to community" or "one can 'start from substantiality' or from community and work down toward individuality." Hegel's method starts from the substantive and opposing the atomistic process he associates with earlier modern thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. He argues that the atomistic method cannot explain the ethical structures that constitute Spirit, and therefore

[345] Honneth, *The Pathologies of,* 7-8.
[346] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 3701 of 7959.
[347] Hegel, *The Philosophy of RIGHT*, Loc. 3908 of 7959.

cannot adequately ground individual freedom.[348] Although, any language which compares individuals to accidents, or not placing the individual experience as a starting position, can be cited as dismissive to individual freedoms, to look past such hindrances to the rationale of Hegel's system equally allows a focus on the elements which clearly envisioned individuals as meaningful participants within political life. Jeffrey Church, for example, argues that "'active citizenship' is justified based on Hegel's philosophical view of the good life for human beings, and hence that modern politics is justified as providing the best institutional system for the good life."[349]

The key distinction between this thesis and the firm position of Lachs, concerning the view of German Idealism, specifically Kant and Hegel, is consideration of context as part of the interpretation of their positions concerning the individual. There appears to exist offsetting evidence, through the cited example of Hegel, for the interpretation that the individual is of significant consideration within his philosophy. This is illustrative of the larger position of this thesis, in that a prevalent assumption holds that traditional German philosophy placed the whole community above, or at the expense of, the individual. In fact, the intricate philosophical teachings also presented its audience models concerning how the ultimate goal of individual rights may be achieved. The context in question would be of concern if one focuses on the method or the end when interpreting a position. German Idealism's theoretical consideration afforded to the individual is only one part of this worldview component and the overall consideration for this thesis. Other components presented within this thesis, specifically the ontological

[348] Jeffrey Church, *Infinite Autonomy, "The Divided Individual in the Political Thought of G.W.F. Hegel and Friedrich* Nietzsche, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), Location 417-429 of 7155, Kindle.
[349] Church, *Infinite Autonomy,* Loc. 748 of 7155.

element, will reveal the next step representing the methods theorized by these philosophers and ultimately how they may have been interpreted and practically integrated within the development of the nation. As to the development of interpretations of German Idealism and the practical development of German liberalism, this chapter will next examine the multiple phases of scholarship and its development.

Modern German Scholarship & Liberalism's Role

Since its unification in 1871, Germany had both internally and externally told its story as having subscribed to a special path separate from its neighbours and contemporaries on either side.[350] Following the devastation and societal upheaval of two total wars within half a century, the post 1945 world would see the division and creation of two separate German States and undoubtedly face a schism as to how Germans had been and would be viewed within historical scholarship. Recasting the subsequent debates through a worldview lens helps to clarify that what was at issue is not merely institutional failure or success, but the deeper German identification of culture, reason and the state in the nineteenth century.

In Germany's "political culture, historicism produced a close connection between historiography and monarchy."[351] The traditional Prussian school of history presented the "grand narrative of German history" which viewed the state or nation-state as the highest form of statehood in the nineteenth century. Following defeat in war and revolution

[350] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "The Return to the Western Tradition: German Historiography since 1945," Washington: German Historical Institute, (1991), 5.
[351] Volker Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn' in German and American Historiography," *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 54. No.3, (2009): 431.

within the nation-state in 1918, many historians of the older school rejected democracy and initially viewed the Nazi takeover as an improvement.[352]

In 1949, the German Historical Association attempted to reflect and take stock concerning the unknown challenges for the German people. Gerhard Ritter remarked "Germany is a defeated, heavily mutilated country, one might almost say a country cut into four segments. A country, powerless, without a common voice." The traditional or separate status for Germany, one independent and distinct from the East and the West, was no more, but Ritter called for a defense of the distinct German tradition to regain Germany's own history, while obviously allowing for a necessary "new spirit."[353]

Early West German historiography was shaped by historicism, which emphasized a worldview, a skeptical attitude toward historical interpretation, and a particular method for studying the past. Most historians of this view would claim that ideas, great individuals, and state structures shaped history.[354] This understanding of history and historical development continued to shape West German scholarship into the 1960s, but with historians such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Thomas Nipperdey, Jurgen Kocka and others, the discipline shifted decisively towards social history. As direct opposition to historicism, this group "felt that National Socialism was the product of the authoritarian and anti-democratic traditions and structures that were deeply entrenched in German society."[355] The social history movement introduced a new spirit, breaking away from a nationalistic devotion to history and of Germany as a whole, and firmly entrenched in the

[352] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn'", 431.
[353] Mommsen, "The Return to the Western Tradition", 6.
[354] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn' ",430.
[355] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn'", 432.

Western liberal ideal. Most importantly, the *Sonderweg* theory, closely associated with Wehler's work and his contemporaries, argued a distinct continuity in German history, mostly focusing on lack of growth of liberal structures in German society, which separates it from the normal pattern exhibited in contemporary Western societies. The integration of the liberal paradigm as a corrective measure to West German society, and specific focus of this work, academia and historicism, was seen as essential for understanding modern German history. By the 1980s and 90s, however, British historians Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, would argue that the liberal paradigm had gone beyond to the point of an overcorrection.[356]

The cultural turn emerged as a reaction against the dominant social history approaches of the 1960s and 1970s, which tended to interpret human behavior primarily in terms of material ambition and "focused on long-term developments and sought to classify types of societies."[357] It largely ignored historical actors, framing both individuals and groups as victims swept up in the type of structure overarching a society. In the 1970s and 80s, the new cultural critique to this view argued that people operate inside social structures, not outside them. This cultural case for historical actors stated that just as much as individuals and groups were determined by structures, individuals and groups actively shaped those structures.[358] An interest in "culture, cultural history and in 'cultural studies' became increasingly visible in the 1980s and 1990s", explains Peter Burke.[359] Those working from within the established field of social history, devoted more specific focus to issues and "began to embrace anthropology, phenomenology,

[356] Mommsen, "The Return to the Western Tradition", 18.
[357] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn'" 427.
[358] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn'" 428.
[359] Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 85, iBook.

poststructuralism and other theories from the field of cultural studies as a means to actually 'complete' and 'fulfill' the social history project by bringing the dimension of culture and agency back into the equation."[360]

In 1990, a conference entitled "The Kaiserreich in the 1990s: New Research, New Directions, New Agencies" was held at the University of Pennsylvania. Most of the original research essays were published in 1996 in *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany 1870-1930*[361]. The contributors demonstrated how the expanded field expanded and enriched scholarship on the period. Despite the general lack of conclusions from both the originating conference and the resulting publication, this work is of vital importance as a statement on the importance of interdisciplinary approaches and new approaches to important historical questions. The majority of the contributors, who were both British and American, did present concern questioning if the "new approaches have gained more acceptance in the English-speaking world than in Germany, where a conservative academic establishment still resists innovation."[362] It was the widening of historical study and the re-evaluation of previously known truths, that allow us to explore the complexity within the role of German liberals in pre and post-unification Germany. As has followed the structure of this chapter, the mediums of philosophy, intellectualism and art would influence the members of society who would eventually adopt liberalism, and most certainly would affect the goals and methods of this eventual movement as a group. Any determination as to the outcome of their efforts must consider both their philosophical

[360] Depkat, "The 'Cultural Turn'" 433.
[361] Geoff Eley, ed., *Society Culture, and the State in Germany 1870-1930*, (The University of Michigan Press, 1997).
[362] Ann Taylor Allen, "Review: Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930 by Geoff Eley", *German Studies Review* 21, No.1 (Feb, 1998): 141, https://doi.org/10.2307/1432413.

and cultural motivations, while also judging not the immediate, but more the long-term ramifications for society.

The narrative of a German *Sonderweg* "is constructed to a great extent as a story of liberalism's failure" and explicitly linked to "Germany's 'misdevelopment.'"[363] Geoff Eley contends that due to a new look at the true lives of the German bourgeoisie during the previously assumed failures of German liberalism, scholarship recognizes that middle-class values gained significant influences after the 1860s.[364] From this viewpoint, the next step is to revisit the previously thought nationalistic and ultra-conservative *Kaiserreich* period and ask "How 'bourgeois was the *Kaiserreich*?" The essays combine to question "both the social history of the working class and the broader analysis of everyday life."[365] Eley suggests that cultural history may revive older intellectual-historical questions, but with new methods.[366]

Since the mid-1970s, a historical school or theory based on the results of research into modernization has increasingly gained ground, "presenting nineteenth-century German historical development as an autonomous attempt at modernization in a unique region." From this understanding of liberal progress and the persistence of its ideas, historians increasingly regarded the revolution of 1848 as marking the beginning of a new era in German history. Though perhaps only a step in the formation of a "national identity", it represented new "political schools" within.[367] As to the contentious culmination of unification, the debate concerning capitulation or tactical achievement

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[363] Geoff Eley, "Introduction 1: Is There a History of the Kaiserreich?" in *Society Culture, and the State in Germany 1870-1930*, ed. Geoff Eley, (The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 4.
[364] Eley, "Introduction 1:" 5.
[365] Eley, "Introduction 1:" 15.
[366] Eley, "Introduction 1:" 39.
[367] Erdody, "Unity of Liberty?", 91.

continues as "opinions differ widely about the evaluation of 1866-71." Some historians interpret unification as a liberal surrender to Prussian authoritarianism, others place it as a victory of national, or public, unity over narrow regional interests.[368]

Though it may seem counter-intuitive to most observers in the gaze of history, or even most contemporary liberals of the day, amongst the German people the "great majority of liberals experienced 1871 as a moment of culmination." Through the political consolidation of Prussian power, the German people achieved the long theorized unity of a once dispersed and vulnerable cultural polity. This result incorporated numerous additions to state design denoting decades of normalization amongst the German citizenry of liberal ideals identified as practical expression of the theories of German Idealism. Through these practical expressions, by the early 1870s "liberalism seemed to have gained some ground" as within the new empire, "the pace of economic growth picked up considerably, and the apparently decreasing social tensions and national liberal initiatives for comprehensive reforms held out the hope of improvements in the near future."[369]

Beyond the traditional belief in a *Sonderweg* Theory, but short of its rejection due to the existing and thriving bourgeois of liberal ideas, there is the position that liberalism's failure in Germany, culminating in the rise of National Socialism, was due to a racist or ethnocentric form of liberalism. Eric Kurlander, for example, presents the course of German liberalism's development as a "blatant rejection of universalism in the

[368] Erdody, "Unity of Liberty?", 99.
[369] Erdody, "Unity of Liberty?", 102.

name of *volkisch* national, that virulent strain of racist chauvinism that found its purest political manifestation in Nazi Germany."[370]

Those like Kurlander, focusing on the racist elements or interpretation of the *volkisch* culture, contend that "Eley does not go far enough. *Volkisch* ideology was more than a 'residue of nineteenth century liberalism. It was an integral factor in twentieth century, German liberal consciousness." This position would hold that from this influence, be it intellectual or cultural, became the predominant influences and thus, "German liberalism failed because it was progressively undermined by an increasingly ethnicized conception of national identity prevailing in German political culture after 1890."[371] The position draws the stark distinction between a true form of liberalism which should be universal and labeled as "racialist (*volkisch*) conceptions of German national identity."[372] Further expanding this distinction, Kurlander defines that the "Volkisch-nationalists or particularists" may adopt some of the ends of liberalism, or the "equal political rights, free market principles, and social progress compatible with a *volkisch* worldview, in essence, *volkisch* liberalism, so long as the hegemony of one particular ethnic or racial group remains unchallenged."[373] It has previously been identified within this component that a German worldview remained a composite within which exclusionary appropriations coexisted with, and often contested, liberal norms. This identified complexity is essential to explaining the developing and identification of a German worldview during the era of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century.

[370] Kurlander, *The Price of Exclusion*, 2.
[371] Kurlander, *The Price of Exclusion*, 5.
[372] Kurlander, *The Price of Exclusion.* 5.
[373] Kurlander, *The Price of Exclusion.* 6.

Of course, the racist evaluation of this one group can be categorized as polarized as it assumes the extreme dichotomy of positions for liberalism. While most modern liberal democracies would reject a declared motivation concerning one ethnic group, the actual theory and practical ideals stated within German liberalism would seem to align with any recognizable agendas of typical examples of liberalism, specifically the enumerating of individual rights within a constitution. Future theory identifying the failure of liberalism as a causality for National Socialism necessitates the narrow categorization that German liberalism was a *volkisch* movement which simply adopted elements of liberalism and thus classifies German liberalism as a racist *volkisch* vulgarization. This precludes consideration that it was indeed a true liberal movement, but one influenced by historic, regional, and philosophical issues specific to the cultural or ethnocentric group of people. In truth, many nations such as Germany and Italy possessed strong cultural identities long before political unification. From these identifiable influences there "gradually developed a political identity, a commitment to the population territory, and institutions of the new policy."[374] As has been expressed, and will further be examined in this thesis, specifically the component of mythos, the association of racist and ethnocentric elements within the intellectual influences of *volkisch* movement have been identified. The fact that the call for a German nation began as an ethnopolitical desire, does not denote that all actors within the resulting state are racist, or that a liberal movement is not a true form of liberalism.

[374] Jan Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria, and the Idea of the German Nation, 1871-1914," *History Compass* (9/3, 2011): 201, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00758. x.

While Kurlander recognizes the multiple historical theories and schools of thought which denote "the deleterious effects of modern nationalism on liberal democracy," his theory seems to mandate acceptance of "liberalism's abject capitulation to a racialist (*volkisch*) worldview"[375] and therefore rejects inquiry into other possibilities. One issue that has been stated by previous reviews, highlights that the "ardour for rigid generalization is present throughout the book as a whole and thus shapes its conclusions."[376] The hard line drawn between the previously stated dichotomy on the part of the author does not allow the work to "recognize the changing conception of federal nationhood, as it is not part of his question."[377] While Kurlander's approach has many merits and evokes interesting discussions important to the nature and construction of German ideologies in this time period, it again falls to the stringent view of liberalism and the ardent generalization of the German cultural influences, through the construction of two conflicting archetypes. As we will find, neither the uniting concepts of the German people, nor liberalism specifically in Germany or other similar nations, was ever so final or unaffected by worldly affairs.

Modern German historiography has long debated whether German liberalism represented a failed movement or a distinctive path (*Sonderweg*) in comparison to the West in particular. By situating liberalism within the broader framework of a German worldview, this thesis contributes to that debate by emphasizing the intellectual and cultural foundations that shaped its trajectory. In doing so, it harkens back to perspectives

[375] Kurlander, *The Price of Exclusion.* 2.
[376] Dieter Langewiesche, "Reviewed Work(s): The Price of Exclusion. Ethnicity, National Identity, and the Decline of German Liberalism, 1898-1933 by Eric Kurlander", *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, No.2, (Apr.,2009): 351.
[377] Langewiesche, "Reviewed Work(s):" 352.

such as Gerhard Ritter, who stressed the moral and cultural dimensions of German history, while also incorporating the progression of institutional or event-driven interpretations. The worldview lens offers a broad but connecting view of liberalism's role in German national development.

The Unifying Power of the State

For a long period of time preceding German unification, the idea of the unification of the German people within one German nation-state would have, to many, included most of the people of Austria. During the early to mid-nineteenth century, the formation of a state without Austria would be thought of as the "kleindeutsch or Lesser German solution." Until the "war of 1866," many German States had fought on the side of Austria "against Berlin and its allies" and were far more in favor of a Habsburg led German nation. These states would include large groups opposed to the "Prusso-German solution" to the long struggle for a unified German State. These groups, "opponents of Lesser Germany", fearful of the authoritarian and protestant Prussians, included the "Catholics, the democratic Left, anti-Prussian particularists, and the national minorities."[378]

Part of Bismarck's maneuver to seize upon the ultimate drive of nationalism and the goal of unification, was the division of lines through military conquest and the resulting power found in victory. As a result, Germany's relatively rapid ascent as a major power strengthened popular loyalty to the new empire. Very quickly, new lines of

[378] Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria," 201.

division, creating a them and us attitude emerged and "the Lesser German nation-state was not perceived as a provisional entity, a temporary solution, but was gradually accepted as a legitimate political reality." Change of mentality across this spectrum played into Bismarck's gambit as on one side the National Liberals supported Bismarck's planned Reich, but "many Conservatives, having initially resisted the modern unified and parliamentary nation-state, increasingly embraced nationalism as a means to maintain their socio-economic and political standing."[379] Rather than an immediate decision on the part of the German groups identified, noting the developing nature of nationalism, eventually "Catholics and Social Democrats, too, dubbed 'enemies of the Reich' in the 1870s and 1880s, came to accept the new situation, even though many aspects of Imperial Germany's political and social constitution remained contested." Due to this developed influence, the identification of "official nationalism and the rhetoric of unity and harmony have to be distinguished from the existing variety of interests, loyalties, and expectations within German civil society."[380] Liberalism, therefore, or any number of political or ideological identifications certainly existed amongst the German people, and in German culture, but was influenced and altered in practice due to the unique considerations with the other theoretical influences.

Obviously, before Bismarck and the realization of unification, albeit a lesser or Prussian controlled version, the cultural and intellectual elements of the German people began the call for such unification. These elements included a common language, collective historical experience, cultural connections, and the circulation of ideas across

[379] Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria," 202.
[380] Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria," 202.

political boundaries. The consolidation of the "Prusso-Protestant vision" would entail the "prevalence of traditional prejudices toward the Austro-Germans as backward, sluggish, and politically inept" but there can be no doubt that "Austrian literature, art, and music constituted essential elements of the German national heritage." As a result of this executed elevation of the "Staatsnation" as an element of identification and political allegiance from the existing influences of the "Kulturnation", the power and influence of "the Volksnation" increased throughout the 1880s and gradually added more "genetic attributes to the political and cultural definition of the German nation."[381]

This then again denotes a progression rather than a unilateral identification of German liberalism, or any other ideology or political movement, as inherently defined by elements of a racial *volkisch* movement. We see that within a unified Germany, a new "state centered identity evolved; 'Germany', which had earlier been identified primarily as a linguistic and cultural community, became increasingly associated with the borders, institutions, and inhabitants of the *Kaiserreich*." This is not to say that this cultural community was replaced, but instead realigned as a "German collective identity [which] retained a strong ethno-cultural dimension."[382]

The Practical Application of Theory

This section has presented, through the work of Eley and Blackbourn, that one of the central claims of an established *Sonderweg* theory, the idea that a conservative victory over liberalism was won by the all controlling *Kaiserreich*, could be fundamentally

[381] Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria," 204.
[382] Vermeiren, "Germany, Austria," 207.

questioned. This reappraisal of the *Sonderweg* theory was the result of the identifiable success of traditional liberal goals within a unified German nation. Correspondingly, critical accounts like that of Kurlander's presents an inability to accept a form of liberalism influenced by national and ethno-nationalistic elements. This latter position mandates a dichotomy of positions excluding any possibility of nuanced development concerning German liberalism and the form of political liberalism which developed during this time period. This then would discount the elements and contributions of the multitude of sub-groups representing political, cultural and religious groups identifying as German. We see through these examples the tendency to create hard lines of division, rather than explore the development of nuanced change amongst these disparate yet united groups. The question that needs to be asked is what influences ultimately united these groups, liberals, conservatives, and nationalists, alike? If it seems counterintuitive that liberalism would capitulate to conservative autocrats yet ultimately gain many traditional liberal achievements in German society, what could account for this? Why might such a long list of groups representing varied positions and allegiances enter into agreement within the call of unification? Perhaps the answer is that within this large and seemingly disparate group of people there existed shared theoretical ideals and a pragmatic understanding of how to achieve them while also assuring practical ends within their political agenda. Speaking to these groups and theories concerning how these individuals could protect their rights, their freedoms, their religions, political concerns, cultural elements all cast together, projected a shared spirit, within a unique intellectual force. This shared spirit highlights what this component, and subsequent components, of

a German worldview during the nineteenth-century presents as a durable pattern, one that presented unity under law as the surest path for personal and communal attainment.

The position as presented in this chapter does not accept either extreme dichotomy of theories presented and attempts to simply ascertain the influence and action of the time period in question. The primary considerations of the day and the pragmatic identification of societal and political ideals stand as resulting examples of the influence of German Idealism. From these examples, it appears there can indeed exist a degree of liberal success, and a *Sonderweg* of sorts. This denotes a philosophical *Sonderweg*, exhibiting a unique theoretical conception of the ideal of a freedom as the realization of the individual, without disqualifying a theory placing the resulting practical actions of German citizens within the standard political spectrum of Western liberalism. The manner in which the liberals identified their theoretical goals and how to achieve them is understandable as they were plausibly influenced by the expression of German Idealism, specifically the ideal structure of a just society as has been detailed in this chapter. Disseminated through universities, printing technology and the popular arts, the elevation of the principles of freedom and autonomy were then identified as the protected rights of the individual as presented within a strong, unified German State.

Conclusion- Worldview Framework Component: German Idealism and Liberalism

The gains of liberalism in Germany were similar to those exhibited in other contemporary nations, but the events leading to these achievements were specific to the cultural, philosophical and political realities of that society. Perhaps therefore, instead of negating a special path of the German people, it is true that every nation has its own path,

based on particular ideas, the philosophy expressed by its people and their resulting actions. The study of this history through the context of a worldview component, can strive to ascertain the principles and most influential teachings of a society through the thoughts and action of its citizens, highlighting what is important to them, and what ideals and theories resonate for them. The component has not merely identified the prevalence of liberal or idealist ideas, but as one component of a German worldview it provided categories which connected autonomy to the ethical state, interpreted the people as a historical and cultural community, and evaluated political choices by their contribution to lawful unity.

The liberal movement was forming concurrently within a long developing polity of the German people. The theoretical influences and practical expressions of this group of people resulted in a method different in certain respects to that of other nations to attain similar goals. This was a path specific to what would become Germany, and these elements would remain at its core, to varying degrees, throughout the period of the late eighteenth century and the course of the nineteenth century.

Chapter 3:

Ontological Beliefs Through Societal Vision

What did the development of a German nation-state during the nineteenth century reveal about the intellectual beliefs of the German people concerning the nature of what it is to be human? As introduced in Chapter One, a "societal vision" can be a significant demonstration of an ontological component acting as evidence of "fundamental assumptions about how society should be organized and how societal problems should be addressed."[383] This chapter will investigate the German people's particular concept of what it meant to be human, a particular ontology spanning the late eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century. This period began before the German people were a single unified nation-state and culminated with the unification period of the 1870s.

The chapter examines the second component in the worldview framework: the concept of the human (ontology) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This period encompasses a decades-long series of civil and constitutional events culminating in the unification of the German people in 1871. An examination of the societal institutions and designs of the state which they envisioned and strove for will identify a German concept of the human, and the rights, values, and expressions accorded to the human within this society. Framed within this thesis, these ontological assumptions constitute a core component of a German worldview, for they reveal the underlying picture of the human person that guided state development, constitutional designs, and political judgement throughout the nineteenth century. It is through the structure and

[383] Hedlund-de Witt, "Exploring worldviews and their," 79.

operation of a society, and the inherent consent of an electorate, that we can see the realization of the philosophical nature of the ontological element. How do the highest of intellectual beliefs concerning the nature of what it is to be human translate in the design and regulation, or enforcement, of a functioning society?

Societal Vision as the Embodiment of the Philosophical Conception of the Human

The philosophical conception of what it meant to be human amongst the German people during this time period will be presented through the theoretical development and the practical expression of the *Rechtsstaat*. The philosophical contemplation of a particular ontology and the design of a society to allow for this potential to every human is what would drive the course during this period for the German people. The development of a new focus in German philosophy, as presented in Chapter 2, denotes a progression beginning with Kant to a post-Kantian fulfillment of German Idealism resulting in a clear focus on freedom and autonomy as essential for the human being. This progression also incorporated inquiry into the tangible structures in the world to assure these principles. Freedom, in this philosophical tradition, is treated as an essential attribute of the human being. From this essential philosophical identification, there results practical expressions "of human existence whose legitimacy and motivation is conferred by the ontological dimensions of human freedom."[384] This reveals how the German philosophical tradition furnished a German worldview premise that freedom is not merely an abstract attribute, but a lived condition requiring appropriate institutional norms. The

[384] Marius Andreescu and Andra Puran, "From Legal Liberties to Ontological Freedom," *Law, Society & Organisations* IV, Issue 7 (2/2019): 39.

nineteenth century German nation-building process can reveal an ontological component of a German worldview as to how the human being is conceived by a polity of the people identifying as a united group. Read historically, this is the fulcrum from ontology to order, the belief that the human is free and can demand public forms such as rules, rights, and legal procedures, all through which freedom can be lived in a shared order.

The *Rechtsstaat* is the theoretical conception of the state incorporating the freedom of the human being, and in practical terms, the individual in society. To this individual, the theory presents the role of the state to allow for the best possible environment for this freedom to exist. The increasing development and recognition of this theory during the nineteenth century was identifiable through the actions of state actors attempting to implement this theory as applied rules of law within multiple attempted iterations of the united German nation-state. The progression from the philosophical theory to the enumeration of certain rights acts to demonstrate how the "practical importance of the ontological meaning are to be found in the freedoms consecrated in the law."[385] The development of a more pragmatic and materialist approach understood freedom as something shaped by real-world constraints.[386] The events of this period culminated in the formation of the German nation-state. The steps towards this ultimate goal, including multiple examples of constitutions and political compromises regarding the state, demonstrated the influence of the philosophical identification of the core human principle. Within the translation from the philosophical to practical application, the law as enumerated within the constitution does not define

[385] Andreescu and Puran, "From Legal Liberties," 39.
[386] Andreescu and Puran, "From Legal Liberties," 41.

freedom abstractly, but specifies the particular freedoms it protects. The examination of the developments towards a unified German State allows this study to analyze how the rights established in law reflect the choices and priorities of lawmakers at a particular historical moment.[387] In the present chapter's analysis of the ontological component, these enumerated rights embedded a shared understanding of what a human being is owed within a political structure of a polity. Accordingly, constitutions in this period serve as evidence of a conversion of ideas about freedom into institutional shape.

This growing support for a unified nation-state and the normalization of liberal views during the first half of the nineteenth century recognized that the human being innately held a purpose and required the means to develop in the manner they decided. The philosophical theory of the *Rechtsstaat* would to some degree assume the social trends of increased liberal principles which resulted in declaring the legality of an administration's power and enshrining the principles specifically designed to protect individuals from infringing actions by said administration.

The liberal ideas would follow from the design and reason of the philosophical theory and decide upon a positive law approach to establish and protect its principles as fundamental human and civil rights. The growing liberal priorities, based on the right for a human being to choose their own purpose and free determination, equally held the corresponding recognition that freedom could not be guaranteed for every individual due to the nature of human beings. With the corresponding goals of a German people, that of unity and the developing transfer of power within a society, a design of society was required to best achieve the fulfillment of a human being's fundamental right to freedom.

[387] Andreescu and Puran, "From Legal Liberties," 42.

The liberals' preferred method for assuring these priorities, based on the fundamental conception of the human being's purpose, was through the form of written positive law. As the state was the identified method of assuring this principle of human freedom, the rule of law as declared and protected by the state would best protect these individual freedoms. The resulting development of legal norms formalize individual rights as the concrete expressions of freedom within society, "which is the phenomenal aspect of human manifestations in the social environment."[388]

Through the practical progression of the German state during this time, the theoretical principles of the Rechtsstaat theory amassed acceptance and proponents from a wider variety of political associations. The priorities established through the intellectual and philosophical development concerning the human being, specifically a focus on freedom and its elevation within the state, would be adopted by a larger representation of the German population. The philosophical identification of freedom, and the identification of the required or best practical societal structures to achieve this freedom, influenced the actors of the time. The emergence of the *Rechtsstaat* as a viable concept shared by a plurality of citizens resulted in practical expressions of the philosophical influence. The elevation of liberal ideals and enactment through pragmatic applications of this rule of law merged in society with the force of nationalism. The fusion of ontological freedom with nationalist aspiration demonstrates an identified pattern within this worldview component, the conviction that individual flourishment and collective unity are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive. The unified state would be identified as the protection and assurance of the freedoms as presented within the *Rechtsstaat* theory,

[388] Andreescu and Puran, "From Legal Liberties," 41.

as this philosophical conception of the human being would blend with and add to the growing force of nationalism.

This component explores a particular concept or notion of what it meant to be human, a particular ontology. A German view of what it means to be human, as articulated within eighteenth and nineteenth century political and philosophical discourse, is an aspect of a German worldview. The nineteenth century offers multiple examples of societal and political change following the destabilizing events and intellectual forces at the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout the progression of various iterations of attempted unifications amongst the German States, a new conception of state power would take hold. The freedom of the human being and the inherent rights of individuals would become normalized amongst the German people. This ultimately influenced the desired target of their society in terms of design to achieve the rights expressed within a philosophy and political theory.

Unity, Rights & the Role of the State

This section traces how unity, enumerated rights, and allocations of state power functioned as the chief nineteenth-century mechanism for turning the philosophical concept of freedom, integral to an unfolding German worldview, into a mechanism of public structure. The nineteenth century offers points of insight as to the ontological beliefs and the valuations assigned to those beliefs as exhibited through the growing desire and systems conceptualized for a unified German nation-state. This timeline of efforts to achieve a unification of the German people through political calculations and intellectual proliferation will reveal the priorities of a people and how they ultimately

acted to achieve these discernable priorities. The period represents the first time a constitution was considered amongst the united German States to address the individual rights of citizens. This would in turn incite multiple examples and proposed structures of how the power of the state should be allocated to best achieve and assure those rights. These practical actions within German society expresses the higher overarching ontological identification of freedom as a priority principle to be established and protected within this practical societal structure. The intertwining of political design and human ontology illustrates how, in a German worldview developing during the nineteenth century, linking personhood with institutional stability as rights required unity, and unity gained legitimacy by safeguarding rights. Despite the growing, or evolving, recognition of this ontological priority, the practical political steps towards this goal would be represented in numerous iterations of governments and societal upheaval over the course of the century. What follows links these devices, including unity, rights and state power, to the period's emerging pattern of making freedom practical. This will also reveal how important human freedom is to a German ontology and hence a German worldview.

1815 German Confederation and the Emergence of Political Nationalism

The nineteenth century presents a period of impactful steps towards unification of the German nation-state. A focal point of this process occurred in 1848, representing a break with the previous form of both government and conceptualized rights of citizens and ultimately one which forced the traditional power holders to change to incorporate the demands of German society. For this reason, the 1848-1849 period will be a central

focus of this chapter, but the events both preceding and resulting from this event will help reveal the impetus behind decisions made and the onus placed on human rights within the state.

The German Confederation, or *Bund*, was established in 1815 as a direct result of post Napoleonic European restoration during the Congress of Vienna.[389] This significant step followed a period of defeat of a conquering force and the collapse of the previous structure within the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleonic rule introduced societal changes across the German states, only to be immediately followed by a renewed call for unity to defend against foreign threats. This confederation of sovereign German States represented an indirect step in the process towards a unified German nation-state, but ultimately served to highlight this emerging nationalistic trend. With military defeat and invasion serving as the impetus for the catalyst in 1815, this nationalistic trend was not merely cultural, it was increasingly tied to militaristic protectionist concerns. The memory of Napoleonic dominance and the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire helped to instill and perpetuate theories that only a strong, unified state, and more specifically a unified military force, could safeguard any form of German sovereignty. Thus, ontological commitments shape a developing German worldview as issues such as security, unity and sovereignty are recognized as necessary preconditions for the desired development of the human being.

The Confederation accounted for a combined population of 30 million, with membership ranging from very large states such as Austria, 9.5 million, and Prussia, 7.5

[389] Robert Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation, 1815-1866," *Report of the Annual Meeting/The Canadian Historical Association* 41, 1, (1962): 68.

million, to tiny ones like Liechtenstein with below six thousand. Protecting the sovereignty of the individual states and their prince's power would complicate procedures, as the power base of the confederation certainly rested amongst the largest members. The official inauguration of the German Confederation was delayed until November 5, 1816, when the "*Bundesversammlung*" held its first session. Within this structure, the *Bundesakte* presented an "almost skeletal constitution" which established "no central organ beyond the *Bundesversammlung,* a form of permanent congress of ambassadors of the constituent states."[390] In the event of structural changes or matters of law, "a *Plenum*" would be held, which meant that voting was allocated by state, with larger states receiving multiple votes. Any hopes for progressive change or national developments within the Confederation would be dashed as in any matters of the constitution itself each member state, including Austria, "possessed a veto."[391] Through this design, it became obvious that following the Napoleonic era, the main intent of this confederation was to fortify a traditional order against similar threats, which would most certainly come to include emerging intellectual and political movements. During the 1830s especially, a new series of ideas and revolutions, including the growing influence of nationalism and liberal priorities, would grow amongst an educated and expanding middle class. During this period of political demands, the *Bund* directly intervened in constitutional disputes in Braunschweig, Electoral Hessen, and Hannover.[392]

German nationalism would emerge during the 1830s "as a political force with a much broader social base than at the time of the Congress of Vienna." In this atmosphere,

[390] Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation," 71.
[391] Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation," 72.
[392] Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation," 73.

further political discontent and ideologies would combine with nationalism, "providing a strong unifying force of growing importance, through wider and better provisions of education."[393] With the threat of revolution stoked, there existed great impetus to introduce new internal security measures, tightening censorship and surveillance, including the banning a number of newspapers. The *Bundesversammlung* would eventually create a new Central Investigation Authority and by 1834, a series of secret measures were introduced to reinforce censorship, limit constitutional reform, and suppress revolutionary activity. The Confederation's repressive measures illustrate a tension within the development of a German worldview through this period, as the existing tendencies of absolutism and the emerging ontological recognitions of freedoms would propel the political activity throughout this century. This series of anti-revolution measures would eventually subside, but this was mostly credited to the weak powers of the Confederation body, a result of its intentionally minimal framework. Even as revolutionary sentiment would build towards social upheaval in 1848, the *Bundesversammlung* continually attempted to suppress these activities, but the intentional design to protect the individual states' sovereignty limited any broad suppressive response to the growing power of an expanded middle class within the states. Faced with outbreaks of uprisings within the individual states, in "rare *Plenum* sessions" the *Bundesversammlung* ceded power to the new provisional authority of the German National Assembly, or Frankfurt Parliament on July 12, 1848.[394]

[393] Peter Burg, "State and nation in the German confederation (1815-1866), *History of European Ideas* 15:1-3: 31. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(92)90108-O.
[394] Spencer, "Thoughts on the German Confederation," 74.

State Design Prior to 1848

Prior to the events of 1848, one of the most important and influential effects of the Confederation of 1815 was Article 13 of the Confederation constitution. It declared that the "member states must enact their own 'representative constitutions', entailing a limited form of representations based on the social estates." From this article, we see that parliamentary government was not introduced to the German States because of the revolution of 1848, but in fact, at least some form of constitution was propagated across the member states some 30 years earlier as "a strategy to avoid revolution."[395] This example of constitutionalism, in what would ultimately be a development stage of the nation-state, reveals an important aspect within this component of a German worldview, the belief that stability and rights must be balanced through legal mechanisms.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the individual states shared a common status as "absolutist monarchies in which the whole authority was vested in the monarch and his bureaucratic apparatus." This traditionally accepted "idea of *Polizeistat*" formed the basis of these societies. Social order rested on the concept that the monarch would provide "his subjects with the widest possible care, but in circumstances of their limited freedom."[396] As events within neighboring European nations such as France accelerated new ideological forces such as liberalism, local intellectual influences flowing from the likes of Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humbolt popularized the idea of *Rechtsstaat*.

[395] Andreas Biefang and Andreas Schulz, "From Monarchical Constitutionalism to a Parliamentary Republic, Concepts of Parliamentarism in Germany since 1818", in *Parliament and Parliamentarism, A Comparative History of a European Concept*, eds. Pasi Ihalainen, Cornelia Ilie, Kari Palonen, (Berghahn Books, 2016), 63.
[396] Pawel Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights in the Views of Robert von Mohl," *Studia luridica Lubinensia* XXX, 1, (2021): 182.

The *Rechtsstaat* concept implied a gradual liberalisation of political and social life and coincided with the rise of ideas such as fundamental human and civil rights. Introduced during this period of liberal ideas was the "emergence of the concepts of the so-called 'fundamental rights' (*Grundrechten*), 'human rights' (*Menschenrechten*) and 'civil rights' (*Staatsburgerlichen Rechten*)."[397] Though these concepts would predominantly be introduced and remain within this broad conglomeration of individual states, what would otherwise be labelled as revolutionary ideas, would refrain from enticing complete societal or political upheaval. The growing representation of those attracted to these ideas could be placed within two groups. There were those who adopted the "natural law approach", as inspired by Kantian philosophy and through it "derived the existence of fundamental rights from the norms of natural law, trying to link them with the reality of a state based on the idea of *Rechtsstaat*." Associated within the new liberal wave, a second "positive-law" group held that "the source of fundamental rights should be the norms of written ('positive') law related to citizenship." This second group ultimately sought an enumerated list of fundamental rights. Early on, both of these groups were associated with the theory of *Rechtsstaat*, and ultimately the State was identified to be the vessel in which the rule of law would best guarantee individual freedoms. The identified freedoms theorized to be protected within the State, representing the normalized real-world representations of the ontological freedom, included "civil freedom (*burgerliche Freiheit*), personal freedom, freedom of religion, freedom of thought and freedom of movement (*Freizugigkeit*)." This intellectual and philosophical expression would be promulgated through expanded education opportunities and the

[397] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 183.

concurrent expansion of the middle class, or bourgeois, thanks to the industrial revolution. The idea of freedom, therefore, is also inherently tied to financial independence through concepts such as "freedom of contract and business, equality before the law and guarantee and freedom of ownership." As these rights would gain specificity and enumeration, the positive law approach, though gradually rather than aggressively, would become an accepted and expected norm throughout the German States.[398] These notions of freedom came to ground German ontology, and hence another important aspect of a German worldview.

Revolution?

The nineteenth century marked a struggle between the traditional form of a governing absolutism and continuing trend of individualism and the resulting political ideology of liberalism. Through this period, the political interpretation of the *Rechtsstaat* theory and the ontological principles it espoused would combine with the force of nationalism to propel a society towards a societal ideal. If 1815 was a soft agreement and step towards the imagined goal of German unification, but an agreement without any substantial form of unified representational government, the next 15 years would see numerous potential catalysts for a climactic step forward towards this goal. In July 1830, one such catalyst emerged from the familiar accelerator of France and the July Revolution. The July Revolution was widely seen as a triumph for revolutionary ideals, and inspired constitutional concessions in smaller German states such as Hesse-Cassel,

[398] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 184.

Brunswick and Hanover. Despite this growing empowerment of liberal demands, the strongest German states such as Prussia "rigidly suppressed" forms of liberal nationalism and calls for constitutional rights.[399] Through a worldview lens, these upheavals serve to demonstrate how philosophical conceptions of human autonomy emerged as political expectations. The people increasingly interpreted themselves as individuals with rights, whose collective identification demanded institutional recognition.

Constitutions granted to or demanded by the people of a nation was a growing trend in the first half of the nineteenth century. Such was the case in the "Kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurttemberg and the Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt" where there had existed constitutions since the "first wave of constitutionalization, 1818-20." In the early 1830s, a "second wave" followed the July Revolution in Paris, which introduced constitutions within more states, "the most important of these being the Kingdoms of Hanover and Saxony and the Electorate of Hesse." Most often, these constitutions would be "negotiated between princes and assemblies, but then imposed unilaterally."[400] Despite relatively substantial gains through the defining and naming of specific rights, achieving these concessions from the former absolute police state and ultimately "granted by a self-restricting monarch" inherently implied that the people and their codified rights were still "depended on the ruler's decisions."[401] Across the individual states and the various versions of constitutions, there existed the common thread that held to the accepted form of "monarchic constitutionalism", resulting in the "monarchical principle" which would

[399] Louis L. Snyder, ed., *Documents of German History*, (Rutgers University Press, 1958,) 171.
[400] Biefang and Schulz, "From Monarchical Constitutionalism," 63.
[401] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 185.

project across these societies an acceptance at least, that the "prince was the sole possessor of sovereignty."[402]

On May 27th, 1832, the Hambach National Festival was held "to celebrate the anniversary of Bavaria's constitution", but much more so to "stimulate liberal sentiment." The event would see some 25,000 in attendance, denoting the widespread vigor within this movement, as people came "from Bavaria, Central Germany, Alsace, the Palatinate, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt." It was at this event that Johann Wirth delivered a speech to the enthusiastic attendees. His speech sparked a zeal for liberal constitutionalism and sought to unite this potentially disparate base within a growing geographic, linguistic and cultural form of nationalism. The speech was addressed to those of the "land, in which our language is spoken, the land, where our hopes live, where our love intoxicates us." He cast Germans as potential custodians of European "enlightenment, freedom, and international order", mobilizing sentiment to bind disparate regional populations to a constitutional project.[403]

The French Revolution of 1830, the July Revolution, would commence a decade of further destabilizing forces and the continual progress of incremental concessions within many of the individual German states. Eventually, however, uprisings would be witnessed across states, including populated cities such as "Vienna, Berlin, Cologne, Breslau, Konigsberg, Dresden, Darmstadt, Mannheim, Heidelberg, Stuttgart." A connection between this vast area was the people seemingly all calling for a "creation of

[402] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 64.
[403] Snyder, *Documents of German History*, 172.

a German republic."[404] This persistent ideological wave and the uneasiness of the monarchical leaders, culminated in the destabilizing event of 1848. Prussian King Frederick William IV, "a firm believer in divine-right monarchy, had little use for 'liberal constitutions'." On March 13th, citizens gathered in Berlin to "petition for reform," and from a position of weakness the King promised the crowd a constitution. By March 18th, however, the crowd remained and the palace security opened fire, resulting in a "loss of life on both sides." The Prussian king blamed foreigners for these events and asked his citizens to "Forget the past, as I shall forget it" and look instead to the future which he assured "under the peace-giving blessing of God, is dawning upon Prussia and through Prussia upon all Germany."[405] On March 21st, Frederick William IV finally and publicly "announced his openness to liberal reforms." A mere ten days later, more than 500 political reformers would meet at St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt and would initiate a period that came to be known as "the so-called Pre-parliament." From this location, the initial members would decide on how to hold an election for a "national assembly whose task should be the drafting of a constitution for an all-German state."[406] Here, in the developing ontological component of a German worldview, the forum becomes the argument in that assembling a national legislature presumes co-equal persons capable of self-rule under law.

Despite the label of a revolution and resulting revolutionary parliament, 1848 was something less than a complete social revolution in that it was primarily viewed as "an

[404] Elmar M. Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849 Constitution," in *The Democratic Tradition, Four German Constitutions*, ed. Elmar M. Hucko, (Berg Publishing, 1987), 3.
[405] Snyder, *Documents of German History*, 176-177.
[406] Michael Herrmann and Ulrich Sieberer, "The basic space of a revolutionary parliament: Scaling the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49," *Party Politics* 25, (6, 2019): 843, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068817749778.

uprising by the propertied and academic bourgeoisie." The work of Marx and Engels "was ahead of its time", but it was the air of social upheaval and nationalistic force which had "caused many workers in the towns and cities to join the demonstrations, and it had united them with students and middle-class burghers on the barricades." This pull across social divides can to a certain degree also be attributed to the increasingly pervasive influence of Romanticism as this "Revolution was a manifestation of a striving for an ideal" which "opened up the political stage for emotional speeches full of pathos in which the lyrics of the Romantic period can be discerned."[407]

A Realized State: By Design?

