

Measuring “Quiet” and “Loud” Contentious Politics in a Mature  
Staples State with Degenerative Qualities

by

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## **Abstract**

This thesis examines variation in the volume of environmental contention associated with the application of the herbicide Glyphosate in a Canadian province (New Brunswick) between 2000-2023. Using interdisciplinary methodology combining research in the fields of Canadian Political Economy and Contentious Politics, the thesis examines how the sequenced actions between markets fluctuations, political regime response and regime capacity influences contentious episodes, as well as how established spatial identities further contextualize the volume of the contention. It argues that established identities allow communities to generate loud politics, despite existing within a resource dependent province whose dominant industrial-government relationship hinders collective action.

## **Dedication**

*To my Papa Omer: a proud woodlot owner, an avid naturalist, an amateur historian and a wonderful grandfather. If he were here, he would be quick to remind us how “majestic” life is on the Green River.*

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## **List of Symbols, Nomenclature, or Abbreviations**

- APEC—Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
- CCNB—Conservation Council of New Brunswick
- CCWOA—Charlotte County Woodlot Owners Association
- CNBPPA—Central New Brunswick Pulpwood Producers Association
- CPG—Concerned Parents Group
- DDT—Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
- FGPA—Forest Game Protective Association
- FPA—New Brunswick Forest Products Association
- FPC—New Brunswick Forest Products Commission
- FPL—New Brunswick Forest Protection Limited
- MSA—Miramichi Salmon Association
- NBEN—New Brunswick Environmental Network
- NBIP—New Brunswick International Pulp
- NBFWO—New Brunswick Federation Woodlot Owners
- NSFS—North Shore Forestry Syndicate
- NBWTF—New Brunswick Wildlife Trust Fund
- NCFLU—Northumberland County Farmer-Labour Union
- NEP—National Energy Program
- OCMOH—Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health
- POEA—Polyoxyethylene Tallow Amines
- SABS—St. Andrew’s Biological Station
- SSNB—Stop Spraying New Brunswick

UBJCA—United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

The motivation for this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of how the relationship between industry and government might influence the public's ability to mobilize on environmental issues. In the Canadian context, we see some variation in how sub-national governments react and respond to environmental contention. Regarding extractive reliant provinces, we see similar trends emerge—provincial and territorial governments will attempt to protect industrial efforts (Carter, 2020; Neville & Weinthal, 2016). We already know that the relationship between industry and the state affects how claims are made (Neville, 2021), and how public perception about job creation silences dissenting voices (Eaton & Kinchy, 2015). This research builds on these findings by examining how provincial governments interact with people who wage grievances against certain policies and procedures, when a relationship with a resource industry is embedded within a province's status quo. This interaction carries implications involving how provincial governments maintain control, how they influence democratic capacity, and how they disseminate public goods and services, along with how these elements influence a society's ability to wage concerns. Knowing more about how resource economies effect provincial democracy is important for anyone in the broader field of Canadian political science who examines topics related to power and public policy but is especially important for those who study topics of land ownership and/or land dispossession, environmental history, environmental justice/racism, and social movement theory. The goal of this work is twofold: firstly, I hope to be able to provide activists working in grassroots movements with better ways to frame their grievances and be more successful at environmental mobilization when "traditional" avenues do not work. Secondly, this work will hopefully

provide a lasting contribution to the field of Canadian environmental political science by contributing a new framework to assess “environmental-political opportunity structures.”

This thesis examines how environmental grievances have been shaped over time by provincial relationships with dependent industries, as well as how relationships between provincial governments and industry affects the ability for environmentalists to succeed or fail at waging grievances. Provincial governments who manage heavy natural resource agendas can either aid or abet the capacity of environmental mobilization at the provincial level. Implied in this statement is the requirement to dissect the relationship that these governments have with the resource industries operating in their domain and how this relationship then influences the degrees of opportunity that people possess to wage their concerns. A concurrent question that this examination raises is: does the type of resource that the province depends upon shape the capacity for public response? This work will answer this question by introducing aspects of literature on Canadian staples theory to existing frameworks of political opportunity structures and slow violence and apply this framework to a comparative case study of anti-glyphosate activism in the Canadian province of New Brunswick.

### **Staples Theory: Regional Divergences and Provincial Political Economy**

This section will provide a background on Canada’s political economy, beginning with a summary on the evolution of the different staple’s eras beginning at the dawn of confederation until the early 21<sup>st</sup> century including frontier, classical expanding, mature and degenerative staples states, with special attention given to both mature and degenerative staples states. I discuss why regionality became an important distinction in

the analysis of Canadian political economy and why it impedes the categorization of Canada as a true post-staples nation.

In brief, there have been four iterations of the “staples state” throughout Canadian history. Canada’s political economy has been fundamentally structured around the harvesting and export of natural resources, with a deep concentration of state-sponsored investment facilitating the transportation of goods to market (Innis, 1956; Wellstead, 2007). In the era prior to confederation, North America was a “frontier staples state,” where raw material was abundant and plentiful. The fur trade supported the mercantilist economies dominant during the period of North American discovery and went through multiple iterations of French, and then English control that gave way to a wider swath of trade relations with Europe, and British outposts such as the West Indies and later, the United States (Innis, 1956). The development of railways and canals opened opportunities for deeper expansion into the west leading to challenges of competition in regional agricultural, lumber and fishing industries on the east coast. This was the backdrop as Canada separated itself into an independent state: “confederation emerged in relation to the problems of the St. Lawrence and the Maritimes and of the Pacific” (Innis, 1956, p. 367). In a frontier state, there is typically very little necessity for the state to intervene and support industry by investing in ways to extract raw material and get it to market. Moving beyond the period of abundance typified in the frontier state, is the era known as the “classical expanding staples state”. Here, staples industries are further expanded, as the global demand for raw material increases. The state itself was also increasingly more involved in staples expansion, and resource extraction becomes a topic of national interest. Additionally, the “metropolis-hinterland” (Howlett

& Kinney, 2016, p. 41) relationship was further entrenched between industrial cities in the south of the country and the sites of extraction, mostly in the northern portion of the country, as both the federal and provincial governments become more vested into the extraction of resources. Around the First World War, there was a rapid expansion in technological advances that streamlined manufacturing processes, along with new staples resources like oil and gas, agriculture, pulp and paper and hydroelectricity (Wellstead, 2007). While these technologies facilitated a greater pursuit of raw materials, they also brought about a change in the domestic economy, whereby new processes ousted jobs previously done by labourers. This “mature staples” era saw the rapid growth both in cities to the south, along with the explosion of extraction, processing and manufacturing. It also accelerated the collapse of already dwindling resource stocks. In 1930 the *Natural Resources Transfer Agreement* was enacted, transferring the responsibility of resource management from the federal to provincial governments (Wellstead, 2007, p. 16). The “post-staples state” that emerged in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the early 21<sup>st</sup> century was a reaction to the extreme extent of resource extraction in the years prior and was characterized by changes in perceptions around environmental and social issues. In the environmental movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s, for example, interests arose advocating for the protection of remaining resources (Olive, 2019). This resulted in varying challenges for resource industries and governments as they had to react and adapt to the newfound policy dilemmas that arose from mid-century shifts in political preferences, notably, “conservation, sustainability, and ‘full-cost accounting’” (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, p. 38). In response, a cognitive shift that trended away from resource extraction towards more service-based industries took hold.

## **Resources: the Shift from National to Provincial Interests**

It is here, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we see changes in the salience of resource development as a tenet of Canadian political economy. Hutton (2007) suggests that pockets of mature staples economies in Canada still operate, but he argues that since the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been a noted uptick of shifts in regional divergence. There has been an acceleration in attitudes and ideals forged in the city centres that no longer envisions Canada's national economic policy as one dominated by resource extraction. These ideas, Hutton (2007) posits, have reached a level of influence within the federal political sphere where decision makers continue to choose policy agendas that will further squeeze out outlying resource economies (p. 17). Nevertheless, despite changes in attitudes and preferences in city centres, Canada has experienced an asymmetrical transition into a "post-staples" state; and even amidst the challenges of access to resources, some areas in the country have remained firmly entrenched in staples resource extraction (Hutton, 2007; Wellstead, 2007).

Hutton (2007) further dissects the characteristics that are present in a mature, advanced staples state. He presents eight characteristics, ranging from shifts to secondary manufacturing processes in reaction to resource depletion, more vocal social movements, and the increasing costs related to finding deeper measures of extraction. One characteristic that he identifies that deserves mention is the "spatial recalibration of the core-periphery framework" (p. 13). In foundational staples scholarship, spatialization was considered at the national scale, with resources from the periphery being distributed to large Canadian metropolises, typically Toronto and Montreal. As Hutton identifies, over time this relationship could be recapitulated at a smaller scale, with the hinterland-

metropole axis instead operating at the provincial level, with provincial hinterland regions being sites for extraction, whose raw material was then sent provincial metropolitan areas. These city centres in turn, serve as satellites, conducting bureaucratic functions for said resources industries as well as being the hubs conducting “processing and secondary manufacturing” (p. 13). To echo the words of Innis (1956) “the provinces have become landlords with great disparity of wealth varying with federal policy, technological change, and provincial policy. The changing disparity enhances the complexity of democracy in Canada” (p. 358). Another characteristic of a mature resource economy put forward by Hutton (2007) is the “search for resource substitutes and ‘synthetic’ stocks” (p. 16). This has been a maneuver that provinces undertake to rectify the challenges associated with the depletion of resource stocks. Synthetic stocks may include “plantation-style cultivation of softwood timber,” (p. 16) or things such as open-water aquaculture. Although these measures serve to alleviate the primary issue of resource depletion, they still bring along their own set of difficulties, though Hutton (2007) elaborates little on what those difficulties might be. One could speculate that the challenges of synthetic stocks is most likely at play in New Brunswick with softwood timber nurseries, one of the underlying grievances waged by environmental groups associated with glyphosate spraying in the Acadian Forest.