The important issues of the Frankfurt Assembly can be boiled down to the two most consequential questions of the day it confronted the twin problems of constitutional design and territorial scope. This then, provides a window into a German worldview and its ontological component, as an example in which freedom must be actualized through a structure capable of harmonizing individual rights with the unity of a polity or nation-state. This theoretical, unified state was initially organized by its members within a parliament "divided into radical democrats on the left, and liberals and conservatives on the right." The radical democrats on the left supported, if not expected a position of "complete popular sovereignty and abolition of monarchist rule." The liberals, positioned more to the political centre, "sought to preserve hereditary monarchy and to hedge it with a constitutional framework which would provide legal protection from feudal order and

[407] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 6.

parliamentary representation for the middle classes." A smaller group, identifiable as conservative members, represented the traditional aristocracy and "rejected democratic reforms and sought to preserve the old order."[408]

The representatives of the German States were eventually organized within the all-encompassing objective of the "transformation of the German Confederation into a federal state." As revolution and national aspirations consumed these states, a number of diverse groups would take part, including conservatism, "liberalism, democratic radicalism, political Catholicism and socialism." Nationalism, however, traversed and connected this wide range of the political and intellectual forces across German culture. Within the unifying force of nationalism, however, there still existed the complication concerning the existing states comprising the structure the German Confederation and its multi-national representatives.[409] The existing gamesmanship between individual member states that had restricted the development of the German Confederation would remain an aspect within the new Parliament. It was not until late October 1848, for example, when the "National Assembly decided – with 80 dissenting votes — that the Austrian territories that existed as members of the German Confederation should be incorporated into the new Reich."[410]

The Frankfurt Parliament

The National Assembly is referred to by many names including the Frankfurt Assembly due to its location in Frankfurt, or the *Paulskirche* Assembly as it resided "in

[408] Hermann and Sieberer, "The basic space," 843.
[409] Burg, "State and nation," 33.
[410] Burg, "State and nation," 34.

Frankfurt's neo-classical St. Paul's Church from May 1848 to May 1849." Whatever the name, this national governing body marked the "first and only occasion that all Germans (including the Austrian ones) elected a parliament in a reasonably free vote."[411] The National Assembly, located in Frankfurt, is treated here as an example where the legal image of the person, including enumerate rights, was named, debated and partially enacted. As will be most important to the development of a German worldview, this test for the political representation of the human being, was framed within the overarching call for sovereign unity.

With the February Revolution ushering in the Second Republic in France, in the German lands "51 liberal and democratic leaders met in Heidelberg and repeated the call for a national assembly." From a committee of seven, the call went out for representatives of all areas to form a preliminary parliament, the *Vorparlament*. Beginning on March 30th, 1848, clashes in both ideologies and political tactics emerged between "radical members under Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve who favored a democratic republic, and the more moderate majority" who favoured a "monarchical solution." Simultaneously, the pre-existing Confederation which had existed since 1815, "legalized the elections to the National Assembly." From the existing German intra-state body, 17 members were assigned the task to draft a new national constitution, under the direction of "Prussia's representative Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann." On May 18th, 1848, the first German parliament officially assembled in Frankfurt. As an operating representative body, the National Assembly, elected as President, Heinrich von Gagern, who framed the

[411] Lothar Hobelt, "The Austrians in the German National Assembly in 1848," *Parliaments, Estates & Representation* 18:1, 91, https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.1998.9627038.

Assembly's authority in terms of national sovereignty.[412] In his speech to the parliament he presented this call to its members:

> Let us unite as far as union is possible! Let us sacrifice what must be sacrificed in order to obtain and to lighten the passage toward better conditions. We do not compromise liberty, and we constitute the unity of our nation and Fatherland, for which we have yearned so long.[413]

A "National" Assembly

The design and structure of the first national parliament has often been conflated with the political upheaval on the continent, as it is assumed the German experiment merely "copied its French predecessor of 1789." Much more so than the French Republic, an influence for the National Assembly was the United States of America as established in 1787. The 38 German states would attempt to follow in the same blueprint as had been established by the 13 states in America.[414]

The liberals as a broad group would exhibit a great deal of disagreement concerning a constitution. Despite potential fracturing, the group still exhibited actions towards singular targets, or more aptly put, ends. Whereas only about "30 per cent of the Assembly adhered to their republican colours", the majority of parliamentary representatives "for reasons of principle or expediency, opted in favour of a constitutional monarchy." Along with a connecting goal of German unity, most members not

[412] Felix E. Hirsch, "Frankfurt, 1848 and 1948," The Problems of German Liberty and Unity," *Current History* 14, 81, (1947): 284**,** https://doi.org/10.2307/45307345.
[413] Snyder, *Documents of German History*, 178.
[414] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 92.

representing the conservative right came to Frankfurt from individual German states and in many cases had worked for years to wrestle power from a centralized class, namely, the princes. Though it may seem odd for liberal republicans supporting a single monarch, it is important to remember that if the body "was centralized, even in a monarch, then all but one of the German princes would be dispossessed in all but name." This design decision, which would appease the right and achieve specific ends of many of the center and the left, would impact most debates.

Although "Federalism versus Confederation was a war cry sometimes heard during the embryonic election campaigns of 1848", it would be revealed through the debates and ultimately the voting that "the legal distinction was less important than the realities behind it." A unified state affecting the lives of all German citizens would be an end achievable based on a negotiated balance between the rights of the individual states and a form of federal centralized power. This debate and the balance struck would decide whether the National Assembly held the power to produce and approve the document and laws on its own, or simply be their duty to "produce a draft that had to be ratified by the member states?"[415] The small group of left-wing members represented mostly the "smaller states of Germany: Baden in the southwestern" and "the Palatinate and Saxony, including some of the small principalities of Hesse and Thuringia." If their adherence to more radical political theories or positions can be explained due to a lack of state control or political prestige allowing for the growth of left political ideologies, then the inverse

[415] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 93.

would prove true in that the centre and the moderate right predominantly represented the "big states, Austria, Bavaria and Prussia."[416]

The membership of the National Assembly was "somewhat fluctuating, but never reached 600" members. As a working experience, it lacked a "rigid party system", but was comprised mainly of its "four major political groups, usually identified by the hotels in which their members met."[417] Despite these detrimental features of the design, expectations for the parliament at the beginning were high and engagement was diverse. The governmental body handled roughly 17 000 petitions totaling approximately three million people, representing "different group interests, articulated by craftsmen, merchants, entrepreneurs, and workers, who responded to current economic and social restraints." The petitions carried requests and issues ranging from constitutional and liberal political systems, to education, religion and the nation-state.[418] Mass petitioning presumes citizens as rights-claiming agents whose appeal belong in a juridical form, and another avenue of appeal beyond the previous stage of mass revolt. This breadth of public participation and concerns signals the dissemination of ontological beliefs into a societal consciousness.

In German states, the expansion of both the bureaucracies and education fields to include the growing middle class, increased engagement with politics and current events. Although many will point to the indecisive nature of the German Confederation, one vital consequence was that restrictions on print were relaxed after March 3rd, 1819, allowing

[416] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 94.
[417] Hirsch, "Frankfurt, 1848 and 1948", 284.
[418] Carola Lipp and Lothar Krempel, "Petitions and the Social Context of Political Mobilization in the Revolution of 1848/49: A Microhistorical Actor-Centred Network Analysis," *IRSH* 46 (2001): Supplement,151.

for the rapid expansion of newspapers and pamphlets. This lifting of controls on press and publishing, applied to "all printed matter, from books and brochures to pamphlets, bill posters, poetry and caricatures."[419] Certainly, this expansion of governmental freedoms is to be considered as a contributing element of the spread of new information and growing popular ideologies within the German States. The timing was also concurrent with the expansion of printing technologies, representing greater mass publishing and more financially available goods, allowing for wider access to political content. Newspapers within the German states expanded quickly to meet surging demand for timely political news. Across the German States, including Austria, it is "estimated that there were around 1700 newspapers in the whole of Germany in 1849."[420] The expansion of media and literacy helped solidify developments within a German worldview, as a shared vocabulary helped Germans interpret political events and their place within versions of the nation.

Equally contributing to the rise of political and ideological engagement was the expansion of access to education and the requirement of training for the expanding professional class. Whereas a rough estimate of the broad German population in 1848 puts the percentage of illiteracy at a low "20 per cent", a contemporary example such as Austro-Hungary stood at "40 to 50 per cent." Even accounting for the engagement within the 20 per cent of illiterate German society, the enhanced popularity of public readings and political songs allowed that these people "were also drawn into political events."[421] This simple, easily accessible and mass-produced content included a medium known as

[419] Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49*, trans. Christine Banerji, (St. Martin's Press, 1985),110.
[420] Siemann, *The German Revolution*, 112.
[421] Siemann, *The German Revolution*, 117.

"the illustrated broadsheet." Through "single printed sheets illustrating contemporary history" or providing "detailed depictions of the events of the day" printings would be known to exceed "10,000 copies per broadsheet."[422] The expansion and variety of mediums conveying a unified history and current affairs, these elements impacted the lives of individual citizens within the German states and transcended the previously closed political classes. Dissemination of accessible political accounts and theories widened who may count as a public legal subject. The spread and popularity of the print sphere acted as a medium to educate and popularize the opportunities and mechanism of human rights and representation. Thus, increasingly habituating a greater share of the public to make reason-based claims addressable by law and further cementing this development within the ontological component of a German worldview.

The Parties/Groups

Party positions within developing political bodies by nature relate cultural, societal and philosophical views, and thus reveal assumptions about the capacities and limits of the individual human being, and the role of the government body. The action of the parties and their individual actors within them, serves as evidence highlighting the unfolding of a German ontology and the development of a German worldview.

In May of 1848, the Assembly consisted largely of professionals, including professors, jurists, civil servants, clergy - both Catholic and Protestant, doctors, and others. This make-up of parliamentary members lessens any expectations concerning a

[422] Siemann, *The German Revolution*, 118.

revolutionary parliament and reveals that these professions almost exclusively represented the middle class.[423] By the end of 1848, membership lists identified parties covering the political spectrum, from Donnersberg representing the extreme left with 47 members, Deutscher Hof, Westendhall, Augsburger Hof situated more within the Left Centre with Wurttemberger Hof as well. The Right, beginning with more central representatives Landsberg, moving to the main right party of Casino and its 121 members, and finally the extreme right represented by Café Milani's 40 members.[424]

The Frankfurt Assembly was established with relatively little planning following a short period of revolutionary activity. Further, parliamentarism "had not yet existed in Germany, except locally in a few states." The structure of the assembly and the organization of its members had equally never before existed, meaning most of the "Frankfurt deputies" were "complete newcomers with little or no prior parliamentary experience."[425] Within weeks of its inceptions, the parliament "quickly developed party groups which played an important role in parliamentary life." A lack of traditional rules meant that voting would be largely "unrestricted" while the "thresholds for motions and amendments were low, and parties had little means to enforce voting discipline." From the eventual voting patterns of the members, distribution of the members can be grouped into three blocs: the "republican left, liberal right and monarchist far right."[426] Within these broad associations, and the disputes between them, exist rival answers to what

[423] Snyder, Documents of German History, 177.
[424] Donald J. Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848: An Inquiry Based on Roll-Call Analysis," Central European History 12, No. 2 (June 1979): 130, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900022329.
[425] Hermann and Sieberer, "The basic space," 841.
[426] Hermann and Sieberer, "The basic space," 842.

persons can responsibly do in law and in turn, their role within the long sought after unified nation-state.

The strongest political group was most likely the "so-called Right Center, the largest group, consisting of about 160 members." Strong representatives from this group included "dynamic personalities like the historians Dahlmann, Droysen, and Waitz, the famed philologist, Jakob Grimm, and the Vadensian statesmen, Karl Mathy and Karl Welcker." The left center was comprised of leaders such as "Robert Mohl and Gustav Rumelin from Wurttemberg, and Gabriel Riesser, respected spokesman of the emerging Jewish element from Hamburg." The Left boasted "about 90 members", while more to the fringe, the right-wing group was the "weakest in numbers."[427] Complicating the issue of power and influences within the assembly, the body's two most powerful states and their members held singular goals concerning the direction of German nationalism. Whereas Prussia sought to protect its power and influence within the combined German territories, equally powerful and affluent Austria guarded its territorial concerns and held considerations beyond its German connections.

Despite the wave of revolution which had facilitated the assembly's existence, a majority of the members could be classified as "fairly conservative liberals who saw the Assembly's task as ending revolution while preserving its achievements." These achievements were most likely identified as "constitutional liberties and national integration." Furthermore, in voting to confirm the new assembly, the German Confederation had certainly propagated some degree of its conservative foundations. As a directing power over this forming body, there would exist a "provisional executive for the

[427] Hirsch, "Frankfurt," 285.

whole of Germany." This executive would be led by a single "Vicar of the Empire ('*Reichsverweser*')" who in theory would "conform to constitutional practice by appointing a government responsible to the Frankfurt parliament." In a maneuver designed to use revolutionary means for conservative ends, protecting this conservative tendency, but appeasing any revolutionary forces in power, it was actually von Gagern, the speaker of the assembly, who "insisted that the Vicar be elected by parliament rather than appointed by the German princes." Despite the revolutionary trappings of the assembly, there was little in the way of traditional elements one might expect to see; "working-class politics played almost no part in the debates (or the elections);", and amongst the loosely related members of the far-left, very few of the members at the time or after "ended up in a sociality party." Even in terms of religious identity politics, as opposed to what would become a major cleavage, at this time "Catholics were not yet gathered within the ranks of any one party or faction." In fact, only "about 10 per cent of the National Assembly belonged to the Catholic Association, even though the percentage of Catholics all over Germany was slightly above 50 per cent."[428]

During the first half of the nineteenth century the feudal system still regulated the lives of much of the peasantry in many German states. This caste generally conducted "a religious life, without political perspective", and their personally held displeasures or grievances did not see beyond the realm of the local. Targets of discontent would isolate the local issues and often reaffirmed loyalty to the monarch once initial unrest subsided. The peasantry would take up pitchforks and rifles in the heights of revolutionary chaos around them in the first half of 1848, but with their most immediate grievances aimed at

[428] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 92.

local magistrates and newly arrived bureaucrats. After the initial fervor of revolution or the local injustice registered had past, peasants "were lost as a significant group" within the revolutionary force. In most German states, especially Prussia, following the initial period of revolution, the peasantry in large part returned to their traditional lives. This subgroup largely "proclaimed their loyalty to the King", placing this group firmly on the "counter-revolutionary" side.[429] These episodes from within segments of the population, expose the gap between social status and legal standing, showing an ontology was identified and argued from below as well as legislated from above.

Much like the peasant class, worker protests often targeted particular employers or officials rather than systemic political change. This personal focus on an individual, for example, generally targeted a business or owner who was at fault in the eyes of local workers. Larger, organized activities would be fueled by "politically active associations" including revolutionary groups like the democrats. This typically specific focus on local issues, such as those "responsible for their miserable material situation", did not always extend the workers support further beyond to grander national reforms.[430] From this view, within an unfolding ontology, we see that local grievances were translated unevenly into generalized rights.

Although the spread of new ideologies such as liberalism was inherently tied to the expansion of education and political engagement resulting in an expanded middle class, so too was it the result of growing government bureaucracies and commercial businesses. The result was conflicting agendas within this politically active group. As the

[429] Siemann, The German Revolution, 181.
[430] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 183.

potential revolution would present associated risks of chaotic change, "members of the commercial middle class" quickly "became worried about the economic losses they were suffering as a result of the revolution." The concern of chaos and upheaval did not just affect the overarching goal of national unity or the form of parliamentary representation, personal hard lines would be drawn within multiple sub-sets of the middle class.[431]

The Jewish population, along with women, were the two groups "most heavily discriminated against in the pre-revolutionary legal system." In the events leading up to the March revolution period of 1848, "anti-Semitism had been evident amongst the peasant populations." The very same economic concerns that were personal on a peasant and worker categorical level, were tied to this rise in antisemitism and further "exacerbated by Christian and nationalist discrimination." The revolution then, was an opportunity for many within this category, as "Jews emerged as active political campaigners and elected deputies for the first time in the parliaments." Within the Frankfurt Assembly itself, the "The Basic Rights resolutions of the Frankfurt Parliament (Article V) granted full legal emancipation and total freedom of religion and conscience." The ultimate failure of passage would mean that some of the emancipation provisions were "curtailed, although it was not lost altogether." As a result of this period and the prolonged lowering of revolutionary passions, "the legal emancipation, the integration into the middle classes of the Jewish people and their identification with the national movement assumed an ambivalent character."[432]

[431] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 184.
[432] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 186.

The revolution, though short lived or classified as an outright failure, held impactful ramifications concerning women. Though at one time overlooked, the very "beginnings of the German women's movement, with its own press, politics and independent associations can be traced back to the year of the revolution." Women were a large part of the protests in many states, and in examples such as "Vienna and Berlin some even became involved in the fighting on the barricades and were killed or wounded." 1848 then, would not only introduce the written form of (mostly) universal male suffrage for the first time within the National Assembly, so too would the concept of "woman's emancipation" be "discussed openly."[433]

This section reveals through examples such as women's public presence and growing political associations, that there is a widening sense of who may count as the bearers of agency, or in this case, freedom and rights. Even where outcomes were limited, this points towards the expanding engagement and identification of rights. It signals that personhood was being argued and re-negotiated as an important aspect of a German ontology. In this expansion, the state was increasingly expected to specify legal conditions in which the individual could develop.

The Constitution

Constitutions particularize the human as a rights-bearing legal subject and thus makes freedom legible through articles and procedure. The development of a constitution, the events and actors contributing to its drafting and eventual ratification or

[433] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 187.

failure, demonstrate the positions, elements and appeal of a developing ontological component of a German worldview.

Long before 1848, there existed the identified need for a German constitution. This legal doctrine would serve to catalog the functions of government, who and what geography would define this nation, and most importantly the rights of its citizens. The actual task of writing and agreeing to a national constitution from the representatives of the individual German states would not be a quick or easy process and would be drawn out until March 28th of 1849.

In the judgement of history, the National Assembly is typically viewed as having erred by beginning with prolonged debates over basic rights.[434]. The most consequential result of the Frankfurt Assembly was strictly speaking an ultimately unsuccessful document. The creation of this document, however, would define a cultural and political philosophy which would impact the future of the German State for eras to follow. The Constitution of the German Reich as completed in 1849 contained seven parts. The negotiated and complete document "provided for an executive of the realm, a responsible ministry, a Reichstag composed of a conservative upper house and a democratic lower house, and a supreme court."[435]

The Reichstag would consist of "two chambers, the *Stattenhaus*" and the "*Volkshaus*" as based on the existing example of the United States of America. Although this "proposed federal structure of Germany was similar to that of the US", there was in fact "no precedent in modern constitutional history for a union of monarchical states

[434] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 9.
[435] Snyder, *Documents of German History*, 179.

within a democratic federal state."[436] In a compromise weighting the function between the upper and lower bodies, in the *Staatenhaus* "Prussia was to hold forty and Austria thirty-eight seats out of a total of 192." A concession to the individual states allowed that they "retained the right to nominate half of the members." It was the *Volkshaus*, "the second chamber", that was designed to become the "hub of the new democratic state." This chamber housed deputies who were to "be elected for four years" in their first term, and then subsequent three-year terms.[437] Although the articles "relating to the *Volkshaus* are few and brief", the expression of the design relates that the "*Paulskirche* deputies agonized a great deal over the shape of these clauses."

The first part of the constitution "dealt with the frontiers of Germany" and clearly established that "no German land could have a real union with a non-German country." The second part established the "wide authority to the executive branch" of the new government. The third part denotes the relatively conservative agenda as supported by members ranging all the way to the left and stipulates the "hereditary dignity of the Emperor of the Germans." The fourth part presents to the citizens of the new government, the "bicameral *Reichstag*, which was to consist of a representation of the states (*Staatenhaus*) and the people (*Volkshaus*)." Following this, the fifth chapter specifies the role and functions of the "*Reichsgericht*, i.e. the Supreme Court." As previously noted, important to the objective of this chapter, the sixth part "enumerates the rights of man (*Grundrechte*)" and draws a distinction to "clarify the inalienable rights of the nineteenth-century German." As will be important to note, this sixth part of the National Assembly's

[436] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 13.
[437] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 14.

Constitution, despite its assumed failure, would survive in memory to significantly influence future iterations of German Constitutions, for instance "the National Assembly of Weimar in 1919."[438] Finally the seventh part concerns the guarantees of the constitution. Enumeration converts abstract ideas of freedom into actionable predicates, including what the human may say, own, believe, and contest under law. These practical expressions within the ontological component, work together with other components of a German worldview, to represent the progression from theory to practical applications.

The Fundamental Rights of the German People

As presented in the framing of this chapter, the presentation of legal freedoms and rights in a legal document represent the worldly manifestation of the higher ontological identification of human freedom. The following articles act as a record to consolidate a core image of the human, including issues of equality, free speech and due process. The specificity and limitations of the articles also act to demonstrate the conceded balance concerning how agency interacts with government authority. Within Part VI of the constitution, Article 130 defines the scope of citizenry for the German people. It states that "The German people shall possess the following fundamental rights." Further, these rights would "serve as a standard for the individual German states" and once approved by the National Assembly, "no constitution or legislation of a German state shall abolish or circumscribe them."[439] Article 131 next defines the German people as "citizens of the states which make up the Reich." The articles continue then to enumerate the individual

[438] Hirsch, "Frankfurt," 286.
[439] Elmar M. Hucko, "The Reich Constitution of 1871," in *The Democratic Tradition, Four German Constitutions*, ed. Elmar M. Hucko, (Berg Publishing, 1987), 104.

rights of this people, including Article 132, “Every German has the right of German Reich’s citizenship” which through it “Reich franchise legislation shall provide for the right of the individual to vote for members of the national assembly.”[440] Article 137 declares that “There are no class differences before the law. The rank of nobility is abolished” and within this article, it further states that “All Germans are equal before the law.”[441] Article 138 proceeds then to the “freedom of man” which “shall be inviolable”, the power of the state to arrest or assign capital punishment is restrained within the law, as is protections granted for property, personal letters and papers.[442] Article 143 states that “Every German shall have the right freely to express his opinion through speech, writing, publication, and illustration”, and equally, “The freedom of the press shall be suspended under no circumstances through preventative measures, namely censorship, concessions, security orders.”[443] As Part VI comes to a close, it offers an allusion to where the enumerated rights and freedoms emanated from in the negotiated statement of this revolutionary parliament, as it concludes “Every German citizen stands under the protection of the Reich.”[444] These articles exemplify the practical expressions of a German worldview’s ontological component as the human is conceived as morally autonomous, socially integrated and entitled to protected actions. From this series of enumerated rights, it can obviously follow that the collective unit of this unification, the State, would be the source assuring these liberties and personal freedoms.

[440] Hucko, “The Reich Constitution,” 105.
[441] Hucko, “The Reich Constitution,” 106.
[442] Hucko, “The Reich Constitution,” 106
[443] Hucko, “The Reich Constitution,” 107.
[444] Hucko, “The Reich Constitution,” 115.

At its conception, the Frankfurt Parliament had envisioned "to include the principles of the voting rights in the Constitution." The immediate debates and obvious differences of opinion in the Constitutional Committee concerning the question of equal voting, resulted in an agreement "to exclude this problem from the document and merely to refer to a special electoral law."[445] As suffrage definition draws the boundary of agency, the procedural decisions carry ontological stakes of who is counted within the identification of expanded individual rights.

Taken together, these clauses display the operative picture of the person, whether morally, autonomous, socially, and protected through law. The transition from initial conception to the practical document and enumerated rights included, express the importance of those rights, and of the political body the document represents.

Universal Suffrage

Within an ontological component of a German worldview, expanding the franchise of voting rights presumes agency to some degree inherent, to classifications such as citizenship, whereas any restriction presumes agency under an authority. The enumerated rights of German individuals established within the unified state and ascribed by the federal democratic structure under a constitutional monarch, places enormous importance on how the constitution ultimately addressed the issue of suffrage, which came to be seen as also important to a German ontology. It remains an important distinction when examining the National Assembly, that before 1848 "virtually all the

[445] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 14.

European states—including the various states of Germany—had had some sort of suffrage restriction." In the steps leading to the events of 1848, the political easing of restrictions within the German states resulted in an expansion or widening of the voting group within these states, and yet most preserved some restrictions even as the rules loosened. At the time of the constitutional debate the, there still existed contention concerning who would take part in this new national assembly, and which groups would hold power as to the direction and form of the new unified state,

To begin, the Frankfurt Parliament was populated by an "unofficial 'Pre-Parliament'" in the spring of 1848. This appeared to many as an early model for "universal manhood suffrage", but in reality, the "elections had been subject to a number of suffrage limitations." The election utilized a very specific stipulation "that voters be 'independent.'"[446] The internal states election utilized the term "independence" to "exclude beggars and poor-relief recipients, servants, artisans, factory workers, and farmhands, and even (in Bavaria and Oldenburg) those who paid no direct taxes." During the constitutional negotiations, even when male suffrage had achieved consideration, there remained a vast interpretation of how this would be applied. For the Left, universal manhood suffrage represented an expected and essential demand. This was a smaller group within the assembly, and the much larger group of "moderate liberals" transitioned over this period to "regard universal suffrage with almost universal distaste." The context to this perhaps unexpected position can be better understood when considering the "wave of working-class violence in autumn 1848." The examples of upheaval of the lower

[446] Carol Rose, "The Issue of Parliamentary Suffrage at the Frankfurt National Assembly" *Central European History*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1972): 129, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900000595.

classes stoked fear amongst the upper classes and raised a number of concerns about the potential chaos or instability as a result of enfranchising members of this class. Yet expanding the franchise came to be regarded as an important aspect of a German ontology.

By that fall, an assembly member and scholar representing the liberal mindset, Georg Veseler remarked that "the maintenance of liberty depended on some sort of franchise restriction."[447] Just as events in France had acted as a catalyst for the influx of ideas and revolutionary vigor in some of the German States, so too did the negative consequences of the various iterations of the French Revolution instill mistrust in suffrage for the masses. The timeliest event in this case was in late 1848 and the French national election. To the shock of most of continental Europe, the French electorate under male suffrage had handed a sweeping victory to Louis Napoleon.[448] With the memory of the wreckage a Napoleon had inflicted across the European continent still fresh, this apparent radical action on the part of a universal (male) electorate in France, served as a firm example to carefully control such an expansion. Six months "after democracy had been established, fear of the masses had already become greater on the Right of the National Assembly than mistrust of the old authorities."[449]

The majority of liberals within the Assembly, whether they should be classified as rationalists or "restrictionists", would guide the "first body to deal systematically with the Electoral Law" through the Constitutional Committee. At the beginning of 1849, this group would work on the first draft of the Electoral Law. The earliest drafts of the

[447] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 130.
[448] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 131.
[449] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 13.

Electoral Law were very cautious and "required that voters be 'independent' and defined certain classes of persons—notably servants, journeymen, factory laborers, and farmhands—as 'not independent.'" The term independent, was a term of use to distinguish between persons, in this case men, who could and could not vote. For the assembly members of the left, this was "as such unacceptable."[450] For a large portion of the liberal representations, a pragmatic agenda guided their position as "suffrage restriction emerged as the assurance of political stability." The expansion of the middle class had aided in the rise of liberal ideals in German politics, and thus the class which liberals truly wished to vote was the "solid middle classes, men with property, education, and culture."[451] It was through this stability that the "security for property and individual rights" would be most assured.[452] While the liberals would be labelled as "restrictionists" due to this practical view, their ideals certainly had a base "reverence for the individual and distaste for aristocratic rule" and most of the liberals "at least theoretically affirmed equality and rejected paternalism." Perhaps distinct to their ideology due to culture, or timing, or pure practicality, they also "wanted political institutions to serve specific substantive purposes—particularly the promotion of property, education, and stability."[453] There does seem to be a distinction, therefore, between the unfettered ideology of the Left which fueled the members to seek universal suffrage, and the pull of political rationalism for many liberals that recognized the best path towards societal goals. This political rationalism, or specific political philosophy, would seem to limit some individual liberties to achieve the assured level of stability required to achieve other

[450] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 138.
[451] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 141.
[452] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 133.
[453] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 143.

ends. Even as these liberals display motivation and politically activity in support of expansion of individual rights and prosperity, the ends to these goals are identified as achieved or secured through a stable society and strong state. This tension reflects the noted pattern in a German worldview thus far, that freedom is acknowledged as essential, yet its ultimate security is believed to require the authority of an ordered state.

When the electoral committee first began to draft and ultimately debate the electoral law, a proposal came forward stating that "'All honourable Germans who have completed their twenty-fifth year of age are eligible to vote. All servants, day-labourers, journeymen and factory workers are excluded from the right to vote. The vote is direct, but public.'" If this proposed version of the electoral law were to pass, "half of the German male population – the vote for women was barely contemplated – would have been deprived of a voting right which they had already exercised when the National Assembly was elected." Further, the process and inherit right to freedom of vote would have been compromised as "voters would not have been able to cast their vote in secret and freely, but in public."[454] In response to this position and attempted subversion of any form of suffrage movement, those from the Centre Left to the left rejected this and similar proposals in the Assembly. The Left countered with the repeated call for "a universal, equal, direct and secret ballot."[455] The Left with the support of their unlikely coalition with Austria, would "push suffrage restrictions back to what seemed at the time an absolute prudential minimum." By February 20th, 1849, the "'not independent'" categories proposed by the Constitutional Committee were defeated by a "resounding

[454] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 14.
[455] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 16.

vote of 422 to 21." With this momentum, the "Left-Great German coalition went on to reject, one after another, all the remaining proposals for property qualifications." The result of the National Assembly's vote, following the drafting and debate of the Constitutional Committee, assured that all men age twenty-five and above would be allowed to vote with the only exceptions specified as "bankrupts, poor-relief recipients, and persons in the guardianship of others."[456] As the National Assembly drew the legal boundary of agency, suffrage rules can be viewed as ontological line-drawing, not merely electoral engineering. Despite the political tensions, however, the achievement of broader male suffrage reveals a deepening normative recognition to human autonomy, or agency, as part of a German worldview.

Principles to be expected at this time included, "Constitutional monarchy, protection and liberation of private property," and broader positions included "demolition of all but the tokens of aristocratic privilege, rigorous legality and procedural correctness." Universal suffrage, however, unlike the more expected positions, "had never played a significant part in the German liberal program before 1848." The creation of this document would cement the principles as expectations for future embodiments of representative governments, and the issue of universal suffrage, even this specifically carved out notion, would remain to the time of Bismarck and ultimately successful German unification.[457]

Rather than ideological revolutionaries unmovable in their rhetoric or ideas, we see instead a "pragmatic" course of action advocated by a leading majority of the

[456] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 143.
[457] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 128.

assembly members. As the goals ultimately achieved in the draft of the constitution are still identified within the camp of what one might label stereotypical revolutionaries, these pragmatic concessions encompass the right of the political spectrum to the centre. For the democrats, during this drafting, the distinction of "independence' was a red flag, an insult, and a "symbol of all the sneaking suffrage restrictions of 1848." Despite any form of disappointment concerning the pragmatic approach to voting intentions by a majority of the members, what remains true is that the National Assembly ultimately "ratified a law relating to the elections to the *Volkshaus* which implemented the principle of a universal, equal, direct and secret ballot."[458] In attempting to derive the ontological influence from this example of a practical legal freedom or right, the pragmatic course of politics fails to clearly demonstrate the philosophical ideal. Despite a less than magnanimous process, however, the final result and ramification in society was a communal normalization of the ontological philosophy placed within the societal vision in this period.

A Liberal Constitution?

The events and eventual failure of the Frankfurt Constitution have led to corresponding decades of interpretation, with many claiming the constitution itself was never indicative of a true liberal agenda. Competing interpretations influence our identification of the ontological component during this period. Differing labels, of liberal, rest on differing association of competence and trust in the human being and their

[458] Hucko, "Introduction, The 1849," 17.

agency, whether persons require stewardship, or can stand as co-legislators. Within this critique there developed the narrative that the revolution within the German States was an instance in which "the out-and-out democratic radicals rather than the timid moderates" demanded a parliament be created for the political unification of Germans under a "libertarian institutions for the nation." The moderates as they are referred to in this narrative are labeled as focusing on monarchical rule and seek to maintain an "authority kept intact as a safeguard against social revolution." This interpretation argues that the moderates should not be considered true liberals as compared to recognizable examples in western Europe. This argument asserts instead that they were "adherents of a notion known as *deutscher Konstitutionalismus."* These members *"*rejected constitutional government as it was known in France, Britain, and Belgium."[459]

An alternative interpretation offered by others such as Manfred Botzenhart point to evidence that the so-called moderate agenda of the Frankfurt Parliament was indeed the aims of liberal reformers. These reformers did express a fear for revolution and were "suspicious of the unpropertied multitude" but did ultimately advance "a constitutional government recognizably similar to that proposed by the democrats." Through this progress and justified by the ends, the "restrictions on the suffrage" and "monarchical veto power" can be conceivably labelled as reasoned methods. The ends ultimately did include the achievement of an "elected parliament" in which the moderates ensured "that government ministers be politically responsible to it."[460]

[459] Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism," 125.
[460] Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism," 126.

Based on the roll calls, the moderates did appear to be "massively opposed to one liberal measure after another." Many of the motions identifiable as a traditional liberal agenda item were passed in the National Assembly by a "slim margin that was provided by a very small Left Center group whenever it chose to side with the radicals." For the moderates, right of centre, priority was clearly placed on "a stronger monarchical executive with an absolute veto against the enactments of a weaker parliament." So, was the Assembly body a truly liberal? The Frankfurt Parliament points to the growing power of an expanding middle class within the individual German states, and the expansion of education resulting in the growing acceptance or expectations of new liberal ideas. If we assign a primary expectation of this era and a middle class imbued with liberal ideas the individual representation and liberties as guaranteed by the state, the National Assembly's "attachment to the individualist dogmas of nineteenth-century liberalism can hardly be doubted." The National Assembly or Frankfurt Parliament voting patterns indicate strong support for core liberal rights, "such things as instituting equality before the law ('great majority'), the career open to talent ('unanimous'), the inviolability of personal liberty ('unanimous'), and freedom of the press (338 to 67)." The clear liberal leaning agenda, however, becomes less recognizable when issues were introduced concerning "abridging the rights of the sovereign or of specifically attacking an aristocracy that was associated with traditional monarchical sovereignty."[461] The traditional authority and perceived traditional stability of the state then, stands as a point of delineation in which the unabridged rights and agency of the human being were

[461] Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism," 141-142.

seemingly balanced with the goals of autonomy within a sovereign, stable, and secure state.

Austria and Political Maneuvers

If a majority driving force of the National Assembly was the increased representation of individual rights through the realization of a unified German State, which appeared to be a driving sentiment in an unfolding German ontology then an outlier holding less obvious motives within this parliament was Austria. Though it represented a potential "190 out of 655 members" in Frankfurt, only "134 Austrian constituencies" were actually present at any one time. The Austrian representatives were "split in almost the same proportion as the average", which meant the normal conservative leaning, placing them somewhere "more conservative than the average southwesterner, but slightly less conservative than the average Prussian."[462]

When the members arrived in Frankfurt, early visions of Reich frontiers were imprecise and influenced more by sentiment than policy clarity.[463] Whether it was language, or cultural traditions, or a rigid power base of royal ancestry, Austria's influence as to the German State's design and function would be a history altering element. During the October 1848 revolution in Vienna, the "overwhelming majority, including the Austrian deputies" voted for the "greater German solution." This solution entailed that the Habsburg monarchy would "be constitutionally divided into German areas which belonged to the Reich, and non-German parts which would remain outside

[462] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 94.
[463] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 188.

it." Examples of states such as "Galicia, Hungary, Croatia and Lombardo-Venetia" would remain outside of the German Confederation, as there was "no intention of absorbing the Habsburg monarchy as a whole into the German *Reich*."[464] By 1849, however, this hybrid solution was rejected when the first elected parliament within Austria, the Kremsier Parliament, was "dissolved and a constitution imposed" on March 4th. The "incorporation of the Austrian state as a whole" within the amalgamation of German States would be the new directive from within Austria. This unlikely situation all but declared that there could be no "national parliament of any kind, but simply a consultative *Staatenhaus*."[465]

The question of Austria would affect the negotiations and drafting of the constitution, just as it had since 1815 and the limited nature of the German Confederation. Within the increasing nationalistic call for a unified German State, Austria would count as within and without. This was a major continual concern from the position of Prussia which was maneuvering to protect its own internal state power, and also its prospects of future control should German unity. Even by the time of 1849, when "the chances of a Habsburg leadership in Germany" had faded, Austrian power would continue to influence the course of the National Assembly as its representative members held a large voting bloc and play a role in the further unfolding of a German ontology.

Continually torn between its cultural ties to a united Germany, and its own traditional, diverse empire, the course of Austria's involvement changed when the Austrian army under Prince Windisch-Graetz recaptured Vienna by force in October. This propelled the process of "reconquering the Hungarian and Italian possessions of the

[464] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 189.
[465] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 190.

Habsburgs." With the ground shifting, the Frankfurt Parliament would make "clear that Austrians could either hang on to their non-German fiefs or join Germany." To this ultimatum, the Habsburgs, and with them a "majority of their bureaucratic and aristocratic camp-followers, clearly opted to hold on to the Empire."[466] Austria's next step was to introduce clauses into the constitution draft that would make Prussian acceptance highly unlikely. This manifested in an unlikely alliance between the "republican Left and the Austro-Bavarian States' Rights party." During the debate concerning universal suffrage in particular, Austria's involvement requires special attention when trying to assign voting intentions according to political, ideological, and yes ontological concerns.[467] Territorial choices implied that within this ontological component, freedom depends on order, and that the human was always recognized as socially embedded, requiring the capable state to secure legal promises.

With the growing influence of nationalism, the national assembly was not steered solely by the issue at hand, nor the revolutionary principles of 1848. There was a clear distinction between the two groups regarding plans for the future of a unified state. On one side there was the "so-called 'Little German' delegates, those who wished to exclude Austria altogether from a unified Germany."[468] Countering the Little German aspirations was the Great Germans, a "peculiar alliance between Left democrats" and a conglomeration of "Austrians, Catholics, and south German particularists."[469]

[466] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 94-95.
[467] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 95.
[468] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 135.
[469] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 137.

The Little Germans were led by Heinrich von Gagern and "included some of the most illustrious figures of the assembly, among others the historians F.C. Dahlmann and Georg Waitz, the jurist Georg Beseler, and the Baden bookseller and politician Friedrich Bassermann."[470] Their actions were guided by a "desire for stable, moderate government" which placed them in opposition to universal suffrage. As they wished to retain elements of a stabilizing tradition within the new society, this radical element of the proposed constitution could put the entire National Assembly in jeopardy.

The members representing a left political position in the lower house would ironically find themselves pitted against the Little Germans with the other behemoth, Austria, as their unlikely ally. The Great Germans side would succeed in placing the "Electoral Law on the assembly's agenda beginning February 15—between the first and second readings of the constitution." This act, clearly against the agenda proposed by von Gagern's cautious approach, represented the "first confrontation between the new Great German and Little German groupings" and would officially begin the Electoral Law debate.[471] The suffrage dispute clarifies the ontological stakes under debate, as broadening the vote presupposed that agency attaches to persons, and restricting it assumed that freedom needs institutional oversight. Citizenship, therefore, created a new identification of agency or freedom, and was of course mediated through a government hierarchy.

Read within this component of a German worldview, the Frankfurt debates indicate a pattern in which human freedom is treated as something to be institutionally

[470] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 135.
[471] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 136-137.

realized rather than merely asserted. Rights appear as concrete guarantees, secured by positive law under a polity capable of coordinating many states. Unity and rights function here as mutually reinforcing hypotheses. A unified legal order is presumed necessary to protect personal autonomy, while the protection of autonomous persons is presumed to legitimate unity. These are component level indicators of a developing German worldview of the period, tending to frame freedom through law as the condition for human freedom.

The Constitution and the End of the National Assembly

Since the inception of the parliamentary body in Frankfurt, the situations in both Austria and Prussia had changed considerably. By the time the final draft of the constitution was "accepted by the National Assembly on March 28, 1849, most of the presuppositions under which the task had been begun had evaporated."[472] The importance of political and territorial considerations, paired with the drive for a unified German State, serves as a test within this ontological component for which elements of the human being, represented in law, would endure across shifting coalitions and which required new power balances to achieve core goals of the populace.

After the drafting, the debates, the affiliations and intrigue, the presentation of a monarchical constitution was to be delivered to the chosen monarch, Frederick William IV of Prussia. This was not the automatic intent of the parliament as made clear by the upheaval and passage of left leaning principles based on the tenuous support of Austrian

[472] Hirsch, "Frankfurt," 286.

members within the Greater German side. Ultimately this was a realist position in support of a stable German State, for it was fair to assume that without the king of Prussia at the center of this new constitutional power, Prussia would not have remained part of the united German body. Within yet another contested final vote concerning the constitutional draft, "290 members favored Frederick William IV of Prussia as hereditary emperor, while 248 abstained."[473]

A Turning Point

On March 28, 1849, the National Assembly election of the Prussia King to be the new German Kaiser included sections "of the right, the centre-right and centre-left, half of the 'Westendhall' and even individual deputies from the 'Deutscher Hof' and the 'Donnersberg' factions." On April 3rd in Berlin, "a delegation of 32 deputies, led by the Parliamentary President, Eduard Simson, offered the crown to Frederick William IV."[474] The response from the King was "hedged in restrictive clauses." The King stipulated he would accept only if the "'free agreement of the crowned heads, the princes, and the free cities' was acquired." This stipulation effectively cast doubt on the constitution as a document carrying the weight of an accepted and unified German government.[475]

By May, the official response was received by the parliament, leaving no doubt as to the rejection. The once threated power and position of King William IV of Prussia had been regained and motivated his fervent disregard for liberal demands. The Prussian

[473] Louis L. Snyder, Eds, "Text of the King's Refusal, May 15, 1849," in *Documents of German History*, (Rutgers University Press, 1958,) 186-187.
[474] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 197.
[475] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 197-198.

monarch also appeared to have appropriated the cause of the people, stable nationalism. On May 15, 1849, the King explained his decision by addressing his people. Framing his reasoning, the King asserted that the representatives of the Assembly and through them the revolutionaries, were "Using the pretense that they are working in the interests of Germany, the enemies of the Fatherland have raised high the standard of revolt." Immediately, the revolutionary actions are situated as against the Fatherland, and the interests of the long sought unified state, Germany. From this position then, he framed the National Assembly as illegitimate and portrayed revolutionaries as destabilizing, for the "body does not have the right, without the consent of the German governments, to bestow the crown they have offered me." The revolutionary side is depicted here as acting outside the laws and consent of the German States, and ultimately due to this recklessness their actions place the safety of these states at risk. The theme of safety and stability continues from the King's argument, as he professes how he tried to work with the assembly, and despite this intent, the king accused that a "party now dominating the Assembly is in league with the terrorists." Perhaps the most fatal conclusion, after assuming the mantel of representing German unity and adopting the ever-growing wave of nationalism, Frederick accused that while the members and power holders of the National Assembly used "the unity of Germany as a pretense, they are really fighting the battle of godlessness, perjury, and theft, and arousing a war." The King concluded by simultaneously declaring the Frankfurt Assembly finished, and absconding its greatest driving issue, when he stated:

> such crimes have put an end to the hope that the Frankfort Assembly can achieve German unity, I have, with a fidelity and persistence suitable to my royal position,

never given up hope. My government has taken up with the more important German states the work on the German constitution begun by the Frankfort Assembly.[476]

The King's rhetoric serves to illustrate the conflict within the development of a German worldview at the time in 1848. The failure of inaction seems to stem from a debilitating doubt of whether legitimate authority flowed from the unity of the people, or from the traditional order whose assumed responsibility it was to safeguard that unity. In terms of a German ontology, and hence a German worldview, the contrast is instructive in that both positions view freedom as requiring juridical function, whether from above or through representation of the people.

Post Rejection

Despite this devastating blow to the constitution and through it the agenda of the National Assembly, the parliament carried on with the position that "the constitution decided on 28 March 1849 and published in the imperial law gazette" was the law of the state. The power of the Assembly to implement this constitution and the refusal of some states to recognize it represented a new wave of revolution, or counter-revolution, and began a period of the "campaign for the Imperial Constitution." Whatever unity existed following the first revolutionary period rapidly unraveled by May 4th as the National Assembly narrowly passed a resolution by a count of 190 to 188 calling "on the

[476] Snyder, "Text of the King's," 186-187.

governments, the constituents bodies, the local authorities and the individual states and the entire German people to recognize and implement the Constitution of the German Empire."

The rejection and failure of his agenda resulted in the resignation of von Gagern on May 10th. The National Assembly would attempt to re-unite its remaining body and assert its power, by protesting "against Prussian intervention in Saxony" and supporting the 1848 revolutionary movements in numerous states. In reaction to the parliament's resolution of May 4th, Prussia next declared that it had cause to declare the body unlawful, and the Austrian government followed suit by recalling its deputies by April 5th.[477] The previous leadership of the Little Germans, including "Gagern, Arndt, Dahlmann, Mathy and about 60 other moderate members withdrew from *Paulskirche*." Leaderless and directionless, the remaining members of the National Assembly, moved to Stuttgart, only to be broken up by Wurttembergian soldiers once and for all on June 18th, 1849.[478]

The end of the National Assembly revealed that a revolutionary assembly or an attempted federation following a revolution was in fact a "utilitarian alliance" in which a small portion of its members happened to be revolutionaries of the left. The sincere legitimate cause of increased individual liberties and its support from the public appears to have been tied to the individual interest in a unified German State, aspects of a German ontology that had been slowly unfolding, developing and entering common political reason, up to this point. The Left for its part had accepted the point of a monarchical

[477] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 201-202.
[478] Hirsch, "Frankfurt," 287.

constitution only because it was obvious that without this provision there was no hope for the Frankfurt Parliament to survive, let alone succeed. Once the constitution was rejected by their chosen monarch, the fragile alliance crumbled, and individual concerns of the states returned to primacy. Without the presence of the behemoths, Prussia and Austria, the Left for the first time held "an overall majority." Once in a position to lead the body, but with a deposed "Vicar of the Empire", there remained only "slightly more than 100 deputies (15 of them Austrians)." Despite truly representing a revolutionary parliament, it had lost the efficacy, legitimacy, and any power on which the previous body depended. What remained of the revolutionary forces holding out "in Saxony and the Upper Rhine valley were suppressed by Prussian troops" and on 18 June 1849, that "the Rump parliament was disbanded."[479]

With the failure of the Frankfurt National Assembly at Paulskirche, it was generally assumed that the "great movement for the unification of Germany on liberal principles came to an end."[480] The revolutionary period experienced across many of the German states, "ended on 23 July 1849 with the written capitulation of the approximately 6000 revolutionary fighters incarcerated in the fortress at Rastatt."[481] So with the revolutionary period over, and a short lived attempt at a unified German parliament failed, would the individual states of the proposed Germany revert to a previous or traditional status? The immediate thought was to reconvene "the old Bundestag", but

[479] Hobelt, "The Austrians," 99-100.
[480] Snyder, "Text of the King's," 189.
[481] Siemann, *The German Revolution* 211.

there equally existed a Prussian gambit to "introduce 'from above' a unification of the Reich without Austria, though with the agreement of the other German princes."[482]

If the revolution of 1848 was either something less than a revolution, or a short-lived revolutionary victory, the failure of the National Assembly to effectively govern would be one legacy of the revolutionary period. This does not appear to be the case, however, as the granting of the constitution to the people of the individual German states, though already appearing throughout the societies prior to 1848, would continue to become a norm, and by 1850, the reinvigorated Prussian government of King William IV presented its own constitution to the people, with many elements following the precedent set by the Frankfurt Parliament. Within this component, the diffusion of written constitutions indicates a successive expectation that human persons be addressed as rights-bearing legal subjects under law. Despite the political mechanisms, these constitutions which codified due process, equal treatment, religious and press protections, and age-based suffrage, imply that personal freedoms should be secured by law.

Prussia Strategy - Assuming the National Agenda

Despite the ultimate disappointment of the revolutionary parliament, the political discontent forced the controlling class of Prussia to "learn lessons based on their experiences of upheaval." 1848 and 1849 would teach several highly placed ministers that the existing "conservative fear of constitutions" only exacerbated the destabilization of society. From this conclusion, the political maneuvers of the Prussian State would

[482] Siemann, *The German Revolution* 213.

gradually reverse its traditional tactics and adopt an "appreciation for the ways in which such documents could restore confidence in the state."[483]

At the end of 1848, Friedrich Wilhelm IV appointed to the Ministry of State, President Friedrich Wilhelm Brandenburg, and as Minister of the Interior, Otto Theodor von Manteuffel. Though ardent conservatives, these appointments would result in the eventual break with the previous ardent ultra-conservative, anti-constitutional position of Prussia.[484] Once the state had regained control, the period to follow would come to be referred to as the "'decade of reaction'", denoting the assumed re-emergence of conservative policies. This conservative renewal and retaliation in response to an era of liberalisation was certainly the agenda for "a circle of ultraconservatives at court, known as Friedrich Wilhelm IV's *Camarilla*." Other members serving within the ministry recommended a more conciliatory approach with its citizens. Against the extreme members and direction of the *Camarilla,* Brandenburg "insisted on being able to appoint and direct the new ministry without interference."[485] The resulting "pragmatism" appeared to be a guiding influence as Brandenburg believed that Prussia had no option but to constitutionalise. Brandenburg wrote that only "'the state revolutionised from above [can be] saved from anarchy'." Much like Brandenburg, his eventual successor, von Manteuffel, equally "showed signs that he too was unwilling to act on behalf of the *Camarilla.*" Manteuffel argued that amongst the members of Prussian society, the perceived "influence of hard-line conservative ideas on state-building created a major

[483] Anna Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics, The Case of the Prussian Ministry of State," in *The 1848 Revolutions and European Political Thought*, eds. Douglas Moggach and Gareth Stedman Jones, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 276.
[484] Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics," 278.
[485] Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics," 279.

source of opposition in Prussia."[486] While it was clear up to this point that the role of the state was integral to a German ontology, it was not yet clear what kind of state this should be, and thus the developing overarching pattern continued of a liberal security by institutional form.

In December of 1848, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, seemingly acting upon the advice of pragmatic considerations and not the ultra-conservative course, "promulgated a constitution." After numerous revisions, "he finally signed a confirmation of the document on 6 February 1850." While this would appease some concerns within the Prussian citizenry and its bureaucracy, the larger issue of German unification amongst the populations of the individual German states remained a uniting source of political aspirations and a threat to the power of the Prussian hegemony.

To the immediate opportunity to impose a Prussian Union from above, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, the chief advisor to the Prussian monarch, helped to win "the support of the majority of his fellow princes for a plan that would create a unified Germany under Prussian hegemony." Naturally opposing this plan, the "leaders of Austria realized that success of Radowitz's program would mean the expulsion of the Habsburg Empire from Germany and used every means to destroy the Union before it could go into effect." Austria rallied its allies amongst the "southern states of Bavaria and Wurttemberg," united by a mistrust or fear of Prussia.[487] The top-down approach would no doubt "increase the power and influence of Prussia," but too frontal an attempt to remove Austria or to forcibly assert autocratic power was ultimately advised against by

[486] Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics," 280-281.
[487] Warren B. Morris, Jr. "The Prussian Plan of Union: Traditional Policy by 'Revolutionary Means'" *Historian*, (May 1977): 516-517.

Radowitz who recognized that "some elements of the national as well as of the constitutional aspirations of 1848 needed to be satisfied to achieve a new stability."[488]

A union parliament was planned to sit in Erfurt and by "the end of 1849, 26 German states had endorsed the union plan." The Erfurt Parliament met on 20 March 1850 and accepted the draft constitution but the constitutional "unification of the Reich 'from above' turned out to be simply an instrument in the competing power politics between Austria, Prussia and the medium states." This was equally supported by Brandenburg as the Prussian-led Union project was an advantageous solution to the national question. To counter Prussia, Austria had invited "the German states to the reopening of the Bundestag in Frankfurt on 2 September 1850"[489]. By the autumn of 1850, the Prussian "ministry broke with this project" because they ultimately feared that continued support would drag Prussia into armed conflict with Austria and Russia. This further demonstration of political pragmatism further highlights that the likes of "Brandenburg and Manteuffel were seeking to reintegrate the state and post-revolutionary society across a number of areas of state-building."[490] The course of 1850 would see the "full restoration of the German Confederation", but the conflict between Austria and Prussia in Germany was" left an unresolved issue.[491] These political maneuvers continue a pattern within the unfolding of a German ontology, that freedom was commonly treated in the political realm as dependent on order. Issue items such as security, territorial

[488] Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany 1850-1918*, (Routledge, 2021), eBook, http://site.ebrary.com/id/5001553., 3.
[489] Siemann, *The German Revolution,* 213-216.
[490] Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics," 283.
[491] Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany,* 4.

integrity, and international political strength were regarded as preconditions for personal autonomy and enumerated rights under the law of the state.

King Wilhelm IV, Prussian Parliament and Reworked Frankfurt Constitution

During the process of this pragmatic approach as opposed to the more oppressive tactics, the development of 1850s would see the state "shake off cumbersome, ultraconservative approaches to crime and punishment in the 1850s."[492]

On May 22, 1848, the king presented the proposed plan for a constitution, through this act removing himself from his position, and granting the people themselves the "right to approve or reject all laws, grant all taxes and ratify the provisions of the budget." By July of that year, the committee presented its draft to be considered by the provinces of the state, and by October the left wing of the members asserted their power in the process. Despite this progress, the revolutionaries remained in Berlin and their continued presence seemingly played into the monarch's hands when they "threatened the members of the right with violence." Citing this violence, "the king ordered the transfer of the assembly to the neighboring city of Brandenburg."[493] With Berlin under siege "the king dissolved the constitutional convention and promulgated the so-called 'octroyed' constitution of December 5, 1848." Early the next year, on February 26, 1849, "the new chambers met and after formally recognizing the constitution drawn up by the king as the law of the land, proceeded to subject it to the contemplated revision."[494] By December of

[492] Ross, "Post-Revolutionary Politics," 286.
[493] Friedrich Wilhelm and James Harvey Robinson, "Supplement: Constitution of the Kingdom of Prussia," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 5, Supplement 8, (Sep.1894): 208.
[494] Wilhelm and Robinson, "Supplement:", 209.

that year, the draft was completed and consented to by the king. This new version differed wildly from May of 1848, and on January 31, 1850, a royal message declared the proposed revision of the constitution to be complete and the document in its modified form was promulgated in the official organ as 'the fundamental law of the land.'"[495]

The result of a "parliament representing the people as a whole" was certainly a win for the masses, but in the case of Prussian pragmatic strategy, it was offered "on a very restricted franchise." This then was a form of progress within Prussia as produced as a result of the revolutionary era, but the true power still rested with the monarch. Following in the tradition of the "provincial estates", the monarch "retained full executive power, though he chose to exercise most of his powers through ministers, who could be removed only by him and not by parliament." Some power was indeed placed within the representative body, such as the power to "legislate and vote taxes", but ultimately the society would know that power and their rights was granted by the king for the parliament was ultimately both "summoned and dissolved by the king."[496] Having felt "bound" by the constitution forced upon him in 1848, the counter-revolution period alleviated this pressure as the constitution was "further modified, the most important change being the introduction of the three-tier franchise which lasted till 1918." This form of granting individual liberties in the age of liberalism, but holding power over those liberties, presented Prussian conservativism a strategy for its "successful survival in the age of liberalism."[497] An unfolding German ontology of a unified state had not yet

[495] Wilhelm and Robinson, "Supplement:", 210.
[496] Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany,* 9-10.
[497] Feuchtwanger, *Imperial Germany,* 10-11.

been fully worked out, but important steps as to essential practical designs of the state would next emerge.

Prussian Constitution of 1850

Within the powers presented in the Prussian constitution, Article 4 contains the provision that "All Prussians shall be equal before the law. Class privileges shall not be permitted. Public offices, subject to the conditions imposed by law, shall be uniformly open to all who are competent to hold them." Article 5 then continues to state that personal liberty was guaranteed, with any limitations, especially arrest, regulated by statute.[498] Further enumerating these rights, Article 12 stipulates "Freedom of religion, the organization of religious societies, and the exercise of religion at home or in public are guaranteed", and Article 27 affirmed freedom of expression in print and image and barred prior censorship, except again, through statutory limits. But equal to these achieved rights reminiscent of the Frankfort Constitution, Articles 43 and 45 preserved strong royal prerogatives, declaring the monarch inviolable and concentrating final authority on his person. Further owing from hard negotiated and won rights within the revolution, Article 70 states that "Every Prussian who has reached the age of twenty-five years is eligible to vote."[499] The resulting constitutional order, a mix of conservative measures and expansion of rights, demonstrates the process of compromise through which German ontological commitments were translated into institutions. What emerges within this component is a dual tendency, one affirming personal autonomy while

[498] Wilhelm and Robinson, "Supplement:", 223.
[499] Louis L. Snyder, Eds, "Extracts from the Prussian Constitution", in *Documents of German History*, (Rutgers University Press, 1958,) 190-191.

designing guardrails that reflect concerns about stability. Simultaneously, expanded liberties increasingly articulated the agency of the human being, while through these gains traditional monarchical power consolidated control. This result was the recognition of the desire amongst the polity of the people for continuity and legality.

Immediate Legacy of 1848

Though not the first example of a parliament or a constitution within the German States, the National Assembly in Frankfurt at *Paulskirche* was the first serious effort to build a central democratic legislature for all German territories, and it ultimately failed. This result was almost certainly due to a "lack of power" centralized within the body to assert its agenda or enact policy. The events that unfolded amongst the splintered amalgamation of groups within diverging agendas would turn the "work of the assembly into 'discussion without government'." Beyond this initial consensus, the longer impact of this attempted government on a social consciousness, was an accepted expectation of norms, for future goals and achievable policies of future parliaments. The benefits then of policy forum that was the National Assembly, resulted in the highly influential "formulation of the fundamental rights of the German people (*Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes*)" which has in turn "strongly influenced German constitutional discussions ever since"[500]. The institutional outcome may be secondary, however, as the consolidation of a rights language concerning the person, in this case the German people, revealed a more firmly acknowledged ontology as part of a developing German worldview.

[500] Burkhardt, "German Parliamentary Discourse," 177.

It is important therefore, when studying the events of the National Assembly, or Frankfurt Parliament, to recognize the immediate events and equally consider the long-term ramifications of this inarguably societal event, and the role it played in firming up a German ontology. Since the end of the revolutionary period in question, distinct reactionary ideas would be defended, opposed and reworked. Friedrich Julius Stahl would come to represent "a conservative apology of the existing monarchical principle", while Robert von Mohl continued to represent "a liberal justification of parliamentary government."[501] Seen through this components lens, post-1848 arguments converged on the human as a legal person whose freedom requires institutional form, but the sources and limits of that form were still in question. Thus, within the development of a German worldview during this period, there is ongoing clarification inside the component based on real world events and the pull, or influence, of other identified components.

The first attempt at a federal assembly would have an immediate psychological effect concerning both the attempted revolution and the idea of a universally elected government. Many Germans would consider "the relation between parliamentarism and democracy as problematic if not contradictory at least until the middle of the twentieth century." In the subsequent debate during the rest of the nineteenth century, traditionalists and the somewhat empowered citizenry of the German states would not battle, but certainly work in congruent paths, towards some form of agreement concerning who might best represented the people's interest, "the parliament or the monarch." Conservative scholars and representatives such as Friedrich Julius Stahl, "criticized

[501] Dirk Jorke and Marcus Llanque, "Parliamentarism and Democracy in German Political Theory since 1848," in *Parliament and Parliamentarism, A Comparative History of a European Concept*, eds. Pasi Ihalainen, Cornelia Ilie, Kari Palonen, (Berghahn Books, 2016,) 262.

parliamentary government for its strong connection with the democratic idea" and advanced instead a separate and practical solution, a "monarchical principle." Despite this position for the elevation or defense of the monarch, it is important to note that "Stahl does not reject the idea of a representative assembly altogether." Correspondingly, defenders of the Frankfurt government such as Robert von Mohl "stressed the necessity and the legitimacy of a parliamentary government."[502]

Friedrich Julius Stahl

The nineteenth century conservative member and theorist Friedrich Julius Stahl represented a particular form of conservativism, Protestant conservativism. His work formulated answers to rising theoretical opposition in society following a chaotic period of both restoration after invasion and subsequent revolution. Ultimately, Stahl's "supreme principle" would include a religious component, as strong convictions formalized within the work of this "Bavarian Jew" who converted to Protestantism at the age of 17. The Protestant religion would open "up the path for him to the Historical School", the "teaching of Hegel" and ultimately moving past Hegel's dialectic philosophy, to an earthly "living conservativism."[503]

When citizens pushed for reforms threatening to upend the traditional structure of society, relocating power to the individual and thus removing it from the monarch, conservative "thinkers like Friedrich Julius Stahl criticized parliamentary government for

[502] Jorke and Llanque, "Parliamentarism and Democracy," 263.
[503] Peter F. Drucker, "Friedrich Julius Stahl: His Conservative Theory of the State," *Society*, (July/August, 2002), 47, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02717544.

its strong connection with the democratic idea." Opposed to this democratic idea, Stahl countered with the "monarchical principle, which he regarded as the only legitimate government." The parliamentary principle was argued to have originated in the West with foreign ideas, and Stahl specifically noted potential points of chaos, such as the fact "ministers are responsible only to the random majorities in parliament." Further points of instability inherent to the system included "the separation of powers and the corruption that, according to Stahl, is a constant feature of parliamentarism." Rather than simply a list of grievances concerning change, "Stahl does not reject the idea of a representative assembly altogether." He was prepared to consider and contemplate a "*reichsstandische Verfassung* (constitution of the imperial estates)" which would assure "the representation of the people through the estates." This position of course speaks to the traditional form of conservative thought which assumes "there was a higher organic order besides the aggregation of the individual will." Through this prospect of an estates, it "should not be understood as an expression of popular sovereignty" Whereas the "estates should not be considered mandatories of the people" this would arguably situate the main function of this assembly of the estates to act as an intermediary and "mediate between the king and the people."[504] Stahl was not conveniently blind to the events of the nineteenth century and the growing demands of the people, nor did he ignore some of the positive developments or additions to German society from the events spurred by these influences. His call "for a representative body of the people" would function as a form of "consent to laws or reject them", effectively keeping "watch over the regular

[504] Jorke and Llanque, "Parliamentarism and Democracy," 263.

management of public finances, the constitutional enforcement of laws, the impartial dispensations of justice."[505]

The conservative principle of Stahl, specifically Protestant conservativism, is based within the stability of historical development. The "Conservative theory of the state" is so firmly based in a belief in historical stability implicit within traditional power that it actually makes a point to "affirm and defend the historically developed freedom of politics and conscience." Despite these being practically identified as the evolution of non-conservative agendas, including "political self-determination, the right to free expression of opinion, the right of ever more social strata to share in political power, the right to personal freedom", the basis of the conservative principle would seek to assimilate the positive outcomes as implications of the state. This pragmatic recognition of basically elevating "everything which developed" as the conservative theory of the state acknowledges the "imperfection of man", it seeks the assurance of the "justification by faith", and the safety in that "political freedom is only of value, when it is anchored in a higher communal obligation."[506] Stahl casts humans as dignified yet fallible, indicating a moral and religious element tied to the conservative theory of the state.

Whereas work concerning *Rechtsstaat* has a tendency to view the term in a largely conceptual or substantive context, the conservative Stahl "was the first to apply such methods to the Rechtsstaat in a formal sense." His formal, or practical presentation of this theory, was presented as a work within the "philosophy of law, under a sub-

[505] Drucker, "Friedrich Julius Stahl," 51.
[506] Drucker, "Friedrich Julius Stahl," 56.

heading referring to the law and the State based on a Christian world-view."[507] This was clearly evident in his speech given in 1852, years after the revolutions and the Frankfurt Parliament experiment, entitled "What is the Revolution?"[508] Delivered to a meeting of the Evangelical Association for Ecclesiastical Aims, he sought to further distinguish the tangible benefits resulting during the previous decade from the purported negatives of the revolutionary period. To the question whether there inherently required a "revolution to want a closer union of the German states or protection", Stahl immediately answered "Far from it! Political freedom, the unity and power of the German nation are aims pursuant to God's will."[509] Seemingly recognizing the hold the intellectual and liberal ideals that had developed and in certain ways enshrined themselves within German society, Stahl wished to utilize the popular elements, while offering a different attribution in hindsight of the failed revolution. He defined revolution as "the establishment of the entire public condition on the will of man rather than on God's order and providence." It was ultimately a disruption which consisted of "placing uppermost what should be lowermost according to eternal laws and vice versa."[510] To the positive elements gained during the revolution period, but speaking back to 1792 as well, Stahl admitted that the political freedom may be a positive goal, but proposed revolutionary order, he warned, is "meant to be based on the will of man, that is the evil, and thereby all the good being sought also turns into evil." Any new order, such as the revolutionary period, devoid of the previous system and hierarchy, and not referring to God's command nor the monarchs whose

[507] Martin Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat* in a Substantive and a Formal Sense: Revisiting the Theory Development of the 1830s and 1840s," *Journal of Constitutional History*, 44/11, (2022): 86.
[508] Friedrich Julius Stahl, "What is the Revolution?" (1852), German History in Documents and Images, https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/from-vormaerz-to-prussian-dominance-1815-1866/ghdi:document-386
[509]Stahl, "What is the Revolution?", 2.
[510] Stahl, "What is the Revolution?" 4

power was bestowed by God, was the result of "rationalism."[511] To fight the upheaval brought by rationalism, while still maintaining the positive elements developed over these decades, Stahl advocated for the only "one power, that shuts down revolution", as he stated emphatically, "This is Christianity."[512] Stahl's position holds humans as dignified yet fallen or fallible, hence freedom should stand under a moral order the state acknowledges. Within this, rights are tied to duties and law as higher norms. This conservative interpretation, or element, within the component can be recognized and compared to other interpretations of *Rechtsstaat.*

Stahl presented the *Rechtsstaat* "on the basis of his definition of the State, which, in his opinion, has not been established because of the needs of individuals but because of the needs of the people of the nation." From this view, and situated within the tumultuous era of the 1840s, leading to the events of 1848, Stahl spoke of the people within an entire nation, rather than an individual level. For Stahl, the state was "an entity that maintained order and promoted social life – it was both a realm of law, a 'Rechtsstaat', and a realm of morality, a moral community." In this dual role of the state, it should act and as a result "secure the liberty of the citizens but also protect the necessary morality."[513] From this view then, as a representative of the conservative position, it can still be noted that "Stahl did not oppose the Rechtsstaat as such, but rather modified the concept." The rule of law, or "principle of legality" was a positive benefit of the *Rechtsstaat* and only possible through the state. It was through this focus on the state, and thus the benefits the states offered to the individual, or the people of that state, Stahl managed "to amalgamate

[511] Stahl, "What is the Revolution?" 6.
[512] Stahl, "What is the Revolution?" 8.
[513] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat*," 87.

the untouchable 'monarchical principle' with the most important liberal demands (representation, Rechtsstaat) into a 'constitutional conservativism'."[514]

Robert von Mohl

Certainly, of an opposing political ideological view, liberal members such as Robert von Mohl "stressed the necessity and the legitimacy" of the democratic parliamentary system. He pointed to the examples of the "representative systems of Britain, France and Germany." In the British example, von Mohl commended the "government with the cabinet's strong dependency on both houses" whereas he "criticized the dualism between the parliament and the government that was typical of most of the German states." This dualism, in von Mohl's belief, empowered the "backwardness not only of the political system by also of the whole society." By the 1950s, it was not only political theorists such as Stahl, who believed the fall of the National Assembly justified their concerns regarding parliamentarism. It was a common attack both during the time of the Frankfurt Parliament, but especially afterwards that parliamentarism fostered "demagoguery and corruption." Arguing against this position, and without citing the monarchical principle, he "argued that constant alternations of the government and the opposition had a moderating influence on the representative assembly." This "parliamentary principle" then, "primarily meant that the government was formed from the majority of the assembly and secondly that the parliament had the right to formulate laws and to approve the budget of the state." It was von Mohl's

[514] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 88.

contention that this system would "overcome the dualism between the prince and his governmental power on one side and the representative assembly on the other." Many have pointed out that in von Mohl's case for parliamentarism, his position did not explicitly "include democracy." He was in fact, "a strong opponent to universal suffrage, which he equated with the emergence of 'communism'." Speaking to the middle ground position of many liberals during the constitutional debates in the National Assembly, he too worried about the stability of government and thus "argued for a limited franchise as the precondition of a wise parliamentary system."[515]

The movement from the dual state in which the power remained with the government or monarch, and some power was transferred to the people, whether that be the previous existing theory of the police state, or the monarchical principle, mirrored the call of liberal idealist to the *Rechtsstaat*. For von Mohl, "a state according to the idea of *Rechtsstaat* was a state based on particular axiology." A *Rechtsstaat* as an option "alongside the patriarchal, patrimonial, theocratic, classical and despotic models" would characterize the nation "at the highest level of civilizational development." The *Rechtsstaat* would move from an ideological conception of the state and through the developments of the mid nineteenth century, blend through events of failure or compromise, into a liberal ideal of the "'modern' State, corresponding to the needs and spirit of the time."[516] The work of von Mohl presents a distinction concerning the individual within a state, between that of "'subject' (*Unterthan*) and 'citizen' (*Burger, Staatsburger*)." The subject was further explained as "everyone obliged to obey the

[515] Jorke and Llanque, "Parliamentarism and Democracy," 263-264.
[516] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 182.

authority and render services to the community." Despite the fact this form "was primarily linked to less developed forms of statehood than *Rechtsstaat*", it "does not mean, however, that von Mohl perceived the concept of subject unequivocally negatively." Citizen, therefore, "is a concept attributed to the rule of law." As von Mohl was a theorist of his time, that being the "era of late monarchical absolutism", he was "not able to break away from perceiving the individual as the subject, having primarily responsibilities towards the State." He presented a more modern concept of the *Rechtsstaat* than previous German intellectuals, having experienced the era of revolution and expansion of liberal ideas, his work more clearly "assumes that the individual has certain freedoms and rights in the State."[517] This then, translates autonomy into policy, including the mechanisms of justice and administration as the state's ethical function to adjudicate claims and remove obstacles to autonomous agency.

These views may seem lacking compared to the term of the revolutionary hopes of liberalism within the German states, a more intellectual or pure form of liberal ideology. In this liberal scholar's defense of parliamentarism, we see this example to understand that "von Mohl's views on civil rights can be regarded as going in line with the mainstream of early German moderate liberalism in the period before and during the Springtime of the Peoples." Rather than a revolutionary seeking upheaval or disruption, his views "constituted an attempt to find a compromise between the conviction of the need for reform and liberalisation of absolutist *Polizeistaat*, and the aspirations of monarchs and conservatives to maintain the *status quo*."[518]

[517] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 187.
[518] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 194.

The fact that both conservatives and liberals grounded their arguments in the *Rechtsstaat* underscores its status as a shared element of this worldview component, an agreed vision of what human life requires, despite deep political disagreement. From the perspective of this ontological component, both interpretations affirm the legal personality of the human and the need for predictable and stable administration. They differ however over whether hierarchical stewardship or representative accountability best safeguards freedom. The key takeaway is the shared choice in terminology, through which human agency becomes actual, *Rechtsstaat*.

Rechtsstaat

The term "*Rechtsstaat*" is important to understand due to the dual developmental of influences within German society during the nineteenth century. The emergence of the *Rechtsstaat* as a viable concept shared by a plurality of citizens was the result of elevated liberal ideals and the practical applications of nationalism. The *Rechtsstaat* theory and its practical application represents the evolution of the ontological component of a German worldview during the nineteenth century. This is not proposed to be a controversial statement, for this follows a common understanding of many Western societies, more commonly recognized as the Rule of Law. During the nineteenth century it is commonly accepted that the concepts of the "'Rule of law' and 'Rechtsstaat'" emerged to denote the "essential characteristic of modern democratic societies."[519]

[519] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 81.

In 1798 Johann Wilhelm Petersen, writing under the pen name of Placidus, used "the word 'Rechtsstaat'" to convey "the proponents of Immanuel Kant's philosophical theories of law." The *Rechtsstaat* then, was conceptually introduced "in the context of Kant's enlightened ideas as his theories about the freedom of the individual and the largest possible room for liberty as the generally first purpose of the state."[520] From the perception of the late twentieth century, legal philosopher Neil MacCormick argues that *Rechtsstaat* and the rule of law share broadly similar normative commitments. Within these possibly broad concepts, others have studied and declared that "the key difference between the two concepts has to do with the question of where the rights of individuals originate." The distinction seems to be whether the rights and laws protecting the individual are understood to have already existed within a society, or if the state is viewed as affording rights and laws to its citizens, potentially in a form of contractual power sharing or limitation.[521]

According to MacCormick, the distinction lies in the enacting of the concept, thereby moving the question away from any distinction between the two concepts and instead focusing on "how far any particular state does live up to the rule of law, thereby achieving the character of a 'law-state"[522]. Whether *Rechtsstaat* or the Rule of Law, "both express certainly closely related values that have been advanced in respect of legal order." Equally, however, we should not assign the minor distinctions to tangible but extreme expressions. MacCormick warns that by *Rechtsstaat*, we should not think of "'a

[520] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 83-84.
[521] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 82.
[522] Neil MacCormick, *Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth*, *Law, State, and Practical Reason,* (Oxford Academic, 1999), online edn, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268765.001.0001 .

state under any kind of law whatsoever', nor by 'Rule of Law', rule under any kind of law whatsoever." Both traditions emphasize procedural safeguards essential to legitimate governance in which "at least certain kinds of process-values are securely observed."[523]

Specific to the events of the first half of the nineteenth century amongst the German states, the initial attempts at a unified nation-state and the ramifications which followed, MacCormick reminds us that these events continued to form and mold the concept of *Rechtsstaat*. For what we today understand as the nineteenth century *Rechtsstaat*, or the "historic German programme", this German program insisted that administration rest on statue and that the state bind itself to law.[524] Despite the intricacies or the substantive differences that have played out in reality from the concepts, it seems clear that the "Rechtsstaat and rule of law, despite their different constitutional histories, rest upon the same underlying *principles*"[525] Of key conceptual, or in fact ideological difference, however, in the German instances of practical execution, the doctrine situated legality within state authority rather than subordinating the state to law.[526]

It was the events of 1848 and the subsequent version of liberal parliamentary democracy as attempted amongst the German states, that resulted in the substantiation of the ideals of the concept of *Rechtsstaat*. Despite the appearance of failure, the necessary compromise between traditional monarchies and a developing form of liberalism within the individual states, resulted in a "'compromise' between constitutional liberalism and the *Monarchisches Prinzip* apparatus." It was through the monarchical principle,

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[523] MacCormick, *Questioning Sovereignty,* 43.
[524] MacCormick, *Questioning Sovereignty,* 45.
[525] Gustavo Gozzi. "RECHTSSTAAT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY," in *The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism,* eds. P. Costa and D. Zolo Springer, (2007,) 237.
[526] Gozzi, "Rechtsstaat and Individual," 238.

obviously centered in the traditional role of the monarch retaining such a role that "the entire power of the State was concentrated in the sovereign," but with the provision of limiting "his own power through constitutional laws, representation of the people, and so on."[527]

From the early concept of the *Rechtsstaat* there existed a tension between this new concept of societal design and the conservative, or more precisely traditional, beliefs. The period of time prior to the 1848 revolutions, the Frankfurt Parliament and after, serves to mark the progression of the conception. The new reality following this event signifying an expanding set of demands amongst a citizenry can be found in Stahl's work which "grounded his doctrine of the *Rechtsstaat* on the monarchic principle." Stahl stated that "The *Rechtsstaat* 'must determine with precision and with certainty the boundaries and the limits of its activity, as well as the free sphere of its citizens, according to the modalities of law'." From this conservative view of societal order of rights, then, we can see that the more typical liberal view of the *Rechtsstaat* "was divided between natural law and positive law doctrines." Of course, the "natural law perspective was quite heavily influenced by the legal doctrine of Kant" and the events of the nineteenth century saw a much more materialistic or practical focus.[528] After Kant and denoting this more practical form of liberalism growing in society during the "the 1830s and 1840s", von Mohl "worked in Kant's Enlightenment tradition and saw the protection of the liberty of the individual as an important part of the Rechtsstaat."[529]

[527] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 83.
[528] Gozzi, "Rechtsstaat and Individual," 241.
[529] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 84.

From the positive law position, von Mohl held that "Only the Rechtsstaat – as distinct from the state of patrimony, despotism, and theocracy – had citizens." The state in its design and purpose held several aims "in the first place, the preservation of the legal system throughout the state; in the second place, support for the rational purposes of individuals, in cases in which their means are inadequate."[530] In 1832, well before the experience of the Frankfurt Parliament, von Mohl presented the state as ordering life within a territory and providing means to pursue shared purposes, or, "the general will."[531] His interpretation of the *Rechtsstaat* provides the liberal view, based on a "conviction among the people that life has a purpose in itself and that the future is uncertain." This purpose of life, was reasonable and "common to humans" in that "their natural powers could develop in all directions, but individuals needed to acquire and enjoy the means necessary for this to happen." Standing in the way of this goal for the human being, theoretically, would be the "unlawful will of other human beings and the overwhelming forces of external obstacles." It falls upon the state then, "to remove these obstacles" standing in the way of a human beings right to purpose. From this interpretation of the *Rechtsstaat,* von Mohl held that "justice and administration were fundamental to the Rechtsstaat." He envisioned the *Rechtsstaat* as combining legal order and rational administration.[532]

Following the work of Kant, the "category of post-Kantian perfectionism has recently been applied to ethical programmes like those of Fichte and Schiller." As examined previously in Chapter 2, German philosophers work would follow as both

[530] Gozzi, "Rechtsstaat and Individual," 242.
[531] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 84.
[532] Sunnqvist, "The *Rechtsstaat,"* 85.

influenced and in reaction to the work of Kant. German philosophy would take on as their "central end the promotion of freedom and of its material, political, and social conditions." This "post-Kantian character" represents then, a "shift away from *eudaimonia*, happiness, or need-fulfilment" to "freedom and autonomy as core values." From the societal actions both representative and following from the work of German intellectuals, and in the increasingly accepted concept of the *Rechtsstaat*, "the aim is to secure and enhance the conditions for the exercise of freedom and to eliminate obstacles to self-determination."[533] Within this component of the worldview framework then, the *Rechtsstaat* represents the institutional expression of the German concept of the human as rational and autonomous, yet reliant on the construction and function of state to secure the conditions necessary for development.

Conclusion

This chapter, in efforts of identifying components of a German worldview asked, what did the development of a German nation-state during the nineteenth century reveal about the intellectual beliefs of the German people concerning the nature of what it is to be human? To answer this question, it specifically addressed how the governmental priorities and theories of societal design of the German people were exhibited during the nineteenth century. For the grand nature of this component, it may be surprising for the focus of a chapter to revolve around a short period of time resulting in what most have deemed a failed revolutionary parliament. On the surface of events, this assertion would

[533] Douglas Moggach, "German Republicans and Socialists in the Prelude to 1848," In *The 1848 Revolutions and European Political Thought*, eds. Douglas Moggach and Gareth Stedman Jones, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 216.

appear correct as after the events in 1849 and the fall of the National Assembly, "Paulskirche resumed its life as a church in 1852, and it generally lost its symbolic importance until the onset of the Weimar Republic in 1918."[534] After the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, however, and a decisive move in West Germany toward the Western democratic community, Frankfurt and specifically the landmark of *Paulskirche* gained an elevated status.

Through first the Weimar Republic and subsequently the Federal Republic of Germany, this site would become a "core sacred site for renovated ideals of German nationalism." As an elixir of sorts against the ills of Nazism, the church landmark would be referred to as "Germany's 'cathedral of democracy'." The answer then to what this period of time can reveal as to a German conception of the human being, can in part be gleaned through the importance future generations would posthumously assign to the place, time and its historical actors of the National Assembly in Frankfurt. The physical site of "human ascription in speeches, inscriptions and commemorations" was proof that democratic and liberal ideals were present and tied to a German nationalism, prior to the slow devolution towards National Socialism. By 1949, Frankfurt's *Paulskirche* would become "a *lieu de memoire*: a nostalgic crystallization point for 'German democracy'."[535] If there was to be a "'redeemable' German nationalism," in modern day Germany, Paulskirche was to be "steadily imbricated with lived traditions that made it both a milieu

[534] Andrew Demshuk, "Building the Cathedral of Democracy: Frankfurt's Paulskirche in Hitler's shadow," *German History* 39, No. 4: 608.
[535] Demshuk, "Building the Cathedral," 606.

for active discussion about the postwar German nation and a nostalgic reference point for 1848."[536]

The heights of apparent revolutionary victories of 1848 and the optimism of *Paulskirche* and its developing constitution at the beginning of 1849 quickly shifted to a lasting narrative of failure which disproportionately affected perceptions concerning the liberal agenda in Germany until the end of the First World War. This can be summarized as an issue of theoretical expectations versus the realities of political compromises and yes, defeats.

Whereas the initial conception of the *Rechtsstaat* emphasized liberty as a central normative principle[537], the realities of negotiating these theories into political and societal change mirrored the development of the theory into practical application and protection of these rights and freedoms. The practical application of the concept saw that during the mid-nineteenth century, major elements of a German constitutional tradition were introduced and accepted as rational and even expected amongst the citizenry of the German states. The fact that traditional princes and monarchs would accept limitations placed on or carved out of their once unfettered power, points to a result that "liberalism reached a compromise with the constitutional monarchy." From this view, the man-made agreement of law assuring both sides, "the legality of the administration and the 'statutory reservation' were the principles of the Rechtsstaat specifically designed to protect individuals from possible arbitrary action by the administration."[538] The constitutional agreement then, and the fruition of the multiple steps and actors in the

[536] Demshuk, "Building the Cathedral," 607.
[537] Gozzi, "Rechtsstaat and Individual," 244.
[538] Gozzi, "Rechtsstaat and Individual," 251.

unification of the German nation-state, are the principles of the developing *Rechtsstaat* theory in practice.

The Frankfurt Parliament and its constitution represented the first time that "fundamental rights were proclaimed for the entire area of the state of all Germans which was about to be established." Technically, it would take seven decades until the "next comparatively liberal catalogue of civil rights and freedoms was included in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic."[539] The steps leading to the dissolution of the Frankfurt Parliament, and ultimately the National Assembly's final iteration in Stuttgart, were certainly the result of a lack of centralized power and internal political maneuvers. The act of the National Assembly and the period of debates, presentation of ideas and ultimately codified laws introduced standards which would come to be expected in any future iteration or evolution of a German unified body. For instance, by 1871 and the successful unification of a true "national parliamentary government was finally established in Germany with the founding of the German Reich", universal male suffrage existed within groups and individual's minds as possible and a right which "was elevated to constitutional status and was further developed in a law echoing that of 1849."[540]

In terms of the unfolding of a German ontology, the institutional success or failure is secondary to what the debates clarified about the human as identified through the principles advocated for during the drafting, debates, and eventual passing of the 1849 constitution and subsequent constitutions of the state. It is true that for the two decades following the rejection of the constitution, the electoral law and the constitution of the

[539] Lesinski, "The Question of Civil Rights," 186.
[540] Biefang and Schulz, "From Monarchical Constitutionalism," 67.

National Assembly was largely ignored as there "was no national representative body to which it could be applied." The fact, however, that "Bismarck revived the Electoral Law twenty years later in the North German Confederation" does seem to offer that the existence of the idea, from the conception, through debate, the vote, and ultimately it being utilized by Bismarck as a political maneuver, denotes that the principle itself was of importance to a large portion of the German masses. The fact that it was utilized some two decades later, largely intact and by a politician from a very different political position, suggests that the law was of importance and that the event of the Electoral Law itself does serve to tell us "a good deal about German political life at mid-century."[541] By 1949, the human being had increasingly been addressed as a bearer of legally articulable freedom, and political actors normalized expectations that constitutions ushered via parliamentary bodies acted for the rights of the individual, or citizen.

The period of time prior to the 1848 revolutions, the short-lived era of the Frankfurt Parliament and the apparent conservative revival of power after, all serve to mark the progression of a conception of human rights and agency amongst a people striving to live together in pursuit of that ideal. The work of liberal idealists, conservative revivalists, and German philosophers all reflect a growing notion amongst the German concept of the human, human rights and the human ideal. The concept of the *Rechtsstaat* was advanced in German society through both philosophical theory and practical applications service of numerous political aspirations. Throughout these tests of the hypothetical in action, there remained the conviction that the human being held a common relationship to develop in the direction of their choice but towards an ideal of

[541] Rose, "The Issues of Parliamentary Suffrage," 147.

purpose. Against the obvious impediments to this idea, the state both had an expectation and a role in assuring the ability of the human to achieve this right through the promotion of freedom and the necessary social conditions. The power and means to provide these conditions for the human being would be both recognized and consented within the power of the state, and yet this power would be limited through service to this end and its citizens. The nineteenth century German nation-building process reveals a German ontology, a component of a German worldview in which the human being is conceived as morally autonomous yet socially embedded, free yet dependent on institutional order. This represents both the philosophical ontological conception of the human being as part of a German worldview, and its practical application in German society.

Chapter 4:

Myth as a Uniting Narrative

The preceding chapters have exhibited that the individual components of this a German worldview are deeply interconnected. As introduced in Chapter Two, a unique aspect of German Idealism, a component of a German worldview, concerned the way in which students of the Enlightenment shared connections and inspirations with the passionate artists of German Romanticism. With the predominant acceptance of the Enlightenment movement so diametrically opposed to considerations beyond reason, the natural rival was the reactionary movement of Romanticism. In German culture, however, the two schools seemingly shared a cultural aim to unify the German identity. As outlined in Chapter Three, the second component of a German worldview, the concept of the human (ontology), there existed a developing identification of human beings as free, self-forming agents morally autonomous yet embedded within a shared order. At a time when people of individual states and regions were searching for connections between the long conceptualized, but still developing idea of the German people, the power of perpetuated myth would help foster a common ideal for their union. This chapter examines a third component in the worldview framework– the German mythos of the *Volk* as self-identification – and investigates the degree to which it shaped a German worldview. This will primarily concern the elements of the German myth from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In what forms was this narrative of a German myth transmitted among the people and which ideas did it prioritize? How would these ideas transmit and reach an audience? The evolving concept of a German people, a German *Volk*, served as a powerful force for collective self-identification spanning centuries. The

influence of this lineage will be addressed. By approaching the mythos of the *Volk* as a worldview component, this chapter highlights how symbolic narratives shaped the German peoples shared interpretation, offering a culturally embedded lens through which Germans understood themselves, their past, and their political objectives.

In this chapter, German myth refers to the evolving symbolic narrative through which a German polity of peoples imagined themselves as a unified cultural community. This German myth can also be described as the mythos, or myth, of the *Volk*, meaning the elements of myth which helped to identify the German people as a distinct cultural and historical entity. This chapter will use German myth as the primary term for clarity and readability. Within this exploration of myth as a component of a German worldview, the concept of the *Volk* appears when emphasizing the myth's focus on collective self-identification.

This chapter examines four interrelated elements of the German myth. First, an origin narrative portraying the German people as ancient and distinct. Second, a belief in a shared historical destiny. Third, the cultural unity expressed through folk traditions and artistic forms. Finally, the emotional and symbolic power of myth as carried through Romantic art, music, and later nationalist expression. Each section elaborates one of these elements and shows how it contributed to the unfolding German myth.

The Application of Myth

Without a direct polity, constitution, or forged geographic borders, the idea of a German people existed partly in historical accounts and partly in stories, folk tales and

songs comprised of legend, reaching a status achievable only through myth. The mythos component of a German worldview, referred to as a German myth, represents an inciting influence responsible for the unique blending of otherwise opposing intellectual positions and the subsequent political ramifications, a blending which made myth an especially powerful medium for expressing collective identity, and thus a crucial component in the development of a German worldview.

Derived from Greek and Latin and referring to something like a narrative or tale, Mythos is a "pattern of beliefs expressing often symbolically the characteristic or prevalent attitudes in a group or culture."[542] We use the now common word myth (German *Mythos*) to refer to "a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon."[543] In exploring the German myth as an important component of a German worldview, the formation, development and eventual use or abuse of the myth will highlight specifically the formative narrative elements which, in building connections amongst its audience, attained a mythical status aligning with the definition as ostensibly historical.