### **The Resource Curse**

Hutton (2007) uses the terms “mature” and “post-staples” states interchangeably, but this warrants further analysis. For one, a mature staples state assumes that a state has been able to transition away from primary export to one that relies in greater part on secondary manufacturing, offering a solution from the more acute issues that arise when

resource stocks devolve. A post-staples state on the other hand, is presumably the natural conclusion of a mature state who has been able to diversify, bring its population into the city centres, and move away from resource dependency (Wellstead, 2007, p. 12). But, in the Canadian context only Ontario and Quebec have found their way into true post-staple economies (Hessing, Howlett & Summerville, 2005; Wellstead, 2007).

When a national or sub-national jurisdiction engages in staples extraction despite resource scarcity, it is known as a degenerative mature advanced staples political economy. This type of state arises when public interests and easy access to natural resources constrict the ability for extraction to continue unimpeded. Resource areas that can be characterized as degenerative are highly susceptible to boom and bust periods, mass exoduses of population and unemployment (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, pp. 41-43). A reoccurring theme present in resource literature is how resource dependent countries are vulnerable to shifts in global market trends due to a lack of diversification (Carter 2020; Hessing, Howlett & Summerville, 2005; Howlett and Kinney, 2016; Hutton, 2007; Warnock, 2006; Wellstead, 2007)

The transition from a mature to a post-staples state and the subsequent devolution into a degenerative state may not be fully within state control. It was previously articulated in the section on staples states that in a frontier state, resources are abundant and little state intervention is required to bring such material to market. However, Canada's path through the frontier state offered a unique challenge in that "climate and topographic difficulties forced Canadian governments to play a heavier role in the provision of such infrastructure than was the case for many other countries" (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, citing Innis, 1956, p. 41), which Innis feared "doomed Canada's chances

of developing a domestic industrial base” (Wellstead, 2007, citing Innis, 1956, p. 10). Without any viable “spread-effects,” a state may lack the necessary foundation to transition into a fully-fledged post-staples state. In a degenerative state, provincial governments continue to invest and support the industrial status quo, although this may no longer be economically advantageous (Howlett & Kinney, 2016). This carries political implications. Governments will hold back on public spending because they need to ensure they have adequate resources during periods of constriction (Howlett & Kinney, 2016). They will also exhibit varying degrees of policy retrenchment, engaging in anything that would make their location a competitive place for industrial pursuits (Carter, 2020; Drache & Gertler, 1991; Howlett & Kinney, 2016; Urquhart, 2018). Ian Urquhart (2018) has examined the phenomenon of policy retrenchment in his work plotting the transition from state interventionism towards free market policy, and what that transition meant for the Alberta Oil Sands. He finds that in a free market approach, often termed “neoliberal,” policy is both removed in spheres where its removal would support industrial interest and reintroduced in policy spheres that would lend to the support of industrial interest. He points to examples from the oil and gas sector to support his characterization (Urquhart, 2018, p. 57). Angela Carter (2020) also speaks to degeneration and points out that empirically, the state will erode environmental policy and let the industry permeate the state’s political identity to maintain status quo (p.127). She has found that this erosion is present within each of her case studies of Saskatchewan, Alberta and Newfoundland.

In conclusion, Canada’s political economy developed through the extraction and export of its raw material resources. This was achieved in great part with financial

support from the dominion government who viewed resource development as a cornerstone of its economic policy. But this relationship created embedded challenges for provinces trying to shift away from resource extraction and has exacerbated regional divides. Although many resource stocks have since been depleted, many provincial governments continue to operate on neoliberal policy agendas that favour resource extraction even if it comes at a heavy cost to environmental or social public policy outcomes. From an analysis of the literature, this retrenchment presumably would stifle more vocal modes of contentious expression.

### **Defining “quiet” and “loud” contention**

I now turn towards the analytical steps that this research will take to answer the research question: *why do resource dependent communities mobilize at some times but not others?* First, how does one measure contention? I propose a categorical measure of quiet versus loud. With quiet contention, individual voices are subdued and are thus theoretically incapable of brokering relationships with other likeminded individuals, inhibiting upward scale shift (Neville, 2021; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). As Eaton and Kinchy (2016) note, individuals who have concerns about industrial expansion may feel uncomfortable expressing their concerns out in the open but engage in “individual repertoires of action” (p. 28) like blocking access to rural roads or notifying authorities when they notice industry representatives encroaching on private property. Individuals may feel ill at ease expressing their opinions when they have conflicted feelings about the benefits that industry provides to regional economies, or if they fear retribution from social or political powers (Eaton & Kinchy, 2016). With quiet contention, further

examination into things like music, storytelling, and other abstract regional specific cultural practices may offer hints towards feuds that remain buried beneath the surface.

Loud contention, in contrast, offers a higher opportunity for collective action. With loud contention, external social and political powers do not represent a large enough impediment to vocalization. Individuals worry less about the consequences of speaking their minds; and this allows for an upward scale-shift, bringing together previously unconnected individuals and/or groups, who can coalesce around shared grievances (Neville, 2021; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). These collectives may then engage in behaviours that we historically associate with social mobilization like protest marches, sit-ins or letter-writing campaigns to elected officials (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Organizations dedicated to the issue may be established, with the goal of garnering a higher degree of legitimization. Artistic emblems like graffiti, bumper stickers, t-shirts and bracelets may be produced, with individuals proudly proclaiming their affiliation to the cause.

### **Quiet and Loud Contention in the Forestry Sector in New Brunswick**

In New Brunswick, the forestry sector contributes approximately 1.5 billion dollars in GDP annually, and is a significant contributor of jobs, both directly and indirectly (Department of Natural Resources and Energy Department [DNREDA], n.d.). The application of foreign substances in effort to control forest regeneration has a long history of use in the province. As best understood given the scope of research in this thesis, the application of herbicides as a silviculture practice emerged in the 1990s as forestry managers required solutions to resolve problems associated with regeneration capacity (Klager, 2000; Rashid, 2003). Glyphosate is a “non-selective herbicide” (Ritter,

2015, pg. 4) applied to newly replanted forests with the goal of reducing growth competition for conifer species (DNREDb, n.d.) and is applied on “less than 0.5% of New Brunswick’s forests” annually (DNREDb, n.d.). The application of glyphosate on Crown land has amassed a reasonable amount of scrutiny in the last two decades regarding its necessity as well as its perceived threat to public and ecological health. Despite much consensus that glyphosate poses little risk (New Brunswick Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health [OCMOH], 2016), there has been a concerted effort at the hands of environmental organizations to denounce its application. A quick web search with the header “glyphosate organizations New Brunswick” reveals at least three organizations, including the New Brunswick Environmental Network (NBEN) (New Brunswick Environmental Network [NBEN], n.d.), the Conservation Council of New Brunswick (CCNB) (CCNB, n.d.) and an environmental non-government organization dedicated solely to the elimination of glyphosate, called Stop Spraying New Brunswick (SSNB) (SSNB, n.d.). This suggests that contention in the province on this issue is alive and well and exemplifies the presence of “loud” contention. This issue, however, is not only about the application of glyphosate. Although many have rallied around the end of its use in the Acadian Forest, the movement also attracts individuals with concerns around the overall management of Crown land. Because of this and, as we will see in the cases below, much of the sparks of loud contentious periods come from instances where there are economic fluctuations in the pulp and paper markets, and when government makes decisions to modify land allotment in favour of large industrial players, most notably for New Brunswick, J. D. Irving, Limited. This paper traces three eras in which

the “volume” of contention has shifted over time: 2000-2009; 2010-2018; and 2019-2023.

### **Analytical Framework**

Drawing on staples economy and contentious politics literature, this study puts forward an analytical framework to explain why resource dependent communities mobilize at some times but not others. I argue that variation in contention can be explained through a causal chain of events. First, fluctuations occur in the pulp and paper market that exacerbate embedded discontent around the erosion of economic linkages. The political regime of the day attempts to provide a venue for individuals to express that dissent but do not reach policy decisions that satisfy their demands. This creates a perception of an open opportunity structure but ultimately is one that is closed in nature either through industrial capture or government self-interest. One would expect that this slow erosion of democratic expression would lead to a slow violence ergo quiet contention— instead in this case study, it leads to louder contention. In the case of New Brunswick from 2000-2023, fluctuations in market forces often reignite underlying frustrations from those on the losing side of long eroded linkages, especially as is the case for the small woodlot owners (which I refer to also as small-scale foresters). These fluctuations, beginning with the market collapse of pulp and paper in the early aughts, have caused a two-pronged action sequence from the political regimes of the day: governments both seek an abundance of public input, but then often make decisions that run in contrast with the wants of the public revealed through said channels of public consultation. While the government feigns an image that it is heeding public concern, on

the inside it appears that they are either unable or unwilling to acquiesce to the changes that the public wants out of fear that industry will retaliate. This sequence became especially acute in 2014, as will be discussed below. While the theory would suggest that this type of undermining might contribute to a slow violence of sorts, where the public loses faith that the government will make decisions in their best interests thereby suppressing their motivation to mobilize, this is not necessarily the case in New Brunswick in this context. In my chapter on slow justice, I examine how the reality of forestry politics in New Brunswick is more delicate and nuanced, where historically yes, people from all walks have been exposed to accretional forms of environmental and democratic harm, but these harms have not overtly dampened their desire to publicly contend against them. I adopt then the positioning put forward by Neville & Martin (2022) that suggests both slow violence and slow justice can exist in tandem and that environmental justice can often evolve through diffuse pathways. This thesis demonstrates that in the case of New Brunswick, a high-capacity state whose predominant resource sector possesses a mix of both *mature* and *degenerative* qualities, there exists a public who is particularly sensitive to instances when the government makes concessions that are out of alignment with a collectively possessed identity.

## **Linkages**

Recent scholarship on staples theory and contention argues that staples theory can help researchers understand why the public chooses to raise grievances over industrial projects. Linkages (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018; Watkins, 2006a; Wellstead, 2007) is a term used to explain the influence that the export sector may wield within the domestic economy. Linkages can be broadly explained in three categories. Firstly,

forward linkages are the benefits that a processing industry could bring to improve the existing manufacturing sector in a specific area. Backward linkages offer support to the domestic economy through employment (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018, p. 170). Final demand linkages examine the relationship between foreign ownership and the state, and it is at this point where the unique properties of state-market relations influence in great deal how the economy develops (Watkins, 2006a). The interaction between linkages is referred to as “spread effects.” (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018, p.170). Central to Bowles and MacPhail’s (2018) argument is that to some extent, our understanding of linkages can bring us closer to understanding resource contestation in Canada, highlighting that the logic of linkages can be translated into benefits to the domestic economy, and enrichment at the local economic level. At least in one instance, the literature has demonstrated that when communities perceive an energy project as lacking linkages, they will mobilize in protest. This suggests that linkages are sparse in degenerative states. If the public registers these costs as an issue, then contention should be loud.

Meanwhile, more linkages should be found in mature staples state. If the public recognizes the benefits that industry brings, then contention should be far quieter. For example, we may suspect linkages are less prevalent in degenerative states, especially where the oil and gas industry are involved. As Warnock (2006) illustrates, contracts are often awarded to companies that take money, jobs, and benefits outside of the province in question. Whereas for example, New Brunswick’s forestry industry operates in a mature economy, presumably bringing jobs and industry into the province.

### **Political opportunity structure**

A political opportunity structure is the “aspects of a regime that offer challengers both openings to advance their claims and threats and constraints that caution them against making these claims” [Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 49, citing Gladstone & Tilly (2001)]. Meaning that, for those in a society wishing to protest or bring light to a certain topic, a political opportunity structure is the degree to which those grievances are either ignored or listened to by the government. There exists a correlation between the degree of democratic capacity a state possesses, and the chances that its citizens will engage in social movement.

Tilly and Tarrow (2015) assert that the higher a state’s democratic capacity, the greater the chances that citizens will mobilize “when breadth and equality combine with consultation in the form of elections, referenda, opinion polls, press discussion, interest group formation, and rule of law, the combination gives citizens both incentives and means to band together for demands and complaints” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 71). Democratic capacity then can be defined by an equation: widespread ability for the public to wage concerns *plus* state capacity to field said concerns using various democratic tools at their disposal, *equals* high democratic capacity (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 71).

Table 1: Political Opportunity Structures and Contention

Government Capacity	HIGH	LOW
Public Engagement		

HIGH	Loud contentious politics	Quiet, fragmented politics (contentious but not durable)
LOW	Brief confrontation leading to repression, and ongoing quiet contention	Violent contentious politics

Adapted from Tilly and Tarrow (2015)

In a high-capacity democratic state, we expect grievances to be communicated if a society deems them unacceptable but, we may also see the state react by trying to protect the status quo from said grievances. Employing Tilly and Tarrow’s logic, I place low and high democratic capacity on the x axis. The y axis represents states who offer a high degree of public engagement and participation and low degree of public engagement. In states with both high public engagement and high government capacity, we can expect to see loud, sustained contentious politics. In states with low government capacity but a high degree of public input, grievances may “bubble up” but are not acute enough to sustain a contentious episode. In cases where there is low capacity for public engagement but high democratic capacity, we expect to see flagrant bursts of contention, only to be quickly repressed by a high-capacity government. And with low public engagement and low democratic capacity we can expect to see episodes of contention that quickly turn violent. In a degenerative state, government capacity is lower, and public engagement is lower meaning that contention is mainly quiet except for sporadic episodes of violence when contention reaches a head. In a mature staples state,

governments have a high democratic capacity, but the public is often shut out of decision making. In these instances, loud contention erupts but is quickly dampened by regulatory power.

### **Slow Violence and Environmental Harm**

Although linkages and political opportunity structures do partly explain contention, they do not explain why the public's internal perception of harms vary case to case. Turning to political environmental scholarship, and the work of Rob Nixon (2011), we can explore the importance of diffuse, yet chronic harms on the community. Nixon (2011) has detailed the term slow violence as an out of sight out of mind, embedded harm which disproportionately affects disenfranchised communities along economic lines. This type of violence is a slow burn, a "violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all" (Nixon, 2011, p. 2). In Canada, scholars have pointed to such harms uniquely disenfranchising racialized minority groups (Waldron, 2018), and Indigenous peoples (Wiebe, 2016). These harms are byproducts of globalization (Nixon, 2011), where decision-makers disproportionately choose to allow the consequences of harm to fall on marginalized social groups for the sake of progress. In an exploration of Mi'kmaq resistance, Hornborg (2005) suggests that the secular culture of risk reduction creates disparities between the city centres and the periphery. On the one hand, the modernized technology sector would seek to reduce risks by implementing infrastructural projects, meanwhile those on the periphery employ spirituality. "The quarry controversy illuminates how the modern project of development pursues its utopian vision of security through local, technological risk reduction, while generating and exporting other kinds of

risk such as the deterioration of both the natural environment and sources of identity” (Hornborg, 2005, p. 197). Each faction has their own embedded perceptions then of risk, with the city collective’s perception rooted in ontologies of modernity and progress, and the rural inhabitant’s perception rooted in ontologies of cultural and spiritual expression (Hornborg, 2005, p. 197). Modernity is the power holder when it comes to world views. It serves as a “strategy of conceptual encompassment of local life worlds” (pp. 207). Slow violence is not only an environmental harm but could be recapitulated to also include interactions with prevailing power structures who do not have the language, tools or motivation to consider other worldviews. Wiebe (2016) points to this notion in her exploration of chemical exposure within the Aamjiwnaang first nation, who must engage with the Canadian government in effort to legitimize their concerns regarding under-measured harms to public health. The Canadian government and its policy assemblage, however, are structurally designed in ways that become tools of dispossession for indigeneity. Therefore, not only are the Aamjiwnaang dealing with environmental violence; but any potential solutions that require engagement with the state impose an inherent structural violence.

Thus, investigating quiet versus loud politics in mature staples states with dimensions of degeneration requires an investigation into the history of environmental harms, but also an investigation into “local life worlds” (Hornborg, 2005, p. 207) where instances of spiritual or cultural risks were not honoured. This is important because ownership claims need to be traced over time to predict how they may become activated in present instances of perceived harm (Neville & Martin, 2022). History as a tool can be used to bring to light asymmetrical power relations in ways that other approaches may

not illuminate (Waldron, 2018). In effect, an ethical dimension of research examining environmental justice in resource dependent communities requires attuning to spatial harms that do not always make themselves apparent at first glance. Not only is it an act of honor to “local life worlds” (pp. 207), but it also enriches the analysis by providing insights into how seemingly unconnected episodes of contention relate across time and space by revealing embedded spatial identities (Neville & Martin, 2022) that are important factors in tracing legacies of justice.