As some of the foundational elements of this myth did not develop naturally from within, the most illuminating periods arise when internal actors intentionally manipulated the myth to build the narrative towards their intended goals. The power of the myth rests in the collective desires of the people, even at the expense of the authenticity of the

[542] "Definition of Mythos", Merriam-Webster, accessed Apr. 12, 2018, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mythos
[543] "Definition of Myth", Merriam-Webster, accessed Apr. 12, 2018, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/myth

sources used to further this story. The power, and inherent danger, of this myth resided in the emotion it could evoke within a people, rather than the strength of the sources to stand up to scrutiny. Ultimately, a people seeking a connective narrative, refined a myth focused on the people, the *Volk*, united in the drive for nationalism. This dynamic illustrates the role of myth as an important component of a German worldview, as it provided a unifying symbolic vocabulary sharing personal sentiment with collective aspirations, thus making nationalism both strategically and emotionally compelling.

The position that nations are "a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent…political destiny, are a myth." The power of nationalism as a force which takes "pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them"[544] is the ultimate stage in which the development and presentation of the German myth will provide answers for this chapter. The desire and power of nationalism would direct the curation and presentation of the German myth within German culture. Whether naturally or by design, the myth of a German people and a united national community, a people, a *Volk*, was fostered from both internal and external sources. The long lineage and increasing power of the myth touched seemingly boundless areas of expression. This chapter will first concern itself with the period of German Romanticism. Additionally, as such a driving inspiration of community, this vast myth of the people would offer ample areas of manipulation specifically within the context of nationalism.

[544] Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780,* 15.

This chapter will address these stated areas, to understand the origins, influence and ramifications of the German myth as a unifying medium or source of identification of the people as an important component of a German worldview.

The German Myth as the Identification of a People

The gradual accumulation of elements of the German myth is inherently tied to the question of identification and the intent of the people. The trajectory and enduring power of this form of identification is tied to its origins, the source of which has been widely recognized as part historical and part mythical. This identification was not produced from within but instead based on outside assumptions, from the vaunted vantage point of the Roman Empire, by a celebrated yet often questioned historian. Its prominence in German reception demonstrates how an ostensibly historical narrative became integrated into a German worldview as a pre-ethnographic source of collective identity.

The foundations of the German myth as a component of a larger German worldview can be identified as far back as the work of Publius Cornelius Tacitus, historian, politician, biographer among a number of posthumous identifiers. This section examines the first element of the German myth, the origin narrative. Tacitus's work provided later German readers with a symbolic account of purity, antiquity, and distinctiveness. Understanding how this text was received helps explain how the German myth acquired its earliest historical foundations. A constant theme through this Roman's oratory and writing suggests his interest in asking "how values depend on social and

political circumstances"[545] as his historical method sought to "aid in the formation of individual moral character."[546] In approximately 98AD, Tacitus's *Germania*[547] defined Germany as being "separated from the Gauls and the Raetians and the Pannonians by the rivers Rhine and the Danube: from the Sarmatians and the Dacians by mutual misgivings or mountains."[548] Based on his observations, Tacitus portrayed this society and people in a manner which would inspire some of the most prominent and utilized, or abused, elements of the German myth,

> …I associate myself with the opinions of those who hold that in the peoples of Germany there has been given to the world a race unmixed by intermarriage with other races, a peculiar people and pure, like no one but themselves, whence it comes that their physique, so far as can be said with their vast numbers, is identical: fierce blue eyes, red hair, tall frames, powerful only spasmodically…[549]

In highlighting Tacitus as important to the beginning of the German myth as a component of a larger German worldview the point is not Tacitus's accuracy but his existence as a flexible source of pure origin that later readers could imagine as theirs. Though unquestionably prolific, the work of Tacitus has amassed critiques when read as a true historical work. Scholars argue the *Germania* mixes observations with moralizing and

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[545]Christopher B. Krebs, *A Most Dangerous Book, Tacitus's Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich*, (W.W.Norton & Company, 2011), 42.
[546] J.S. Reid, "Tacitus as a Historian," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 11, (1921): 192.
[547] Cornelius Tacitus, *Germania*: *The Earliest Beginnings and the Land of Germans*, in *Tacitus: Agricola, Germania, Dialogus*, trans. M. Hutton, W.Peterson, Revised by, R.M.Ogilvie, E.H.Warmington, M.Winterbottom, (Harvard University Press, 1970).
[548] Tacitus, *Germania*, 129.
[549] Tacitus, *Germania*, 135-137.

legend, drawing criticism of its historical method. What remains widely accepted by most scholars is "that the *Germania* is comparable to other ethnographic works of antiquity" and should be viewed as a mix of observation, legend and moralizing.[550] As a source indicative of its time, the most important ramification may be that "separate units of people, tribes and nations" were not presented as "merely a string of proper names," as to the author they were to be viewed as "individual ethnical and cultural entities.'"[551] Tacitus's work is important to the unfolding of the German myth as a worldview component in that it can be treated as illustrative of how, and why, a mythic script was found, selected, or identified with, by others.

Though initially widely read, the work faded from prominence until its resurgence in the sixteenth century when a second German-language printing of *Germania* gained great recognition and acclaim. German speaking readers accounted for "as many as six thousand copies" a widespread number for the era.[552] Specifically recognized amongst "German Humanists", Tacitus's work existed as a glimpse of a past connection, a story conveying to the German speaking readers that "their ancestors had lived a hard but free, simple but moral life as tall, fair, and flaxen-haired men and women of war." This ostensibly historical source, or perhaps more aptly labelled narrative myth, existed for this group of German readers and "allowed them to dream up a common German nation." Through these connections, a singular culture "increasingly spoke of 'all Germans,' 'all of Germany,' and the above-quoted 'common German fatherland.'" Such reception demonstrates how mythicized sources of antiquity provided a conceptual base for later

[550] Marianina Demetri Olcott, "Tacitus on the ancient amber-gatherers: A re-evaluation of Germania", *Journal of Baltic Studies* 16:3, (1985): 302.
[551] Olcott,"Tacitus on the ancient amber-gatherers", 312.
[552] Krebs, *A Most Dangerous Book,* 91.

assumptions present during the development of a German myth and the period of this thesis. The mythicized sources of antiquity become the foundational element which came to influence a German nation which was "defined culturally and with particular recourse to the common and morally superior past."[553]

This revival of Tacitus's work presented the cultural connection "between about 1470 and 1520" and through the "variety of themes that fleshed out the meaning of the term *deutsche* Nation, and endowed it with a history and a foundation in myth."[554] Within the continually defined German society, the intellectual and cultural focus on the people expanded beyond conventional political or geographic borders, through the growing sources of both fact and legend. In 1520, *Omnium Gentium Mores, Legges et Ritus* (*The Customs of All Peoples*) by Teutonic Order Monk Johannes Boemus was published signifying "one of the first modern surveys of peoples throughout the world and it contains the first serious study of the habits and customs of 'the fourth estate of the Germans.'"[555] Boemus presented these geographic and cultural distinctions of peoples based on locating and researching everything from historical sources to simple fragments of descriptions of travelers.[556] Boemus's contribution, within the revived interest of the foundational identification of the people, represents a connective point of framing Germans as a recognizable cultural community with seemingly stable traits and inherited customs.

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[553] Krebs, *A Most Dangerous Book,* 105-106.
[554] Joachim Whaley, "Reich Nation, Volk: Early Modern Perspectives," *Modern Languages Review* 101, (2006): 449.
[555] Smith, *GERMANY,* 33.
[556] Margaret T. Hodgen, "Johann Boemus (Fl.1500): An Early Anthropologist," *American Anthropologist* 55, No.2 Part 1. (Apr.-Jun., 1954,): 285.

The task of identifying more supporting sources as stable traits, qualities or connective features of a German people signified the desire to explain and potentially propel a unity of a people. These foundational and connective elements, identified through the popularized works spanning Tacitus to Boemus, represent the emergent drive to identify and propagate elements of a peoples' connections. This drive would accelerate into the next era in which the imagination and medium to connect details to passion merged through an enduring spirit.

Romanticism and the Deepening of the German Myth

This section turns to the second element of the German myth, the belief in a shared historical destiny. German Romanticism expanded the myth by infusing it with emotional depth, metaphysical meaning, and a sense of cultural mission. These developments made the German myth more resonant and more widely assessable.

Romanticism traditionally refers to "the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century concept of an era informed by the profound experience of momentous political, social and intellectual revolutions."[557] The term Romanticism, or romantic, can be open to interpretation as much as the artistic expression is to the audience, but in connection or relationship with idealism, its relevant traits may include:

> the free play of the imagination in a world where the unexpected is to be expected, where identities may undergo sudden and surprising transformations; a rich tapestry of images, events, feelings, and moods; a loosening of the

[557] Azade Seyhan, "What is Romanticism, and where did it come from? in *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism*, ed. Nicholas Saul, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1, Kindle.

> distinctions fixed by ordinary understanding between the real and the ideal, between the factual and the fictional; a conviction of the interrelatedness of things; the sense of a certain emptiness or absence in the present time; and a longing for the infinite.[558]

These aesthetic characteristics reveal something important about an unfolding German myth, as a component of a German worldview because they enabled narrative forms capable of expressing metaphysical unity, historical destiny, and the emotional polity of a German people. The characteristics, or traits, furnished the formal means to idealize unity by binding a people through image, song and story.

It was the co-existence and blending of these characteristics of Romanticism with the philosophical teachings of the Enlightenment which would help define the philosophers of German Idealism and eventually carried their theories to a mass audience through the mediums of the arts. But what in German culture predispose those previously assumed opposing sides to such cooperation? Whether a devotee of reason or defiant limitless imagination, at the heart of both the German philosophers and artists was the "deeper common cultural current, a groundswell", or simply, the "Zeitgeist".[559] No matter the form of language or education, the cultural connection and will of the *Geist*, is a common idea expressed spanning centuries. This "*Geist*, the Germanic Spirit," is distinct from other cultural notions of spirit as it "does not take its measure from the technical philosophical sense of the Greco-Latin *spiritus*" which involves a "distinction

[558] Kenneth L. Schmitz, "The Idealism of the German Romantics", in *The Emergence of German Idealism*, ed. Michael Baur and Daniel O.Bahlstrom, (The Catholic University Press, 1999), 177, ebook.
[559] Schmitz, "The Idealism of the German Romantics", 177.

of form and matter." *Geist* in the purely "philosophical sense" partly originates from "the particular conditions of eighteenth-century German national life" and partly from the influence of "Greco-Latin intellectual heritage." This heritage, though present in German continuity, was "transformed" by "the German *Geist*."[560] This spiritualized conception of collective identity provided a German myth with a universal, or metaphysical, level, engraining it within the evolving culture.

The early development of the Romantic era, and its "turn to 'myth'" in general, has been extensively debated. Whereas one position can confine Romanticism as "an essentially conservative or apolitical movement, which diverted the energies of the French Revolution into the by-channels of cultural life", others "stress the emancipatory and democratic dimensions of Romanticism." During this same period, the German myth developed as several German writers, including Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Friedrich Schlegel, noted the need "for a 'new mythology'." Such intellectuals identified a "legitimation crisis in modern society" and identified the necessity to instruct or prepare a people for "a public life that would foster genuine individuality."[561] The source of this instruction and connection for a people was presented through an internal mythology. This internal mythology represented a "non biblical source of sacred symbolism and narrative, which had the potential to rejuvenate aesthetic and religious life and overcome the divisions of modern society."[562] German Romanticism's "early formative years" spanning 1796 to 1801, are "known as *Fruhromantik*."[563] The developing version of

[560] Schmitz, "The Idealism of the German Romantics", 180.
[561] George S. Williamson, *The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche*, (The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. 2004), 23.
[562] Williamson, *The Longing for*, 24.
[563] Frederick C. Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative, The Concept of Early German Romanticism*, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 23.

German Romanticism during this period very clearly exhibited "cultural and philosophical" aspects. The contributing elements of this period would contain "ethical and political" ideas, ideas that came to be included in the unfolding of the German myth component of a larger German worldview.[564]

The "ethical ideal" of this German Romanticism movement "was *Bildung*" referring to a "self-realization" and "the development of all human and individual powers into a whole."[565] The term *Bildung* can be used to "mean education, culture, and development" but it literally expresses the "'formation,' implying the development of something potential, inchoate, and implicit into something actual, organized, and explicit." From a philosophical context, it has been presented as "an ethics of self-realization."[566] During this period, this self-realization matched the philosophical elevation of freedom as a first priority of the human being. The expressions of German Romanticism would elevate "the concept of freedom" through its recognition in that "*Bildung* must arise from the free choice of the individual." This priority of freedom followed from the philosophical example which had "been stressed before the romantics by both Kant and Fichte." As freedom was expressed in a moral sense, and moral duty was presented in "terms of autonomy", the connection with the philosophy influencing the period of the *Fruhromantik* is apparent as "romantics did not question the Kantian-Fichtean emphasis on autonomy and its central role in morality."[567] From this reaction, it can be inferred that the mythological foundation of emotional sentiment came to be included in the German myth, complementing the philosophical and ontological elements

[564] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative,* 24
[565] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative,* 25
[566] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative,* 26
[567] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative,* 29.

of autonomy and agency. *Bildung* connected personal self-formation to collective cultural identity. Thus, myth carried autonomy into popular forms with individuals connected with a German polity through mediums such as poetry, painting and music.

Evident from the earliest forms of German Romanticism in the late eighteenth century, "the monumental political and cultural events at the turn of the century called for a 'new mythology'." The mythology component of a German worldview supplied the symbolic forms through which Germans could imagine a coherent people, purpose and future. This mythology imparted a shared spirit which represented a "restorative principle of modern life, fragmented by opposing intellectual and cultural drives."[568] As philosophers such as Hegel also recognized, these early artists presented mythology as "a vision that strove to synthesise diverse literary traditions to create the most artistic form of all arts, art to the highest power."[569] The philosophers of the Enlightenment or the new Idealism would not oppose this standard, as they called attention to "Idealism philosophy's inability to grasp the absolute securely." Allegory, for example, was viewed as the only method for expressing the "inexpressible" nature of the absolute. The early Romantics recognized the power of art in "representing the unrepresentable, in other words, to intimate the absolute that eluded all reason."[570] It is through the power of this growing mythology specific to the German experience that the limitations of reason could be breached. These developments exemplify an unfolding German myth during the Romantic period which increasingly took on artistic expression to convey intellectual sources. The next section examines how the German myth was carried into cultural life

[568] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism," 10-11.
[569] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism," 12-13.
[570] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism," 10.

through mediums of the arts, where its symbolic power became visible, repeatable and emotionally resonant.

Cultural Unity - The Arts as Carriers of the German Myth

This section addresses the third element of the German myth, cultural unity. Through painting, poetry, folk song and communal music, the German myth was carried into popular consciousness and embedded in everyday cultural practice. These artistic forms made the myth tangible, repeatable, and emotionally compelling.

Like the philosophical pursuits of German Idealists, the Romantic painters represented in their art the "tensions between empirical reality and spiritual vision." Through artists such as Caspar David Friedrich and Philipp Otto Runge, "Art was no longer conceived as a medium of entertainment, edification or even aesthetic gratification", instead its purpose was grander, empowered to bring "forth insights into the transcendental."[571] Politics and the real world events of the early 19th century would motivate German painters entry into more "political themes and even propaganda by the upheavals of the Napoleonic wars."[572] Whether to inspire resistance or to encapsulate a hopelessness, works such as "*Fall des Vaterlandes* (Fall of the Fatherland), presented the hope of Germany as a male figure buried alive, naked and without a coffin, while the turf above comes under the plough." Other artists, meanwhile, relied on the comfort of tradition and "folk themes, in celebration of German provincial culture, or in re-creation

[571] Richard Littlejohns, "German Romantic painters," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism*, ed. Nicholas Saul, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 227, Kindle.
[572] Littlejohns, "German Romantic painters," 234.

of medieval splendour."[573] Read within this component of a German worldview, the canvases ritualized belonging as seeing the nation became a way of being a people. These images visually encoded the symbolic vocabulary of the German myth.

Similar to the advancement of literature, but not as dependent on education and technology, "popular music as performed in traditionally communitarian settings became an important folkloristic pursuit in the course of the nineteenth century."[574] Music in German culture has been presented as its own language and like painting, music functioned as a carrier of myth in community settings. The "idea of longing", for example, viscerally linked music and philosophy as "melody relies on moving away from and returning to a tonic note." These emotional connections evoked through its tones and poetic forms a language that could "respond to needs which are not fully satisfied by verbal language."[575] The variety of expression in German culture is exemplified through the collection of poems, ballads and texts within the German *Lied*. This carrier of the German myth thrived since the twelfth century and was "heralded by the rediscovery and revalorisation of the simple, 'artless' folk poem or folk ballad by the poets of early Romanticism." Romantic artists imbued this long tradition with the growing appeal of nationalism expressed as the "moral-political register of patriotism and 'love of the fatherland'."[576] Through the expanding bureaucratic middle class, the need for education increased and the growing student groups were of great importance to the "song propagation." During the "German anti-Napoleonic wars of 1813-1814", the "choral

[573] Littlejohns, "German Romantic painters," 234.
[574] Joep Leerssen, "Romanticism, music, nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 20 (4), (2014): 617, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12087.
[575] Andrew Bowie "Romanticism and music," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism*, ed. Nicholas Saul, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 246-249, Kindle.
[576] Leerssen, "Romanticism," 618.

repertoire was being written to cater for nationalist taste." This period exemplifies the popular artistic medium taking on a "very important nationalist function."[577] Music as a carrier of ideas and emotional spirit transcended class divides and education barriers. Music allowed these nationalistic sentiments to be repeatable, memorable and communal. The composers of Romantic and classical music have often been distinguished due to structural differences in form, but many famous classical composers utilized the "differing schemes" of Romantic expression.[578] Such artists and works include the names of "Joseph Haydn, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ludwig van Beethoven, Franz Schubert, Felix Mendelssohn, Robert Schumann, Johannes Brahms and Richard Wagner."[579] Through the revitalized passion for communal song and poetry and powerful nationalist themes, "the idea of using narratives set in the national past or the country's local colour" also influenced opera composers. Specific to Germany, and of considerable influence over the following century, "various German-themed operas of Richard Wagner" dominated "the period from the mid-1840s to the mid-1870s."[580] Through these artistic forms, the German myth became embodied, repeatable, and woven into everyday cultural life. It democratized the German myth by making it accessible and participatory.

Emotional Power - Wagner and the Intensification of the German Myth

This section explores another element of the German myth, its emotional and symbolic power. Richard Wagner's use of mythic themes exemplified the intensification

[577] Leerssen, "Romanticism," 618-619.
[578] Bowie, "Romanticism and music," 243-244.
[579] Bowie, "Romanticism and music," 243-244.
[580] Leerssen, "Romanticism," 611-612.

of myth by presenting its power as a sort of cultural religion, capable of expressing themes such as collective longing and national purpose. The grandeur of Wagner's productions enabled vertical unification across society through monumental cultural forms. Wagner's use of myth and his version of romanticism developed for German society within the context of the "*Vormarz*" period. This time period refers to the influences of literature and art propelling a political movement toward the revolutionary period of 1848. The late eighteenth century had introduced a political and theological conjecture threatening the previous societal role of religion. Recognizing the role religion had played in society as a conjoining source of myth, symbols and inspiration of a people, Wagner envisioned a historically grounded new myth capable of expressing a shared human longing and furnishing a cultural alternative to traditional religion. This new myth would seek to play a role in both fostering a union of the people and inspiring their actions towards that union's ideal. Wagner conceived of this project as providing the cultural substance of musical drama and functioning as a social religion.[581] For Wagner, the potential of the purest human condition was central to his artistic vision. He believed myth could reveal an uncorrupted form of human nature beneath accumulated historical norms and religious layers. Wagner's work is a popular example of the artistic development and its influence represented myth's application "centered on a singular image of the 'human'."[582] As an unfolding element of the German myth, the social religion spoke to the collective rites of meaning and unity, analogous to the collective power of theology.

[581] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth*," 181.
[582] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth*," 196-197.

Wagner "popularized the images and stories of 'German mythology' for the nineteenth-century public" as part of the larger development of German Romanticism. The popularized and accessible expressions of the German myth had permeated general comprehension of a shared German history. These dramatic and popular artistic mediums had even "created a consensus among educated Germans that the ancient Teutons had indeed possessed a pantheon of gods." The transition from the early development of German Romanticism to the later period of the *Vormarz* would represent corresponding changes within the "configuration of political, religious, and cultural forces" of German society. Against secular trends of the late eighteenth century and the influence of Napoleonic administration, "Rationalist and Hegelian forms of Protestantism were on the defensive, while Neo-Pietist and late Romantic theologies affirmed an inherent connection between throne and altar in the 'Christian state.'"[583] Despite Wagner's intent for a new aesthetic social religion in the early period, the myth and German Romanticism would broaden and be incorporated by traditional groups to include a larger section of the existing German polity. The appeal of the German myth and the growing acceptance of it by traditional, conservative and religious groups accounted for an inherent and ambiguous "straddling of the pagan-Christian divide" which became "typical of the German discourse on myth."[584] Myth's malleable nature, as a component of a developing German worldview, allowed it to draw on both pre-Christian pagan sources and embrace the centuries of Christian heritage which equally served to unite the German people. The unity of a people and growing consensus of nationalism within the German myth also

[583] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth*," 209.
[584] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth*," 209-210.

meant that this growing force would not consistently, or automatically, align with the inherent trends of the developing liberal-democratic period.

What began as scattered sources of origin and cultural unity had unfolded into a shared narrative through which Germans increasingly interpreted their collective purpose. The German myth as a component then, can be identified with roots in antiquity, expanded by Romanticism, and carried through cultural life through the mediums of the arts. The revolutionary period in 1848 and the subsequent National Assembly represented a turning point in the development of this brand of German Romanticism. Following the collapse of the liberal-democratic parliament, many assumed a failure of "the *Vormarz* brand of liberalism, with its roots in Romanticism and idealist philosophy." As examined in Chapter 3, however, what emerged in reality was not a failure of the former cultural and intellectual force, but the evolution of "a more practical and materialistic form of liberalism."[585] German Romanticism's artistic presentations of the German myth in the first half of the nineteenth century had played a role as a central connector of the German people and fueled the spread of intellectual ideas and a shared ideal. The widespread acceptance of this ideal and the rise of nationalism directed the majority towards pragmatic approaches to nationalistic goals.

Political Realization - Nationalism and the German Myth

This section examines how the German myth moved from the cultural expression to political realization. As nationalism intensified in the nineteenth century, the German

[585] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth*," 211.

myth provided a symbolic vocabulary through which political actors imagined and justified the emerging nation-state.

Through mythology the German Romantics sought to continue the work of the philosophers and idealists, specifically by deepening the connection to the German spirit. It was from this early stage that the Romantic movement in Germany embraced "the question of how Germans might conceive an authentic national culture of their own." We learn that the unfolding German myth included a national identity that was framed not as political convenience but as the unfolding of an organic, historically rooted spirit. Its organic register signaled belonging by memory, mood and sentiment. This direction was an obvious progression towards a goal, for while a cultural state was continually forming, a "German state, in the sense of a homogeneous, centralised political entity did not exist."[586] The work of the intellectuals and artists represented "social models" which "grounded their postulate of togetherness on the imaginative 'evidence' of aesthetic experience."[587] This refined focus of German theorists and artists was not compelled solely through internal stimulus, however, for the long reach of the French Revolution and its ramifications equally acted as a catalyst.

The accelerating application of the German myth and the addition of elements in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century was to some degree a reaction to the initial ideals and resulting chaotic turmoil of the French Revolution. The German artists and philosophers alike aspired for their culture and people to "ground the state in a constitution." This was conveyed from both positions of initial sympathizers and eventual

[586] Ethel Matala de Mazza, "Tendencies of an age," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism*, ed. Nicholas Saul, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 191, Kindle.
[587] Matala de Mazza, "Tendencies of an age," 192.

critics of the events in France. In the early throes of the revolutionary era, initial supporters like Johann Gottlieb Fichte hoped for a cosmopolitan ideal and defined "the state's sole purpose to be the preparation of a 'vollkommere…Gesellschaft' (perfect society)."[588] Eventually, however, the focus of German Romanticism would elevate the ideal of the nation-state within the previously defined dimensions of the German myth. The expression of Romanticism, therefore, acted as a pivot, by the pre-existing German myth and assumed the role of curator and purveyor of its core theme through culture, with the Germanic spirit as a unifying device fueling the construct of nationalism.

The German form of Romanticism acted as the purveyor of the lineage of the German myth, but the intent of the artist added to the myth and shaped a message. The literary group, the Heidelberg Romantics, directed their efforts to both the study of German history and to collect "forgotten stories, songs, fairy tales and myths." The work of the romantics through identifying and presenting these touchstones "exemplified the widespread German desire for national and cultural reassurance."[589] The cultural preservation projects served the development of a German worldview as a function stabilizing the imagined community and sharing a narrative through which a people recognized themselves within one group. For a people that lacked the customary trappings of the political state, the cohesion of a shared past and the elements of the myth offered protection from outside forces through a previously established cultural tradition. In 1806 and 1808, Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano published a collection of "half-forgotten, half-invented folk-songs entitled *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (*The boys*

[588] Matala de Mazza, "Tendencies of an age,"193.
[589] Matala de Mazza, "Tendencies of an age,"198.

magic horn).” A subsequent survey “Die *Teutschen Volksbucher* (*German Chapbooks*)” by Joseph Gorres in 1807 followed. In 1812 and 1815, “the Grimm Brothers, Jacob and Wilhelm, *Kinder und Hausmarchen* (*Fairy tales for Household and Nursery*)” was published. This series of publications represented an intentional, patriotic or defensive act in the “preservation of a native culture.” The goal to recover and stake claim to “common property” as a “cultural inheritance of the nation” was ultimately an effort of producing a “national identity.”[590] These editorial projects are evidence of an unfolding German myth, as part of a larger German worldview as they select, standardize and intentionally circulate a repertoire a large portion of the population can repeat. These actions represented the intent and power of “political Romanticism” in the direct “mobilisation of a *Volk.”*[591]

Taken together, these elements, including the origin, destiny, cultural unity, and emotional power of the German myth as a component of a German worldview, constituted the development and power of the German myth. Each intellectual and artistic movement added new layers to this narrative, making it increasingly resonant and politically potent. By the nineteenth century, the German myth had become a central component of a German worldview, helping to shape how Germans understood themselves, their past, and their national aspirations.

[590] Matala de Mazza, “Tendencies of an age,” 198.
[591] Matala de Mazza, “Tendencies of an age,” 199.

Volk

This section elaborates further within the origin narrative of the German myth. The concept of the *Volk* emerges as a symbolic category through which later German readers imagined purity, antiquity, and distinctiveness. Understanding how the concept of the *Volk* was constructed helps explain how the German myth acquired its earliest ethnocultural foundations. During this period, starting in the late eighteenth century, German philosophers, intellectuals and artists envisioned a special path for a continually refined concept of the German people. Even as such ideas began to flourish, the traditional social strata remained. During this time, the word *Volk* was used almost exclusively to mean simply "the common man." Previously in the 16th century, *Volk* "denoted soldiers, the poor, the rabble, or specific subgroups such as the young or occupational groups." It was in the eighteenth century, partly due to the influence and teachings of the Enlightenment, that the *Volk* was first viewed as "capable of being educated and elevated." The term, therefore, "gradually ceased to be pejorative and came to denote the people as a whole."[592] As the concept evolved, so too did its boundaries and the term increasingly reflected contested ideas about who belonged to the German people and who did not, shaping both cultural identity and political ideology.

Stemming from emphasis on preserving mythic traditions, the German people were thought to be destined to rise up together and become a guiding light for all of Europe. Such a narrative speaks to a broader sense than simply an "empirical notion of *Volk"* and instead denotes a "metaphysical *Volk*".[593] By shifting from empirical

[592] Whaley, "Reich Nation," 452-453.
[593] Brian Vick, "The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Germany", *German Studies* Review 26, No.2 (May 2003): 243, https://doi.org/10.2307/1433324.

descriptor to metaphysical principles, the term became another central fulcrum point of a German worldview, pointing to the transition between the mythic past, cultural present and a targeted national future. As the term has surfaced previously in this thesis, it is necessary at this point to further define the varied and contested use of this term *Volk*. It is helpful to understand terms that would follow in its development, including "the noun, "'Volksgemeinschaft' ('national community')" and "the adjective 'volkisch' (depending on context, translated as 'ethnic,' 'racial,' or 'popular')." From our more modern viewpoint, we recognize the term *Volk* based upon these stated terms, the former stemming from "the first decade of the Weimar Republic" during which "Volksgemeinschaft constituted an appeal to national unity" and the latter which has resulted in more negative connotations beginning from late WWI and beyond. *Volkisch* would eventually be used by "radical nationalists" opposed to the end of the war who sought "to distinguish their particularly hard-edged positions from conventional, moderate, nationalism, centered on Volksgemeinschaft." The subsequent ascension of far-right forces and further divisive politics has seemingly cemented the recognition of the "adjective 'volkisch' over the noun 'Volksgemeinschaft,' and the infusion of the latter term with the ethnic and racial meaning of the form."[594] Combined, these early conceptions and development of the Volk provided a symbolic origin point for the German myth. It offered later generations a narrative of unity and distinctiveness that could be adapted, expanded and mythologized. Through this level dissemination, it would also become the practical identification of the polity of people, the German people.

[594] Smith, *GERMANY,* 299.

The Philosopher, The Romantic & The People – A United Goal

The elements presented in this malleable myth serve to demonstrate the ideologies of those torchbearers who promulgate it. This section addressed how philosophical and artistic movements jointly contributed to the unfolding of the German myth. By aligning rational inquiry with imaginative expression, German Idealists and Romantics helped articulate a shared cultural purpose for those identifying as the German people. This cooperation expanded the German myth beyond origins into a narrative or unity and aspiration. Due to the changing conditions following the Renaissance and Reformation eras, the search for and utilization of collective elements would increasingly enter the political realm. New additions to the German myth increasingly advocated societal designs through cultural expressions. Whether aspirational goals for a culture and society, or defensive tactics due to witnessed turmoil in a neighboring nation, German Romanticism found a place between "the interlinked crises of the political turmoil that engulfed Europe and the limits of understanding introduced by Immanuel Kant's critiques."

German Romanticism did not rebuff the teachings of reason; in fact, many of its direct influencers operated within the most impactful schools of philosophy. Unbound by theoretical limitation and communicating through expressions of myth, the Romantics viewed "expressive freedom in life, writing and art as an end toward which humanity had to strive in order to rise above mere physical and natural existence."[595] German Idealism would represent the result of this blending of philosophical practice and mythological inspiration present in culture. Intellectual contributions to German Romanticism resulted

[595] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism," 6.

from a group of "individuals largely (but not exclusively) concentrated in Jena and Heidelberg." From these clusters we find the "main philosophical and poetic texts associated with German Romanticism, from approximately 1795 to 1848"[596], previously identified as the *Vormarz* period. Despite this very specific timeline representing the intellectual force of Romanticism, the inception and development of the German iteration was fueled by centuries of influential elements. Philosophical and mythic heritage converged into identifiable elements of the German myth worldview component, demonstrating self-identification through participation in cultural life, that is, through the everyday practices, symbols and artistic forms in which individuals recognized themselves as belonging to a shared German community.

As a representative of Enlightenment thinking and yet viewed as the progenitor of German Idealism, the philosopher Immanuel Kant represents another connection point and inspiration to many German Romantics. This inspiration speaks to the progression of the German myth itself as his ultimate goal of the "complete development of all man's natural capacities." It could not, however, be realized within one individual lifetime, but "only within that of the species." Lending credence to the long lingering and developing myth, man lives over a historical timeframe of progress; mankind develops "collectively toward a fuller expression of rationality."[597] This then would suggest the inspiration of elements within the Germanic Myth, but further represented a source for those seeking to curate the ambitions of a unified German people; a people that likewise had not been realized in one lifetime or even centuries, but would be looked upon by its advocates as a

[596] Laurie Johnson, "German Romanticism Renewed," *Seminar (A Journal of Germanic Studies)* 50, Issue 3 (September 2014): 251-252.
[597] Gunnar, Beck, "Immanuel Kant's Theory of Rights," *Ratio Juris* 19, No. 4. (December 2006): 391.

positive step forward for humankind. This interpretation, or utilization of Kant, would obviously fuel the grand themes of Romanticism. What is most tangible in drawing a connection to Kant is stating that "early German Romantics were, in fact, the first generation of Kant readers" and some specific examples were even his pupils.

Within German Romanticism we find the "important challenges to the universal claims of reason and a move towards incorporating history and political issues into philosophy." On a greater scale perhaps more accessible to a public, it incorporated "these concerns into philosophy, and in the development of the field we know today as the human sciences."[598] As for historic and real world concerns, Kant's support for the most reasonable and legitimate mode of the state, that of the republic, further inspired revolutionary ideals for "a transnational institution capable of adjudicating disputes between states once these states adopted fundamentally similar and stable forms of republican government." In response to Kant's work, specifically his treatises, many such as "Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel, and Joseph Gorres" would praise "Kant's initiative but sought to exceed his ambitiousness."[599] This adaptation of Kant helps to illustrate how rational moral theory became engrained within the mythic cultural character central to collective identification, a further unfolding of the German myth, a component of a larger German worldview.

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[598] Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, "Introduction, What is Early German Romanticism" in *The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism*, by Manfred Frank trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, (State University of New York Press, 2003), 5, ProQuest Ebrary.
[599] John Pizer, "The German Response to Kant's Essay on Perpetual Peace: Herder Contra the Romantics," *The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory* 82: 4, (2010): 344, https://doi.org/10.3200/GERR.82.4.343-368.

Herder

Among Kant's students, Johann Gottfried Herder, though not a self-identified Romantic, was a major influence for much of early German Romantic expression. Undoubtedly a major contributor to the German myth, Herder is another axis point between the philosopher and the romantic, signifying the linking of German Idealism. Herder's work as a "language theoretician and philologist", and eventually followed by figures like Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, actively surveyed the written word for the "riches of a specifically Germanic culture." The results of these searches would be the "folk tales (*Volksmarchen*) and folk songs (*Volkslieder*) as material evidence of indigenous culture." Herder's focus challenged the "universalist orientation of his teacher's philosophy." Specifically, he believed that the "fundamental cognitive and communicative function of language had been underrated by Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers."[600] Herder's emphasis on language as the vessel of spirit further revealed that the German myth was an important component of a larger German worldview, based on a concrete mechanism, specifically the linguistic production of a community. Language makes myth portable as it carries a people's memory from past to present.

In 1769, Herder embarked on a journey through German lands and beyond in his search for evidence connecting back to his culture. His trek would take him from Copenhagen, to places such as Denmark, through the North Sea and all the way to the English Channel.[601] This endeavour would further the German myth as it resulted in new sources identified as German or otherwise denoting a linkage of German culture to

[600] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism", 7-8.
[601] Smith, *GERMANY*, 133.

"ultimately reshape how Germans thought about themselves."[602] The populace appeal which Romanticism would come to possess, and its ability to render information accessible to the masses, was apparent early on when "*On German Customs and Art* appeared in 1773" and the work "achieved instant popularity.'"[603]

Exemplifying the connection between traditional philosophy and romanticism within the development of German Idealism, Herder believed that the people required a variety of sources including "the games of the circus" and the work of philosophers "to entertain itself."[604] From this it seems obvious that he recognized within the history and stories of a people there existed something perceptible, an emotional appeal, capable of conveying to the people the importance of the philosophical theories. Herder warned that philosophy had become detached from both ordinary people and scholars, losing its audience. As demonstrated in the tales he collected, the ancestors of the culture he was seeking to identify were presented as "warriors", whose "bards sang the history of past times." Presumably speaking about the negative results of modernization, Herder viewed these ancestors as having their communities divided into distinct cities and separate states. This "metamorphosis" of traditional culture groups, the result of "invasions and transformations", represented the loss of focus on the "people." As a remedy to this lost connection and loss of fervor, Herder prescribed for his profession of philosophy that inquiry must remain focused on the people.[605] Herder's concept of the *Volk* traced the progression of this group from its initial phase of potential, when it is "most aesthetically

[602] Smith, *GERMANY*, 134.
[603] Smith, *GERMANY*, 138.
[604] Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Michael N. Forster, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28, ebook.
[605] Herder, *Philosophical Writings*, 29.

creative and religiously vital during its youth, before it slipped into the evils of luxury and civilization." The aesthetic creativity recognized in its highest form speaks to the "mythology of the *Volk*" and the expressions advocating its future development which included "its poetry, its art, its customs, its religion, its laws."[606] All of these become elements of a German myth, and hence of a larger German worldview.

Within this focus on the people, there was a deeper appeal to the specific character, or spirit of the people, especially within a particular time and place. For only by recognizing the time and context of a culture in which the work, theory or artistic expression is produced, can we comprehend the changes between eras and who the people may be in modern time. Herder concluded that the focus to identify or "separate" the spirit of an author or artist was crucial to be able to "put together in imagination the taste and the character of each age." This recognition then, avails us the ability to "travel through the various periods of world events with the penetrating look of a traveler hungry to learn." The practice of the historian is vital when "taking note of this change over the course of time" and by teaching the people about these changes.[607] Herder himself was not ambivalent to the reception of his teachings or the enthusiasm it produced, as in presenting this specific "treatise", he noted his hope that his lessons would resonate with the audience and that success would avail him the opportunity to continue. In recognizing the importance of presentation and connection to the people, Herder finished by stating that, "When philosophy is led by history and history is enlivened by philosophy, then it becomes doubly entertaining and useful."[608] Through this recognition of the power of

[606] Williamson, *The Longing for Myth," 33.*
[607] Herder, *Philosophical Writings*,244-255.
[608] Herder, *Philosophical Writings,* 255.

shared and entertainment or cultural life, communal mediums popularized and made regular more broader engagements in which the people could educate and understand themselves.

In highlighting the stories to build connections with his audience, the German people, Herder cited the work of Tacitus. Through this source and element of the German myth, the "purity" of the ancestors was presented by focusing on qualities "primarily cultural and linguistic; they were 'original' as opposed to pettily imitative; they constituted their own 'archetype.'" Tacitus's portrait, in Herder's reading, furnished Germans with an existing self-image valued less for its strict historiography than for capturing an enduring "spirit of things.'"[609] This supports the earlier identification within this component, with Tacitus's work serving as a function, rather than an accurate historical source. The German myth was identified as building a connection within the intellectual and cultural influence of the people as Herder identified the common people to be the "true carriers of the spirit." This connection represented a "change of *Volk* from a predominantly sociopolitical to an ideological term" and this distinction held potential for greater power, influence and correspondingly, abuse of this power. As was presented to readers at the time, Herder "used *Volk* and 'nation' interchangeably out of conviction" as his ideas defined the German nation culturally with "its mystical spirit alive in the past and in the present still preserved in the language and traditions of the *Volk."*[610]

The distinction of a people in Herder's position flows from the history of said people and their language, hence "each nation speaks in accordance with its thought and

[609] Krebs, *A Most Dangerous Book,* 179.
[610] Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 180.

thinks in accordance with its speech."[611] From their words and where they come from, we find the importance of language as representing the soul, spirit, the connective tissues of a nation. Through our understanding and subsequently the transmission of a culture's language and historical memory, the "explanation of such words unlocks for us manner of thought and policy, character and ethics, in short, the secret of the nation."[612] For Herder the *Volk* represents "a natural element of the human race, endowed with its own language which it must preserve as its most distinctive and sacred possession." He presented his concept of *Volk* in "anthropomorphic terms" as an organism with a distinct "body, soul, language, and culture, relating it to climate and submitting it to the changes of history, endowing it with different ages through its evolution."[613] His position affirmed that the "*Volk* is the nation", and further the "*Volk* is defined by language and poetry; and the *Volker* become the basic elements of history."[614] Following this premise, the German people could evolve and their culture, perhaps worldview, or simply the *Volk* would change with it to represent its history, and contemporary influences.

Placing him firmly in the school of German Idealism, Herder's ideal community "combined the private and public spheres", with the two bonded together through "shared language and beliefs and positive emotions that grew out of meaningful local interaction." He viewed culture "as a unique expression of native spirit," one which authors, artists, and thinkers "sought to construct" from "past traditions that they believed

[611] Herder, Philosophical Writings, 50.
[612] Herder, Philosophical Writings, 47.
[613] H.J. Hahn, German thought and culture. From the Holy Roman Empire to the Present, (Manchester University Press, 1995), 61-63.
[614] Whaley, "Reich Nation," 453.

defined their collective nature."[615] Through his theories, Herder is also "generally recognized as one of the key founders of nationalism." In what would become essential in the identification of the *Volk*, the development of German liberalism, and the eventual achievement of a unified German nation, Herder allegedly attempted "to 'make state and nationality co-terminous'."[616] From this view, "the mystical identification of nationality with a sort of platonic idea of the language, existing behind and above all its variant and imperfect versions," is the result of "the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet."[617]

As with previously addressed elements connected to dangerous connotations of German tradition, the prevailing view of Johann Gottfried Herder has largely concerned "his status as a critic of the Enlightenment, in his opposition to rationalism, universalism and progressivism."[618] Revisiting previous assumptions has led to re-evaluation of the philosopher as a forebear who established the "general conception and the interpretive methodology of our modern discipline of anthropology"[619]. Herder himself "never spoke of bloodlines and explicitly rejected the term 'race' for its vagueness" to distinguish the truth of his work from its subsequent utilization, or association. To some degree, however, Herder directly shaped a powerful myth, when he himself recognized its power to connect with the people. To a very serious degree, thanks in no small part to Herder and his contribution to early German Romanticism, "the *Volk* and its spirit would take on

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[615] Marsha Morton, "German Romanticism: The Search for 'A Quiet Place'", *Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies* 28, No. 1, Negotiating history: German Art and the Past (2002): 9.
[616] Dominic Eggel, Andres Liebich, and Deborah Mancini-Griffoli, "Was Herder a Nationalist?", *The Review of Politics* 69, No. 1 (Winter, 2007): 48.
[617] Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780,* 70.
[618] Rachel Zuckert, "Review: After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition", *European Journal of Philosophy* 21, (March 2013): e8.
[619] Michael N. Forster, *After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition*, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 9-10, eBook.

a life of their own."[620] His insistence that each people possesses a distinctive spirit provided the conceptual foundation for imagining the people, or *Volk*, as a unified cultural subject, making Herder a crucial contributor to the unfolding German myth, and as a component of a larger German worldview.

Fichte & the Time of Nationalism

It was Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) whose philosophical voice served to highlight an emergent Romantic influence, and the primary concerns of his day. Fichte "set out to overcome the duality of Kantian philosophy" by searching for an "absolute first principle from which self-consciousness could be deduced."[621] Fichte placed the power and the ability to discern the absolute within the individual, and his hopeful ideal supported the ability of the individual to achieve his own destiny. An "ardent admirer of the French Revolution, even as it turned violent," he looked upon the initial event and the ramifications in France as "a rich painting about the great text: the right and value of human beings."[622] Though the resulting turmoil and violence witnessed during the stages of the French Revolution did not seem to sway Fichte from the aspirational goals of universal representation through political revolutions and the hope for shared republican ideals like that of Kant, it was the subsequent aggression of Napoleonic France and invasion upon his homeland which finally altered the philosopher's positions. Fichte declared that "foreigners have lightly and with fiery boldness seized on another task of reason and philosophy facing the modern world – the establishment of the perfect state –

[620] Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 180.
[621] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism", 9-10.
[622] Smith, GERMANY, 171.

only shortly thereafter to abandon the same." Seemingly encapsulating his initial support for the revolutionary forces in France, and his disdain for the subsequent invading authoritarian force, Fichte argued that a rational political order could arise only after the people had been correctly educated for it. Here again, like Herder, Fichte recognizes the need to build a connection with the audience, the people. This then presents the purpose of educating the people within a wide and accessible dissemination of philosophy, preparing for the opportunity of the perfect state, as "Only the nation which has first of all solved the task of educating the perfect human being, through actual practice, will also solve that of the perfect state."[623] For the development of the German myth, Fichte presented the people as agents of their own moral and political identify. His call for national education and cultural formation turned the people into a purposeful collective, introducing the narrative to a larger audience that a united people could shape history through shared priorities.