These findings suggest that degenerative staples states possess a deepening history of social and material costs. In contrast, mature states have already endured catastrophic events associated with deep extractive harm of the past. The present is marked by low, less perceptible, sustained costs but these costs have been associated with episodes of harm in the past, which make the public more wary in accepting risk. Therefore, in sub-national jurisdictions operating within a mature staples state, you would expect for past slights to be reignited when government makes decisions that associate with said harms of the past. On the other hand, scholarship examining resource contention highlights how structural harms work to further erode public participation and engagement because they lack resources to engage, resulting in quiet contention (Eaton & Kinchy, 2016). In Chapter 3, I will attempt to demonstrate the volume of contentious episodes by exploring the previously mentioned cases in the New Brunswick context, noting how political regimes have reacted in the face of varying market conditions and what their reactions do to arouse or suppress episodes of contention. I also include the variable of political opportunity to measure the extent to which the conditions of that case influence change within the political opportunity structure. Then, in Chapter 4, I

provide a history of the formation of two distinct ownership identities present in New Brunswick, the forester and the environmentalist. Lengthening the analytical timeline is a deliberate research design choice because it reveals how spatial identities may be created and reified over time (Neville & Martin, 2022) allowing greater context in the actual volume itself of contention, but also insight into how movements are able to circumvent traditionally closed avenues of protest that we would expect to lead to quiet contention.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

According to the survey of the literature, four main characteristics emerge and are present in resource dependent communities. For one, resource dependent communities are vulnerable to market volatility. Second and third, they contain varying degrees of social and environmental policy retrenchment. And lastly, they tend to lack spread-effects that would make extractive projects lucrative for the area. To analyze these characteristics, my literature review will bring forward work that that has been done that involves the relationships between the market and the state, as well as the relationships between the state and its citizens. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the analytical framework for the project that specifies how the political economy of resource dependent communities influences the degree of quiet and loud contention over time.

### **Staples Theory: Canadian Political Economy**

Since before confederation, the seeds of Canada's political economy have been fundamentally structured around the harvesting and export of natural resources. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and the fur trade supported a colonial relationship with the British crown and the harvested raw materials from north American soil were sent to other colonial outposts to lend themselves toward the further expansion of the British in other places around the globe (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, Wellstead, 2007). Although not unlike other newly established states like New Zealand and Australia, who were also being used to export their raw materials, Canada was unique in that the challenging climate meant that the Canadian state intervened heavily in getting export to

market (Wellstead, 2007). As Howlett and Kinney, citing Innis, explain “climate and topographic difficulties forced Canadian governments to play a heavier role in the provision of such infrastructure than was the case for many other countries, such as the US” (Howlett and Kinney, 2016, citing Innis 1956, pp. 41).

According to Howlett and Kinney (2016) there are four main iterations of the “staples state” throughout Canadian history. The era of North American discovery was known as the “frontier staples state”. In a frontier state, raw material is abundant. Typically, there is very little necessity for the state to intervene and support industry by investing in ways to extract raw material and get it to market. Moving beyond the period of abundance typified in the frontier state, is the era known as the classical expanding staples state. Here, staples industries are further expanded on, as the global demand for raw material increases. The state itself is also increasingly more involved in staples expansion, and resource extraction becomes a topic of national interest. Additionally, the “metropolis-hinterland” (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, p. 41) relationship is carved out between industrial cities in the south of the country and the sites of extraction, mostly in the northern portion of the country as both the federal and provincial governments become more vested into the extraction of resources. Around the first world war, was a rapid expansion in technological advances that influenced manufacturing processes. This ushered in the era of the mature staples state. Not only did these technologies allow for greater pursuit of raw materials where the initial stocks were plundered, it too brought about a change in the domestic economy of staples extraction, where technological processes were introduced to jobs that were previously done by labourers. Additionally, there was an increase in the extent that raw material was processed on Canadian soil

prior to being exported. This era saw the rapid growth of metropolis cities in the south, exacerbating tensions between rural and metropolitan areas. This explosion in extraction, processing and manufacturing brought a collapse for a lot of once abundant staples industries. The post-staples state that emerged in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the early 21<sup>st</sup> century has been characterized by changes in public perceptions around environmental issues and changes in availability to once abundant staples stocks. In response, some cities have shifted away from resource extraction towards more service-based industries. Some other areas, however, have remained firmly entrenched in staples resource extraction despite ongoing challenges towards access (Wellstead, 2007). When a national or sub-national jurisdiction continues to engage in staples extraction despite resource scarcity, it is known as a degenerative mature advanced staples political economy. This comes about when interests and resource availability constrict the ability for extraction to continue unimpeded. In the environmental movements of the 1960's and 1970's, for example, these interests came to the forefront of advocating for the protection of remaining resources. This resulted in various degrees of challenges for individual resource sectors (agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, and energy), as they had to react and adapt to the newfound policy dilemmas that arose from mid-century shifts in political preferences. These new preferences are described by the authors as "conservation, sustainability, and 'full-cost accounting'" (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, p. 38).

Despite changes in political preferences, there is evidence to suggest that certain subnational jurisdictions continue to operate in a degenerative state. Something that galvanized the Staples literature beginning in the 1960s was whether Canada could

consider itself truly a “post-staples” state, as it grew to prioritize manufacturing and a technological base (Wellstead, 2007). In “The (post) staples economy and the (post) staples state in historical perspective” (2007), Adam Wellstead discredits the post staples thesis put forward by scholars like Thomas Hutton (1994) suggesting that Canada was indeed moving in this direction. Instead, as Wellstead demonstrates with export dependency data, is that Canada’s post-staples reality is in fact extremely region specific and not beyond-staples dependency as previously articulated (Wellstead, 2007).

An important aspect to note in the Canadian context, is that the mechanism to get raw material from one area of the country to another with the goal of export was function of state investment rather than industrial investment. For example, railways were projects funded by the state. According to Wellstead, Harold Innis’ work remains influential insofar as he highlights the relationship between the Canadian state’s investment of resources into the infrastructural sector towards the transport of goods and services (2007). In a more expansive response to Harold Innis’ legacy, Duncan Cameron (2020) writes “the staples story is a cautionary tale Canadians ignore at their peril.” This statement plays into understanding the enduring nature of the Canadian state’s relationship with industry “the increasing dependence on staples correspondingly widened Canada’s technological backwardness, which only deepened the country’s dependence on unprocessed or semi-processed raw materials” (Wellstead, 2007, p. 9). In other words, staples theory is the first influx of scholarship in Canadian economics to highlight in detail the relationship between the market and the state. Its legacy remains influential in encapsulating Canada’s deep dependence on resource extraction, as well as how this dependency varies depending on the region and resource in question.

This reluctance, failure, or ignorance for policy makers to adapt to a post-staples economic agenda that is outlined in staples theory, has ongoing financial and social implications that connect with other bodies of scholarly study such as International Development Studies and political ecology. Reinvestment into industrial sectors can skew the financial landscape away from the favour of consumers and small businesses (Howlett & Kinney, 2016) in a process that is echoed by Wellstead: “economic wealth and political power are concentrated in Canadian business and political elites—often the same people who act as the instruments of interests in the industrialized countries importing the staples” (Wellstead, 2007, p. 11). From a social perspective, the dependence on staples resources reifies educational divides along geographic lines. As Howlett and Kinney describe “frontier staples economies have only a limited need for education and technical skills, and this serves to entrench a system of metropolitan-hinterland links both in economy and also in culture” (2016, p. 44).

Perhaps most influential, is the vulnerability that staples economies have regarding international market volatility. This has a direct influence in the governments capacity to invest in social spending. Despite these realities, and with the case studies of the different staples sectors demonstrating asymmetric evolution from a mature to a post-staples reality, governments still operate as though resources are the top economic priority. The authors argue that “policy makers often continue to use a policy portfolio designed to solve mature staples problems, rather than promote a post-staples trajectory” (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, pp. 53). This relationship becomes more complicated when one factors in the infrastructural nature of economic policy that reifies and entrenches partnership between the state and industry.

While staples theory helps to understand the scope of the conditions present in resource dependent communities, engagement with the broader literature on political economy helps to understand how these conditions interact with the state. Development studies literature asserts the notion of the “resource curse,” a foundational concept arising from the idea natural resource “abundance” can influence a host of negative democratic and economic outcomes (Rosser, 2006). As Rosser explains, resource curse literature falls into three streams. One, comparative cross-country studies can show how economic performance is influenced in detail, and often negatively, by resource availability. Outcomes include irrationality in state operations, “Dutch Disease,” meaning the carving out of other areas of the state in reaction to market volatility and revenue dependency. Behaviouralists, as Rosser points out, assert the relationship between resource availability and the preponderance for state actors to respond irrationally, effectively leading to “poor” resource management (Rosser, 2006). This is consistent too with assumptions in staples theory which posit that leaders continue to emphasize resource extraction despite it no longer being economically advantageous as states move out of and away from the modern staples state (Howlett & Kinney, 2016). Rentier theories are the third offshoot, emerging from state level analyses that help to understand how state officials react when not needing to respond so heavily to their voter base, as income is generated in rent style fashions from the industrial interests that are given access to land to extract their natural resources (Rosser, 2006; Carter & Zalik, 2016).

As articulated by Angela Carter and Anna Zalik (2016), “rent includes the financial payments to states as landlords over territory and over the natural resources

embedded within it” (p.54). As they explain, this system creates a false sense of security in the national economy and can also cause failures for states to diversify their revenue streams. Such inflation creates incongruencies with domestic market shares, leading to economic decay over time (Carter & Zalik, 2016).