Through this transition from a cosmopolitan ideal to an ardent national focus, one which would continue to include juridical and commercial separations between states, Fichte would present the "German nation as the 'Wiedergebarer in der Welt,'" or a chance for a rebirth in the world.[624] The external threats of the time seemingly refocused his attention to the local and national level, with the assurance that the education and ideas moving towards a preferred state would presumably lead to the cosmopolitan potential later. The threat of the unrealized potential of the French state and the invasion of German lands was certainly a catalyst after which point "Fichte became an enthusiastic

[623] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation, ed. Gregory Moore, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), page 80-81 of 203, Kindle.
[624] David James, Fichte's Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 95.

supporter of armed resistance to the Napoleonic occupation."[625] The German philosophical tradition, while deeply invested in ideals of autonomy and moral development, also laid the groundwork for the growing influence of militarism to be philosophically justified. Philosophers like Fichte, responding to the obvious trauma of Napoleonic invasion, reframed the role of the military as a moral institution, whose protection could help unify the nation and defend its integrity. For the temporal, or real-world influence on this specific period in the development of the German myth, Fichte recasts national defense as a moral duty rooted in the character and destiny of the people. By framing militarism as an expression of collective virtue and cultural integrity, he helped embed the idea that the German people were not only a cultural community, but a community defined by shared sacrifice and protective purpose. The narrative and popular appeal propelled the medium of the German myth real world force as philosophical ideals about the people were translated into expectations of national unity, mobilization and resistance.

Though a number of his writings would remain unpublished during his career, "in a series of lectures courageously delivered in French-occupied Berlin," Fichte's ideology and aspiration for nationalism would be presented with impetus and disseminated far beyond those in attendance. Through his famous Addresses in the German Nation, he professed that "the means of salvation" would be achieved by developing a shared selfhood, universal in aspiration, yet concretely national, a level only achievable through common education.[626] This universal yet national identity achieved "solely by means of

[625] Pizer, "The German Response", 352.
[626] Fichte, Fichte: Addresses, page 17 of 20.

the common trait of Germanness" was the only way in which they could "avert the downfall of our nation threatened by its confluence with foreign peoples and once more win back a self that is self-supporting."[627] Fichte's theories and passion would be expressed through oratory and transmitted into a populace as made connections and inspired key figures of the time.[628]

Noting his own hope for success and the immediacy imparted through the lectures, Fichte sought to reach "the entire German nation (insofar as it is presently possible to assemble the same by means of the printing press), to come to a firm decision and inwardly agree" on several key issues. First and foremost, he challenged his audience to determine whether a distinct German nation existed, whether it was worth preserving, and how it might be secured.[629] Following defeat to foreign forces, freedom and unity would represent the answer and cure to the issues of the day to which Fichte spoke. To impart these goals, Fichte adopted a much more nationalistic manner than his previous hope for transnational ideas expressed. "This is the very reason why love of fatherland must govern the state itself, as altogether the supreme, final and independent authority," declared Fichte. Further, he prescribed that within a regained and reformed ideal German state:

> To attain this end the natural freedom of the individual must of course be limited in various ways; and if this were the only aim and consideration in regard to these individuals, it would be well to limit their freedom as narrowly as possible, so as

[627] Fichte, Fichte: Addresses, page 11 of 203.
[628] Smith, GERMANY, 175.
[629] Fichte, Fichte: Addresses, page 156 of 203

> to bring all their movements under a uniform rule and keep them under constant supervision…[630]

In conclusion to these prepositions advising a people as to the remedy for their long sought identity and the threat this lineage currently faced, Fichte concluded that it "ought to be the state, therefore, on which we first fix our expectant gaze."[631] Here again, the realities of military conquest had impacted the philosophical theory of a temporal actor within his time and context. Fichte's reorientation demonstrates how mythic understanding of collective identity could reshape philosophical doctrines, connecting and embedding nationalist interpretations within the German myth, and the larger framework of a German worldview during this time.

The importance of Fichte's addresses, both to the contemporary considerations of the audience and readers and the eras of analysis that have followed, is the fact that his work has been claimed "by liberals and conservatives, socialist and fascists alike." Due to the intent, but much more the reaction to his ideas and subsequent inspirations, "Fichte's best-known work has come to be seen as a definitive statement of romantic or 'messianic' nationalism." Through the varied and sometimes diametrically opposed interpretations, the goals presented by Fichte through "his portrait of German character and its mission in the world" would "shape German self-understanding for the next 150 years."[632] This added significantly to the developing German myth.

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[630] Fichte, Fichte: Addresses, Page 105 of 203.
[631] Fichte, Fichte: Addresses, Page 141 of 203.
[632] Gregory Moore, "Introduction", in Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation, ed. Gregory Moore, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), location 238 of 4996, Kindle.

His influence on the German consciousness was certainly bolstered by the developing beliefs of Romanticism, as he "appeared before his audience not merely as a philosopher." The stated intent of his address was to be both accessible and stirring to as large an audience as possible. As a result, some would hail him using allusions to Greek antiquity, or more internal German lineage, "as a German Demosthenes, others saw in him a new Luther." No matter the position, the attention ensured that his words, "a mixture of prophetism and polemic, eloquence and abstraction", were "long echoed in the German cultural imagination."[633] Through the intent and success of Fichte we can understand the reach to the people offered by Romanticism and the content of nationalism. It was through the medium and popular engagement of a people, once again utilizing elements within the myth component to engage nationalistic fervor in the face of military invasion, that the philosopher Fichte demonstrates the power of myth within a German worldview. The refinement of the message and its power was rooted partly in German history and partly in the passionate connection to the German myth. Fichte's message drew strength from historical resonance and the emotional depth of that myth, an increasingly developing component of a German worldview. After Fichte it was certain that both would be used to promote national unity through the prescribed measures of nationalism and the ideal of the state.

The convergence of philosophical and artistic currents strengthened the German myth by linking intellectual ideals with popular sentiment. This synthesis helped transform the German people, or *Volk*, from an origin category into a people with a shared cultural mission.

[633] Moore, "Introduction", location 244 of 4996.

German Romanticism & the Message to the People

This section further examines the medium of the second element of the German myth, the belief in a shared historical destiny. German Romanticism translated philosophical ideas into accessible cultural forms, enabling the German myth to reach broader audiences. Through this process, the myth gained emotional depth and narrative coherence. Romanticism as it appeared in multiple European nations represented "a cultural, political and socioeconomic movement of revolutionary vision and ambition."[634] German Romanticism did not stand against the Enlightenment as it developed in German culture. What was seemingly unique, German Romanticism did not reject the Enlightenment it emerged from its own critical methods. Scholars note that this development reflected earlier cultural forces within German intellectual life, rather than a simple reaction against rationalism.[635] This reaction, quite contrary to the rise and purpose of Romanticism seen elsewhere, denotes the influence of previously existing forces preceding the German form of Enlightenment thinking and its representatives.

The critical recognition within German Romanticism was not an admonishment of the Enlightenment period, but instead a recognition of a gap which existed between its teachings and the people. Romantics argued that only art could fill the cultural void created by Enlightenment criticism.[636] The gap reflected a people who were united by geography but culturally shaped by sources outside of its group and location. Hegel also noted the need for a religious connection that would have to arise linked to "local geography to the popular memory of uniquely German heroes, myths, and legends." The

[634] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism", 6-7.
[635] Seyhan, "What is Romanticism", 8.
[636] Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 53.

Catholic Church provided such a role in German society, but it was much more the "lives of local saints and tales of nearby miracles" which had connected the larger Catholic faith directly to the "towns and villages." Protestant Germany faced the challenge of creating a genuinely local symbolic tradition without relying on biblical or Catholic imagery.[637] The Romantics identified that "Art could restore moral and religious belief through the creation of a new mythology." The period of the Enlightenment and the practical events of war and upheaval following the French Revolution had removed previous elements that once fostered social cohesion. These traditional elements were recognized as aesthetic sources by the people through a personal or visceral perception of "old mystery, magic, and beauty" in culture and amongst a people. This connection was also identified as essential within a community as "the basis of all social bonds, the natural feeling joining all free and equal persons."[638] As a reactionary lesson from the chaos following the French Revolution, these elements of connection needed to be introduced to a population, along with the teachings of philosophy and science. Education alone was not enough to inform and unite a people towards a goal, it was an equally important element of a community to "cultivate feelings and desires, to develop a person's sensibility so that he or she are *inclined* to act according to the principles of reason."[639] This framing reveals a continuing pattern connecting individual components within the framework of a German worldview, that individual autonomy was valued, yet often subordinated to the mythic mission of the people, understood as the collective strength through periods of chaos and threats.

[637] Williamson, The Longing for Myth," 73.
[638] Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 54.
[639] Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 94.

Throughout the German States and their culture, we have seen a sustained interest to continually propagate elements which help identify the German people. The appeal of Romanticism to the people flowed from the near boundless scope of artistic imagination in this goal. The broader areas of expression allowed for much greater application of the German myth to disseminate and connect with members of the Germanic culture. German Romanticism helped shift nationhood from an external marker to an internal sense of identity. This interior bond emerged through stories, lectures, and art, reinforcing elements of a German myth, as "one began to say, 'This is who I am'."[640] The ever-developing German myth had been a present influence for both the representatives of German Enlightenment thinking and a driving force for those members that would impact and constitute the Early German Romantics.

Equally as important, the passionate ideals, eventual chaotic turn and ultimate militaristic advancement of France further refined the expression and perceived utility of the Germanic Myth within the construct of nationalism. In this period, the "primary meaning of 'nation', and the one most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political."[641] Whether acting as an accelerant or a galvanizing event, the "French occupation of German lands in the wake of the French Revolution, particularly during the Napoleonic occupation, led to an obsession with myth."[642] This turn to myth reflected a deeper need to reclaim cultural agency as a response to foreign domination. The worldview lens helps to identify the significance of how mythic narratives translated foreign domination into cultural self-assertion and resulted in a strengthening national

[640] Smith, GERMANY, 149.
[641] Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, 26.
[642] Pizer, "The German Response", 345.

consciousness. Romanticism deepened the German myth by presenting the Volk as a people bound by destiny, imagination, and cultural inheritance. This expansion made the German myth more compelling and more widely resonant.

The ramifications of the goal identified as national unity and the broad use of sources to connect the people to this goal by the German myth would result in a susceptible nature of this mythical concept of a people. Although many of the contributions of early German Romantics and the movement as a whole has been "heralded for its poetic achievements" in support of liberalism and the expansion of individual rights, it is equally at times "scorned for its nationalistic leanings" and identified as having "sowed the seeds of fascism, Nazism, and many other evils."[643] It was the broad and undefined nature of the German myth which both allowed for outside, fringe, or otherwise random sources to be identified as part of the concept. The development of the myth also inspired expressions based on their understanding or engagement with a particular conception of the myth. In the future such expressions would represent an extreme ideology that "appropriated and thereby discredited" German Romanticism, just as it would "many German traditions."

Broad Associations of the German Myth

It is necessary for this chapter to next explore a wider degree of elements produced during this time, that would either be inaccurately identified, brazenly appropriated by extreme ideologies, or completely misunderstood due to its association

[643] Millan-Zaibert, "Introduction," 1.

with the German myth. This section explores how the German myth expanded into multiple cultural domains. As the myth circulated through literature, scholarship and public discourse, it accumulated new associations that broadened its interpretive reach. Not only would traditional elements of the German myth be distorted to serve nationalist ambitions, exterior sources would also be utilized as well. The precedence of a wide allocation of sources sought by its users spanning the selections of antiquity and other lands and the broad mythological elements presented within the developing German myth, would allow for further sources to be misrepresented or strategically employed by artists, intellectuals, or political figures advancing nationalist narratives. This susceptibility underscores the double-edged nature of myth in general, and specifically the German myth as a component in a larger German worldview developing during this time, as its emotional power provided integrative success, but left it open to dangerous distortions.

Arthur de Gobineau was a "Legitimist journalist in the 1840s" and later "diplomat, mayor, general counsellor, novelist, poet, and sculptor."[644] His *Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines*[645] stands as an infamous record of theories concerning race in the latter nineteenth century. His focus builds from an "a priori approach, the false erudition and arbitrary opinions" which informed his view of the past and advanced a rigid racial hierarchy that exalted a so-called Aryan stratus within the "white" category and essentialized virtue and capacity as biological traits.[646] The Aryan race consisted of

[644] Steven Kale, "Gobineau, Racism, and Legitimism: A Royalist Heretic in Nineteenth-Century France", Modern Intellectual History 7, Issue 01 (April 2010): 33, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244309990266.
[645] Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. Adrian Collins (H.Fertig, 1967).
[646] Paul A. Fortier. "Gobineau and German Racism", Comparative Literature 19, No. 4 (Autumn, 1967): 341-342, https://doi.org/10.2307/1769493.

blonde, blue eyed, tall human beings of superior athletic ability and aesthetic beauty. They aspired towards perfection, while conducting themselves of the highest etiquette and mannerly decorum. Gobineau's racial hierarchy elevated the purported Aryan people above all others, and this identification was determined by blood. While influential for later extremists, his framework was not originally tied to German identity, and its later adoption reflects the German myth's susceptibility to ideological appropriation of outside sources.

Although a majority of these themes would ultimately become appropriated by extreme variants of the German myth, it is likely that Gobineau's wild racial theories were "tailored specifically to account for France's uniquely tragic historical development."[647] Though his work remained overlooked for decades in France after it was first published, there are many who connect its rise to notoriety through its acceptance within Germany. In 1894, a Gobineau Society was established by prominent pan-Germanists as "his principal arguments were either ignored, deformed, or taken out of context in German racial thought." Differing from the formative and propelling sources identified within the German myth and its drive in the nineteenth century, Gobineau's work did not specifically "identify the Aryans with modern Germans, and he did not locate the Aryan race with modern Germany."[648] Gobineau's literary musings, which in fact represent his own mental exercises of trying to attune the historical evolution of France with racial and political excuses, rose to widespread prominence during the height of the equally unsound assertions of Chamberlain.

[647] Kale, "Gobineau," 36.
[648] Kale, "Gobineau," 60.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, "the British-born independent scholar who was also a fervent German nationalist", his "major anti-Semitic work, *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century), was first published in 1899."[649] While *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*[650] is a revisionist view of the history of Western Civilization leading to the state of affairs in the nineteenth century, Chamberlain's work stands at the foundation of Germanic fanaticism and a wider trend of European anti-Semitism.[651] From this text the Germanic race is presented as an umbrella term for the Celts, Teutons, and Slavs, with all the Northern European races standing above the other races of the world. Chamberlain portrayed the Roman Empire as humanity's greatest achievement, but one weakened by religious conflict and ethnic mixing.[652] Through his use of subjective historical rhetoric, Chamberlain makes his case undervaluing everything non-Aryan or Germanic, whether through his overvaluation of Germanic history or his undervaluation of Jewish historical contributions. Chamberlain's work, though obviously flawed, counter-intuitive, and often offensive to the rational mind, was presented with enough flair and *prima facie* justification to engage the audience it found. Through his writing style, Chamberlain's personal insight at many times may even seem insightful and prophetic. He deems the problems of the nineteenth century leading into the present day to be those created by division. The world had become a conflict of isms, religion dividing Christians against Christians, Christians against Jews, politics dividing liberals against conservatives, monarchists against

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[649] Felicity Rash, "Images of the Self and the Other in the Nationalist Writing of Houston Stewart Chamberlain," Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 12, No. 2, (2012): 344, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2012.01177.x.
[650] Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century. (John Lane Company, 1910.)
[651] Samuel Schulman. "Review: Chamberlain's 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century' and the Claims of Judaism." The Jewish Quarterly Review 5, No. 2. (Oct, 1914): 164.
[652] Chamberlain, Foundations of, 188

parliamentarians and so on, the breadth of European powers spanning the seas, controlling the destinies of nations around the world.[653] Chamberlain claimed that Rome declined when its ethnic purity eroded and foreign influences entered its polity.[654] Through this example, he concluded that without racial purity, society devolved into a parasitic state, a view emblematic of his extreme ideology. To Chamberlain, the Jewish race was this mongrel race, a race with no home, no identity, just a collusion of homeless peoples attaching themselves to the lights, diminishing that light like a cancer.[655]

Chamberlain's most driving view is that which he states motivates a man, that of the *plis de pensee*, a category of the thought of a man which is determined by his race.[656] A man can diverge, can explore, but ultimately is defined and guided by his blood. They would fight the dogma and expel the cancers of the impure races, they would unite around the German Aryan ideas, united in one pure Aryan blood.[657] Chamberlain would eventually be portrayed as a "'folkish' author", "a political outsider", and not cast within the mainstream or driving German myth.[658] Despite not representing an internal source of the German people, engaging with the German myth, its presentation would later be utilized and assigned a place within vulgarized variants.

These racialized interpretations reveal how external ideological imports would graft themselves onto the myth when its boundaries were left undefined and exemplify the inherent susceptible nature of a myth-based component within a German worldview. The widening associations of the German myth allowed it to function as a flexible

[653]Chamberlain, Foundations of, 138.
[654] Travelers, referring to the nomadic Jewish peoples.
[655]Chamberlain, Foundations of. 252.
[656] Schulman, "Review:" 180.
[657]Chamberlain, Foundations of, 203.
[658] Rash, "Images of", 344.

cultural resource. Its adaptability ensured that it could be invoked across contexts, thus reinforcing its power, yet diluting its precision or the intent of the sources.

Nietzsche

Perhaps no intellectual is more misconstrued today due to the porous connecting nature of the German myth and its susceptibility to future uses and mischaracterization than the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. It is important, therefore, to distinguish Nietzsche's texts from Nietzsche's canonization as the mythic style he often employed eased appropriation and is evidentiary for this component. His early work certainly exhibited a fascination and connection to German Romanticism and elements of the Germanic myth, as he wrote of the heroic idea, blonde beasts and supermen. His later work moved away from mythic expression and adopted dense realisms concerning the world and the human race. Future distortions and misconceptions concerning Nietzsche would exemplify how the opportunistic, yet often indistinct manner of myth allowed a form of political and intellectual appropriation, especially concerning its role tied to nationalism and community identification. Nietzsche's use of myth, eventual critique, and reimagining of myth clarified its cultural power and exposed its susceptibility to distortion. Nietzsche is essential to understanding myth as a component and specifically, the development of the German myth, as a component of a German worldview.

Nietzsche's work is often associated, sometimes reductively, with images of the superhuman, and the wolf among the sheep. Nietzsche warned that weakness posed a

greater threat to human flourishing and any offsetting strength.[659] In later defiance against the weakness of the Weimar Republic, these stereotypical statements raised the passions of the downtrodden Germans left abandoned by the materialistic, liberal leaders of the oppressive West.[660]

The selective propagation of his writing was the culmination of a general trend among right-wing ideologies following WWI. The ultimate Nazification of Nietzsche's reception was already underway before 1933, as editors curated a version that emphasized force and suppressed counter-texts. Alfred Baumler, "the Reich's authorized Nietzsche scholar", recast Nietzsche as intrinsically anti-individualist and anti-liberal, insisting that real thinking be organized around race, nation or class.[661] The doctrine of eternal recurrence, as stated by Nietzsche in *Ecce Homo,* his last work, published in 1908 nearly a decade after his death, refers to "the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things."[662] Within this specific and tailored presentation, Nietzsche was projected as "a prescient prophet—the isolated individual who in the period of hopeless liberal decline alone embodied the spirit of true Germanness."[663]

Nietzsche's poetic and prolific writing was certainly susceptible to "ideologies of all stripes", explains Peter Gay, as the philosopher "coined memorable aphorisms and seductive locutions that have been used against him – by and large unfairly."[664] The inherent use of myth or grandeur within his work allowed future propaganda to

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[659] Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. ed.Walter Kaufmann (Vintage Books: 1967), 122.
[660] George L Mosse, Masses and Man, (Howard Fertig Press, 1980), 5.
[661] Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy, 233-234.
[662] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo" in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. And ed. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, Inc. 2000), 904, Kindle.
[663] Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy, 237.
[664] Peter Gay, "Introduction", in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, Inc. 2000), 7-8, Kindle.

effectively "falsify his texts, or to take some of Nietzsche's comments out of context."[665] Baumler in particular purported that in following Nietzsche, one "could not be an individualist; nor could anyone who thought historically." The propagandists would cite instances in which Nietzsche "talked in historical categories such as species, races, nations, and classes." This would direct the individual not to think in terms of a "generalized humanity but always a concrete entity: a race, a Volk, a class."[666] Nietzsche's view was far more interested in the individual than many have regarded following the widespread use by the National Socialists. Nietzsche argued that the growth of the state and the internal culture had "stunted the growth of individuality in culture. The state, for instance, employed coercion to police individual attachment to culture norms."[667]

What propagandists presented as Nietzsche's celebration of military or physical power "*Macht"* was closer to "what Nietzsche understood to be" force, "*Kraft",* and violence "*Gewalt"*. In reality, Nietzsche often assigned such violent actions or overly aggressive expressions "to the behavioral patterns of persons who suffered from and expressed the psychological phenomenon of 'negative' power."[668] His recognition of force comes in the presentation of a "primitive energy, to a latent and indefinite state that functions only when activated within a concrete situation." Resisting the easy or automatic desire for force and moving to the higher form of reasoned power represented a "transition" or development, from the basic, primary condition to a "rationally formulated

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[665] Gay, "Introduction", 9.
[666] Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy, 249-250.
[667] Church, Loc 3725 of 7155.
[668] Jacob Golomb "How to De-Nazify Nietzsche's Philosophical Anthropology?" in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, eds. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, (Princeton University Press,) 19, ebook.

power" and "is essential to Nietzsche's original characterization of the process of sublimation."[669] He would call this movement from the primal to the rational "Victory over strength." Through the recognition of the "intellectuality of mankind" as having been "something very low and paltry" resulting in a time when we were "on our knees before strength – after the ancient custom of slaves." For a developed growth from this unwanted condition "only the degree of rationality in strength is decisive." Nietzsche explained,

> I mean the spectacle of that strength which employs genius not for works but for itself as a work, that is, for its own constraint, for the purifications of its imagination, for the imposition of order and choice upon the influx of tasks and impressions. The great human being is still, in precisely the greatest thing that demands reverence, invisible like a too distant star: his victory over strength remains without eyes to see it and consequently without song and singer. The order of rank of greatness for all past mankind has not yet been determined.[670]

He placed emphasis on this intellectual power rather than the easy instinctual physical force. "In the beginning," Nietzsche observed, "the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the soul—they were more whole human beings (which also means, at every level, 'more whole beasts')."[671] The philosopher's recognition of a historical or potential transition in

[669] Golomb, "How to De-Nazify", 20-21.
[670] Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak "Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality," eds. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), Location 3366-3375 of 3743, Kindle.
[671] Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil" in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. And ed. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, Inc. 2000), 491, Kindle.

human development indicates or "expresses the existence of positive power and the other that indicates a lack of such a power."[672] In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche distinguishes between individuals accustomed to self-mastery, "those who can control themselves", and those lacking an internal sense of power.[673]

It seems quite apparent that he did not wish to become an idol for extreme or fervent ideology. He admonished what he identified within Christianity and other religions, when he stated "I want no 'believers'; I think I am too malicious to believe in myself; I never speak to masses.—I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced holy."[674] It is undeniable, however, that his works have been interpreted and utilized by fascists and in particular Nazis.[675] In a seemingly prophetic defense against acting as a contributing element to the extreme ideologies on the rise in his later years, he wrote of nationalism as an infliction particularly harmful to Germans, calling it the "most anti-cultural sickness and unreason there is."[676]

Any defense against the future use or interpretations of his work appears unsuccessful as once the philosopher became incapacitated, his "sister imposed her exceedingly unsubtle notion of hero and prophet on a mindless invalid."[677] With access and control to his work from the time of his dementia in 1889 to his death in 1900, his sister Elisabeth would "manipulate" her brother's work "to enlist him in the very causes

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[672] Golomb, "How to De-Nazify", 33.
[673] Nietzsche, Daybreak, Loc 960 of 3742.
[674] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ecce Hommo", 973.
[675] Berel Lang, "Misinterpretation as the Author's Responsibility (Nietzsche's fascism, for instance)" in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, eds. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, (Princeton University Press,) 48, ebook.
[676] Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Case of Wagner A Musician's Problem" in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. And ed. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, Inc. 2000), 964, Kindle.
[677] Walter Kaufmann, "Editor's Introduction," in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann, (Random House, Inc. 2000), 819, Kindle.

that he had consistently denounced.[678] To the issue of misinterpretation, Nietzsche's "actual influence" seems less direct than does his "invocation by fascists" meaning "their professed debt to him, as quite apart from the consequences that ensued from their understanding or misunderstanding of him."[679] This misappropriation illustrates how the German myth could absorb even anti-nationalist thinkers by selectively reinterpreting their work. Nietzsche did offer the observation, or perhaps a further warning, that collectives tend toward irrationality far more than individuals.[680] Despite his recognition and fear of these groups and the previous systems he had identified as problematic or dangerous, Nietzsche's work did contain the elements which fueled the very causes he identified or perhaps recognized years before their eventual creation. From his writings concerning women, for example, "he was an incurable misogynist", to his central preoccupation "with a destructive analysis of Christianity", and his political thinking which "calls for the distinct separation of an elite and the masses."[681] So how does the truth of his work, its view of society, and culture, and the individual, and its misappropriation, affect our understanding of the German myth?

By 1870, after a patriotic war had cemented the goal of German unification through a nationalistic ideal, "young Friedrich Nietzsche worried for Germany's future." He expressed concern that the euphoria of military triumph against a traditional foe would overshadow the task at hand for a thoughtful realization of the long-sought unification. Nietzsche recognized this thoughtful goal to be "a transformation of German culture on the basis of Schopenhauerian philosophy and Wagnerian mythology." At the

[678] Gay, "Introduction", 10.
[679] Lang, "Misinterpretation", 52.
[680] Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil", 361.
[681] Gay, "Introduction", 7.

time he believed he shared this goal with "a wide range of Protestant intellectuals." Whereas "Liberal nationalists" in the first half of the nineteenth century had "hoped that the process of political unification might lead to greater spiritual and cultural unity", the result appeared to those like Nietzsche and Wagner as a reality of political compromise and division to achieve the goals of a conservative, Christian, Prussian hegemony.[682]

Nietzsche may seem an unlikely figure to support cultural unity through the influence of myth as his thinking was "atypic" for many of his contemporaries and even within the "small circle of intellectuals who shared his passion for Greece, Schopenhauer, and Wagner." Throughout his productive years spanning a period of 1867 to 1899, the work of Nietzsche "resists any attempt to be reduced to a coherent doctrine or political program." Despite the differences from the previous examples in this chapter and overall worldview study, his work "remains indispensable for understanding the development of German thought on myth in the later nineteenth century."[683]

Concerning his use of elements and connection to the German myth, Nietzsche early in his career "was one of a handful of Germans who interpreted the Wagner phenomenon within the context of Romantic scholarship on myth." His work would eventually deviate from both the influence of Wagner and the use or elevation of myth in general, but "Nietzsche continued to engage and, at the same time, subvert the categories of Romanticism, while articulating a new sacred narrative for himself and those he called 'higher men'." Nietzsche's style and utilization of cultural sources, including myth, and his impact on the characterization of the German myth "would be appropriated and

[682] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 234.
[683] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 235.

misappropriated by increasing numbers of German-speaking intellectuals, with the consequences that continue to be debated by philosophers and historians."[684]

From his first meeting and eventual friendship with Wagner beginning in 1869, the Wagnerian influence would represent "a personal orientation" and introduce for Nietzsche "the world of antiquity in a new light."[685] Nietzsche's theory and utilization of ancient concepts, including mythologies, existed beyond the material or even cultural linguistic concerns and "resided in its aesthetic and ethical meaning."[686] Nietzsche's disappointment with the trend of German unification, viewed "liberal theology as symptomatic of a 'historical-critical' trend in modern intellectual culture that had robbed Europe of its myths." He contended that modern "education had disintegrated the individual, while the overweening drive toward specialization in the sciences had atomized even philosophy, a discipline charged with preserving the integration of classical culture."[687] His ultimate disillusionment with Romanticism and myth was due to the assumed failed direction of society and what he had hoped included a movement away from a Protestant or religious foundation.[688] Nietzsche's critique of German culture was inseparable from his broader philosophical rejection of herd mentality, which he saw reflected in the nationalist agenda developing within the German myth.

By the time of his middle period Nietzsche avoided the "term 'myth' in the works", but it would appear again in the writings of 1886-89 period, by this point understood as an illusion that, "while seemingly timeless, was actually infinitely

[684] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 235.
[685] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 238.
[686] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 242.
[687] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 247.
[688] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 276.

mutable." Instead of using the term myth, he would instead speak of "fictions" and viewed this narrative device as "necessary and useful for creative activity in the present." These fictions would be described as "'appearance' (Schein), 'image' or 'parable' (Gleichnis) or simply 'lie'."[689] His new approach distanced his work from metaphysical abstractions and exemplified his rejection of religion as a primary influence for society. He equally rejected the "Romantic emphasis on interiority, belief, and emotion" and yet "he privileged the exterior, the ritual, and the practical, in the process inverting traditional Protestant critiques of Catholicism and Judaism."[690]

Nietzsche's disillusionment with the state of education, philosophical and cultural use by society represents "the degree to which narratives of national liberation, historicism, humanism, and Christianity had become intertwined over the course of the nineteenth century." This thesis identifies the ideological momentum of nationalism was ultimately and practically represented in 1871's unification of Germany as a "triumph of these ideals." This result did not, however, represent the early hopes of the Romantic movement, as influencers like "Wagner viewed the new state as a betrayal and sought to cultivate an 'alternative' Germany." From Nietzsche's position "Romantic ideals themselves were oppressive." A true "liberation" would result only once the ideas presented using myth were "cast aside or exposed as illusions."

Despite his movement away from both the unification cemented in the 1860s patriotic wars, and the former influences of Romanticism and the German myth, Nietzsche did retain "important aspects of Romanticism even in his later thought." His

[689] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 280-281.
[690] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 282.

ultimate belief and use of narrative devices such as appearance, image, parable, or lie, presented his "belief of the heroic individual; the necessity of aesthetic appearance as the basis for human life; and finally, a notion of longing as the fundamental condition of existence."[691] The initial influence, support and use of its sources, represent Nietzsche's contribution to the German myth. This contribution, combined with his emphasis on aesthetic appearance, made his work vulnerable to later appropriation and utilized within distortions of the German myth. Nietzsche's contribution to the development of the German myth lies in his dual role as both critic and re-interpreter, he exposed the limitations of the national myth, clarified the cultural power of myth itself, and proposed an alternative vision in which myth becomes a vehicle for cultural renewal rather than ethnic self-assertion. In doing so, he revealed how myth functions as a worldview component, shaping how a people understand its purpose, its values, and its future, but also how a people can be exposed to misinterpretation or utilization of sources.

Indicative of the association with extreme ideology, and through it derived connections to German Romanticism and myth, until "rather recently, most philosophers in the English-speaking world have paid Nietzsche little heed."[692] A broad vilification occurred in many circles and an unwillingness to address his literature due to the resulting "absurd picture of Nietzsche." In Europe, however, the necessary distinctions slowly prevailed as "his work became a continued object of study and appropriation for existentialists, phenomenologists…critical theorists, post-structuralists, and deconstructionists."[693] The appropriation of Nietzsche's work illustrates how this myth

[691] Williamson, The Longing for Myth, 283.
[692] Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (Taylor & Francis e-Library 2002), ix, eBook.
[693] Michael Tanner, Nietzsche, (Oxford University Press, 1994). 2.

component of a German worldview could disseminate complex ideas via simplified ideological symbols, revealing the worldview's vulnerability to manipulation. The inclusion of myth within a worldview can amplify philosophical ideas but also distort them when reduced to symbolic slogans. In attempts to understand the true position of Nietzsche, his historical legacy must be understood as a product of the dynamic interaction between the peculiar, multifaceted qualities of his thought and its appropriators."[694]

The Susceptible Nature of the German Myth

This section addresses the inherent vulnerability of the German myth to manipulation. As the development of the German myth inherently relied on emotional resonance and symbolic unity, it could be appropriated for divergent political purposes. Examining this susceptibility reveals how the myth's power and danger were intertwined. The German myth and its core Germanic spirit was a propelling source fueling the recognition and spread of nationalism. There exists broad agreement that "nation is a concept of unity, which can be based on a large range of different criteria." These criteria could be harnessed by a group to include a "common language or culture", but other elements could include the "common adherence to a constitution or an ideology, common subjection to a dynasty, a shared historical experience", religion or the possession of a "defined territory or desire one." Whatever the specific element, there "must be criteria by which members of the nation are distinguished from non-members, there must be a

[694]Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990, "Weimar and Now", (University of California Press, 1992), 391

consciousness of membership of a community with some realistic basis of unity."[695] From the existing and recognizable element connecting a nation, nationalism as exhibited by its progression amongst the German people, must have "two essential ingredients: sentiment and action."[696] Within a German worldview, the German myth supplied the sentiment, acting as the emotional connection for collective action. Two obvious variants which developed to provide criteria to a nation and actively evolve thanks to sentimental attachment from the German perspective were the forms of "Liberal nationalism and Romantic nationalism." Broadly speaking then, we see that nationalism combined political structures with mythic narratives to shape collective action.[697]

Of all the possible connecting elements of nationalism, "simplified variants" have been described based on the distinction between the "three chronological phases, Western European, Central European and Eastern European." This identification of variants presents the Western version "associated with Liberalism and arose in already existing states like France", while the Central is presented as having been present in "areas with cultural unity but no political unity like Germany and Italy."[698] Whatever the distinction made in comparing these variant distinctions of nationalism, in the case of German nationalism:

> the underlying assumption in the German model that the union of all German blood in a single state would produce common institution. German nationalism, and probably all nationalisms, contain both subjective and objective elements. As

[695] Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society, Germany 1800-1945, (Edward Arnold, 1988,) 8-9.
[696] Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 16.
[697] Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 22.
[698] Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 11.

> the nineteenth century progressed, the so-called German model was to emerge in Germany as a dominant form of nationalism, that is the search for German unity for its own sake, as a means of expressing the unique essence of the German *Volk.*[699]

This broad focus of unity for its own sake and a mythical uniqueness concerning the people actively sought sources to support this goal. This broad goal would eventually produce variations and interpretations deviating from the original ideals. During the nineteenth century, the center of German intellectual thought and an intellectual school such as idealism, certainly expanded in this way and "permeated the educated stratum of German society in a vulgarized form." The connecting form of idealism flowed from a recognition that most "educated Germans embraced idealism as a superior German alternative to Western utilitarianism and liberalism." The connection and parallel courses of German Idealism with that of German Romanticism further disseminated personal and sentimental identification. German Idealists often "considered themselves the true heirs of the Lutheran tradition," and most recognized the value of "underlying creative accomplishments of 'culture'", as opposed to typical Western European nations where "rational and materialistic values had triumphed." This accessible and cultural connection was also exposed to conservative positions that "reflected fear at the loss of the deference that protected traditional privileges."[700] This specific iteration, identified as "*Volkisch* ideology, represented a variant of vulgarized idealism in which the political motivation"

[699] Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 12.
[700] Roderick Stackelberg, Idealism Debased, From Volkisch Ideology To National Socialism, (Kent State University Press, 1981,) 3.

and the elements of internal distinctions such as "the anti-Semitic component became much more explicit." Within this vulgarized variant, for example, "emphasis on *volkisch* literature is no longer on idealism for its own sake, but rather on its usefulness as a unifying social creed to prevent liberalizing change." This *Volkisch* ideology would emerge "as a major facet of the conservative reaction to democratic mass politics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century."[701]

Looking forward, the ramifications of the increasing power of *Volkisch* ideology in the latter decades of the nineteenth century is pointed to by many in the fulfillment of the *Reichs – und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz* of July 22, 1913, as the culmination or alternatively the inspiration of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The 1913 German citizenship law[702] has remained relevant within the future iterations of the German State. Its conception was, in fact, "greatly inspired by the rules governing French citizenship up to 1889, which were characterized by *jus sanguinis*."[703] Key provisions concerning the direct lineage requirement for German citizenship, though allowing later for multi-year naturalisation process, appeared to be the highest accomplishment of the "ethnocultural, with a heavy emphasis on the value of descent from German stock for membership of the citizenry." Unlike the example taken from France, the document of 1913 "made no provisions for the territorial ascription of citizenship at birth (*jus soli*), instead relying solely on the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*)."[704] To these provisions, there is little

[701] Stackelberg, Idealism Debased, 4.
[702] Official Document, "German Imperial and State Citizenship Law. July 22, 1913", The American Journal of International Law 8, No.3. (Jul.,1914).
[703] Jan Palmowski, "In search of the German nation: citizenship and the challenge of integration," Citizenship Studies 12:6: 548, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020802450635.
[704] Simon Green, "Beyond ethnoculturalism? German citizenship in the new millennium," German Politics 9:3: 106.

debate of the influence, as by the "early nineteenth century the 'German "Volk" (people) were seen as inherently superior', with ethnicity developing 'as core feature and normative value of the new German nationalism'." This then follows from the progression, or refinement of the term, previously presented during the era of German Romanticism, Idealism and as a response to exterior threats. The unfolding German myth as part of a larger developing German worldview was at risk of its elements hardening into an exclusion rule. In the early twentieth century, the German myth, with its acceleration or molding of the concept of the *Volk*, for all intents and purposes formally adopted a "genetic, biological" component.[705]

Of course, an obvious and extreme result of this ideological trajectory, the "*volkisch* doctrine" puts forth that it was comprised of intellectual precursors and thus "essentially a product of late eighteenth-century romanticism." Along with the promotion of "racial purity", a "hatred of enemies", and special focus towards the "charismatic leadership (Fuhrerprinzip)", the "antecedents of *volkisch* thought" continually elevated collective unity above individual autonomy.[706] Both the intellectual sources and national interests during the nineteenth century have previously been presented in this chapter. The issue at hand here is the selection and projection of targeted interpretations within an extreme variation or distinct mythology.

The existence of elements of the German myth during the Romantic era includes warlike, authoritarian, intolerant elements. The sixteenth century writings of Martin Luther advocated the justification of state power. The philosophical teachings of Hegel

[705] Palmowski, "In search of the German nation", 548.
[706] David Welch, "Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People's Community," Journal of Contemporary History 39, No.2, (Apr.,2004): 217.

and his defense of the Prussian state, the authoritative and racist perceptions of Nietzsche, could all be interpreted as forerunners of extreme belief systems that had influence on a German myth. Richard Wagner for instance, and his influence previously identified in this chapter, experienced an era of accentuation or "Wagnerism." Wagnerism emerged as a cultural movement, applying a "philosophical orientation" to the composer's work. The cultural movement that influenced philosophical and nationalist meaning was a "phenomenon that originated in the 1860s, reached its climax between the 1870s."[707] In truth, however, the pervasive national movement during the nineteenth century was met with such a reception from audiences that practically all composers "would feel the need to bring a note of national specificity into their music."[708] Growing along with the call for German unification, "Wagner was paired with Bismarck, both representing the hegemony of the German 'Geist'." The later interpretation of Wagner's work was in reality "the reception of a reception," mirroring the example of the "notorious fan group" the Bayreuth circle, who sought to propagandize "oversimplifications" of the composer's work.[709] This surface level grasp of historical sources was a consistent trend of extreme variants. However, along with authoritarian influences, the German nation held rich democratic examples, such as the revolution of 1848 born of philosophical and artistic aspirations of a government in service of the German people.[710] Even Bismarck recognized this strong democratic ideal and was careful to appear sensitive to the people's needs, as he exhibited in his solution to the crisis which included a new

[707] Mary A. Cicora, "Music, Myth, and Metaphysics: Wagner Reception in Gunter Grass' 'Hundejahre'", German Studies Review 16, No.1 (Feb.,1993): 49-50, https://doi.org/10.2307/1430230.
[708] Joep Leerssen, "Romanticism, music, nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 20 (4), (2014): 609, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12087.
[709] Cicora, "Music, Myth," 51.
[710] Snell, "Hitler's Success as", 23

constitution.[711] In response to appropriation of Martin Luther by conservative theory, many are quick to point out that first and foremost Luther was an advocate of rebellion against a powerful authoritative body, i.e. the Roman Catholic Church.

The unfolding German myth consisted of an intellectual and artistic movement which perpetuated artistic elements encouraging German polity within a philosophical and political ideal. *Volkisch* ideology exemplifies the "marriage of idealism and nationalism" which amplified, often in a reactionary manner, elements which "glorified the state, both as the political expression of a people's wholeness and as the bulwark of spiritual freedom against materialistic self-seeking." By the end of the nineteenth century, the 1890s represented a reactionary period of increased amplification "of *volkisch* conservativism, as Bismarck's dismissal" opened German politics to an initial rise in democratic reforms.[712] The German myth's emotional force made it both unifying and precarious. Its susceptibility to reinterpretation and misuse underscores the need to understand it not as a fixed narrative but as a dynamic and contested cultural resource, and an important component of a German worldview.

Conclusion: German Myth as a Component of a German Worldview

The nature of the German people, their connection to one another, and the way in which they identified themselves as German, was not inherited through citizenship, or through the state. The German people as an idea was established, sustained and eventually propelled through the narrative properties of the German myth. This

[711] Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism, 34-36.
[712] Stackelberg, Idealism Debased, 6-7.

conclusion draws together the elements of the German myth, including the origins, destiny, cultural identify and the emotional power, to demonstrate the collective functioning of this component of a German worldview. Each element contributed to a component through which the German people engaged to interpret themselves, their past and their political aspirations. Through elements and mediums such as language, philosophy, and fine arts, the German people, the *Volk*, became the proprietors and the core of that myth. It was this idea, of the people, of the enduring German spirit which connected German Romanticism and German Idealism. The pairing of the intellectual and artistic would become a defining element of the German myth itself. Myth provided cultural forms that made unity imaginable and rendered its practical translation approachable through the selective use of sources and mediums identified within this component.

Germany during the mid to late 18th century "was a purely cultural concept." The many points of division including "the multiplicity of principalities and states, large and small, administered and divided by religion and political horizons," represented numerous potential gaps between the people, and threatened the realization of their theorized ideal. The elements of the myth and the developing expressions of German Romanticism offered unity via the "Hochsprache' or cultural language."[713]

The German myth was a formative narrative containing elements able to effectively build connections amongst the German people. The first application of myth would be the identification of this group of people, via ostensibly historical sources, tying mythical suppositions to a people of a geographic origin. The identified goal of unity, the

[713] Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, 73.

nation-state, would require that these elements be presented to the people, to fill a gap in society and build the necessary conditions to disseminate a philosophy allowing for the fulfillment of this group, and the individual, within their ideal community. Artistic expressions were identified and developed as the potential medium to transmit elements of myth to a people thereby creating identification and exposure to the concepts necessary to realize its ideal state. Through applications of the German myth, German Romanticism would transmit the aesthetic ideals and connections of the German people, propelling the drive of nationalism towards a unified nation-state of the German people. German Idealism's recognition of the "aesthetic and historical experience as a means of healing the gaps that emerge among individuals within the social body"[714] allowed for the two intellectual forces to work together within the growing unity of the German people. This recognition of a gap, or divisions within the modern group, and the need for it to be filled by an internal mythology, demonstrates the role of a German myth within a German worldview.

The evolving German myth would incorporate sources both internal and external to this society in advocacy of the ideal societal. In the overarching drive of nationalism, German Romanticism would utilize German history and myth to refine its message in support of the goal of unity, specifically the prescribed measures of national unity through the ideal of the state. As identified by intellectuals of this period, education alone was not enough to prepare, inspire or unite a people towards this goal. The artistic presentations of the German myth would cultivate the sentimental connection and desire

[714] Zoe, Beenstock, The Politics of Romanticism: The Social Contract and Literature, (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 41, ebook.

to develop the individual towards the attainment of this ideal. This aesthetic potential empowered as a purveyor of the German myth was of such a priority to artists and intellectuals of the German Romantic period that it was compared to the role played in society by religion. Whether identified to complement the traditional religion, or replace its role, the German myth represented an internal connection specific to the group identifying as the German people. This narrative of an internal identification and sentimental connection was the power, potential and application during this period of the component of the German myth.