### **Canadian Political Economy and Federalism**

The relationship between industry and the state would likely present differently in Canada if not for taking into consideration different dimensions of federal and provincial economic policy. In *Costly Fix: Power, Politics, and Nature in the Tar Sands*, Ian Urquhart (2018) develops an empirical account of the development of the Alberta oil sands and writes an analysis of the political economic policies that dictated their evolution. The early stages of the development in the oil sands came from negotiations with US industries and were about securing a steady supply of oil to American interests. In this time, the prevailing set of federal economic policy took on “a dramatic interventionist and nationalist note” (Urquhart, 2018, p. 48). The main federal program that demonstrated this perspective was the National Energy Policy (NEP), a policy that angered the Alberta provincial government as it shielded oil from competitive prices of the global market, and where the federal government had far more involvement in the oil sands than the province wished for them to have. Its legacy is more complex. As Urquhart demonstrates, the move from state interventionism to free market fundamentalism was fraught. The NEP acted as a mechanism that funneled federal funding into the industry to help it achieve self-sufficiency. But this false notion of self-sufficiency also bolstered the ability for the oil and gas industry to continue bargaining for even more government assistance at a time when free market policies were being

adopted (Urquhart, pp. 57, 2018). With this type of pro-industry re-regulation, not only did oil and gas corporations benefit from deregulation and free-trade agreements that emerged from the era of neoliberal economic policy, but corporate interests also benefitted in great measure from the imposition of other types of state intervention that provided benefits to industry. Thus, the emphasis is placed on a confluence of both policy that supports the free market, as well as policy kickbacks that support industry interests.

This mechanism of pro-market re-regulation, where free trade policies advocated for less state intervention, has been documented in other academic works. In *Fossilized* (2020), Angela Carter explains how governments continued to alter their policies in favour of deeper resource extraction in the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland. Carter argues that this tension has a few separate touchpoints. One touchpoint highlights the challenges related to the relationship between the federal government's progressive response towards reducing emissions and the province's commitment to a modern-staples state resource management approach. But in a similar vein to pro-industry re-regulation, the other touchpoint highlights how provincial environmental policy has been manipulated to support oil extraction. Carter builds out this work from 2005 to 2015. From that time, there were federal recommitments to the extraction of oil and gas reserves. The shift itself was due to outside forces dominated by an overarching Petro-capitalist market including fluctuations in oil prices, that caused Canadian oil reserves to be a topic of global attention. This, combined with the Conservative federal government, and its willingness to exploit Canadian resources,

launched the Alberta oil sands into a new level of prevalence on the world stage (Carter, 2020, pp. 5-7).

This inspiration for provincial governments to exploit the Alberta oil sands, as well as Saskatchewan's hydrofracking industry and Newfoundland's offshore drilling industry was not without heavy sub-national state intervention. Carter's conceptual framework touches on three main themes: Petro-capitalism, resource-cursed Petro-states, and the neoliberalism of environmental policy. Petro-capitalism speaks to the idea that our current political-economic system is both rooted in a limitless growth model, and that it is uniquely oriented towards the extraction of Petro-fuels. This model exists worldwide and therefore Canada is but a filament in a larger web of trade, export, and expansion. The way this system remains at the top of the hierarchy is not by accident, but rather through countless instances of state intervention meant to control the hegemonic narrative. The entrenchment of this global political economy at this moment in time, faces two "crises" (Carter, 2020, pp. 10-16). Not only can this system be characterized using staples theory terminology as operating in a degenerative mature (Howlett & Kinney, 2016) manner, but it is also bringing us into an unprecedented era of environmental destruction. This dichotomy, as Carter (2020) highlights, plays out at the provincial level in two ways. Resource-cursed Petro-states are both victims of the political-economic mandate to broaden their extractive efforts and victims of eroded policy, retracted investment, and environmental exploitation. Petro-states "often discover that possessing large oil reserves is no 'kiss of fortune,' ... governments that become highly dependent on oil extraction are often highly vulnerable to the 'resource curse' and come to know oil wealth to be more of a malediction than a benediction" (p. 13).

Along the backdrop of Petro-capitalism is the preponderance of what Carter calls the neoliberalization of environmental policy. This concept highlights how environmental policy was absorbed into a neoliberal policy framework dominated by efficiency, whose logic benefitted resource policies that mandated further extractive measures. Each provincial case study demonstrates how far each province has gone to support such an erosion of policy in favor of extraction. As Carter identifies, all three provinces, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland all began as hinterland states who initially engaged in primary staples economies. Oil afforded them a different resource that left them less vulnerable to environmental forces as well as volatility. It is now baked into the identity of governance within all three provinces. As the consequences of extraction loomed larger into the new millennium, each government decided to first suppress environmental regulatory capacity and then assimilate regulatory capacity into resource policy all together. Additionally, environmental assessment was reduced to nary a stamp of approval at worst, and environmental impact assessments which neglected key impacts, at best. All provinces faced an inability to effectively record environmental impact leading to large gaps in effective cost benefit analyses. Due to this, land use planning failed to account for ecosystem protection. Environmental monitoring programs also failed to collect the information necessary for informed policy outcomes. Finally, all three provinces were ineffective at responding to calls for meaningful emissions reductions. While all this depth of extraction came at the cost of environmental protection, so too did it prevent provincial governments from pivoting away from investment into oil and gas. Carter highlights that these restrictions are in line with neoliberal policy values which seek to retract government policy if it interferes with the

market. What is more—these issues are contributing to a global crisis of climate change that government officials have been unable to manage (Carter 2020, p. 125-131).

Finally, in Carter’s account, not only did the provincial governments in these three cases manipulate policy in support of the oil industry, but they also too made oil and its role in the economy central to their provincial identities (Carter, 2020, p. 127). The emphasis that has been placed on the positive importance of oil extraction on provincial economies is an important take away to for how to analyze community contention (Eaton & Kinchy, 2016) in the face of energy projects on local land. In her final chapter, Carter speaks of the movements both global and local that are consolidating to resist fossil fuel extraction (2020, p. 139). Employing language used in the contentious politics literature (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015), to explain Carter’s encapsulation, it seems as though there lacks an open political opportunity structure to disrupt the entrenched relationship that has been built between government and industry in support of oil extraction (Carter, 2020, p. 140-141). Still, she calls for organized social movements as a potential avenue for “challenging entrenched Petro-states” (Carter, 2020, p. 142).

### **From Political Economy to Contentious Politics**

Having defined resource-dependency by drawing on the staples literature, this thesis now turns to the literature on contentious politics to define contention. When there are concerted efforts to attract extractive industry to the area, there often exists varying degrees of episodes of contention which are traceable and can be categorized using the tenets of social movement methodology. Previous scholars have highlighted such a link and have asked the questions of which extractive projects become contentious and why

(Neville, 2021). Kate Neville (2021) has demonstrated that characteristics of political economy influence the way communities resist energy projects through the application of various mechanisms (Neville, 2021, p. 15). Three characteristics emerge which Neville describes as financialization, ownership and trade. Financialization refers to the distance between the extractive project being undertaken versus the investors who are supporting the project. These chains are often hidden and difficult to trace, thereby potentially contributing to either perceptions, or a true lack of responsibility or oversight. Ownership involves the various actors who lay claim to the project itself but also extend to those who have a vested interest in the community or land where the project is located. Ownership affects how different camps perceive a project's net benefits or liabilities and influence the public's trust or faith in the project or industry. Trade looks at the interactions and functions between the industry and the market; how external forces shape the market, how different groups engage with the sector at the local level and also in the larger economy; but namely the function of trade in Neville's encapsulation demonstrates that these interactions connect one isolated rural area experiencing resource extraction to others in a larger network (Neville, 2021). For instance, when chains of investment are long and difficult to trace, this obfuscation may lead to a trigger in ownership claims to the land in question and a concerted effort of resistance by the local population who lay said ownership claims. Those who resist projects can benefit from the distance of long financialization chains, as they can capitalize, or to use Neville's word, trade, on a network of supporters previously unrelated to the episode in question (Neville, 2021). Thus, these characteristics (financialization, ownership and trade), colour the mechanisms of mobilization that are

adopted when people lay claims against a resource project by employing the contentious politics mechanisms of scale shift, identity activation and brokerage (Neville, 2021).

As mentioned, Neville (2021) has noted that political economic conditions are known to spark contention. For a broader understanding, we return to tenets of staples theory. This is because staples theory, particularly linkages, can help add context to a contentious episode; an episode, that if taken on the surface, may appear “extra loud” in relation to what it is fighting against. Sometimes identities that become triggered in contemporary episodes are not well understood. Linkages give us a tool gain insight into their underlying grievance. In this conceptualization, a loss of linkages may appear like an injury that can “flare-up” over time depending on certain external conditions.

Linkages (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018; Watkins, 2006a; Wellstead, 2007) is a concept that is of enduring importance in the staples literature and are used to explain the influence that the export sector may wield within the domestic economy. Linkages can be broadly explained in three ways. Firstly, forward linkages are the benefits that a processing industry could bring to improve the existing manufacturing sector in a specific area. Backward linkages offer support to the domestic economy through employment (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018, p. 170). Introduced later was the concept of final demand linkages. As Mel Watkins explains (2006a), final demand linkages were introduced to provide greater context to the understanding of forward and backward linkages. Final demand linkages examine the relationship between foreign ownership and the state, and it is at this point where the unique properties of state-market relations influence in great deal how the economy develops (2006a). The melange of linkages is referred to as “spread effects.” (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018, p.170). Central to Bowles

and MacPhail's (2018) argument is that to some extent, our understanding of linkages can bring us closer to understanding resource contestation in Canada. Bowles and MacPhail highlight that the logic of linkages can be translated into benefits to the domestic economy, and enrichment at the local economic level. In at least one empirical case, absence of strong linkages have been noted as being contributing factors to effectively stalled pipeline construction (2018). They employ the case study of northern British Columbia, based on its geographic location and its relevance as a resource exporter; including mining, liquified natural gas; along with infrastructural projects meant to facilitate export such as pipelines and export terminals. Douglas Channel Watch (DCW), an environmental rights group in the area, was vocal in their opposition for the pipeline and their five points make up the bulk of the case study. To their points, linkages offer some insight into resistance efforts waged by towards the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline. For one, it would not afford forward linkages because it would not bolster the existing manufacturing industry. Nor would it provide backward linkages as those hired to work on the pipeline were speculated to include foreign workers and therefore not employ people from the local community. Finally, it would not afford demand linkages because the resource being moved through the pipeline, bitumen, was set solely for export and therefore not set for consumption within the Canadian market (2018). Ultimately, they conclude that spread effects afford some insight into understanding why certain communities decide to mobilize against resource extraction, however they caution that staples theory does not account for three other reasons for contention: "environmental concerns, a resurgent Indigenous rights movement, and concerns over procedural justice have all arisen as key site of

contestation, issues which largely fall beyond the concerns of staples theory.” (Bowles & MacPhail, 2018, p. 176).

Eaton and Kinchy (2016) have argued that simply the perception of economic trade-offs in the face of extractive projects is enough to encourage people to hide their true concerns, suppressing dissent. The authors argue this is due to an “elite framing” where projects with potentially harmful effects are positioned against “incommensurable values” causing the perceived economic benefits to outweigh the perceived harms associated to loss around something a community holds in high regard. In their words “our observations lead us to believe that when rural people assume trade-offs, they are willing to accept some harms, even if these could potentially be reduced through collective effort” (Eaton & Kinchy, 2016, p. 26-27). Despite these conditions, it was found that community members still attempted to engage in individual acts of dissent towards oil and gas operations. Interviewees were reported to stand up to industry representatives when they felt their values were being infringed upon, whether it be industry workers who community members felt were being disrespectful to the land, or individuals challenging industry for compensation.

Neville and Martin (2022) reconceptualize Rob Nixon’s framework of slow violence by re-orientating it and introducing a typology meant instead to delineate how justice and integrity-oriented episodes can diffuse themselves over time and space and continue to influence contemporary episodes of similar natures. A landscape that may appear untouched may be a result of a history of justice not immediately apparent. To articulate further “Nixon (2011) identifies complex causal chains with non-linear modes of connection, or what scholars in science and technology studies might call

‘entanglements’” (Neville & Martin 2022, citing Nixon, 2011, p.193; Liboiron, 2015). Neville and Martin develop a typology towards tracing such relations that consist of three categories: people, projects, and processes. With people, Neville and Martin trace social connections that ebb and flow because of diffuse inter-personal relations. In the context of environmental justice, this emerges as community stakeholders, those with power or authority at the organizational level or whom have the capacity to bring an environmental protest to higher degrees of salience. These are the individuals who can mobilize their community or may act in the role of land protector. Iterations of social relations are vast and ever changing. As the authors state “social relations can thus be traced through individuals who take on symbolic significance, groups who forge shared identities, and networks of organizations that carry memory or historical knowledge” (Neville & Martin, 2022). The second reference in their typology, projects, refers to the material relations that ground people, the natural landscape and place to one another. This is again a diffuse and constantly evolving pathway, a concept that hovers above time and place in a measure superseding a linear relationship between two points. “Since landscapes are constructed through the entanglement of social and ecological dynamics (Tsing, 2004), they can be understood both materially and symbolically” (Neville & Martin, 2022, citing Tsing, 2004, pp. 197). Land claims, and land occupation are both instances that the authors provide of such material projects. Finally, they point to processes as their final pathway. With processes, they point towards the relationship between mobilizers and political institutions. Such relationships can work to either recognize or ignore certain movements. “It is through ideas about similarities among groups or shared types of grievances that certain institutions are accorded legitimacy and

significance” (Neville & Martin, 2022, p. 198). This typology was then applied to gain a deeper understanding of political-economic resistance in the Mackenzie River Valley. They argue that the Berger Inquiry, along with the rise of Indigenous self-governance and the community movement towards food sovereignty, contributed to paths of environmental protection that continue to permeate the region to this day. This article theorizes that employing a method of tracing positive outcomes of environmental justice pre-emptively, rather than researching episodes of environmental injustice after the damage has occurred, can strengthen community resolve and offer a more sophisticated approach towards understanding outcomes of environmental movements. This type of resolve can instill confidence in community perceptions, as noted by Eaton and Kinchy (2016), particularly in situations where communities feel they have little decision-making power. By tracing episodes where people are making small-scale efforts to defend their property, or locale, opportunity exists to measure how strongly dissent is felt, despite how quiet the act appears. Interactions between the market and state, while they influence state policy outcomes (Carter, 2020), do not fully explain why some communities in resource-dependent states choose to mobilize against extractive projects, while others do not.

### **Bringing Together Linkages, Political Opportunity Structures and Slow Violence**

A framework that analyzes why environmental contention may arise at some times and not others in resource-dependent communities requires an assessment of what characteristics shape these communities. According to this survey of the literature, with an emphasis on staples theory, one would expect that a province operating in a mature staples state would take on a few key characteristics. For one, it would be safe to assume

that, despite potentially possessing forward and/or backward linkages (industrial reinvestment, jobs), final demand linkages (re-investment in the domestic economy) would be absent from the equation. This can take on two dimensions. One, a degenerative state might succumb to boom-and-bust cycles and/or mass exodus, which has largely gone uninspected in this survey of the literature. The other: As the state ignores the call to transition away from resource exploitation, they may find themselves devoting more time and resources towards more invasive methods of extraction.

If a state adopts the latter, it will also potentially need to adopt market fundamentalist policies. This is because the state will potentially need to impose by clawing away at environmental regulations so industry can encroach in previously regulated territories. Therefore, it can be expected to see an adoption of free market (read: neoliberal) economic policy, whilst simultaneously removing barriers for industrial development. Social policy also can take a hit, considering the balancing act where states need to suppress aspects of social policy to make a place look more enticing to industry. The state has a mechanism to stifle potential dissent related to this retrenchment. Government actors can use language and rhetoric to communicate to the public that industry brings jobs, and such jobs would be lost if not for extractive projects. They can allow industry to infiltrate dimensions of social life to reiterate that resource extraction is woven into their identity as a province or community, effectively allowing industry to replace aspects of the government's role in daily life.

This would change the social characteristics related to the community. Presumably, in this type of state, there will be a subset of the population that will keep concerns to themselves if they have doubts regarding extraction projects. They may,

however, take their frustration out in other ways, such as blocking the companies in question from accessing private land, or by being vocal if the company is engaging in disrespectful practices with the land in question. But they will not mobilize in large numbers because they would not wish to be perceived as being against local employment (even though these projects do not always bring local employment to begin with). It could also be inferred that provincial governments who are enthusiastic about managing this way might stifle the ability for the community to objectively assess for themselves what spread effects are present within a given project, and if that would be enough to weigh against the costs (environmental destruction, land claims, etc.) associated with the project. Again, this would have implications related to another aspect, that being the role of “participatory processes” (Neville & Weinthal, 2016) in public engagements over industrial pursuits. As Neville and Weinthal (2016) demonstrate, it would be expected that a state operating in this manner would open public consultation but use the venue to attempt to sway the public towards the interest of industry. For example, the tension of “whose science is the right science” might emerge because experts speaking at these venues may be portrayed as an objective academic source but are ultimately looked at with skepticism when it is discovered that they work for the industry in question. Their validity on the risk assessment from a project, campaign or otherwise is then undermined. If participatory processes are regarded by the public as captured by industry interests, it would likely then deter people from engaging in these institutional pathways of consultation. On the other hand, it would probably make them angry enough to forge another path themselves, unless of course there is fear of social retribution.

In a playbook for mobilized contention, the final dimension examined in this study is whether legacies of resistance may permeate people's consciousness and circumvent otherwise constrictive atmospheres that prevent contention. In other words, histories of environmental protection might be important to analyze so that scholars may predict outcomes related to public mobilization. In the case of New Brunswick, economic linkages seem to reignite embedded debates. But because of the unique nature of forestry, whereby the root of the issue comes from frustration around land allocation, the case deviates from what one would expect. This is because, although forestry is considered a renewable resource, and therefore mature, the reality of the industry is that it must continue to ensure demand is met, and this means often requesting further access to more land, thus perpetuating the cycle of converting naturally existing tracks of forest into monoculture style plantations. The act of further extractive measures indicates that the case possesses degenerative qualities where the government regime continues to give more and more land to industry at costs to other types of land uses, such as community forestry. In a degenerative state we would expect that mobilization would remain quiet overall but in New Brunswick but this has not been the case. This is most likely because New Brunswickers have a long history of identity with the Acadian Forest beyond just economic gain. Speculatively this may have something to do with past harms but may also be due to contemporary changes in the forest that signal discontent. Another aspect of the relationship between industry and government is that they have become business partners in the sense that the regime relies on industry for revenue generated from stumpage fees, which I discuss later. The erosion of traditional linkages in the province has made two things happen. For one, the province engages in market fundamentalism,

where historically they have invested largely in the industry. The provincial government must now continue investing resources to combat market fluctuations if they want to continue seeing returns. And two, it has historically given the industrial base immense power to bargain with the political regime at the expense of other actors, thereby creating a more closed off, so to speak, political opportunity structure. Largely, this project will attempt to understand further what these conditions mean for political action.