This component's reliance on emotional, passionate and larger than life examples to create identifiable connections amongst a people, inherently relied on broad and disparate sources which would make the German myth susceptible to abusive applications by extreme ideologies. Although many of the contributions of early German Romanticism can be identified as supportive of a German liberalism and the express fulfillment of human freedoms via the ideal state, the mythical elements harnessed to this end have been identified for their extreme applications. Nietzsche's style and utilization of narrative tools, including myth or what he later labelled as extreme, powerful images or lies, illustrates the inherent susceptibility to misinterpretation or even false representation of his work. Much like the ostensibly historical nature of the German myth, the work of Nietzsche and many contributors to the German myth and German Romanticism, is remembered as much for how it was appropriated as for its original meaning.

The overarching ideal of the nation as an achievement of unity amongst the German people utilized a broad range of sources in efforts to differentiate criteria

concerning members of the nation from non-members. As nationalism was an active driving force during this time period it utilized sentiment to entice action. The resulting German model of nationalism inspired internal members towards the goal of German unity based on the unique essence and potential of the German people or *Volk*. Ultimately, the overarching goal of unity for its own sake would indiscriminately utilize sources to effectively inspire the necessary sentiment and action. This allocation of elements from within the German myth, German history and external sources, allowed for variants to emerge offering extreme or even vulgarized interpretations. *Volkisch* ideology, for example, represents the dangerous reactionary elevation of nationalism's ends, resulting in dangerous interpretations of the state or vulgarized identifications of the German people.

During the period of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the concept of the *Volk* evolved alongside intellectual and cultural shifts in the late 18th and 19th centuries. As the term propagated so did the society that formed around it, and a mysticism became associated with both the term and the society. Those who were part of it, and those who spent their lives perpetuating it, could not define exactly what it was, only that it was essential to the ontology of the German people. By historicizing the concept of *Volk*, and tracing its evolving boundaries and sources of influence, national identity was shaped by contested sources and definitions of belonging. The German people represented a transitory idea, one that was fragile, ever evolving, and unified only by its potential, a potential that could be realized under the security and the leadership of the unified state.

If the liberal revolutions seemingly failed, or faltered, the overarching goal of unity advanced a focus on pragmatic state-building, including the forces of militarism towards this goal. As unification would be achieved through the tool of strategic war and political maneuvers, these methods would be celebrated as expressions of the national will. The military would equally become a symbol through which the German people could express collective strength and protect the philosophical ideals and cultural expressions of the people against foreign invasion.

The German intellectuals and artists were naturally inclined, but also strategically minded, to utilize the power of a myth fueled by varied sources to galvanize the self-identification of a German people. Though the German myth united a cultural people, the same people were left exposed to those who might use similar sources to direct the passion of this audience for their own political ends. Later, "liberal critics" would view the "romantics' communitarian ethic as a form of incipient totalitarianism", but this criticism would fail to take into account the developmental elements of freedom and autonomy, which identifiably influenced the intent of romantic artists. Future application of elements of the German myth, distorts a clear understanding that the early "romantics communitarian ideal was essentially republican" in that the idea of the "common good was determined first and foremost by the people themselves."[715] As demonstrated through the work and progression of Nietzsche, for example, the use of such mythical elements within the work of these romantics, allowed their works to be used in vulgarized or heightened forms despite their initial intent.

[715] Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 37.

Thus, as a worldview component, the German myth functioned simultaneously as a source of cultural cohesion, political imagination, and ideological danger. It remains essential to understand how nineteenth century Germans interpreted unity, identity and their role within history. This component of a German worldview represented a powerful force during the nineteenth century. The German myth was an artistic, cultural and increasingly political source of polity for the German people. This component was also the most susceptible to extreme applications, abuses or misappropriations. Myth, or what we may now refer to as narrative, is an important aspect of most cultures and their traditions, but formative events or issues amongst a group, especially those responsible for societal norms and functions, must be clear and verifiable, or in other words held to a common standard. Otherwise, the foundational core of a society, in this case based through the identification and protection of a people, can justify only the needs of those in power or those who can reach a mass audience. If the mass appeal of the romantic artists and their mediums was a more approachable or widespread medium for the ideals and theories of German Idealism constructing an argument for a German society, so too could the alarmist and demonizing propaganda of another force to come.

Chapter 5:

Religion and a Shared Connection Through the Lens of a Worldview

This chapter will examine the fourth component of the worldview framework – the spiritual and religious nature of the German people – to ascertain the extent to which the traditional religion of the German people shaped and influenced a German worldview? The religion of Christianity was a major tenet of the German people. Specific to the scope of this thesis and worldview framework, this question must be answered concerning the role the traditional Christian religion played in the development of a unified German Nation-State during the nineteenth century. It is equally important to ascertain how the events and intellectual forces of this period affected both the status and the actions of the traditional denominations within German society. Both perspectives will help answer the question, what do the events of the nineteenth century tell us about the religious component of a German worldview? As with the other components examined in previous chapters, religion functioned not merely as a social institution, but as a culturally embedded interpretive lens through which Germans understood authority, community, morality, and historical purpose, thus constituting a core component of a German worldview. This chapter therefore proceeds on two interconnected levels. First, it examines the role of religion as a component of a German worldview. This will include recognition of the interpretive lens through which Germans understood authority, community, morality, and historical purpose. Second, because worldviews develop within historical contexts, the chapter also traces how this religious component interacted with the political formation of the nineteenth-century German nation-state. Making this

relationship explicit clarifies how religious ideas shaped both cultural understanding and political development.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it outlines the religious landscape of the German lands prior to the nineteenth century, emphasizing the embeddedness of Christianity in communal and political life. Second, it traces the intellectual heritage of Augustine, Aquinas, and the Reformation to show how long-standing theological ideas shaped German assumptions about justice, authority and moral order. Next, it examines how the upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries forced religious institutions to reinterpret their roles within the emerging nation-state. Finally, the chapter synthesizes these developments to clarify the specific contribution of religion to a German worldview. The timeframe of this chapter will be the late eighteenth century following the French Revolution in 1789, spanning the majority of the nineteenth century to the decade of the 1870s which included the events of German Unification and subsequently, the *Kulturkampf*. To comprehend the roles of the traditional German Christian denominations during this period, it will be important to introduce events and influences stemming from the traditional Catholic intellectualism of Antiquity and the pre-Renaissance via the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. Equally influential and climactic in determining the events of the nineteenth century is the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

Religious, Religion and the Christian Tradition within the German States

Religion and spirituality encompass, among other things, ultimate or existential questions such as the meaning of life, the moral justifications of right and wrong, or

belief in a higher power. It also entails "faithful devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity" and "devotion to religious beliefs or observances."[716] In general it involved an "institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices."[717] The term religion also implies for some of its members "the ascetic life in a religious community or order bound by vows." It further implies for others "piety in the sense of 'true piety,' which meant both an idea and a practice: an acceptance of the central teachings of the faith and a willingness to perform the acts prescribed by that acceptance."[718] Religion, as one component of a larger German worldview, implies both institutional and formative elements which also organize social belonging and political expectations. German Christianity involved beliefs and a shared connection among a majority of the German people. It is historically certain that German Christianity was a major tenet of the *Volk*.

Not to be ignored is the important role played by confessions. Because confessional identity helped to shape political culture, social norms, and collective belonging, it became a central mechanism through which the religion component of a German worldview was transmitted. Confessions arise from differences in theological understandings within religious communities, some of which had impacts on the political level. Confessions had long lasting influence on the German lands and the German people and were embedded in the public and political life of the German territories, and

[716] "Definition of Religious," Merriam-Webster, accessed April 12, 2018, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religious.
[717] "Definition of Religion," Merriam-Webster, accessed April 12, 2018, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion.
[718] Thomas A. Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 1400-1650, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 60.

eventually in the German Empire.[719] This embeddedness meant that confessional identity shaped not only religious life, but also influenced political culture, social norms, and collective self-understanding.

The German people, who traditionally were identified through a loosely connected collection of territories, "a common polity both temporal and spiritual", sought to "reform and strengthen its overarching polity." The primary source of this common polity was "their individual connection to spirituality and their religious faith, specifically their organized religion."[720] This chapter will focus on the religion of Christianity within the German nation and specifically the institutions of the Catholic Church, and subsequent Protestant denominations.

While this chapter focuses primarily on Christianity as the dominant religious tradition within eighteenth and nineteenth century German society, it is important to acknowledge that Judaism and Islam also contributed to the broader intellectual and cultural context in which a German worldview developed. These traditions played roles in shaping philosophical discourse, social structures, and interreligious dynamics that informed the evolving conception of German identity and statehood.

The timeframe of this study encompasses the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the eventual development of the nation-state of Germany. Before there was a Germany, there was a "notion" of several elements connecting "lands as possessing a definite if not very concrete unity." What long connected the German people was a "shared zeal for a more spiritual understanding of the Christian religion and a relative

[719] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 8.
[720] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 6.

social, if not religious equality of laity and clergy."[721] This connection long predated the Reformation period and surfaced within the Holy Roman Empire.

The Holy Roman Empire represented both the central core of medieval Christendom and a precursor to modern Europe. This precursor was "not a country", but a "feudal German kingdom" with a German king elevated through "papal coronation at Rome."[722] In the development of this system, the Church "except for language" represented the "oldest human geography of the German lands."[723] The development of this system, meaning the "Stable, heritable, and increasingly institutionalized dynastic states", developed in the German lands during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[724]These developments and institutional arrangements embedded Christianity deeply into the political and social fabric of the German territories, reinforcing religion's role as a foundational component of a German worldview.

Whether in the growing cities, or villages, or more rural areas, a Church was a central piece of the inner German community. This church of the people was "served by a priest" who was appointed by "a bishop, abbot, collegial chapter, noble, or civic regime and ordained and installed by the diocese's bishop." It was this process that established the network of communities resulting in the growing polity of the German people and German lands. So established was this system that a "village without a church and pastor was like a body without a soul or a town without walls, market, and town hall."[725] Here, religion reveals its power within a German worldview, as ecclesiastical structures

[721] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 4.
[722] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 12.
[723] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 15.
[724] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 18.
[725] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 50.

provided the foundation through which everyday experience was interpreted as moral patterns, spiritual meaning and social order.

The "manifestations of the sacred within the profane world", beliefs central to Christianity, allowed people to connect everyday life to the sacred and impose a sense of cosmic order on their world. This religious life and the influence of the Church resulted in "'an essentially sacramental view of the world'." Prior to the Reformation, Catholic Christianity introduced to the German people both universal and local worldly elements:

> The Church contained 'two levels of Catholicism – that of the Church Universal, based on the sacraments, the Roman liturgy, and the Roman calendar; and a local one, based on particular sacred places, images, and relics, locally chosen patron saints, idiosyncratic ceremonies, and a unique calendar built up from the settlement's own sacred history.' In the German lands, as elsewhere in Christendom, Christians high and low lived a religious life configured by the life-cycle of baptism, puberty, marriage, and death, and by the annual liturgical cycle of the sacred year.[726]

Calendars, sacraments, and parish networks translated belief into social time, making religious belonging a daily grammar for communal life. It was these elements present throughout the development of the modern German Nation that define religion's role in society and the lives of the German people. As such, religion forms an important component of a German worldview.

[726] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 63.

Eventually, the established system of beliefs which created connections to the sacred propelled individuals towards a more personalized spirituality or confession within organized religion. This individual connection gave individuals independent choices to seek control of their own spiritual direction, wrestling that power from "the church to prelates, orders, or princes." This potential power transfer from a select order within the institution to the people resulted in a gradual blurring of the "distinction between clergy and laity." The increased education of the people and economic and social changes resulted in a softening of roles as the "clergy was being laicized by its accumulation of property and participation in the market," while simultaneously the "laity was being clericalized through its mastery of writing, statute law, and the ability to think about abstract and spiritual things."[727] The developing role of religion, specifically the religious institution at the turn of the sixteenth century, displayed a growing desire among laypeople for a more individualized religious experience. This period introduced the new factor of "laypeople" seeking new "ways to live a spiritual life in the world."[728] As lay literacy rose, agency in spiritual matters expanded and through the lens of this religious component, we can see this development as new forms of expanding participation. These shifts in religious agency contributed to emerging ideas of individual moral responsibility, a theme that would later become central within the religious component of a German worldview.

The period of the Reformation, spanning from the sixteenth century to the first half of the seventeenth century, represented "a complex set of transformations of Western

[727] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 62.
[728] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 61.

Christianity – Protestant, Catholic, and others." After 1530, the development of regional controls and a hierarchy of power increased the societal functions of the states and introduced "a new conceptualization of the Empire as a particular, secular polity." The different reactions to this increased control of the secular power, often by aristocracies, would influence the role of religion for centuries to come. The Catholic Church and its German adherents "continued to regard the Empire as a universal monarch partnered with a universal Church essentially the medieval dualism of *imperium* and *sacerdotium*." The Protestants, on the other hand, represented by the several denominations, would all tend to view "the Empire as a German national monarchy on an aristocratic corporate foundation." German Catholics and the Protestant denominations shared core elements of the Christian religion; the "need for peace, harmony, and law and order were very similar." Their differing views of modern society, however, would signify the "differences of structure between the two Imperial faiths." What would continue to separate these religious faiths within the German nation can be broadly defined as "the Catholic universal and the Protestant national view."[729] These ideal types are used descriptively and help to explain different institutional reactions during the nineteenth century. From these differing views of society, and religion's role in it, these church institutions would ensure that their beliefs were perpetuated within the state and the lives of German people. These divergent confessional structures shaped different assumptions about authority, community, and the moral purpose of the state, assumptions that fed directly into the development of a German worldview.

[729] Brady Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 248.

The main focus of this chapter in highlighting the role of religion as part of a German worldview is the intellectual elements perpetuated through these institutions via their activity within German society and the State. This existing lineage, heritage and the formal roles of the Church within society necessitates its inclusion as a component of a German worldview, specifically during the nineteenth century. The two major Christian denominations, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, both had long and increasingly distinct traditions and roles in German society by the time of the nineteenth century. The continual growth of nationalism and liberalism as driving forces within German society would heavily influence the churches and challenge them in terms of their own intellectual, communal, and political engagement within German society. As the lives of the German people changed, so too would the religious institutions change in the German states and German culture as a whole. Accordingly, the activities of the churches must be understood as worldview impacting processes. These institutions translated theological beliefs into political expectations, moral norms and communal loyalties.

The State and the Traditional German Religion

The Catholic Church was once the epicenter and defender of the Holy Roman Empire. The prevailing narrative of German Protestantism stated that the German Reformation represented a "modernizing rejection of an intellectually stagnated Catholicism." This Protestant view was married to emerging liberal, humanizing, and nationalistic trends sweeping Europe. A positive view would state that the Reformation ushered in a Christian religion "unshackled from papal autocracy", one compatible with

science and enlightenment philosophy.[730] It can be likewise stated that the Reformation was a catalyst for the division or "fragmentation" of the German states within the Holy Roman Empire, for in the sixteenth century it served to reinforce "political divisions with sectarian divisions." The grand division within German states between that of Catholic or Protestant denominations would continue to be a defining characteristic well into the time of the German nationalism movement. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, secularizing forces paired with international conflicts would reduce the traditional role and power of the Church, or Churches, within German society. The impact of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars brought about the consolidation of many small German states and created an internal struggle within the Churches to solidify their place within the new order. The upheaval of the subsequent revolutions and the rise of German nationalism not only bestowed on the devotees of the Christian faiths new civic rights but also gave them the impetus to be politically engaged so as not to get swept away amongst ideological waves consuming the whole of the budding German nation-state.[731] These transformations reveal how religious institutions adapted their teachings and practices in ways that continued to shape the religious dimensions of a German worldview. As Germans confronted secularization, nationalism, and political unification, religious frameworks provided interpretive tools for understanding moral order, communal identity and the legitimacy of the state. The religious component of a German worldview thus evolved in dialogue with these broader social changes.

[730]Christopher Ocker, "The German Reformation and Medieval Thought and Culture," History Compass 10/1 (2012), 18, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2011.00816.x.
[731] Ellen Lovell Evans, The German Center Party, 1870-1933, (Southern Illinois University Press, 1981,) 1.

The traditional division between the two major faiths in Germany would fluctuate between adversarial and passive relations with one another, but the inherent contentiousness between the two would once again be politically utilized by Otto von Bismarck to facilitate the national unification of Germany. Bismarck would ultimately exacerbate this wedge issue amongst the German people with the *Kulturkampf*, highlighting an era in which one's faith and religious affiliation was tantamount to a declaration of one's civic allegiance and patriotism. Whatever narrative is assigned to the events, however, through a climactic shift in the historical progression of a culture and governed people, the religions were forced to adapt to the ramifications of social change.[732]

To understand the heritage of the traditional German Christian denominations during this period, it will be important to speak about influences stemming from the traditional Catholic intellectualism of Antiquity and pre-Renaissance via the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. This shared intellectual heritage shaped the conceptual vocabulary through which German Christians interpreted authority, justice, virtue and the ordering of a community, all of which are shared elements of analysis across the components of a German worldview. Equally influential and climactic in the shaping of events in the nineteenth century is the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

[732] Ocker, "The German Reformation," 27.

Intellectual Heritage

Understanding the religious component of a German worldview requires tracing the intellectual lineage that shaped Christian conceptions of authority, justice, and the moral purpose of community. The writings of Aquinas and later the Reformers provided the conceptual vocabulary through which German Christians interpreted both spiritual and political life. These ideas persisted through ecclesiastical teachings and shaped the assumptions that nineteenth-century Germans brought to debates about the state, society, and national identity.

To comprehend the positions of the Catholic and Protestant denominations in German states during the events of the nineteenth century, it is important to first understand the thread of intellectual lineage which would be present in both denominations. This shared intellectual tradition, present amongst a unified and organized international faith long before the events of the Reformation, would survive as an influence on the lives of church members through the education and instruction of both denominations. This section will highlight the heritage of Christian theology and intellectualism, which would influence the teaching and direction of the Church prior to the nineteenth century. Next, the point of divergence from a singular heritage to a separating viewpoint between the Catholic Church and the Reformed denominations in Germany, which followed the climactic religious and cultural events of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, will be addressed. This shared intellectual lineage provided the conceptual vocabulary through which German Christians interpreted authority, justice, and community, all central themes of the religion component of a German worldview.

This will reveal the important role religion played as a component of a larger German worldview.

Augustine to Aquinas: The Christian Intellectual Tradition, the State & the Individual

The Christian tradition has a distinct intellectual thread with legitimate considerations concerning the power of the state, the Church, and the individual. The writings of St. Augustine concerning the power of the Catholic Church and its place within the late Roman Empire and those of St. Thomas Aquinas's objective to blend the reason of human philosophy and the theology of Catholic scripture would inform not only how the Western Christian tradition and its members would conceive of a political community and the role of individuals, but also how outside political forces would view them and their intentions.

Augustine was born in 354 in Thagaste (Modern Algeria) during the latter period of the Western Roman Empire when "Christianity was the official state religion, but other religions were still tolerated and practiced"[733]. Educated in Rome and Carthage before 380, when Christianity became the sole religion of the Empire, Augustine would "embrace" Catholicism and return to Africa to found religious communities as a priest. He eventually became the Bishop of Hippo. His "spiritual odyssey" inspired his prolific writing, shaped by philosophy, especially late Neoplatonism, and informed his "distinction between the material and the immaterial."[734] Augustine adopted the

[733] Augustine, Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. Peter King (Cambridge University Press, 2010), ix.
[734] Augustine, Augustine, xii.

systematic approach and potential of metaphysics, yet he found "philosophical shortcomings in its ethical views."[735] He observed and emphasized that genuine moral action depends on the individual's free will.[736] In this time, the faltering empire had mandated a religion, yet widespread communities asserted their independence in varying forms. Augustine's correspondence, ranging from local leaders to popes and emperors, does not negate the importance of earthly concerns in which "Christian and pagans alike benefit from just, peaceful and orderly societies."[737]

As a leader in the Catholic Church, Augustine had a complicated history with coercion and individual freedoms under state power. Prior to 405, Augustine's politics emphasized ordered peace under just law. He rejected excessive severity and insisted on secured justice which can be viewed as "purely 'liberal' principles." Following a period of social unrest and refusals to engage in such discussions, his belief in these liberal principles were shaken.[738] Concerning the issue of civic protests or acts of defiance in Roman societies, he cautioned against abuse of power for according to him in "general we try to keep it the case that no one is punished too severely either by us or by anyone else with whom we might intercede; and we are eager to provide security for people." He equally cautioned against leniency leading to chaos, maintaining that social peace depends on people living rightly, not merely being free to act without consequence of the wrong.[739] The issue of tolerance for individual views and religious freedoms within

[735] Augustine, Augustine, xiii.
[736] Augustine, Augustine, xvii.
[737] Augustine, Political Writings, ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), xiv
[738] P.R.L. Brown, "St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion," The Journal of Roman Studies 54, Parts 1 and 2 (1964): 108-109, https://doi.org/10.2307/298656.
[739] Augustine, Political Writings, 5.

society did exist as Augustine's writing presents the necessary balance of recognizing the accepted thinking of the time by a collective of citizens. While his religious devotion may have had "little to say to secularists still intent on secular fundamentalism", his philosophy or political observance did present a strong precedent for the Church within an open society or state.[740] Generally, in his life within the Roman empire and his recognition of the accepted forms of societal functions through periods of history, Augustine recognized that "laws and other norms – capable of assent both by those who are members of particular churches and those who are not" allow for the goals or ultimate end of a collective citizenry.[741] In identifying the ideal ethical spiritual life, so too he advocated that there must be a matching earthly "well-ordered life and health of the living whole [for this] is of primary importance to a person and a people." For Augustine, this peace consisted of a harmonious ordering of authority and obedience within both families and political communities. Next, this recognition expands for the individual the "peace of the political community is an ordered harmony of the authority and obedience between citizens."[742] It is these norms in society that remain of key importance and allows one to infer that regardless of religious affiliation, citizens can agree to accept and uphold a just law.[743] Hence, one can see that early on just laws were to be part of the religious mindset of the Church, and therefore a foundational element of a developing German worldview.

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[740] James Wetzel, "Introduction," in Augustine's City of God: A Critical Guide. ed. James Wetzel, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6.
[741] Paul J. Griffiths, "Secularity and the saeculum," in Augustine's City of God: A Critical Guide. ed. James Wetzel, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35-36.
[742] Saint Augustine, The City of God, Books XVII-XXII. trans. Gerald G. Walsh, and Daniel J. Honan, (Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 217-218.
[743] Griffiths, "Secularity," 37-38.

Augustine distinguished between the "great nations throughout the world" composing one "society" in the limited and finite earthly cities and another in the eternal city of God. Although of obvious lesser importance to him, humans are presented with choices so that each man can lead "its own kind of peace, and when they attain what they desire, each lives in the peace of its own choosing."[744] By a city Augustine generally means, "a group of people who ordinarily live in spatial contiguity and under a single body of laws and norms."[745] Within this collection of united citizens, he further explains that both individuals and communities achieve happiness through orderly associations.[746] The prescribed need within a society or city or state, a nation of citizens, is justice, for as Augustine stated, "wherever true justice is lacking, there cannot be a multitude of men bound together by a mutual recognition of rights." Without this achieved bond through a mass recognition by the people, "there is no weal of the 'people,' or commonwealth, but only the weal of a nondescript mob undeserving of the designation 'the people'." Augustine defined justice as giving each person their due and regarded it as foundation for a legitimate political community.[747] This element, representing a recognition of the virtue of justice afforded to every man, is present in the Christian intellectual heritage and perpetuated in the education and theology of the Church through the teaching of Augustine's philosophy. This emphasis on justice as the foundation of a true people would reverberate in nineteenth-century German debates about national unity, legitimacy, and the moral purpose of the state. Augustine supplies a vocabulary Germans would later

[744] Saint Augustine, The City of God, Books VIII-XVI. trans. Gerald G. Walsh, and Grace Monahan, (Catholic University of America Press, 1952), 347.
[745] Griffiths, "Secularity," 38.
[746] Saint Augustine, The City of God, Books I-VII. trans. Demetrius B Zema and Gerald G. Walsh, (Catholic University of America Press, 1950), 44.
[747] Augustine, The City of God, Books XVII-XXII, 232-233.

recognize within a shared tradition and use to evaluate emerging institutions in their unfolding religious self-understanding.

St. Thomas Aquinas's writings (1225-1274) came to be "regarded as the most comprehensive treatment of the relation of philosophy and theology." His writings still influence our conceptions today on "theories of the just war, discussions of sexual ethics including abortion and contraception, arguments about property rights, and theories of natural law." Aquinas is renowned for "his attempt to integrate the various strains of medieval thought into a comprehensive system" with his theories drawing on elements of "Platonism, Aristotle, Roman law, Stoicism, the Christian Fathers (especially Augustine), feudal theory, and the contemporary political practice of the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian city-state."[748] This introduction of "The Christianized Aristotelian" resulted in increased attention to a "rationalism in ethics" concerning human recognition of the good through philosophy.

From Aristotle, Aquinas gained the notion that "the principles of social organizations are based on human nature, and society is ordered in a hierarchy of social groupings."[749] Concerning such an ordering of society, Aquinas instilled within the Christian intellectual tradition an associated recognition for individual rights of citizens and the need for strong leadership and security. In the formation of a community, men first recognized that everyone possesses reason, which guides them toward their natural ends. Aquinas noted that Man is said to be "by nature a political and social animal" and "lives in groups." It is further recognized that "a man cannot adequately provide for his

[748] Thomas Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, A New Translation Backgrounds Interpretations, trans. and ed. Paul E. Sigmund, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), xiii.
[749] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, xxi-xxii.

life by himself. Therefore, it is natural for man to live in association with his fellows."[750] It also follows that there "must be some way for them to be governed" and this way must follow from "a single controlling force in the body that aimed at the common good of all the members."[751] Hence, Aquinas communicated that a religious life comprised good order and concern for all members of the society.

Aquinas recognized the need for protections against corruption and especially the potential abuse of power entrusted in the few or in a King. He warned that a ruler who governs for personal gains rather than the common good is "called a tyrant."[752]. Safety and security could only be found through peace. Without this peace society falls apart and therefore the highest duty of a government, or a ruler, was to maintain unity and peace. Even within the ruling power of the few, or a King, Aquinas stated that "what makes a government unjust is the fact that the private interest of the ruler is pursued in preference to the common good of the society."[753]

Aquinas opposed coercive or authoritarian views of government under a single ruler and made clear that "government by a tyrant is the worst." For him, monarchy could be just, but only when the ruler governed for the common good rather than personal interest. The decisive factor was not the form of government but the orientation of its leadership, meaning a ruler who pursued private advantage became a tyrant, while one who pursued the good of the community exercised legitimate authority. This then explains that the distinction lies in whether the many governed justly or unjustly, so

[750] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 14.
[751] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 15.
[752] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 16.
[753] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 18.

justice, not the number of rulers, determined the legitimacy of political power. Aquinas did highlight the shortcoming of oligarchy and aristocracy since both are governments by the few. He opposed kingship and tyranny since "both are governments by one person."[754]Although not his ideal, Aquinas preferred democratic government above these others. Aquinas's synthesis of reason and faith reinforced a tradition in which moral order, natural law, and communal responsibility shaped the religious assumptions eventually to become embedded in a German worldview.

This Christian intellectual tradition, stemming from Augustine and Aquinas, and embraced in the Catholic Church, would become influential during the unification of the German nation-state. German society inherited the religious perspectives on how society should be governed from these two stalwarts, which influenced the emerging nineteenth-century political structures. Here one can again see the power of these religious views within nineteenth century arguments for societal unity, authority and limitations. An intellectual tradition espouses the eternal moral and ethical values of the Christian religion. It recognizes that man in his earthly condition must also act in connection to eternal goals, and that this can only be achieved through a just society operating on the principle of the common good. Aquinas would make clear and presciently forewarn that "The tyrant despises the common good and seeks his private good and as a result he oppresses his subjects in different ways."[755]

[754] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 19.
[755] Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, 19.

Protestant Intellectual Heritage

Within the German Protestant tradition stemming from the Reformation, and specifically its various strains of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Pietism, there existed an intellectual heritage and distinct thread of Christianity that deviated from the Catholic tradition. Protestantism's distinct teachings impacted the political and nationalistic actions of a large segment of the German population.

This distinct heritage within Christianity flowed from the historic event of October 31st, 1517, in the town of Wittenberg and the actions of Martin Luther, "a thirty-three-year-old member of the Eremitical Order of Augustinian friars"[756]. His Ninety-Five Theses would eventually appear as revolutionary to many. Centuries later it would bring about equally momentous change amongst the traditional order of states within the continent of Europe. Whereas Luther would later comment in 1518, referring to his list as "theses, after all, not teachings, not dogmas"[757], the action itself would certainly take on a practical and mythical status as a call to independence and the establishment of freedoms. Alternatively, from the Catholic perspective, the same event would be blamed as inciting chaos within the stable order of the Holy Roman Empire. What is certain is that the former traditional order, which covered "most of central Europe between eastern France and the modern-day border of Poland," had ruptured due to an introduction of these 95 theses. The Holy Roman Empire by this time had exhibited little connective tissue as the empire had become a "patchwork-quilt of towns and territories." German territories were held together largely by cultural traditions, a common German language, the Catholic

[756] Peter Marshall, 1517, Martin Luther and the Invention of the Reformation, (Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.
[757] Marshall, 1517, Martin Luther, 18.

faith, and by their "nominal allegiance to the Emperor."[758] The Reformation changed the religious nature of Germany, adding its own connective elements, including a distinct view of society and the individuals role within it. The Reformation, beginning initially as a religious movement within Catholicism, would become a powerful political force in the nineteenth century, revealing again the impactful role of religion as part of the developing German worldview of this time.

The German Protestant Denominations – From Reformation to a New State Religion

The actions of Martin Luther fragmented the Catholic Church and resulted in the formation of new Christian denominations during what would become the Reformation period. A later and ultimately decisive consequence of this fragmentation from the once unified and international Catholic body would be an "outright state control of the Protestant church" under the protection of the rising territorial princes." Through the period of destabilization and the eventual fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, Lutheranism in particular would become "the official religion of many of the new states ruled over by the princes." The Reformation period represented an opportunity to solidify power and security within the individual German states. Luther's religious teachings spoke of a prince as the "maintainer of order." Despite inciting a religious and societal revolution, Luther taught that spiritual freedom did not justify rebellion and that a just political authority must be obeyed. As a result of this teaching then, the "German Protestant churches became ecclesiastical departments within the civil bureaucracy,

[758] Marshall, 1517, Martin Luther, 19.

invariably subject to territorial law." Corresponding to an intellectual trend within German speaking societies, and undoubtedly present within the intellectual influences of Luther himself, his "teachings and German historical experience brought about an outlook which made opposition to authority sinful."[759]

How did the forms of Protestantism, as a religious movement, develop from the time of the Reformation in early sixteenth to the start of the nineteenth century period and how would the status of the Protestant denomination within the German states influence the development of the nineteenth century? Many of the individual states of Germany and their princes recognized the reformation, and Lutheranism in particular, as an immediate ally of the traditional authority. Leonard Krieger argues that within Lutheranism there exists core beliefs in the "categorical separation of the Word and the Flesh, spirit and the world, freedom and action, and subordination to worldly authority." Since its inception, Lutheranism would be viewed as "essentially a conservative force", and its teachings instilled in its members a role to be "'the passive rather than the active factor' in German history." As Protestantism began to form its own distinct heritage within German culture, those who counted on it would become "men of music and literature as well as men active in public life" in the subsequent generations of the German states and were "shaped to a great extent by the Protestant religious heritage of Germany." It was the German intellectuals in particular who "carried the Protestant religious spirit into secular fields."[760]

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[759] Robert M. Bigler, "The Rise of Political Protestantism in Nineteenth Century Germany: The Awakening of Political Consciousness and the Beginning of Political Activity in the Protestant Clergy," Church History 34, No. 4, (Dec. 1965): 425-426.
[760]Bigler, "The Rise of," 424.

Stemming from the Protestant Reformation, a number of assumptions would influence the development of the Protestant denominations in many German states while contributing to an evolving German culture. First, the Reformation had a marked influence on the individual German states by overemphasizing "that Protestantism initiated the full secularization of all institutional power, thus clearing the way for the growth of modern states." Second, there was certainly exaggeration as to the "nature and degree of the Reformation's resonance in the social and cultural spheres." The Reformation within German society naturally aligned itself to a growing form of nationalism developing even in the sixteenth century, but nationalists would build narratives concerning the Reformation as an example of religious reforms leading "to national awakening." Despite connections to the growing national movement, and the inherent revolutionary influences of the Reformation, the resulting Protestant Church relationship with the state continued throughout the eighteenth century to be a force in support of the status quo.[761]

The principle of "*cuius regio eius religio"* (Whose Realm, His Religion) would become law at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and would govern the "political and religious relations in the German lands" until 1803 with the fall of the Holy Roman Empire. This principle stipulated that the "religion of the ruler should be the religion of the ruled" and was intended to counter the problem or threat of "religious coexistence, religious pluralism, and religious conflict that the Lutheran Reformation and subsequent Protestant reform movements introduced into the fabric of German society."[762] By 1620,

[761] Joel F. Harrington and Helmut Walser Smith, "Confessionalization, Community, and State Building in Germany, 1555-1870", The Journal of Modern History 69, (March 1997): 79.
[762] Harrington and Smith, "Confessionalization," 77.

Lutheranism would account for the largest "Protestant presence among German speakers." Within the numerous German states, however, there were actually "Twelve state churches in different territories within the empire." These further splintered churches were labelled as "Reformed" and in fact "Five imperial cities – Emden, Bremen, Wesel, Mulhouse, and Colmar (Lutheran and Reformed)" had adopted these Reformed practices. It was estimated that the "population of Reformed Protestants at the beginning of seventeenth century was one million (out of a total population of sixteen million)." This influence of Reformed Protestantism, flowing from the direction of local princes, would introduce "relatively isolated pockets" within the groupings of German states and as a result introduced "their own regional character."[763] Many Protestant Germans, and in particular princes, had recognized the strength in a cooperation between Lutherans and Reformed and this possibility was given urgency as Protestants struggled in foreign nations. Within Protestantism, there appeared a degree of protection and strength in a potential "Reformed faith" both internationally and locally.[764] This example taught that political space and religious space could coincide, specifically concerning habits that mattered when nationalism sought congruence of people, territory, and law.

The driving force in the formation and development of the German Protestant religion was the intellectual foundation of Martin Luther. In "contrast to Calvin, Luther wanted to help men to escape from the world, not to order or control it." Oppositely, Calvinist teachings offered to "recreate the world in the image of heaven." Calvinism then professed "a social solution to the problem of man's drifting away from God",

[763] D.G. Hart, Calvinism, A History, (Yale University Press, 2013), 65.
[764] Hart, Calvinism, 65.

whereas "Lutheranism sought a personal solution" which refrained from advocation for altering the design or function of the state.[765] Lutheranism, would dominate the religion and social order at the start of the nineteenth century, but was also joined by contemporaries including "pietism, a movement that had its roots, like orthodoxy, in the Reformation."[766]

The Pietist movement originated in Frankfurt am Main in 1670 and was inspired by the teachings of Philipp Jakob Spener. A committed defender of Lutheran Orthodoxy, Spener believed that the tradition's historical significance and confessional devotion remained essential even as Orthodoxy itself was entering a period of decline. The perceived decline of Lutheran Orthodoxy stemmed from the sense that its once sharply doctrinal distinctiveness had become increasingly homogenized within German society. This was partly the result of Protestantism's strong institutional position by the early seventeenth century, when religion and faith "came to be regarded as natural parts of general education." As this trend continued to the middle of the seventeenth century, the established nature of the Lutheran faith resulted in a perceived stagnation by some, as the once revolutionary methods and content had shifted to a posture of defending "one's theology in opposition to other positions." In universities, the traditional partnership between theology and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics was giving way to more practical concerns and a more "historically-oriented approach." As a result of this perceived loss of status or distinct place in society, it was during the eighteenth century that "Pietism was able to provide answers to the critical questions which Orthodoxy was no longer able to

[765] Bigler, "The Rise of", 424.
[766] Arlie J. Hoover, The Gospel of Nationalism, German Patriotic Preaching from Napoleon to Versailles, (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1986,) 7.

address."[767] Pietism would appear as an opportunity for renewed or reemerging revolutionary ideas that once transformed society during the Reformation. Pietism excited a more historical spark in society, or at least in portions of the Lutheran Church, due to the fact that it "initially addressed the individual person rather than seeking the assistance of the civil authorities or resorting to general measures of reform." Whereas Catholicism remained a communally focused element through its view of a universal system, the product of the Reformation was an individual based movement steeped in the belief that "Christian faith should be directly experienced through reading the Bible and relating it to one's own life."[768]

Through its combination of individual piety and communal cohesion, Pietism offered another potential link between Protestantism and the early development of German nationalism Its emphasis on the inner life of the believer, while still situated within a larger moral community, allowed later neo-Pietists movements to function as a bridge between spiritual renewal and "patriotic revival."[769] Pietism then would be identified by some as having helped connect the lineage and symbolic framework of religion to the force of nationalism.[770] Pietism's role overlapped with the role of the worldview component, myth, for while myth shaped collective sentiment, religion formed moral conscience, and together they offered powerful tools for framing the identity of the people. Nationalists would also identify elements of this community connections within the teachings of the Enlightenment. From the impact of the

[767] Shantz, A Companion, 19.
[768] Shantz, A Companion, 21.
[769] Hartmut Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism: The Relationship between Protestant Revivalism and National Renewal in Nineteenth-Century Germany," Church History 51, No. 1 (Mar. 1982): 40, https://doi.org/10.2307/3165252.
[770] Lehmann, "Pietism," 42.

Enlightenment, German intellectuals would also contribute to the connections and growth of nationalism. Fichte himself would point to this intellectual connection with the nationalist cause as "the salvation of humanity not as guided by divine providence but as a process of self-redemption initiated and carried through by an educated elite."[771]

If the influence of the Enlightenment fanned the flames of revolution, however, the Pietist movement certainly held an opposing position to revolution. Pietists held that the influences of revolution were direct steps leading from "immorality to chaos, from anarchy to hell." As has previously been linked in the development of German intellectualism, the French Revolution had an impact on both the minds of many German philosophers, as it did "on the minds of pious Christians."[772] By the nineteenth century, Pietism did influence a number of segments of German society, whether "involved in foreign missions" or "charitable institutions", but a direct influence in historical evolution of German national developments can most directly be established in its "home among Prussian nobility." There would be an ultimate reverberation in German politics from the merging of "Prussian patriotism, piety, and conservativism" especially concerning the influence of a future statemen, when a "young Bismarck had his conversion."[773]

Pietism, especially in its later neo-Pietist form, is important for this component of the worldview framework because of its connection to the rise of German Romanticism. Both movements "rejected rationalism and dogma and emphasized emotion, feeling, spontaneity, and individuality."[774] By the early nineteenth century, the new theological

[771] Lehmann, "Pietism," 43.
[772] Lehmann, "Pietism,"45.
[773] Lehmann, "Pietism,"46-47.
[774] Hoover, The Gospel of Nationalism,11.

approaches associated with "Kant, Schleiermacher, romanticists, and mature pietists" appeared to some as only a faint echo of earlier doctrinal certainty. The older anchors of authority, including reason, the Bible, and the Church were increasingly replaced by a broader "realm of the religious and emphasized primarily the *attitude* of faith, not the *content* of faith." This shift created an intellectual climate in which individuals were "free to postulate or to feel, depending on whether he followed Kant or Schleiermacher or both." In many ways, this development reflected the long-term influence of "Luther's principles of moral autonomy" but expressed through a more emotional and subjective religious sensibility.[775]

Kant

Kant represents a major turning point in German intellectual and theological development, and his work helps explain how religion continued to shape German thought in the nineteenth century. The movement of German intellectualism and theology, presented in the previous example of both pietism and romanticism, resulted in the looser understanding, or engagement with religion which came to represent broader conceptions of faith and certainly widened the intellectual realm of inquiry. As has been addressed in a previous chapter, Kant's personal experience informed his specific philosophy, equally connecting his work to the subsequent school of German Idealism. Elements of his cultural background, including religion, remained present throughout his work. Because the Enlightenment tended to view human nature in abstract and

[775] Hoover, The Gospel of Nationalism,22.

unhistorical terms, Kant's emphasis on moral autonomy and the inner life of the individual helped shift religious authority from external institutions to the moral reasoning of the person. Whereas the Enlightenment critically can be said to have "failed to understand the part played by historical events in shaping the thought of the past, it was equally unsympathetic towards historical influences in its own thinking."[776] This cultural influence would allow for Kant to interpret the impact of religion as a historical institution in society, even as his own use of the term religion pointed toward a more universal moral understanding.

Kant's intellectual range is so broad that scholars continue to debate both his positions and the influences that shaped them. Yet on the question of his personal background, there is little uncertainty that "Kant was a religious man." His early religious formation remained an important element in his development and helps explain why religious concepts continued to inform his philosophical project. Kant's work makes clear that he approached religion as a "religion of ethics." As with his earlier work, he "does not turn to religion for divine guidance in the determination of duty" but instead focuses on the "moral law to determine our duty and to provide the only sound argument for the existence of God."[777] Reference concerning religion spoke more to an ethical level, but there were passages or allusions to the practical institution of the historical Church and its influence. Kant shows reverence, or at least recognition, towards the historical document

[776] Theodore M. Greene, "The historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion," in Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (Harper Torchbooks, 1960), ix.
[777] John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 1xxx.

of the Bible, especially as a cultural artifact of a people and history.[778] The "sacred books of this people will doubtless always be preserved and will continue to possess value for scholarship", explained Kant, as he further qualified that "even if not for the benefit of religion: since the history of no other people dates back, with some color of credibility, so far as does this, into epochs of antiquity."[779] Kant then, does recognize the contribution of religion as a source of common or connecting elements amongst a people, such as the historical source of the Bible preserving a history of a people and connecting them through its sacred identification.

The legacy and cultural influence of pietism was widespread. The noted reverence for the Bible as a communal source within the work of Kant is perhaps better understood given the context that he was "born and nurtured in a deeply pietistic home." The pietist upbringing and cultural influence merging with his university training through obvious "strong rationalistic influences", resulted in what can be understood as the "deep impressions made upon him by both of these aspects of the *Aufklarung*."[780] Within his *Religion*[781], he compares his focus of the moral law to the historical or materialistic religion of man. Kant argues that a true, pure, religion based solely on reason implies only an ideal, "invisible church", whereas historical institutions, the "visible church" are susceptible to human error.[782] Even as rationalists challenged traditional beliefs, religious categories continued to structure how Germans interpreted moral order, and the meaning of community, thus reinforcing religion as a worldview component. Kant's

[778] Silber, "The Ethical Significance", 1xxix.
[779] Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (Harper Torchbooks, 1960,) 154.
[780] Greene, "The historical Context", xii.
[781] Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason, 1960.
[782] Kant, Religion Within, 140.

reconfiguration of religion into a moral-rational framework contributed to a modernized thread of a religious component within a German worldview, one that introduced the concept of autonomy while retaining Christianity as a cultural heritage. Despite elevating a pure religion of reason above institutional religion, Kant still acknowledged the value of historical religious traditions as sources of shared meaning. The Bible, for example, preserved a common history that connected a people through its sacred narrative. As Kant did not dismiss religion's cultural power, for him religion remained a unifying force that shaped moral life and collective identify and serves as the kind of influence that made it central to the development of a German worldview.

The Historical Progression of German Denominations and Traditional Authority in the Nineteenth Century

From Pre-1815 Secularization to Post 1815 Protestant Prussia

Prior to the 1780s and the period of the French Revolution, "a high proportion of German Catholics lived in states within the Holy Roman Empire" that were officially Catholic.[783] Outside of these states, the "largest Catholic minority in a Protestant state before the French Revolution was in Prussia."[784] The subsequent period would be one of destabilization brought about by foreign conquest and Napoleonic rule. The defeat of Napoleon would incite further reverberations on many levels across the continent, and within the German states it represented "the transference of nearly the entire population of west and southwest Germany to Protestant administrations." Although this was not an

[783] Evans, "The German Center Party", 1.
[784] Evans, "The German Center Party", 2.

immediate intention of the European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815, the diplomatic restoration of the political order on the continent would once again see the German states internally divided by the two denominational faiths, and yet in this new reality "the states were no longer evenly divided between them."[785]

The French Revolution imposed societal changes incorporating trends of secularization into an institutionalized form. Subsequent conquest and the resulting nationalistic fervor of war represented concurrent destabilizing forces which had a "powerful impact on some clergymen who for the first time seemed to be able to choose between political alternatives."[786] It was during this period when the Prussian government identified that the traditionally "docile Protestant clergy could be enlisted in the efforts to overthrow Napoleon's rule."[787] Following the defeat of Napoleon and a period of re-establishment of previous societal norms in central Europe, the Prussia state "emerged as the largest German Protestant state." From this powerbase, the Prussian government would reward "a number of clergymen who had distinguished themselves during the wars by their loyalty to the government." King Frederick William III declared that these "promotions were 'in recognition of outstanding services' to the government."[788] Undoubtedly realizing the potential political influence amongst this large segment of his population, the Prussian King considered it "his 'mission' to bring about confessional union in the state church and devoted much of his time and energy to its enforcement."[789]

[785] Evans, "The German Center Party", 2-3.
[786] Bigler, "The Rise of," 433.
[787] Bigler, "The Rise of," 430.
[788] Bigler, "The Rise of," 443.
[789] Bigler, "The Rise of," 435.

On October 31, 1817, Frederick William III "celebrated the tercentenary of the German Reformation", where he officially called for the union of the "Lutheran and Reformed churches in his kingdom." This call would seek to include all forms of Reformed Protestantism and orthodox Lutheranism within a "single evangelical (read: Protestant) church." Confessional administration held potential for statecraft, as it leveraged the religious belonging previously identified within this worldview component. Obviously, from the Prussian political perspective in particular, this amalgamation of the Reformed Protestants represented a potentially harmonized group of internal supporters.[790] Whether this was a form of harmonization, or pacification, on the part of the Prussian Court, this church union would shift the point of conflict from internal Protestant faiths to the "Protestants and Roman Catholics." From the Protestant perspective, "the individual believer's relationship to Christ was essential" while from the Catholic perspective, which ultimately included the influences of Rome, "the individual's relationship to Christ depended on the Christian's status within the church."[791] This distinction would periodically fuel animosity between the two traditional German faiths but would increasingly take on political calculations during the course of German unification.

German Protestantism as a Political Force

The Protestant Church, whether referring to separate denominations or as a unified body, truly entered the political realm concurrent to the rise of nationalism in the

[790] Hart, Calvinism, 274.
[791] Hart, Calvinism, 276.

nineteenth century. Fritz Fischer would note in his work that the previous "docility and social quietism of German Protestants in general" was a result of its traditional Luther lineage. The course of the nineteenth century would see this heritage, based on the teachings of Martin Luther and his impact on German society, utilized differently to suit the needs of rising nationalism.[792]

In 1817 "a group of German university students with liberal and nationalist tendencies, many of whom were veterans of the Wars of Liberation, assembled at the Wartburg Castle in Eisenach." These students identified in Martin Luther a symbol of "the reformer as a German citizen and patriot who had embodied the liberal characteristic of reason, virtue, and freedom." This was quite different from the previous role the memory of Martin Luther had played for the princes and their individual states, which resulted in a traditionally passive form of Protestantism. With the zeal of nationalistic tendencies and the ideas of an international liberalism, the students either identified what they required within this Protestant heritage, and Luther in particular, or recognized a new application for this heritage which suited the time. To view the Reformation as an act of defiance in the hopes of revolution, Nationalists recast Luther as a liberator of the German people from Roman Catholic domination. In the nineteenth century, the liberal and nationalistic forces would equally hope for "political liberation of the German states from the conservative princes."[793] The event of Wartburg in 1817 would be an inciting event for the simmering movement of German nationalism. Those who amassed to celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the Protestant Reformation represented an

[792] Stan M. Landry, Ecumenism, Memory, and German Nationalism, 1817-1917, (Syracuse University Press, 2014), 3.
[793] Landry, Ecumenism, 3.

intentional shift in the perception and use of Martin Luther and the Protestant heritage. This three hundredth anniversary was "celebrated throughout Protestant Germany and represented as much of a pan German event."[794] This new interpretation presented Luther as "enlightened and bourgeois" and 1817 represented the demarcation point in which Luther would go on to "serve as a German national hero accessible to all Germans" even beyond Protestantism.[795]

Previous celebrations marking the anniversary of the Reformation had been very different affairs, communicating a much different message, than that which occurred in 1817. The hundred-year anniversary in 1617 was very much "an orthodox affair" focusing on the theology, or philosophy, of Martin Luther and the corresponding reforms to Christian doctrine. By 1717, the occasion was "celebrated in the spirit of German Pietism", with emphasis on the "renewal of individual spirituality" and Martin Luther's "pious zeal and individual personality." The course of these celebrations were "strictly Lutheran affairs" as neither "German Calvinists, Catholics, nor Jews participated in either anniversary celebrations." In the nineteenth century the iteration of the celebration was presented in a broader "ecumenical fashion." Expressed as a connecting national element of German history, this celebration was projected towards "German Catholics, Reformed Christians, and in some cases, Jews attending and participating in the festivities for the first time."[796] German nationalism and the new focus on the German nature of the Reformation transcended religious confessions of Christianity. Protestant memory and symbolism were used to transcend the old territorial divisions of German lands, offering a

[794] Landry, Ecumenism, 4.
[795] Landry, Ecumenism, 5.
[796] Landry, Ecumenism, 6-7.

shared historical narrative that could unite diverse communities. The 1817 celebrations demonstrate how religion continued to function as a powerful cultural force, shaping a collective identity and contributing to the formation of a larger German worldview.

German Protestantism and the State in the Nineteenth Century

Previously in Prussia, under the rule of Frederick William I and Frederick II, "the Protestant clergy was, in principle, completely subordinated to the personal will of the vigilant sovereign." Prior to the nineteenth century all "ministers had to go to Berlin for periodic inspections" as stated by "the so-called Prediger-Revue," and the Protestant clergy of Prussia had accepted this "assigned role in state and society."[797] Nationalism as a force would represent a jostling of these traditional roles and would force the clergy of Prussia "into a politically articulate and active" phase.[798]

This period of change had actually begun with a new degree of stability in the form of "interconfessional peace." The catalyst towards independence or freedom of religion within a German state began with the King Friedrich Wilhelm III when he called for the unification of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. What would become the Prussian Union was inaugurated on October 31, 1817, not coincidently during the Reformation anniversary celebrations. To evoke a patriotic and communal feeling amongst the members of the Protestant confessions, the memory of Luther and the Reformation would be the backdrop to "establish a union of the Reformed and Lutheran

[797] Bigler, "The Rise of," 428.
[798] Bigler, "The Rise of," 426-427.

Churches on the occasion of an anniversary."[799] That fall, the Prussian king called for an "intra-Protestant service " in Berlin, to "inaugurate the Prussian Union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches into a unified Evangelical Church"[800]

From an existing aristocratic hegemony, the creeping upheaval of growing liberal priorities amongst an expanding middle class, paired with a conservative fear of chaos exhibited during neighbouring revolutions, would continually impact religious groups. The conservative awakening would not only view the Protestant Union as an opportunity to transmit principles of stability and order, but Protestant groups themselves would once again seek to form religious renewal within German society. The principles and theme which would bind together the respective conservative and protestant awakenings included "'constitution,' 'legality,' 'monarchy,' and 'revolution.'" The introduction of destabilizing forces in society represented a threat to the traditional authority. Religion and especially the Protestant denominations offered support to this traditional authority. The Prussian monarchy's efforts to utilize these elements and bolster Protestants through a Protestant Union had the real-world result of a "politically and culturally energized church."[801]

During the climactic year of 1848, over 500 Protestants convened in Wittenberg to discuss Church renewal and engagement.[802] Resulting from this congress was "what became the Internal Mission [*Innere Mission*]." As presented by Johann Hinrich Wichern, the message decried the "pitiful picture of dechristianization sweeping the

[799] Landry, Ecumenism, 9.
[800] Landry, Ecumenism,10.
[801] David L. Ellis, Politics and Piety, The Protestant Awakening in Prussia, 1816-1856, (Brill, 2017),196.
[802] Ellis, Politics, 196-197.

German states" as he sought to demonstrate the strong connection for many neo-Pietists between political and spiritual considerations.[803]. This Wittenberg congress would directly lead to the "creation of the Central Committee [*CentralausschuB*] of the Internal Mission by January 1849."[804] This Central Committee stated its "'purpose' as 'saving the Protestant people [*des evangelischen Volkes*] from its spiritual and bodily need through proclaiming the Gospel and reaching out a fraternal helping hand of Christian love'"[805] This appeal, through both the sacraments of the Bible and Christianity's core belief, calls back on the history and progression of the German peoples' polity, during which Christianity served as a foundational connection amongst a people.

The Prussian State, acting in a manner to commandeer the mission of saving the Protestant Church, directly funded the Central Committee's mission, increasing the intertwined cultural and political measures between the Protestant Church and the Prussian State, even as the Church would expand its autonomous activity as well.[806] From 1847 to 1850, the Union Church fully transformed from a state church to one "separated from the institution of the state, but more immediately than before connected with the king as the summus episcopus'." This trend and distinction would continue until further reforms in 1873.[807] The attempts for confessional unification indicate how the state sought to harness religion as its role as a component within a German worldview, as it still harnessed elements vital to forging a national identity.

[803] Ellis, Politics, 201.
[804] Ellis, Politics, 204.
[805] Ellis, Politics, 205.
[806] Ellis, Politics, 205.
[807] Ellis, Politics, 212.

Constitutions, 1848 & Beyond

When the Prussian king "dissolved the constitutional convention and promulgated the so-called 'octroyed' constitution" on December 5, 1848, the document that was drawn up provided "the greatest possible regard for the wishes expressed by the representatives of the people"[808]. Concerning the freedoms and roles of the churches and religion, Article 12 "officially recognized two churches and a host of religious associations," but further "guaranteed total religious freedom, establishing what contemporaries called the 'parity' of all religions." Article 12 further defined that "[t]he Evangelical [evangelische] and Roman Catholic church, as every other religion association, orders and administers its affairs independently and remains in the possession and enjoyment of the institutions, foundations, and funds for its cultural, educational, and charitable purposes." Next, Article 15 rescinded state confirmation rights over ecclesiastical offices. Of course, this freedom, or particular parity between the stated Churches, and other possible religions, represented a loss to the staunchest Protestants who "during the early days of the Awakening" had sought an expansion of one within the state.[809] Many of these introduced articles would remain within German society for the rest of the nineteenth century, as "the controversial Article 12 from the 1848 constitution was adopted unchanged (as Article 15) in the 1850 constitution."[810] These rights and freedoms would represent a foundational change within German society. The provision of rights for religious freedoms and religion's role in society empowered the traditional Churches and resulted in increased activities within German society. These constitutional changes

[808] Friedrich Wilhelm and James Harvey Robinson, "Supplement: Constitution of the Kingdom of Prussia," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 5, Supplement 8, (Sep.1894): 13.
[809] Ellis, Politics, 218.
[810] Ellis, Politics, 222.

further institutionalized religion within the emerging nation-state by formally recognizing the spiritual commitments of the communal identity, and reframed believers as rights-bearing citizens

What was clear following the chaotic and threatening societal upheaval by the mid nineteenth century, the Protestant church, or specifically the Protestant Union, had cast off its unengaged stance and had become intertwined in the cultural, political and nationalistic forces of the century. Moving forward, "German ecumenism" would not only be a means of uniting a large segment of the population across classes and political ideology, it would also present a medium for "imagining German national unity and identity."[811]

There were also some hopes and overtures during this period for a unification of German Christians, for "supporters of the Erfurt Conference proposed a model of unification that acknowledged the political realities of a conservative and multicultural Austria and an increasingly powerful Prussia." The divide between Protestant and Catholic, so fervently assigned to the national divide of Austria and Prussia, would immediately spark outrage and highlight the internal "consequences of a political unification of a religiously divided nation."[812] As a result, during the conference on September 21, 1860, "only two Lutherans and eight Catholics (three priests and five laymen) were in attendance." Amongst the few attendees, there was a key emphasis that they "did not seek a reunion of the separated confessions on account of any sense of religious indifferentism, but instead from the conviction that the separation of the

[811] Stan.M. Landry, "That All May Be One? Church Unity and the German National Idea, 1866-1883", Church History 80:2 (June 2011): 282.
[812] Landry, Ecumenism, 59.

churches was a truly lamentable condition." This small group would seek to point out the larger idea present in society, that the "German people, whom they identified as essentially conservative and Christian" wished to work together. The power of the growing nationalism was obvious by reaching levels of this minor attempt "toward a rapprochement of German Catholics and Protestants for the cause of a single and undivided fatherland."[813] By 1866, however, any efforts in hope of a formal or wide-spread unification of the Christian faiths under a German nation were dashed with the Austro-Prussian War. With the obvious demographic association of Catholics with Austria and the largely Protestant Prussia, many viewed the results as a "confessional victory for Protestantism over Catholicism and redemption for Protestant Germany's terrible losses in the Thirty Years War."[814] This trend would continue as empowered by politics during the onset of the Franco-Prussian War. German Protestant sermons "took on a decisively anti-Catholic" tone and spoke specifically about "German Protestants as God's chosen people and the French (read: Catholics) as deserving of defeat and humiliation." The elevation of the nation within both the culture and faith of the German people was accelerated by this series of wars in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as "Protestant congregations celebrated the emperor's birthday and the anniversary of the Battle of Sedan (1870) as religious holidays."[815]. Religion as a component proved effective in sacralizing the nation's narrative, even as confessions remained divided.

[813] Landry, Ecumenism, 62.
[814] Landry, Ecumenism 283.
[815] Landry, Ecumenism 284.

Protestant Allegiance to the Prussian State

The connection between the Prussian State and the Protestant Church would not be an ambiguously or lightly stated one. Adolf Stoecker, Prussian court pastor (1835-1909), would remark following unification in 1871 that the "new German Empire" was a "distinctively Protestant empire and claimed to see the hand of God at work in 1517 and again in 1871."[816] If the drive of the nineteenth century, especially following the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848, was a series of acts towards a unified German State, then the question for the Christian denominations was what role would their Church play within this unified nation. The divisions between the two major denominations, whether inherently present or exacerbated by strategic political maneuvers, would be driven by a central assumption, or fear, that due to a Prussian hegemony "Protestantism defined what it was to be German."[817]

There was, of course, the issue of the areas of mixed religion, or those not marked by such extreme distinctions, as in "Alsace and Lorraine and in the lands of Prussian Poland" for example, where "conflicts between the confessions assumed added layers of complexity." In these places, religious affiliation overlapped with cultural and national questions about "who counted as German, who as Polish or French."[818] In areas in which "Protestant and Catholic Germans lived among Polish Catholics, Protestant Masures, Catholic Cassubans, and German Jews", there were cases in which "national and religious groups struck a balance; more often they existed in conflict."[819] Within these

[816] Landry, Ecumenism 284.
[817] Joel F. Harrington and Helmut Walser Smith, "Confessionalization, Community, and State Building in Germany, 1555-1870", The Journal of Modern History 69, (March 1997): 93.
[818] Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914, (Princeton University Press,) 1995, 169.
[819] Smith, "German Nationalism," 170.

disputed lands, both of the major Churches exhibited political aspirations to win the area for their own congregation, presumably adopting this aggressive or proactive posture as a defensive measure to prove one's loyalty to the nation. The German states, recognizing this valuable resource, would continue to utilize the pull of the Christian faiths to appeal to communities in question concerning their national allegiance. The ultimate question of whether a community identified as German, or with another nationality, would be yet another area in which the Christian denominations of Germany would be entangled and ultimately fall in line with the patriotic call. The Protestant League, for example, would work within the ethnic border areas and counted "among the largest nationalist groups in the east."[820] For their part, German Catholics were often just as motivated to fortify their position within the developing nation-state lines, or to prove their patriotic credentials. Though clergy would not boast their efforts, evening hiding "their Germanization efforts behind pro-Polish rhetoric and appeals to interethnic harmony", they worked to introduce German influence within their church services.[821] The acts in apparent allegiance to a German nationalism, rather than to the international connection of the Catholic Church, would later negatively affect the relationships between German and Polish Catholics.[822] These conflicts serve to highlight how religious identification continued to shape a German worldview by defining boundaries of identification.

[820] Smith, "German Nationalism," 178.
[821] Smith, "German Nationalism," 185.
[822] Smith, "German Nationalism," 191.

Catholic Renewal and Renewed Oppression in Prussia during the 1850s

Once again stemming back to the era of French occupation and the reverberations it caused, Napoleon "had decreed that there should be equal rights for minority sects in the Confederation of the Rhine, and the Left Bank of the Rhine, when it was joined to France." The period of 1814-1815 and the Treaty of Vienna would next guarantee the "equal rights for all Christian churches." This was not inherently an oppressive period then, as the "German princes themselves saw the Catholic church as a force for conservativism and stability." From this recognition of the Catholic church as a resource, the aristocracy did not seem to "contemplate its impoverishment, but instead, adopted the pattern of state support which had prevailed in Lutheran states since the Reformation."[823] These shifts reveal how political change reshaped the lived religious experience of the people, as altering the institutional standing would in turn alter the spiritual and community identification of its members.

During this time of restructuring, the Catholic Church as ultimately tied to the direction of Rome, Pius VII and "his agent Cardinal Consalvi" negotiated with Bavaria the Concordat of 1817, and similar treaties with other states by 1821. While the treatment and freedoms of the Church and the faithful may have been assured by laws of the states, it is important to note that in all of the "arrangements, dioceses were redrawn to coincide as closely as possible with the new state boundaries"[824] In conforming to the newly drawn states, the representation of the people would subsequently change, and thus in Prussia for example, any hopes Catholics held for "'parity'" within the state, meaning

[823] Evans, "The German Center Party", 3.
[824] Evans, "The German Center Party", 3.

"equal representation in the civil service, universities, and other public institutions, were never realized."[825]

Two decades later, there was some hope amongst the German Catholics that a renewed relationship with the Prussian Court was possible, as the death of Frederick William III in 1840 would see the accession of "the romantic medievalist Frederick William IV." Initially, there were clear signs for this optimism as under Frederick William IV "religious education in the schools was intensified for both denominations."[826] This conservative, yet romantic, renewal would of course be upended by the era of liberal revolutions, and an acute decline of the Prussian monarch's power. Following 1848, German society again entered a period of re-establishing traditional norms and a new course to secure the traditional conservative powers in the age of constitutional rights had begun. The newly defined freedoms and rights of religion had provided the Catholic Church in Germany a certain degree of empowerment to reengage, if not politically at this point, certainly culturally within the German states. The 1850s would also present a period of renewed consolidation of powers by the Prussian elite. The result of this consolidation of powers by the state resulted in a contentious period between the two traditional authorities: the Catholic Church and the Prussian State.

Was this contentious relationship between Church and state unavoidable? There are many that will point to the similar heritage of the two traditional authorities, presumably a shared ultra-conservative view of society and the traditional hierarchical order that could unite the Prussian Court and the Catholic Church within similar societal

[825] Evans, "The German Center Party", 4.
[826] Evans, "The German Center Party", 7.

goals. Obviously, both the Protestant and Catholic Church in Germany shared a base reverence for a hierarchical authority structure. Rather than solely relying on this connection as a basis for cooperation in politics during the tumultuous periods of the nineteenth century, it must be noted that "the Catholic Church was not so conservative or traditional, that the only government it could identify with or support was an absolutist state." In 1851, immediately following the revolutionary era, the *Deutsche Volkshalle, "*Prussia's leading Catholic newspaper", wrote concerning the role of the clergy and the Church in politics and state activities. Instead of declaring or "establishing the indivisibility of the Catholic Church and monarchical absolutism," the paper presented to its readers that the "Church was in fact compatible with all forms of government, from monarch to republic." The Catholic Church projected its ability to "embrace all basic models of political organization."[827] Before 1848, the Catholic Church's status in Prussia was tenuous as the societal change and trend of secularization removed the Church from "direct political power." Following 1815, the Church would have to navigate its place within the Prussian State under the control of a renewed Protestant aristocracy. Throughout this period, Catholics were "largely unrepresented in the all-important upper echelons of the state administration."[828]

It was in fact the liberal influence spreading amongst German society and the revolutionary period which can be credited with deteriorating the absolute power of the monarchical states, offering a reversal of fortunes to the fading Catholic political influence. With the trend of secularization persisting since the measures the French

[827] Simon Hyde, "Roman Catholicism and the Prussian State in the Early 1850s," Central European History 24, No. 2 (1991): 104, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900018884.
[828] Hyde, "Roman Catholicism," 104-105.

imposed on German society, the events of 1848 would add the Catholic Church "as a beneficiary." Both through the measures introduced in the ultimately failed constitution, and in the expectations of the Prussian State's revised constitution of January 1850, a new political order was established "that not only guaranteed the Church's freedom and independence but also provided a national parliament where Catholic material and spiritual interests could be defended."[829]

Despite rather low activity within the National Assembly itself, without any official alignment of Catholic members, there did exist an initial effort to form a Catholic representation to exert some degree of influence within the Constitutional debates. The "so-called Catholic Club in Frankfurt" was formed during the constitutional debates of the National Assembly when the members were discussing the role of church and state as expressed in "Article III of the Reich Constitution."[830] The period of liberal revolution, despite its ultimate outcome, did result in the first "articulation of Catholic interests within a national political forum." This period also acted to exemplify the ramifications of political engagement by representatives of the Catholic Church, and its members, as a collective force within parliamentary and constitutional politics.[831]

Catholic and Protestant Relations

Prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Catholics had hoped that within a re-Germanized control of the states, Austria's "coreligionists might receive lordship over

[829] Hyde, "Roman Catholicism," 105.
[830] Hyde, "Roman Catholicism," 106.
[831] Hyde, "Roman Catholicism," 108.

their lands." This was not to be the outcome, however, as in defensive measures against future "French aggression", the congress redesigned "the region as a geostrategic buffer." As a result of this defensive act, parts of "the Upper Rhineland went to the Grand Duchy of Hessen-Darmstadt and the Kingdom of Bavaria", while the "Lower Rhineland and Westphalia were awarded as western provincial aggrandizements to the powerhouse Kingdom of Prussia"[832] The addition of a transitioning German Catholic group that had once been socially stagnant within the control of the Prussian court would exacerbate the divide between confessions within the state. Protestant and Catholics would be placed in a continuous string of potential conflicts, as routine civic frictions included confessional debates concerning schooling, civic associations, and public spaces. A frequent example of these conflicts appeared in the "Rhenish-Westphalian 'contact zone'." Within such conflicts, the people would consult "their religious traditions to impute meanings to ideas and events." From this redesign of the Congress of Vienna, the Province of Westphalia included the previously existing Prussian territories including the "Principality of Minden, the county of Limburg in the Ruhr Valley, and much of the bishoprics of Munster and Paderborn." To the South and the West of this area, the new territories included "the Rhine Province or Rhineland", which encompassed the "ecclesiastical reach of the dioceses of Aachen, Cologne, and Trier."[833] The technical, and mechanical economic potential of this large area which boasted immense natural resources would be capitalized under the control of "Prussian Protestants" which would involve "controlling the Catholic population that would groan to deliver it."[834] As opposed to many areas of

[832] Zalar, Reading and, 97-98.
[833] Zalar, Reading and, 100-101.
[834] Zalar, Reading and, 103.

Prussia in the East, in Westphalia, and West Prussia in general, "the population almost equally divided between Catholics and Protestants." Despite this geographic confinement of the two Christian confessions, "they intermingled in the towns and villages of Wesphalia so slightly that fewer than 1,000 Catholic and Protestant pupils attended schools of another confession in 1861."[835]

Under Prussian control, the "Protestant press" freely, and with the support of authorities, challenged "Catholic legitimacy in full throat." Echoing a traditional attack or point of divergence between the two denominations of Christianity, the Protestant press inferred that as Catholicism "did not recognize the exclusive authority of the Bible, Catholicism was not grounded in Christian truth."[836] From these theological differences, the ultimate point of division and accusation between the two sides regularly concerned the German Catholics' allegiance to a foreign or international organization. An evident campaign of "protestanization" would appear within this series of attempts to "marginalize Catholics in public life upon convictions of their political unreliability." As a result of this evident policy, Catholics were blocked from leadership roles within government bureaucracies. As an example, and ramification of this process, from "1815 to 1900 in the overwhelmingly Catholic district of Trier, all but one of its chief administrators were Protestant."[837]

The pervasive attitude of the era and these regions was also influenced by a Catholic "'educational deficit' or *Bildungsdefizit."* By the year 1816, "85 percent of

[835] Marjorie Lamberti, State, Society and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany, (Oxford University Press, 1989,) 21.
[836] Zalar, Reading and, 106.
[837] Zalar, Reading and, 107.

Protestant children attended schools that were the envy of Germans everywhere." Once completing this schooling, graduates from the region's "prestigious *Burgerschule*" were expected and placed within careers in "the military, civil service, pastorate, and entrepreneurial sectors of the economy." For Catholic citizens, however, they were much more likely to struggle to "receive equal access to educational facilities." Even by 1825, "there was no state school in Xanten, located just forty miles up the Rhine River from the government educational consistory in Dusseldorf." The schools serving predominantly Catholic children "also received unequal staffing and material supply."[838] All of this would result in "fewer than half of the Catholic children" who were obligated to attend their education, actually attend class, and this would remain consistent "well into the 1830s." Eventually, due to government directives issued by 1844, "99 percent of children had received at least some education" and by "1846, anywhere from 73 to 95 percent of all children in Prussian lands, including Catholics, attended school regularly." The delayed agreement of Catholics to accept "compulsory schooling" can plausibly be "attributed to Protestant harassment, government neglect, inherent landed conditions, or labor abuse." Another possible, or simultaneous, explanation for this discrepancy is that there remained a cultural quality that "Catholics were hesitant toward learning." Whether this was a plausible factor or not, the assertion would become another common belief and attack by the Protestant elite and middle classes.[839] The traditional divide between the denominations of Christianity as far as their commitment within a developing German society would represent a point in which the Catholic Germans could continue from a traditional view of their universal community, or evolve with the influences of the time to

[838] Zalar, Reading and, 109.
[839] Zalar, Reading and, 111.

actively engage within the national German community. Here again we see the impact of religion in various aspects of society, though at times in divisive manners.

The Role of Literacy, Publishing and the Press

If 1848 and the revolutionary period was the entry point for unified Catholic political activity, the ramifications of this period certainly reignited a cultural surge amongst the Catholic population. Within the Catholic community this period reaffirmed the power of associations and introduced the important role of the press to the Catholic community. Whereas between 1815 and the early 1840s, Catholic centric publications struggled due to oppressive state measures, especially within Prussia and the East, thanks to the introduction of "press freedom in March 1848", there emerged a new era of success and engagement with print throughout the Catholic community. October of 1848 marked the publication of popular Catholic newspapers "the *Rheinische Volkshalle* in Cologne" to be joined by fellow publications "*Deutsche Volksblatt*" and "the *Mainzer* Journal."[840] Thus, print re-tooled the traditional Catholic community life for a new age of expanded influences, as new associations and newspapers pulled traditions into an expanded society.

Reading and the printed transmission of education and ideas within the German Catholic community would present a further avenue of intellectual dissemination during the nineteenth century. The Catholic Church would represent a traditional body existing within a period of cultural changes and intellectual influences. It is generally assumed

[840] Hyde, "Roman Catholicism," 107.

that the "Reformation greatly advanced literacy because Protestantism, much more than Catholicism, was the religion of the Word."[841] Certainly, the Reformation would steadily increase production of the Bible to individual readers, and a partnership of church and state education would coincide with an expansion of other books and publishing made available to a growing percentage of the masses leading to the nineteenth century. What is clear from this progression, thanks to multiple factors, was that by the nineteenth century "the primary mechanism for transmitting information in Germany was beginning to change from the spoken to the printed word."[842] Despite assumptions that might follow from conservative stereotypes, it becomes apparent that the population identifying as German Catholics were not isolated from the societal transforming forces of the reading revolution.

Traditionally within Catholicism, reading was as important and as available amongst the population as it was for the trendy taste-making bourgeois class or "*Geschmackselite*." Reading would be viewed as important and encouraged under the provision of traditional Catholic directions, as "reading was intended to occur within the structures of discipline" to develop and achieve the goals of "faith, knowledge and respectability." As Germany experienced a "Reading Revolution", the Church certainly identified reading as a resource but also recognized the potential threat of "cultural pluralism and religious disagreement", which could be transmitted through this new medium.[843]

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[841] Richard Gawthrop and Gerald Strauss, "Protestantism and Literacy in Early modern Germany," Past & Present, No. 104 (Aug. 1984): 31.
[842] Gawthrop and Strauss, "Protestantism and Literacy", 54.
[843] Jeffrey T. Zalar, Reading and Rebellion in Catholic Germany 1770-1914, (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 56.

Christianity was certainly "a factor in the spread of literacy in German lands." From a Catholic perspective, a major impetus in the spread of literacy was "mandatory mass education" as directed by the state during the nineteenth century. If there did exist a delayed reading revolution amongst the Catholic population, it is important to take into account a general hesitancy within Catholicism towards "lay literacy." There is also an equal consideration concerning the geographic and practical obstacles faced by many of the Catholic areas of the population. While avoiding generalizations, geographically it is important to note that many of the "people in question were the vast poor living hand-to-mouth on the land; peasant farmers and their families in villages and day laborers, domestic servants, and craftsmen in small towns." Prior to the revolutionary periods at the end of the eighteenth century, rural education was sought primarily "to prepare upright Christians for salvation and instruct them in the practical activities of household economy like beekeeping, husbandry, basic craftsmanship, and the care of trees."[844]

In 1794, the "The General Civil Code" of Prussia declared that schools "were under the supervision of the state authorities" but in reality it conceded "the church's historical ties to the school and entrusted school supervision to the superintendents of the church dioceses and the parish clergy."[845] Eventually, some degree of progress in access to reading, especially within specific local examples, was achieved as "Parish priests could be enthusiastic about reading if it unified faith behind confessional boundaries, and attitude consistent with pastoral priorities."[846] Throughout the nineteenth century, the public school system in Prussia was by law an instrument of the state, but it remained in

[844] Zalar, Reading and, 58.
[845] Lamberti, State, Society, 13-14.
[846] Zalar, Reading and, 60-61.

operation as “an institution of the church through the clergy’s virtual monopoly of school inspection offices and the precedence given to confessional religious instruction in the curriculum.”[847] In 1817, the Prussian Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs was established and within it two departments for the church and school affairs were merged and “housed in the Ministry of the Interior.” This implied that in Prussia there was little “separation between the functions of education and religious life.”[848]

Despite any delay of intentional expansion of education, “rural Catholics were broadly familiar with the printed word.” Reading would naturally lend itself to develop in work settings such as “labor at the spinner and even in the fields.” Amongst the working classes, reading would become a focus of “neighborhood gatherings after quitting time and convivial encounters at inns.” Rural locals would gather in these settings to read or listen to reports concerning current events, weather and of course, vital “harvest prognostications.” The Church’s own teachings also created internal obstacles, since official instruction focused primarily on promoting basic reading skills alongside strict confessional discipline designed to prevent believers from drifting toward other denominations. Despite this degree of control, geographic areas were not strictly segregated by confessional divides, and increasingly two “of the most common inducements for Catholics to learn to read were the acquisition of books from Protestant neighbors and simple curiosity.”[849] In each area, the local or “county level” provided the supervision of the school system to either “the Protestant Territorial church and the archdeacons of the Catholic church.” Under this religious guidance, some of the

[847] Lamberti, State, Society and, 13.
[848] Lamberti, State, Society and, 14.
[849] Zalar, Reading and, 61.

instruction and focus was "confined to the instruction of religion and the teacher's moral character"[850] By the 1840s, a ministerial decree "conceded that the clergy were 'behind the teachers in matters of pedagogy'", eventually forcing religious administrators overseeing schooling in their local areas to "demonstrate their skill to teach religions and to possess a knowledge of instructional methods for the other subjects in the school curriculum."[851]

Due to the inevitable blending of culture, especially the result of a vast expansion of education and easier access to print, Catholics gradually expanded their access to publishing and the new ideas conveyed in it. During the last decades of the eighteenth century, these new ideas concerned topics such as "gender, property, social location, and proximity to Protestants." By the start of the nineteenth century, "most Catholic peasants and even women in urban parishes in western German regions could read and write." Obviously, this assertion spans a large segment of a population spanning numerous independent states and a wide variety of conditions of class and geographic access. In general, proficient readers within this group were most likely to have "included clergy and seminarians, along with members of the bourgeoisie."[852] Within Catholic regions, however, "coeducational schools" did exist by the end of the eighteenth century at which "more than 40% of the pupils were girls." In more specific "Catholic girls' schools" established since the time of early modern Germany, "reading and writing formed an important part of the curriculum."[853]

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[850] Lamberti, State, Society and, 16.
[851] Lamberti, State, Society and, 16.
[852] Zalar, Reading and, 62-63.
[853] Andreas Rutz, "Elementary education and the practices of literacy in Catholic girls' schools in early modern Germany," Paedagogica Historica 48:2, (2012): 287-298.

Catholic reading culture, especially under the supervision of the Church would most likely have contained or provided access to "religious books only, such as devotionals, exegeses, moral theologies, confession manuals, church histories, and the Summae by Thomas Aquinas." In areas of population density such as towns and cities, increasing availability and popularity of books spawned attention to "roles in everyday *Hauskultur"* and related to the readers "expanding possibilities for self-definition through leisure." Even in areas of Catholic majority, such as the "heavily Catholic Rhineland", the publishing market expanded rapidly as displayed by the proliferation of "Bookbinders, bookstores, and book peddlers."[854]

Within this period of the early nineteenth century, it was political intrigue and the real-world local ramifications of current events such as the French Revolution that influenced a reading revolution of its own. The market and the desire for reading in this area is not without some explanation, as there was obviously "an intellectualist strain in Catholic ethics going back to Aquinas", but amongst the general masses the "everyday practice" of Catholicism was "voluntarist in basic orientation" referring to a choice by its faithful, and directed by ideas concerning basic "comprehension of good and evil."[855] The expansion of intellectual ideas and thirst for current events, or popular trends, would not drastically alter this group from their traditional orientations concerning the influences of the French revolution and any similar corresponding ideas in German lands. As a rule, Catholic peasants predominantly "hated the 'godless' revolution, but they read about it all the same."[856] The news of revolution and corresponding chaos would harken back to a

[854] Zalar, Reading and, 64.
[855] Zalar, Reading and, 65-66.
[856] Zalar, Reading and, 68.

wound within German culture, the Reformation, from the Catholic perspective and pointed to the dangers associated within an expansion of literacy.[857] Despite this negative connotation, the collective community and heritage of Catholic Germans would also lead to the progression of literacy and the advancement of publishing as "Catholic book culture stood upon a robust theology of organic community."

Far from a simple directive of Church leadership banishing publishing and literacy within congregations, there was in fact broad support for such mediums when they were recognized to "arrange clerical and lay readers in a single interpretive community that thought with the 'mind of the Church'"[858] The expansion of active and engaged members was increasingly attractive to clergy following the establishment of secular trends at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Whereas Protestants seemingly positioned themselves with the state to assure their status in German society, the Catholic community would appear to look inwards to their own community for renewal and the act of "reading figured as an advantageous method." This attraction of a populace and eventually political engagement is where the divergence between the two confessions, Catholic and Protestant, widened. Whereas the Protestant population of the day in general supported a "Protestant personal liberty, rational intellectual endeavor, and literary imperatives of *Geschmack*," this very "bourgeois" interpretation would view Catholic communal aims as "'tasteless'." Once again, the historical event of the Reformation, and the distinction between group based and individual focus acted as a wedge amongst Germans even as momentum towards a

[857] Zalar, Reading and, 71.
[858] Zalar, Reading and, 90.

unified nation-state intensified. The role of religion within a German worldview is predicated on the connection it provides within German society. The initial decades of the nineteenth century would represent a period when Catholic Germans would increasingly become aware of, and entangled in, the "cultural, intellectual, and political significance" of the era. The political significance especially would threaten the existence of these elements and the Catholic Church's place in society.[859]

Kulturkampf: National Identification Politics

As noted earlier, the history of religion within the German the state, specifically Christianity and more specifically Catholicism, holds a number of wedge issues, but none more impactful and with long reaching ramifications than the *Kulturkampf*. Here we again see the important role of religion in the shaping of what became a German worldview emerging in this time period. The *Kulturkampf* revealed that religious identity remained a powerful component of a German worldview, shaping political loyalty and conceptions of legitimate authority. Following the previously examined event of unification, Bismarck's next major political maneuver would seek to curtail or eliminate another large, united group representing potential opposition to the Kaiser and the traditional Prussian court. The events to follow are of extreme importance in this time of the German Empire and would represent direct consequences in the social and political sphere of Germany through the multiple iterations of the German nation-state to follow.

[859] Zalar, Reading and, 94-95.

With the liberals effectively co-opted, Bismarck was close to achieving his goal of supreme control of the new government for the traditional Prussian aristocracy. In 1870, the Centre Party, or "Catholic Party" as Bismarck referred to it specifically in his memoirs, was officially formed. Under the leadership of Ludwig Windthorst, the previous Minister of Justice for the former Kingdom of Hanover, the party assumed a defensive mentality. The primary goal of the party was "The safeguarding of Catholic rights, particularly in the areas of education and public financial support for Church institutions."[860] What is very important to note with the Center Party is that the Church hierarchy did not control the Center Party. Windthorst recognized that this was a political voice for the faith, and should remain a lay organization, not to be confused with the theological concerns. For the Catholic Church specifically, Bismarck's victory and a perceived victory for liberalism would mean the introduction of modern middle class thinking, such as the separation of church and state and secular education. Beginning during the Middle Ages, the Church attributed secular growth to the growth of humanism and later liberalism. It is ironic that because Bismarck had utilized the support of the liberal middle class which the Catholic Church viewed as representing a secular agenda, the Catholic Church attempted to politically attack Bismarck on the grounds that he was also a liberal. Both Bismarck and the traditional Catholics held a reverence to the traditional forms of social order, but Bismarck was viewed by the Church as furthering the liberal agenda in order to secure power for his Prussian power base. German Catholics recognized most liberals as Protestants or non-Catholics who represented secular sentiments as a political force and one to be prevented from gaining control of the

[860] Dietrich Orlow. A History of Modern Germany, 1871 to Present. (Prentice-Hall, INC. 1987),42.

new German federation.[861] During the 1860s, Bismarck tried numerous times to negotiate with Rome to withdraw Catholics from German politics, or at least scale back their activity within the Centre party.

So, the question is "Why was Bismarck so anti-Catholic?" In a letter to Prince Friedrich Wilhelm in December 1882, Bismarck, in referring to the negotiations with the Holy See, revealed an historic basis for his mistrust, even hatred, towards Catholicism. Bismarck stated that anyone who expected that negotiations with the Holy See would bring an end to "a thousand-year-old-quarrel between the Kaiser and the Pope is fooling himself." He went on to say that there is no possibility of "a final and lasting understanding between the Protestant Kaiserdom and the Roman Curia."[862] The first, most basic answer to the question concerning Bismarck's animosity is that the Catholic Centre Party had been excluded from the power base of the "Bismarck Compromise" and he continued to view this large Catholic base as a threat to his political gains. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Bismarck as a loyal Prussian, stated his kingdom to be a "Protestant Kaiserdom" and resented the influence of Catholicism in his State. Bismarck recognized the important role played by religion in the developing German worldview of the period, and the role of the state in it, but his desire was that it be the Protestant religion that would exert most influence.

As a traditionally unified group with potential allegiances reaching outside the attraction or coercion of the nationalism which Bismarck had vigilantly appropriated,

[861] Orlow, A History of, 292.
[862] Gerhard Ritter and Rudolf Stadelmann eds. "Bismarck's Report to Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, December 19, 1882", in Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke 6c. (Berlin: 1924-1935): 266ff.

Catholicism ultimately represented a foreign power. Through the coincidence of the promulgation of papal infallibility, at the first Vatican Council in 1870, and the formation of the Center Party within a year of German unification, Bismarck was convinced that the Pope was attempting to subvert the political power he had established.[863] Although German Catholics had welcomed unification "no less enthusiastically than other Germans", Bismarck accused the Catholics within the Reich of undermining German unity by maintaining loyalty to an external authority.[864] He enacted *Kulturkampf* legislation, a series of acts intended to secularize German society and institutions, in efforts to leave the Catholic Church politically powerless. If Bismarck realized his plan of unification by staking claim to German nationalism, then the nationalist movement ostracized the Catholic Church.

The *Kulturkampf* was at its simplest a power struggle between Bismarck and the German Catholic Church. Bismarck would then set out to severely limit, if not remove, the Catholic Church's influence from Germany, for as he would later state in his memoirs, "In any *modus vivendi* Rome will regard a Protestant dynasty and Church as an irregularity and a disease which it is the duty of the Church to cure."[865] From 1871 to 1878, a series of laws were enacted that would become known as the "May Laws." They stipulated the appointment of lay inspectors for public schools, provided for compulsory civil marriages, and instituted state supervision of seminaries and monastic orders. These laws effectively provided control of Church governance by the State which then proceeded to systematically secularize all levels of the German Empire. Pope Pius IX

[863] Orlow, A History of, 47.
[864] Orlow, A History of, 48.
[865] Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck: The Memoirs, Vol. II. Trans. A.J. Butler, (Howard Fertig, 1966) 149.

responded to this legislation in May of 1875 by declaring "the entire package of *Kulturkampf* laws invalid and morally not binding on Catholics."[866] The pope went even further in another instance suggesting a stone might come crashing down on the head of Bismarck, who he referred to as a "colossus."[867] Bismarck took great personal offence at this remark, and with it the cultural war had also become a personal war between the aging Pope and Bismarck. Bismarck viewed his remarks as a failure to recognize the authority of the state, and in response, German bishops and priests were either arrested or exiled, leaving many Catholic congregations leaderless.

The Catholic Church in Germany was viewed as loyal to a foreign body before loyalty to the German State and its people. A side effect of this perceived religious discrimination, however, was the forging of a much closer alliance between the Catholic population and its clergy and political representative body. Again, this points to the important role of religion, and in this particular case that of German Catholicism, the worldview component reveals its resilience as the act of persecution intended to reduce or remove Catholic identity had the opposite effect of strengthening the communal identity of German Catholics, and beyond.

The Centre Party: Confessional Politics Within the Nation-State

This section returns to the Centre Party to explore how religion remained a powerful organizing force in nineteenth-century politics of the German State. Religious commitments here would be translated into political language allowing for the shaping of

[866] Orlow, A History of, 48.
[867] Owen Chadwick. A History of the Popes, 1830-1914. (Clarendon Press, 1998), 261.

future political loyalties, moral priorities, and conceptions of national belonging. Its emergence and development illustrate how religion continued to shape collective self-understanding and representation within the new nation-state, highlighting again its importance as a component of a German worldview. Since 1815, when Prussia was "awarded the German Catholic Rhineland and Westphalia", Prussian Catholics, both old and new, "chafed under the social and governmental predominance of the Protestant East Elbian aristocracy." This initial fear and a series of subsequent divisive issues resulted in numerous clashes between Church and State.[868] Following the years of upheaval leading to dalliances with revolution across many German states, and the surprising victories of Catholics during the experiment of the Frankfurt Parliament, Prussian Catholics in 1850 were relieved concerning their protections in the resulting constitution. Most important to them was the newly won religious rights and liberties. The expansion of these rights represented a new level of prescribed enfranchisement for the traditional groups of faith. Like the Protestants earlier, Catholics would more and more enter the political realm both in support of, and empowered by, these rights and freedoms. In the newly established Landtag, "some Catholics again formed a moderate Catholic caucus to support the constitutional provisions and to defend Catholic regional interests." By 1858, efforts toward a stabilization between Catholics and Protestants resulted in a formalization of the politicized Catholic agenda as "the caucus renamed itself 'Center (Catholic Caucus)." This era of political calm, however, would end in the 1860s when King Wilhelm I instituted "army reforms despite the refusal of the Landtag's liberal majority to

[868] Noel D. Cary, The Path to Christian Democracy, "German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer", (Harvard University Press, 1996), 13.

appropriate the funds."[869] This test of parliamentary power versus the power of the monarch revealed the true design of the constitution and the inherent ability of the Prussian aristocracy to retain power through gray areas such as military command in which "the legislature's budgetary rights demonstrated a 'gap in the constitutional'" design. It was a glimpse of actions to come that at this point for "the King's chief minister, Otto von Bismarck, asserted that the authority that had granted the constitution (the monarchy) also had the authority to fill the gap." During this extended period of power struggle between the monarch and the legislature, whether the result of apathy or reconsideration of priorities, a "shrunken and apparently anachronistic Center caucus disbanded."[870] This would not be the last time that the political aspirations and strategy of Bismarck, who himself was influential in shaping elements of a German worldview, would negatively target the Catholic position, effectively attempting to minimize their influence within the same worldview.