### **Research Design**

This project will conduct a most-similar system research design examining variation over time. Gaal (2021) suggests that most similar research is a valuable design because it eliminates the broad scope that comes with needing to explain the variation in each system that a case operates within. Without needing to acknowledge such high degrees of variation, the researcher can then spend their time focusing on what few conditions make each case different (p. 220). In chapter three, I first begin by introducing the legislative and technological structure of the forestry sector in its current form. To follow, I introduce the two primary political groups involved with raising grievances: the forestry base and the environmental base. Then, I examine three episodes of contention employing my analytical framework exploring the causal factors related to market conditions, reactions from the state, and volume of contention. These cases have been selected because they bring into focus the larger debate of silviculture practices and more specifically the contention behind glyphosate spraying that occurred over a twenty-three-year period between 2000-2010; 2010-2018; and 2018-2023. In Chapter 4, I borrow from political-economic and environmental historical scholarship as a framing tool to explain these groups and to contextualize their place within the wider political,

economic and environmental context. To measure these instances of quiet and loud environmental mobilization, the study uses process tracing, and document analyses of grey literature; as well as economic data and news articles, combined with three key informant interviews. Data for this research project, including key informant interviews, was collected according to a research design reviewed and approved by the University of New Brunswick Research Ethics Board, file number #REB 2024-177.

## **Chapter 3: Linkages, Political Opportunity Structures, and Loud Politics in NB**

### **Introduction**

The intent of this chapter is to illustrate how contentious politics have had the capacity to increase or decrease in sound frequency under certain conditions within environmental contention in New Brunswick. As previously explained, political regimes that operate within a staples dependent province often intervene with economic or social policies when it comes to maintaining a province's resource economy. Often, market fluctuations serve as a catalyst that spurs the existing political regime into implementing policies that are meant to assist the affected industry through periods of strife (Carter, 2020; Howlett & Kinney, 2016; Hutton, 2007). In the contentious politics literature, the ability for a political regime to exert policy decision-making denotes a high degree of government capacity. Tilly and Tarrow (2015), to revisit, describe the political opportunity structure as high capacity and democratic when a state has both a high degree of government capacity, along with a large array of avenues for the public to engage in democratic modes of expression (p.58). New Brunswick largely fits into this category, but the conditions around government decision making and the contention they provoke are not static. Before the description of the cases, I begin by briefly explaining the legislative background of forestry management, as well as the recurring political actors relevant to the cases. These include groups or individual actors who fall under a wider umbrella of "forestry actors" as well as environmental groups. Then, using my analytical framework, I examine the cases through four steps. For one, I describe the

market conditions that are present within the cases. Two, I explain how the political regime reacts to the existing market conditions. Three, I describe how the political regime is either operating within the standards set by the existing political opportunity structure or deviating from it. And finally, I explain how this sequencing of events affects the public's propensity for contentious action. After I present the cases, I provide an analysis drawing on the benefits and drawbacks for this framework in its use explaining how contention becomes louder or quieter under certain conditions.

### **Legislative Background**

While forestry has a long history in New Brunswick (Parenteau, 2013, McLaughlin & Parenteau, 2023), the current iteration of the forestry industry began in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century with the transition from lumber to pulp and paper as the province's primary export. Over the last century, there has been a significant evolution in both the understanding and implementation of resource management. Ross (1997) refers to these policy eras largely as the conservation era, spanning from the 1880s to the 1930s and the resource management era spanning from the 1930s into the late 1980s. The resource management era was typified by legislation and policy concerned with the extent to which Crown forests were sustainable enough to ensure long term supply. For the most part, current legislative frameworks in operation in the province are similarly borne out of the concerns that typified this era.

All current Crown land management in New Brunswick is dictated by the Crown *Lands and Forests Act* (1980), enacted in 1982. Its administration falls under the purview of the Department of Natural Resources who oversees the implementation and adherence of the Act across the province's ten timber licensee holders. The primary goal

of the *Crown Lands and Forests Act* (1980) is to ensure even distribution and supply of timber to the forest industry. In exchange of ownership rights, leaseholders are required to produce forestry management plans designed to “give details about harvesting, silviculture and related activities” (Martin, 2003). Adjacent to the Crown Lands and Forests Act (1980) is the Natural Products Act (1999). Organizationally, the Natural Products Act (1999) is responsible for the New Brunswick Forest Products Commission (FPC), although the commission is an independent body tasked with “overseeing the marketing relationships involving forest industries (pulp mills and sawmills); forest products marketing boards (private woodlot owners and producers) and the provincial government” (FPC, n.d.). Currently, there exists seven marketing boards across the province and industry is required to negotiate prices through said boards. Most recently, the use of marketing boards has been left vulnerable due to a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal that affirmed the ability for J.D. Irving Ltd., along with other industry operators, to bypass the use of the marketing boards to negotiate directly with suppliers (Smith, 2018).

### **Political Actors**

Defining contention over time requires the identification of the actor groups involved in making claims against the government regime. As it is understood, the politics of contention regarding glyphosate involves the environmental base, but this is also intimately linked within a broader base of actors who raise concerns over the appropriate use of Crown land. I refer to this broad base as “forestry politics.” I expand on these actors and their subgroups in Chapter 4.

### **The Forestry Base**

For one, there are those who operate small wood-lots and capitalize on the land for economic purposes. This camp can be identified as the woodlot owners who are situated in economic competition with the Provincial government over wood supply. Their plight has been well examined in recent years, most notably by the Private Forest Task Force who published their findings in a report in 2012. The report highlights the key constraints facing the small woodlot sector. Because the larger forest industry is comprised of exporters vulnerable to fluctuations in the global market, the most “rational” (Floyd, Ritchie & Rotherham, 2012) option for large producers is to buy their wood from the source that offers them the best prices and the greatest reliability. In New Brunswick, the provincial government sets the stumpage rates for Crown land and serves often as the lowest bidder and most reliable supplier. It also benefits from the revenues generated by the arrangement. In this context, the Provincial government is both the entity that should be making rational decisions for the good of the industry, and the competitor against small-scale harvesters. Because of the dual nature of the provincial government’s involvement in the market, a true competitive market is unachievable. If the government acquiesces to the demands of the small woodlot owners by reinstating them as the primary suppliers, then the chances may be high that industry will be unable to take on the additional overhead involved with higher stumpage fees, and unreliable supply. This notion is summarized in the Private Forest Task Force Report: “woodlot owners want the government to intervene in the market because prices are low, given the imperfect competition in New Brunswick’s market. But the government is a self-interested party, and the Minister empowered to act in this regard is also responsible for managing (and producing revenue from Crown forests)” (Floyd, Ritchie & Rotherham,

2013, p.27). But externally, neither small nor “too big to fail” businesses are left unscathed to wider market pressures.

### **The Environmental Base**

The environmental base can be divided into two categories, those who possess environmental sensibilities and those who rely on the forest for recreational uses. Both will be explored as follows. For one, the modern environmental movement emerged in New Brunswick in the late 1960’s coincidentally considering the thesis’ preoccupation with a similar environmental hazard, because of aerial spraying of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and its negative impacts on human and ecological health. Public opposition of the spray first originated from outdoors groups and coalesced around the threat of the spray on Atlantic Salmon populations, but the base quickly expanded and led to the establishment of organizations dedicated to the broader goal of environmental protection in general, including CCNB in 1969 (McLaughlin, 2011). Through lobbying efforts, the environment became a “legitimate political issue within the provincial bureaucracy” (McLaughlin, 2011, pp. 4) also becoming an entrenched claimant against the pulp and paper industry, the ones who seem unilaterally targeted for their use of herbicide spraying. For instance, rarely if ever do anti-spray proponents target the agricultural sector (Legere, 2019), even though the agricultural sector is the second highest user of glyphosate in New Brunswick behind forestry (OCMOH, 2016). In this category I also include for the most part the academic community concerned with forestry management, as well as additional claimants whose concerns around glyphosate extend primarily to concerns over its impact on public health. The earliest news articles found reported that glyphosate was being used for the

first time on un-licensed Crown land in the summer of 2000, with a plan to spray upwards of 13,000 hectares of forest (Klager, 2000). This was not the first time however, that glyphosate had been applied to the Acadian Forest in New Brunswick, as it was reported to be a standard industry practice on industrially operated freeholds for some time prior, although that timeline remains unclear. The new program to spray unlicensed Crown land came under fire from environmental advocates at the Conservation Council of New Brunswick [CCNB] (Klager, 2000). Then policy director for CCNB David Coon, commented on the spray, noting that there remained “a variety of health risks associated with herbicides” and that the “worst decision that was ever made in this province was to give the wood-processing industry any say over Crown lands” (Klager, 2000). This also marks the first time that glyphosate was linked to the wider forestry debate in the province.