In 1870 tensions between the precursor to German unification, the North German Confederation, appeared on the brink of war with France. In this climate the "antimilitarist stand of both the southern Catholic parties and the Catholic leadership in Prussia" did not help to dissuade traditional allegations attacking German Catholics' loyalty.[871] In the years leading up to the period of unification, beginning in 1866, "Catholic populists and particularist (patriotic states' rights) parties sprang up with unexpected strength throughout southern Germany." It became obvious that a passive defense against Prussian political aggression was foolhardy and by 1870 "thoughtful

[869]Cary, The Path to, 14.
[870] Cary, The Path to, 15.
[871] Evans, The German Center Party, 31.

Catholics were readying themselves to protect their minority rights in the coming national state." It was in October of that year that "Hermann von Mallinckrodt and other leading Westphalian Catholics met in Soest and wrote a platform for a political party."[872] The Soest Program would act as the party's founding document "signed by fifty candidates and their supporters, of whom eighteen were clergy and eight were noblemen." It's nine points began by declaring a priority to be the "Maintenance of the constitutionally recognized independence and rights of the church." A second point closely followed by calling for a "Practical furthering of equality among the recognized religious confessions." The third point sought to elevate the right of the Church concerning marriage, as the group stated it would "protest against any attempts to dechristianize marriage." Next, the platform stipulated another traditional element of religion within German society, specifying the continued "Maintenance and support of denominational schools." Following these social areas of concern, the fifth point, seemingly to promote the group and the faith's nationalistic devotion, called for "A federal state [B*undesstaat*] for the entire German fatherland which provides unity in essentials but which in all other matters leaves untouched the independence and free self-determinations, as well as the constitutional rights, of the federal states."[873] By the end of 1870, "the Prussian Center caucus was reconstituted in the Landtag." Within months unifications had been achieved and when a true German Reichstag formed "southerners formed a Center-caucus with the northerners."[874] This platform illustrates how religious elements such as sacred duty, tradition and moral authority were adapted to principles within the new national era. In an

[872] Cary, The Path to, 16.
[873] Evans, The German Center Party, 32.
[874] Cary, The Path to, 16.

era of constitutionalism and confessional freedoms, Catholic interests would be recoded into civic language, a key recognition for the importance and influence of religion, in this case Catholicism, in what unfolded as a German worldview.

From this starting point, there would be some deviation from the devotional priorities of the political party, as exhibited in the issue of naming the new party. The traditional assumptions of a staunch conservativism or inherent patronage to the traditional aristocratic authority did not protect Catholic Churches or its parishioners from anti-Catholic sentiment by the State. Further, the results of 1848 and the expansion of liberal rights and the benefits to the Church mandated that the position of the Catholic political arm had to be practical and maneuverable, for if "the party was to be Catholic, it could not be exclusively conservative, and if it was to be 'Christian' and concerned with a variety of social and political issues it could not be exclusively Catholic." A lingering and resilient, if not "noncommittal name of *Zentrum*, the Center, was consequently chosen again for the Prussian fraction, and in 1871 applied to the new Reichstag fraction." More explanation to this open or neutral name denotes the politically flexible position, as a "few Protestants, less than a dozen initially joined the new party."[875]

The Party Program of the Catholic Center Party's Reichstag Caucus, as formulated in March 1871, did not brandish a denominational position or even confessional programs. The document focused instead on religious liberties as achieved through a strong constitution.[876] The first point of the program, stipulates a position

[875] Evans, The German Center Party, 33.
[876] "Program of the Catholic Center Party's Reichstag Caucus (late March 1871)", published in: German History in Documents and Images, accessed March 11, 2024, https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/forging-an-empire-bismarckian-germany-1866-1890/ghdi:document-683.

committed to the structure of the federative state which "shall be preserved" to avoid infringing upon the "autonomous activities of the individual states." The proceeding second point next concerns the "moral and material welfare of all levels of society" which was to "be promoted as much as possible", specifically pointing to the "civic and religious freedom of all citizens of the German Reich, and particularly for the protection of religious communities."[877] These were to be part of a German worldview, and the Centre Party, grounded in Catholicism, sought to make it so.

Bismarck viewed as unacceptable for Prussia and the unified German State that a vast percentage of the German population followed the political leadership of their priest before that of the Kaiser. Priests after all were thought to be ultimately loyal to a foreign, absolute monarch. Bismarck's ultimate goal for the *Kulturkampf*, though he conceded it not entirely possible, was to remove Catholic influence from Germany. In his own words referring to Catholicism in Germany, he explained "This is a disease that only time, and, above all, education can heal, though perhaps never completely."[878] Bismarck had won the backing of a nation behind a forged idea of nationalism, one that secretly consolidated power for the aristocracy by co-opting the idea of nation from the liberal movement and also from Christianity. The German empire self-defined itself as the national state of the German people and the other groups such as Catholicism as a further sub-group were banished to the exterior.[879] The German people who overwhelmingly adopted this myth and embraced the concept of nation, was elevated in the minds of the citizens to a status higher than other individual concerns. In fact, it was the lack of consensus about the

[877] "Program of the Catholic Center Party's," 1.
[878] Ritter and Stadelmann, "Bismarck's Report," 266ff.
[879] Otto Pflanze, "Bismarck and German Nationalism", The American Historical Review 60, No.3, (Apr.1955): 491.

borders of the German nation-state, which necessitated that a strong distinction be drawn between those within and to those considered out of the nation designated by the label of "national disloyalty."[880]

In 1871, the Center Party obtained fifty-one seats in the Reichstag elections; by 1874 that number had risen to ninety-one seats.[881] The death of Pope Pius IX in 1878 marked a turning point in the culture struggle, for both his successor Pope Leo XIII and Bismarck had viewed the emergence of Marxist groups in Europe as a much greater threat. On a more personal level, however, it seems that in his mind, Bismarck would not relent his attack as long as Pius IX was alive. When notified of the Pope's death, Bismarck ordered a special bottle of wine to toast the occasion.[882] In reality, the government's persecution of the Catholic Church did not result in the positive gains they had hoped; instead, it had united the Catholic community more firmly together under their Bishops and their Pope.[883] Negotiations to end the persecutory legislation resulted between representatives of the German and Prussian governments and the papacy. They concluded in 1879, and with the exception of the ban on Jesuits and the law on civil authorization of marriage, the government agreed to rescind or no longer enforce all of the anti-clerical legislation.

For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the Catholic Church's policy within Germany drastically favored the traditional or "absolutist" regime rather than the newer left-wing populist governments. Liberalism was

[880] Pflanze, "Bismarck and," 488, https://doi.org/10.2307/1845577.
[881] Orlow, A History of, 49.
[882] Chadwick, A History of, 265.
[883] Chadwick, A History of, 265.

perceived to be based on individualism and anti-clericalism, positions which the Church had also associated with the *Kulturkampf* of the 1870's.[884] The Center Party became an essential member of the right-wing coalition, presumably making its Catholic members too vital to the stability of the aristocracy to complete the ultimate goals of the *Kulturkampf*. The members of the Center Party could not align themselves with the left-wing parties, and in part advance the further democratization of the German State. The Center Party, along with the German bishops, were positive that the Catholic Church would suffer if the semi-absolute monarchy ever became a democratic state like that in France or Britain for they regarded modernization as a de-Christianizing force.[885] From the elections of the 1890s, when it became clear that neither of the two "national" parties, the Conservatives and the National Liberals, could form a majority government without the Center Party's cooperation, the Center provided an important stabilizing power within German politics. The development of a German worldview of this time was coming into play through the maneuverings of the cultural and political levels and would be influenced in part by Catholicism and its concerns. Catholic reforms preserved a universalist moral and political framework that continued to inform the religion component of the larger German worldview which was developing well into the nineteenth century. It reveals again the role religion, both Catholicism and Protestantism, played in the development of a German worldview.

[884] Sister Ethel Mary Tinnemann. "Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy Toward the Nazi Regime: A Study in German Psycho-Political Culture." The Western Political Quarterly 22 No. 3, (Jun. 1969): 333.
[885] John K. Zeender. "The German Center Party during World War I. An Internal Study." The Catholic Historical Review 42, No. 4 (Jan, 1957): 442.

Conclusion

Within the worldview framework used in this thesis, the religious component refers to the beliefs, institutions, and interpretive categories through which Germans understood moral order, community identity, and legitimate authority. It encompasses both doctrinal traditions and the lived religious practices that structured everyday life. To what degree did the religion of the German people shape and influence a German worldview? The intellectual heritage and teachings of Christianity, first in the form of the Catholic Church and then the various denominations of Protestantism, certainly influenced German society, culture and intellectualism throughout their development. The religious and spirituality component encompasses, among other things, ultimate or existential questions such as the meaning of life, the moral justifications of right and wrong, or belief in a higher power. German Christianity denoted a cultural belief and a shared connection among a large majority of the German people. This large portion of the German people identified and acted within a system of religious beliefs and observances and their connection to the spiritual. The central teachings of Christianity represent an identifiable source of intellectual influences and one perpetuated by the religious institutions and its members. Along with language, religion was a primary connection of the German people. Their religious faith and the systems provided by their institutional expressions introduced central beliefs, a hierarchical structure, and material elements which offered the people a relationship with the sacred, religious or spiritual order. These include sacred places such as churches, images, relics, local saints, and perhaps most importantly a system of ceremonies and calendar dates by which a life cycle was designed based on the religion. They formed a central connection identified and shared

by the German people and stand as a component of a German Worldview. Nineteenth century German religion organized belonging, formed moral expectations, and translated these into political behaviors for large segments of the German polity. The role of religion in society and the lives of the German people reveal the importance of religion in the unfolding of a German Worldview.

What do the events of the nineteenth century tell us about the impact of the religious and spiritual component in the development of a German Worldview? In the politically unstable period of the nineteenth century, traditional authorities such as state princes and kings utilized religion to advance a message of traditional stability and usher in acceptable societal change from above, rather than from below. Equally, the members of these Christian denominations represented and were guided by the teachings, beliefs, and social structures of their faiths.

These religious groups did not exist in a societal vacuum, however, as German Catholics and members of the Protestant denominations were just as affected by the other dominant influences and events occurring within the German states. Citizens from these groups did not live separate from the influences and events of an evolving German society during the course of the nineteenth century. As the formation and achievement of a united nation-state was repeatedly demonstrated to be a priority of the German people, the religious elements of society merged with these new influences, and both Protestants and Catholics, through different paths, entered the functions and processes of state-building. Through the events of the period the assurance and the protection of religious freedoms would equally increase these communities' vibrancy and roles within the design of the new nation-state and the worldview it defined. The events of the nineteenth

century required the traditional religious institutions of the German people to either alter their conception of their place in German society or to act to secure their role within it. Through these actions, new introductions of state design and law would protect large portions of the population, including their beliefs as represented through sacraments, liturgy, important life-cycle events throughout the years and life marking events and ceremonies. Furthermore, the intellectual heritage of these denominations would influence their reaction to this societal and cultural change and through such actions their role within the state and an ever-developing worldview.

What this review of religion through the lens of a worldview framework ultimately illustrates is the continued elevation of the unified nation-state, and a specific form of nationalism, within a German worldview. The inherent insecurity of the Catholic Church within German society was displayed throughout the initial period of German unification, but most especially during the *Kulturkampf* period. When targeted as a specific group existing both within and without German society and forced to choose allegiances whether to the state or an international body, the Catholic Church seemingly rededicated itself to activity within a larger German community. While the same course of action is true for the Protestant denominations, this national view of German society was a consistent loyalist attitude since the time of the Reformation and one which strengthen the position of the Evangelical Church.

The nineteenth century evolution of German religious life demonstrates that the spiritual and religious nature of the German people as a component of a German worldview did not merely survive the pressures of modernity and nationalism, it continued to influence the moral, political and communal formation of the German

nation-state. The heritage, referring to the intellectual teachings, education and ultimately the beliefs of its members, were participatory elements during the nineteenth century and influenced the development of German society. These denominations would continually serve as factors of both identification and of division for large groups within German states and German society as a whole. The institutions further provided a guiding intellectual base, traditional heritage, and educational instruction for the people during this climactic time. These religious bodies would in turn became more active based both on these influences and societal influences of nationalism. A German worldview that emerged, impacted the members of these religious denominations in Germany. Religion in turn, serves to demonstrate its influence within the development of the German nation-state and the development of a German worldview. It equally demonstrates the power of the other components comprising a German worldview, for despite the entrenched history and power of these denominations' heritage, the component of religion continued to change and evolve in the nineteenth century.

The intellectual heritage of Augustine and Aquinas, the confessional divisions of the Reformation, and the political upheavals of the nineteenth century collectively shaped the religious component of a German worldview. These elements provided Germans with shared assumptions about justice, authority, and community, even as confessional differences produced divergent interpretations. Religion therefore remained a central lens through which Germans understood themselves and their emerging nation-state.

Chapter 6:

Conclusion of Worldview Analysis

How did elements of a German worldview in the 19th century influence the development of the German State? Modern national analyses often omit the underlying history, philosophy, and intellectual influences of a specific culture, in this case, of the German state and people. Examining an underlying German worldview can enhance our understanding of the German State. A worldview acts as a heuristic lens or framing device, offering a wider focus of analysis by identifying influences spanning multiple fields of research. From this perspective, one can better understand to what degree elements of a worldview may have been instrumental and therefore engrained within the foundations of the state.

This thesis is structured around four interrelated components, designed to reflect the multifaceted nature of a German worldview. Each chapter isolated a distinct yet interconnected element: intellectualism, ontology, mythos, and religion and spirituality. The components represent the influential forces shaping German identity during the unification period. Their thematic interplay revealed how philosophical thought informed political structures, how cultural narratives fostered collective identity, and how religious and spiritual traditions anchored societal cohesion. By examining these components in tandem, the thesis demonstrated how a worldview became foundational to the German nation-state.

This thesis identified and described a German worldview on a national level to offer perspective on the events that occurred in Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Utilizing the lens of worldview helped to identify and comprehend

how the historical events and intellectual forces impacted the development of the German State. This valuable perspective adds greater context and understanding of the past and current events concerning the German nation and its people.

The worldview framework developed by this thesis consists of the four components comprising this German worldview. The components identified are 1) German Intellectualism: German Idealism and Liberalism, 2) a Particular Ontology: a particular German concept or notion of the human as expressed through a societal vision, 3) the German Mythos of the *Volk* as self-identification: the concept of the *Volk*, and 4) Religion and Spirituality: traditional Christianity. This chapter summarizes the four components of a German worldview and highlights how each contributed to the formation of the German nation-state. Through worldview analysis, the power and influence of these components on the development of the German State is better understood and recognized. By drawing together the intellectual, ontological, mythic, and religious elements examined in earlier chapters, this concluding chapter will show how these components collectively shaped German political and national identity.

The major contribution of this thesis is its interdisciplinary approach to identifying a German worldview that shaped the formation of the nation-state. By drawing from history, philosophy, political science, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, this study offered a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the intellectual, cultural, and religious forces that shaped German national identity. It introduced the concept of a German worldview, understood as a dominant worldview of the period, historically situated and contextually dynamic, which provides a wider gaze, or framework, for interpreting Germany's development than traditional political or

economic analyses alone. The thesis highlighted how German Idealism, Romanticism, Liberalism, the cultural mythos of the Volk, and traditional religion contributed to a collective identity that culminated in the unification of Germany in 1871. These intellectual movements did not merely accompany political change; they actively shaped the ideological foundations of the German State. Taken together, the four worldview components operated less as separate streams than as mutually reinforcing forces. German intellectualism supplied the conceptual grammar of freedom and ethical life; the ontological component translated that grammar into a societal vision of freedom-through-law; the mythos furnished the affective and narrative cohesion that made unity imaginable; and Christianity offered an enduring moral horizon and institutional infrastructure through which collective life was disciplined, contested, and stabilized. The formation of the German nation-state can therefore be read as the historical moment in which these worldview elements became sufficiently aligned to be institutionalized, and thereby cementing the development of a German worldview within the structure of the unified German State.

The worldview lens developed in this thesis not only contextualized the events of the 18th and 19th centuries but also clarified aspects of contemporary German political behaviour. As the strongest economy in Europe today, Germany has been thrust into a position of leadership within the European Union. As a result, the policies within Germany and those advocated for other EU nations are analyzed and scrutinized by nations and analysts of the world spanning opposing sides of the political spectrum, liberal and conservative. These conventional analyses, however, often overlook Germany's historical and philosophical foundations which inform the worldview

explored in this thesis. Through the interpretive frame developed by this thesis, the German State often appears to prioritize philosophical coherence, cultural continuity, and spiritual identity alongside, and at times above, economic pragmatism or individual prosperity. A worldview lens allows for a more nuanced interpretation of Germany's policy decisions in the modern era. While this thesis focuses on the events leading to the 19th century unification of Germany, a worldview framework offers a foundation for future research into national identity formation. In contexts where intellectual, cultural, and philosophical traditions converge to shape political development, a worldview lens may illuminate patterns that conventional political and economic analyses overlook and thus prove valuable for comparative analysis and broader historical inquiry.

Worldview Framework

German Intellectualism - German Idealism and German Liberalism

During a period spanning the 1760s to the 1840s, German Idealism reached a level of productivity and appeal that can be broadly understood simply as German philosophy. This breadth of exposure expounds the power of this philosophical, academic and eventually cultural force. This philosophical expression of theories and ideas represented a connection point of polity for the German people. This academic teaching and philosophical movement came to unite a people by offering a shared agreement as to the goal for a united society and influenced the proceeding practical expressions within a developing nation-state. German Idealism as a period of philosophical expression corresponded with the expansion of an educated middle class and the increased access to mass publishing. This period viewed as classical German philosophy is characterized by

a blending of distinctions between classical philosophy and the new emerging expressions indicative of romanticism. The initial transcendental form of idealism found in Kant would evolve amongst his successors to represent an absolute idealism. This theoretical base would inspire artists such as poets, writers and composers who interpreted and spread these systems of thought throughout a German culture.

Kant's political philosophy illustrates the interconnected nature of both political structures and moral obligations. Kant was a connection point and inspiration to many German Romantic artists who recognized the theory and impact of the Enlightenment and early German Idealism. Whereas in other cultures, Romanticism typically represented a rejection of Enlightenment philosophy, the distinct German form amplified and in turn influenced the theories of German philosophy.

Hegel argued that the political sphere and ethical sphere must be joined together. Within the developing German polity, Hegel's conception of freedom represents a progression of this intellectual period recognizable through societal trends and events leading up to 1848. His ethics and the ideal of a free society both converge within the state as the practical realization of human freedom. Hegel argued that the strength of the state is inherently tied to the actions of its individuals, or citizens.

The theoretical visions of an ideal society would be influenced by cultural sources and political events affecting the society. Revolutionary political ideologies elevating the concept of the individual propelled the liberal movement, but the chaos of the French Revolution also resulted in societal collapse at the expense of the citizens' safety and well-being. The combination of intellectual influences and the real-world events would cause the theories of liberalism to be practically applied in German states in a manner

that would question its validity as a form of true liberalism. Liberalism as presented throughout the various components of this German worldview, refers to the moral and political philosophy promoting concepts such as justice, fairness, and individual rights. For certain, there existed an impactful group of German citizens who would identify as liberals and espouse the rights of the individual, the free economy and representative politics. Liberalism which developed in most West European states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century argued for emancipation and the political state as of higher importance than the ethnic nation. German liberalism supported many of the same liberal policies, but certainly blended it with a growing form of nationalism. The way German liberals pursued their goals, and the political calculations they made to achieve them, reflects the influence of German idealism and its emphasis on justice, fairness, and individual rights.

The influence of German Idealism and the impact of its individual philosophers can be seen in the works of the various artists of German romanticism as well in the universities and mass publishing. The blending of philosophical thought with artistic and popular expressions helped transmit the intellectual to the masses and resulted in practical applications through political activity. The impact of this theoretical influence can be seen in the political developments amongst the individual German states, leading to the climactic period of 1848 and 1849. The German states, like many leading European nations, experienced the upheavals of revolution. Yet this revolution remained limited and perhaps unfulfilled, as concerns over preserving German unity outweighed the revolution's demands.

The defining moment of the defeat of the revolutionary demands, as viewed for decades to come, was the events concerning the National Assembly in 1848 and 1849. As this thesis has indicated, a major shift in historical study occurred when the prevailing view was reevaluated and new scholarship argued that liberalism did not fail to achieve practical gains within the emerging German nation-state. The earlier view held by critics, and later by historians and theorists, stemmed from their inability to recognize in the actions of German liberals the same traditional goals and principles exhibited in contemporary European nations. To the important issue concerning the rights of the individual, John Lachs believes that the philosophers of German Idealism, such as Fichte and Hegel and even Kant, signified the diminished role of individuals within their theories. Lachs argues that in Hegel's system individuals had no standing to make demands of the state. This worldview component and the consideration of German Idealism as part of a German worldview has highlighted a reciprocal understanding in the practical interpretation of German philosophy during this period.

The core liberal tenet of individual freedoms was ultimately presented as the universal right of autonomy, a right that could only be protected and assured within a secure republican state. Due to the specific cultural and intellectual elements espoused by German Idealism and the connective force of German nationalism, questions linger whether German liberalism truly represented liberalism as compared to traditionally recognized examples. The gains of liberalism in Germany were similar to those exhibited in other contemporary nations, but the events leading to these achievements were specific to the cultural, philosophical and political realities of that society. A narrower definition of liberalism precludes the possibility that a liberal movement could be influenced by

historic, regional, and philosophical issues specific to a cultural or ethnocentric group. Refuting the theory of a *Sonderweg* or special path, specifically based on the assumed failure of liberalism in Germany's development, does not preclude a new focus presented by this thesis which points to the unique form of liberalism established within Germany. Perhaps therefore, instead of negating a special path of the German people, it is true that every nation has its own path, based on particular philosophical ideas expressed by its people and their resulting actions.

German intellectualism provided the conceptual vocabulary through which nineteenth-century Germans understood freedom and articulated their political aims. Kant's emphasis on autonomy and Hegel's account of freedom realized in ethical life shaped the liberal imagination of the period. The revolutionary era revealed both the possibilities and limits of this project, as liberal aspirations were pursued within a framework deeply influenced by nationalism. This component, therefore, concludes that German liberalism was not a failed imitation of Western models, but a culturally specific form shaped by German Idealism and the emerging narrative of German unity.

A Particular Ontology – Societal Vision

What did the development of a German nation-state during the nineteenth century reveal about the intellectual beliefs of the German people concerning the nature of what it is to be human? The philosophical contemplation concerning the design of a society is what would drive the German people during this period. The development of German philosophy represented a clear focus on freedom and autonomy as essential for the human being. This progression also incorporated inquiry as to the practical structures in

the world to assure these principles. Freedom as related to the human being would then transition from the theoretical to practical applications. Practical expressions of philosophical theory serve to reflect a German worldview's ontological dimensions.

A German view of what it means to be human, as articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophical and political discourse, was revealed through the theoretical development and the practical expression of the *Rechtsstaat*. The *Rechtsstaat* theory and its practical application represented the evolution of the ontological component of a German worldview during the nineteenth century. The increasing recognition and development of this theory during the nineteenth century was revealed through state actors attempting to implement this theory as applied rules of law within multiple attempted iterations of a united German nation-state.

The progression from philosophical theory to the enumeration of certain rights reveals how ontological beliefs became identified and implemented through the establishment of a state and its laws. The growing support for a unified nation-state and the normalization of liberal positions during the first half of the nineteenth century recognized that the human being innately held a purpose and required the means to develop in the manner they decided. The nineteenth century offers multiple points of insight as to how the ontological beliefs and the valuations assigned to those beliefs were exhibited through the growing desire and systems conceptualized for a unified German nation-state. The German Confederation established in 1815 represented a significant step within the German states and an indirect step in the process towards a unified German nation-state. From this point forward, the new societal vision would represent the transition from the traditional form of absolutism to the growing trend of individualism

and the political ideology of liberalism. The ontological principles espoused would combine with the force of nationalism to propel a society towards an ideal. In 1848, the National Assembly held in Frankfurt signified the first elected parliament by a free vote of the German people. The Frankfurt Parliament and its constitution represented the first time fundamental individual rights were established for an expanded majority of the German people. The steps leading to the dissolution of this National Assembly were certainly the result of a lack of centralized power and internal political debates of its members, but the ideas and ultimately codified laws introduced to a society would be expected in any future iteration of a German unified body. The presentation of legal freedoms and rights in a legal document represent the practical application of the ontological identification of human freedom. The period leading to the 1848 revolutions, the short-lived era of the Frankfurt Parliament and the apparent conservative revival of power after all serve to mark the progression of a conception of human rights and agency amongst a people striving to live together in pursuit of that ideal.

Following the 1848/49 period, the work of liberal idealists, conservative revivalists, and German philosophers reflected a growing notion of the German concept of the human, human rights and the human ideal. The concept of the *Rechtsstaat* was advanced in German society through both philosophical theory and practical applications in service of numerous political aspirations. There remained the conviction that the freely developing human being must be intimately connected to an ideal state. The state had both an expectation and a role in assuring the ability of the human to achieve this right through the promotion of freedom and the necessary social conditions to realize this freedom. The power and means to provide these conditions for the human being would be

both recognized and consented within the power of the state, and yet this power would be limited through service to this end. This represents both the philosophical and ontological conception of the human being as part of a German worldview, and its practical application in German society.

The ontological component of a German worldview centered on the conviction that human freedom is realized through lawful order. The *Rechtsstaat* emerged as the institutional expression of this belief, linking philosophical commitments to practical governance. From the German Confederation to the Frankfurt Parliament, successive political experiments reflected the assumption that the state must secure the conditions for individual development while binding itself to legal limits. This component identified a distinctly German vision in this time period of the human being as free, rational and oriented toward unity within a lawful state.

Myth as the Identification of a People

The component of the Mythos of the German people as a means of self-identification entails a narrative which over centuries not only provided connective elements such as the characteristics and features of a people, but also developed a vision of society and a destiny for its people. Specific to the German people, as elements providing self-identifying features of the people were added, their meaning and properties were elevated to heights only attainable through myth. The gradual accumulation of elements of the German myth is inherently tied to the question of identification and the intent of the people. Ultimately, a people seeking a connective narrative, actualized

within a politically volatile Europe, refined a myth focused on the people united in the drive for nationalism.

This identification was not initially produced from within, but instead based on outside assumptions and points to the German people's desire to explain and potentially propel a unity of a people. These foundational elements and the emergent drive to identify and propagate connections would accelerate into an era in which the imagination and medium to connect details to passion merged through an enduring spirit. From the earliest forms of German Romanticism in the late eighteenth century, many artists and theorists recognized the need for a new collective mythology amongst a growing concept of a German people. The myth allowed the narrative to utilize legend, prophecy, and the romantic arts to connect the intellect of the intended audience with their passion, imagination, and spirit. This goal of uniting a people would ultimately refine itself within the construct of nationalism. This invention of human beings and culture presented a destiny through myth to unite a culture within the nation. This nation-state would become the ultimate end of the German myth and would thus be crafted and utilized by its users for its realization. The narrative of the German myth and its elements had evolved the idea of the *Volk* from a simple identifier of a common man to an elevated meaning of the people and their community. Due to the ever-developing narrative the concept evolved to a mystical or metaphysical idea utilizing elements of conjecture, legend and prophesies of a manifest destiny.

The role of myth as providing a connection of polity for the German people was present through this evolution of the people, but the motivation towards an ideal was fulfilled by different sources. The blending of mythical elements with theoretical

philosophy and political liberalism would be identified through the influences of literature and art propelling a political movement toward the revolutionary period of 1848. The transition from the early development would represent the power of the myth as a cultural narrative propelling a growing political movement.

The expression of Romanticism acted as an intermediary in that it was fueled by the pre-existing German myth and assumed the role of curator and purveyor of its core theme through culture of the Germanic spirit. The overarching ideal of the nation as an achievement of unity amongst the German people utilized a broad range of sources in efforts to differentiate members of the nation from non-members. As nationalism was an active driving force during this time period it utilized cultural sentiment to entice action. The resulting German model of nationalism inspired internal members towards the goal of German unity based on the unique essence and potential of the German people. Ultimately, the overarching goal of unity for its own sake would non-discriminately utilize sources to effectively inspire this sentiment. This allocation of elements from the German myth, German history and varied external sources, allowed for extreme or vulgarized interpretations of the German myth to appear as legitimate elements of that culture.

The power of myth to spread and inspire the people inherently possessed the danger that it could be utilized and fashioned beyond the original goals of nationalism, to an extreme ethnic and racially centric version known as *Volkisch* nationalism. This exemplifies the danger of a culture or community formed within a narrative utilizing sources ostensibly historical or factual. The undefined nature of these elements left the German myth, and through it the overarching force of nationalism, susceptible to extreme

interpretations and fraudulent appropriations. Not only would traditional elements of the German myth be distorted to fulfill the needs of the drive of nationalism towards its ideal, external sources would also be utilized as well. This component's reliance on emotional, passionate and larger than life examples to create identifiable connections amongst a people, inherently made the German myth susceptible to abusive applications by extreme ideologies.

Myth, or what we may now refer to as narrative, is an important aspect of most cultures and their traditions, but formative events or issues amongst a group, especially those responsible for societal norms and functions, must be clear, verifiable and held to a common standard. Otherwise, the foundational core of a society, in this case based through the identification and protection of a people, can justify only the needs of those in power or those who can reach a mass audience.

The nature of the German people, their connection to one another, and the way in which they identified themselves as German, was not inherited through citizenship or a state. The German people, as an idea, was established, sustained and eventually propelled through the narrative properties of the German myth. Through elements and mediums such as language, philosophy, and fine arts, the German people became the proprietors and the core of that myth. The pairing of the intellectual and the artistic became a defining element of the German myth itself. The German myth as a component of a German worldview was a formative narrative containing elements able to effectively inspire and construct connections amongst the German people.

The mythos of the *Volk*, identified generally as the German myth component, supplied the emotional and narrative cohesion that intellectual and political theories alone

could not provide. From early Romanticism to the artists and thinkers who curated a cultural mythology, the mythos of the *Volk* elevated the German people from a social category to a metaphysical community. In the nineteenth century, this mythic narrative mobilized support for liberal-national goals while simultaneously enabling more exclusionary interpretations of German identity.

Religion and Spirituality

The component of religion and spirituality encompass, among other things, ultimate or existential questions such as the meaning of life, the moral justifications of right and wrong, and belief in a higher power. German Christianity was a major tenet of the *Volk*, denoting a cultural belief and a shared connection among a majority of the German people. Along with geography and language, religion was a primary connector of the German people. Their religious faith and the institutional structures of Christianity introduced central beliefs, a hierarchical structure and material elements which offered the people a relationship with the sacred, religious or spiritual order. These elements in society can include sacred places such as churches, images, relics, local saints and a system of ceremonies and calendar dates by which a life cycle was designed based on the religion. Spirituality and the religious faith, or eventual organized religions of these people, would be a leading connector of German polity.

Religion also implies a piety in both idea and practice, and necessitated membership to a believing community. The overarching religion of Christianity and its eventual denominations connected the German people. Its established system of elements, which created connections to the sacred or spiritual, propelled individuals

towards a more personalized spirituality or confession. The period of the Reformation spanning the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century had many ramifications in Germany, including the development of regional controls and a hierarchy of power with the German states. German Catholics and German Protestants shared certain core elements of the Christian religion but, developed different views of modern society. What would continue to separate these religious faiths within the German nation can be understood as a Catholic universal view and a Protestant national allegiance. The Catholic Church in Germany continued with its traditional universal view of the church as transcending earthly borders while the Protestant Churches would view a connection, or allegiance, to the German national monarchy as a foundational element.

From these differing views of society, and their religion's role in it, the activity of these institutions shaped the elements they perpetuated within the state and the lives of German people. The two major Christian Churches both had long and increasingly distinct traditions and roles in German society by the time of the nineteenth century. The continual growth of nationalism and liberalism as driving forces within German society would heavily influence the churches and challenge them in terms of their own intellectual, communal, and political engagement within German society. As the lives of the German people changed, so too would the religious institutions within the German states and German culture as a whole.

It was the liberal influence within German society and the resulting constitutional period which can be credited with challenging the absolute power of the monarchical states, offering a reversal of fortunes for the fading Catholic political influence. The events of 1848 would guarantee the Church's freedom and independence reignited a

cultural surge amongst the Catholic population. Following unification, the *Kulturkampf* illustrated how religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church, were drawn into the project of national consolidation, as state pressure forced them to redefine their place within the emerging nation-state. The same course of action is true for Protestant Churches, where this national view of German society was a consistent loyalist attitude since the time of the Reformation and one which strengthen their position.

A review of religion through a worldview lens ultimately illustrates the continued elevation of the unified nation-state, and a specific form of nationalism, within a German worldview. The intellectual heritage and teachings of Christianity, first in the form of the Catholic Church and then the various Protestantism Churches, certainly influenced German society, culture and intellectualism throughout their development. Religion offers this study the demonstrable example of this large portion of the German people identifying and acting within a system of religious beliefs, observances and their connection to the spiritual. These elements connected the German people and stands as a component of a German Worldview.

In the politically unstable period of the nineteenth century, the formation and achievement of a united nation-state was repeatedly a priority of the German people. The religious elements of society, both Catholic and Protestant, merged with new influences and through different paths entered the functions and processes of state-building. This period required the traditional religious institutions of the German people to either alter their conception of their place in German society or to act to secure their role within it. Furthermore, the intellectual heritage of these denominations would influence their

reaction to this societal and cultural change and through such actions their role within the state and an ever-developing worldview.

Religion can be seen as important in the development of the German nation-state, even as it continued to change and evolve in the nineteenth century. The religious tradition of the German people formed a crucial component of a German worldview by shaping shared assumptions about justice, authority, and community, and by providing institutional structures that influenced political and social life throughout the nineteenth century. At the same time, the religious institutions were themselves shaped by the broader forces of intellectualism, ontology, and myth, demonstrating how the components for a German worldview interacted to influence both religious life and national development. Religion, therefore, remained a central interpretive lens for Germans and a formative influence on the emerging nation-state, contributing moral authority, institutional depth, and a shared cultural vocabulary to the larger worldview that underpinned German unification.

Worldview as a Beneficial Perspective

The worldview framework presented by this thesis served to investigate and demonstrate the influence of the individual components during the development of the German nation-state. It also revealed the influence the components asserted on each other. These components would continue to change and evolve during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A question posed by this analysis was whether founding elements of a German worldview had been engrained within the state from the events and influences leading up to unification? Using worldview analysis as a tool, framing device or lens

through which to view this period and the contributory components has added to provide a better understanding towards answering this question.

A key insight of this study is the distinction between dynamic and stable elements within a German worldview. While certain philosophical and cultural ideals evolved in response to historical events, others, such as the emphasis on unity, intellectual depth, and spiritual heritage, remained remarkably consistent. This distinction helped explain how foundational ideas persisted across centuries and continue to influence German identity today. The four components of a German worldview were mutually reinforcing. Intellectualism supplied the conceptual vocabulary of freedom and ethical life, ontology translated these ideas into the institutional forms, the mythos provided emotional and narrative cohesion, and Christianity offered a moral horizon and institutional continuity. Together these components of a developing German worldview shaped both the idea, imagination and the political structure of the emerging German nation-state.

The component of German Intellectualism, specifically German idealism and German liberalism, frames the development of this time period, The theoretical focus which sparked the imagination and drive of a people was followed by the practical application of this intellectual influence through the emerging political philosophy of liberalism. The elevation of philosophical theories and the recognition of these theories within liberal ideals is identified through the enactment of pragmatic applications of the rule of law. The intellectual forces that developed were enacted in society with the equally impactful force of nationalism. The liberalism of early nineteenth century Germany highlights German philosophical theory as well as the language, culture, history, and religion of a German people.

Due to historical events, such as the expansion of the educated and working classes, German liberalism had been driven and identified by middle-class demands for a constitutional protection of economic and individual rights in society. After the events of 1849, it appeared to many that any foundation of liberalism amongst the German people had been superseded by the desires of nationalism. This component showed how the intellectual forces within a German worldview shaped political developments and helped drive the rise of German nationalism. Identifying the intrinsic motivations of these philosophies is aided by examination of other components to ascertain or refute assumptions concerning the legitimacy of German liberalism. For instance, the events of this period as influenced by theoretical interpretations could be examined through another component of a German worldview, a particular ontology.

The development of German philosophy presented in the previous component offers a progression beginning with Kant to a post-Kantian fulfillment of German Idealism resulting in a clear focus on freedom and autonomy as essential for the human being. Liberal ideas emerged from the philosophical commitment to reason and autonomy and were translated into positive law as fundamental human and civil rights. The growing liberal priorities, based on the right for a human being to choose their own purpose and free determination, equally held the corresponding recognition that freedom could not be guaranteed for every individual due to the nature of human beings. With the corresponding goals of a German people, that of unity and the developing transfer of power within a society, a design of society was required to best achieve the fulfillment of a human being's fundamental right to freedom. The liberals preferred method for

assuring these priorities, based on the fundamental conception of the human being's purpose, was through written positive law.

The elevation of liberal ideals and enactment through pragmatic applications of this rule of law merged in society with the force of nationalism. The unified state would be identified as the protection and assurance of the freedoms as presented within the *Rechtsstaat* theory. The freedom of the human being and the inherent rights of individuals would become normalized amongst the German people via philosophy and the arts.

As philosophers such as Hegel recognized, the artists presented the mythology through a synthesis of a broad literary tradition. The German philosophers of the Enlightenment or the new idealism would not oppose this standard as the early Romantics recognized through art the theoretical conceptions of reason. Richard Wagner's use of myth and his version of romanticism developed for German society a political movement toward the revolutionary period of 1848. Recognizing the role religion had played in society as a conjoining source of myth, symbols and inspiration of a people, Wagner's artistic or aesthetic focus sought to present a new myth that would be supportive of German culture and history. This new myth played a role in both fostering a union of the people and inspiring their actions towards that union's ideal. Through this central role, the new mythology could potentially assume the role in German society that religion had previously performed. Wagner conceived of this project as a potential replacement or companion to modern Christianity, which would be a true aesthetic religion of the German society. The transition from the early development of German

Romanticism to the later period of the *Vormarz* would represent corresponding changes within the intellectual, political, religious and cultural elements of German society.

The review of religion through a worldview lens ultimately illustrated the continued elevation of the unified nation-state, and a specific form of nationalism. In the politically unstable period of the nineteenth century, state princes and kings utilized religion to advance a message of traditional stability and usher in acceptable societal change from above, rather than from below. Equally, people were guided by the teachings, beliefs, and social structures of their faiths. Religious groups did not exist in a societal vacuum, however, as German Catholics and Protestants were affected by the other dominant influences and events occurring within the German states. As the formation and achievement of a united nation-state was repeatedly demonstrated to be a priority of the German people, the religious merged with intellectual, ontological and mythological influences within this society. Both Protestants and Catholics, through different paths, involved themselves in processes of state-building. Through the events of the period, the assurance and the protection of religious freedoms would equally increase these communities' vibrancy and roles within the design of the new nation-state. The events of the nineteenth century required the traditional religious institutions of the German people to alter their conception of their role in German society and to act to secure their role within it. Through these actions, new introductions of state design and law would protect the elements of connection amongst these large portions of the population, including their beliefs as represented through sacraments, liturgy, important life-cycle events and ceremonies. Furthermore, the intellectual heritage of these denominations would inform their reaction to this societal and cultural change and

influence their actions within the state and an ever-developing worldview. The institutions further provided a guiding intellectual base, traditional heritage, and educational instruction for the people during this climactic time. These religious bodies would in turn become more active based both on these influences and the societal influences of nationalism. The other components of this society, and a German worldview, impacted the members of these religious denominations in Germany. The component of religion within a German worldview, therefore, serves to demonstrate the influence of this component on the development of the German nation-state. It equally demonstrates the power of the other components comprising a German worldview.

Conclusion: A German Worldview as a Beneficial Perspective

The components identified by this thesis combine within a framework to present a German worldview for the purpose of national analysis to ascertain how those components or elements influence the development of the German State. The perspective afforded by this worldview analysis has highlighted the historical intellectual influences that played impactful roles during the development of the German nation-state. Liberalism represented a climactic political philosophy which enacted and potentially engrained a special relationship between the German people and the state. This study highlights the principles of liberalism that influenced a long developing polity of the German people. A German worldview has exhibited a propensity to place the safekeeping of the state over that of identifiable individual concerns.

This assumed propensity, however, is not due to an authoritarian tendency nor the failure of a true liberalism to develop and take hold in Germany. Instead, this is due to an

identified core theory of the German liberal democratic tradition in which the highest concern of freedom and autonomy of the individual is assured through the safety provided by the strong state. German philosophers communicated this to a German culture through expanded education, mass publishing, artistic expressions and increased political dialogue.

The tradition of the German myth, superficially the narrative accumulating sources of identification, culminated in the construct of nationalism within German culture. This driving narrative also led to the ultimate unification of a nation, but also introduced elements susceptible to forms of racial nationalism and ideological extremism. The history of German religion exhibits a number of instances in which the systems of traditional German Christianity have clashed with new intellectual and political forces within the German community. Despite numerous threats to their established place in society individual churches and religious community leaders continually integrated themselves into the structure of the public and private spheres and ultimately the structures of the German State.

German liberalism identified the security of the state as an objective, not at the expense of universal rights of the people, but as guaranteeing these rights within the structure of a united German society. As Hegel had prescribed, only through the continued existence of the state, and its security, could the German people be unified, secure, and assured their most important liberties. The tenets of liberalism, including the rights of the individual, a free and open society, were not distinguished in Germany as distinct from the power of the state. The resulting special relationship or contractual trust placed in the state by the people is dependent on its ability to protect the individual.

From this conclusion, future consideration stemming from the insights provided by this worldview analysis will undoubtedly address the issue of continuity within the study of German history. Continuity, understood as the persistence, survival, or retention of the engrained elements or features of the German State is an issue that persists within historical research. Following its unification, the German nation presents multiple potential schism points, whether taking the shape of societal collapse, extreme ideology, or military defeat and occupied status under foreign control. The question immediately following the identification of these worldview elements at the unification of the nation-state, is whether they continued to exist and to varying degrees extend influence within the German State. Throughout the many decades and major turning points of the German State, the question of continuity can help address how the foundational elements were exposed to the rise of authoritarianism, extreme ideology, and ultimately modern liberal democracy.

Finally, by connecting a historical German worldview to contemporary Germany, this thesis offers a framework for interpreting modern political behavior and policy decisions. Understanding the enduring influence of worldviews helps to illuminate Germany's role within the European Union, its approach to governance, and its cultural posture on the global stage. This additional perspective enriches both historical scholarship and contemporary analysis.

These components of a German worldview are presented as foundational influences representing the theoretical and practical formative events of the German nation-state. The components of a developing German worldview did not merely accompany state formation, they provided its conceptual, moral and narrative

foundations. To understand the German nation-state, therefore, is to understand the worldview in which it was conceived and through which it was justified. This line of research highlights the necessity of developing our understanding through interdisciplinary sources. The development of the nation-state during the 18th and 19th centuries and the influence of the various components of a German worldview can aid in research of periods of history to follow and can also be beneficial for modern national analysis. This thesis provides a deeper and more integrated understanding of the German State's development, one that foregrounds the intellectual and cultural forces that have shaped its history, identity,

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