Secondly, there are the camps who profit from the recreational use of the forest both for leisure and for economic advantage (hunters, guides, anglers, naturalists, etc.,). The final piece of the puzzle that requires background information, especially as it relates to the final case in the chapter, is the decline in the White-Tailed deer population. Reported in newspaper articles in 2000 were reports of population decline for the species in the northernmost parts of the province. At this time, much of the blame for the population decline pointed towards harsh winters and predator interference, but as we will see, white-tail deer population decline erupts for the contemporary anti-spray movement in the 2010's. In relation to these past reports that New Brunswick's northern White-Tail Deer population was on the decline, there were reports that Quebec had managed to reestablish its deer population in the St. Lawrence area crediting, amongst

other things, the “[development of] forest management plans, specific to deer wintering yards, in conjunction with forestry companies and volunteer groups” (“A tough year,” 2001). Coincidentally, Quebec also represented a neighboring jurisdiction who had just recently at the time banned the use of glyphosate in their forestry management practices, opting instead for the use of thinning crews (Poirier, 2000). This issue is not “new” in the sense that concerns over ungulate populations have been a topic of media discussion as far back as 1964. At some point between 1959 and 1964, the total volume of deer killed in the hunting season was reduced from 25,000 to 10,000 individuals (Burgoyne, 1964). In comparison, the total number of deer harvested in the 2024 hunting season totalled 11,746. What this indicates is that the overarching contemporary concern that numbers are being reduced at a rapid rate is unfounded if examining the issue in a historical context. Speculatively, contributory causes to the extent of the rapid decline in the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century could concern changes in land right distribution, but also the overall operationalization of natural resource management. The identity of the “hunter” is an ownership identity left largely unexplored in this work but warrants further research.

While the forestry and environmental camps sometimes overlap in terms of the claims they make, in the following cases we will see that they have not always coalesced. Glyphosate has been a fractious issue for coalescence of these two groups because herbicide spraying is an essential component to the silviculture practices implemented by small-scale foresters. In theory, unity between the two identity groups would lead to the capacity for contention to become louder. When political regimes alter the structure of ownership rights in the forest, as will be demonstrated, public outcry is

the loudest. The problem is, historically, no matter how organized the movement becomes, the provincial government has historically not made concessions big enough to quell the public's concerns. Because of this, the movement then fractures and is left in a "holding pattern" (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 125), or in other words there remains always a low-grade hum of dissatisfaction. Environmental activists and private woodlot owners alike have historically had Bonafide grievances regarding the management of the public forest. Following the logic, these grievances will become more acute depending on fluctuations in market conditions that act to reopen old wounds and pluck exposed nerves.

### **Case Study 1: 2000-2010**

#### **Changes in Market Conditions in the 2000s**

The millennium began with the forest industry facing drastic fluctuations in demand in both its sawmill, and its pulp and paper sectors; combined with a growingly acute concern within industry circles over the future of New Brunswick's wood supply. To summarize the former, concerns arose in November 2000, indicating that small woodlot owners were experiencing the negative impacts of a decline in the global demand for softwood. This decrease in global demand was reported in the media to have been spurred by a decline in overall housing starts in the Asian market combined with competition arising from U.S sawmills whose wood supply had been on an increase. These factors were identified as causing a negative effect on the price of softwood lumber being sold to sawmills in the province from harvests on private woodlots (Finnamore, 2000). For private woodlot owners, already being undercut from the

amendments in the Crown Land and Forests Act twenty years prior, this was an especially contentious issue. Declines in demand translated to an approximately \$60 drop in the price of lumber per thousand board feet. Some woodlot owners commented that the decline in sale prices for softwood lumber was further constraining their operations considering increases in fuel costs, denoting a trickle-down effect hindering forwards linkages “it has a ripple down effect. If we receive less money, then there’s less money available. It doesn’t do much for your confidence as an operator. You wonder, should I buy a new piece of equipment or is this time to get by with what you’ve got”

(Finnamore, 2000). A trade agreement United States and the Atlantic Canadian lumber industry also expired, opening tariff renegotiations that placed additional costs on New Brunswick producers. These new costs caused a widespread effect on the overall sawmill industry, causing seven sawmills in the province to go “idle” (“A tough year,” 2001). On the other side of the industry, pulp and paper began to feel the hard-hitting effects of the global decline in demand for paper products. Workers at the St. Anne-Nackawic mill collectively agreed to “pay cuts over 18 months in order to keep the mill running.” In the Northwest, the UPC-Kymenne mill in Miramichi “announced temporary shutdowns” and the Smurfit-Stone mill in Bathurst implemented temporary layoffs (“A tough year,” 2001).

But this was in no way the only issue that the province’s forestry industry was experiencing. Concomitantly, from about 2004, the province was marred by fluctuations in the global paper market, combined with a strong Canadian dollar and high energy costs to already hard-hit mill operations (Roberts & Woodbridge, 2008). The industry was further hindered by the US economic crisis in 2008, which effectively exacerbated

the decline in lumber exports due to stalls in the housing market (Government of New Brunswick (GNBa, 2010; Jenkinson, 2013). New Brunswick witnessed the closure of 25 sawmills and 3 pulp and paper mills (Parenteau, 2013) and industry experienced a total loss of 6,000 forestry related jobs (GNBb, 2014). Exports in Canadian lumber to the United States faced a systemic decline from 80 to 63 percent in total exports (from 2007) (Jenkinson, 2013). The economy took a massive hit as “between 2004 and 2007, the value of New Brunswick’s Forest products manufacturing output dropped by an estimated \$1.2 billion—from a peak of \$4.2 billion in 2004” (Roberts & Woodbridge, 2008, p. 7).

### **Changes in Political Regime:**

From the supply side, there was the need to address the internal challenge on how to adequately manage the wood supply to remain competitive in the market in the future. This issue was brought to the government’s attention by a letter penned by the New Brunswick Forest Products Association (FPA) and addressed to minister of Natural Resources, Jeannot Volpé. Motivated by concerns about the long-term survivability of the industry about harvest rates, the letter urged the government to allow the industry greater access to crown land, and stronger measures to ensure an increased harvest into the future. At the turn of the century, most of the conversation facing the forest industry regarded concerns from the FPA that the province would face a decline in harvestable woodland spurring “implications for industrial competitiveness” (Erdle & MacLean, 2005). The political regime reacted in two ways to these market conditions. From the supply side, the Government did not act immediately with policy, but it did heed the request from industry to table a report examining the state of the forest stock. The report

was contracted out to Scandinavian based forestry firm Jaakko Pöyry. The findings echoed the concerns raised by the NBFPA that contemporary management practices would cause challenges for future harvest rates, subsequently having dire consequences on the industry in the future (Erdle & MacLean, 2005; Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 2004). Staving off a future collapse, according to the report, meant that a more rigorous silviculture program needed to be implemented, along with an increase in tree plantations and an overhaul of existing forest management strategies (Anderson & MacLean, 2015; Erdle & MacLean, 2005). In 2003, the Lord government, facing re-election, made the campaign promise to reinstate small woodlot owners as primary suppliers as part of his platform's "sustainable forestry" initiative (White, 2003). He was re-elected in June of that year with a majority government. Also, following one of the recommendations listed in the Jaakko Pöyry report, the conservative government promised to undertake large-scale public consultation.

The re-elected Lord government mentioned the Jaakko Pöyry Report in the July 2003 Speech from the Throne in the first session of the 55<sup>th</sup> Legislative Assembly. The speech highlighted that "strengthening the role of Legislative Committees is a key commitment of the government's platform" (Lord, 2003) and reaffirmed the government's desire to gauge public input regarding forestry management. That same month, the Select Committee on Wood Supply was created with a two-fold mandate to identify areas of opportunity to help increase available wood supply as laid out by the Jaakko Pöyry report, and to identify avenues for revamped management strategies (Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 2004).

### **Changes in Political Opportunity Structure**

The Lord government's actions on the forestry issue were consistent with what would be expected from a high-capacity state (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 58). This is due to a few factors. For one, industrial interests spoke to the Lord government directly in 2000 through their letter to Minister Jeannot Volpé. It can be surmised that industry did so because the provincial government holds authority and control over New Brunswick crown land (despite its status as technically being held in trust for the people), and industry knew that it was the provincial government would possess the ability to give them what was being asked for. This indicates a high degree of government capacity. To counter public dissent over further land allotment to industry, the Lord government undertook measures to implement avenues for widespread public consultation. This is also indicative of a high-capacity democratic state, where public input is expected to be high. In Tilly and Tarrow's words "democracy means the extent to which people subject to a given government's authority have broad, equal, political rights, [who can] exert significant direct influence over government personnel and policy (p. 57). These political rights can take the shape of "elections and referenda" (p. 57). Lord's majority government win in 2003 could be attributed to his campaign promise to reinstitute woodlot owners as primary suppliers, thereby demonstrating the ability for the public to feel as though they are active participants in the system, who have a demonstrable say in how policies are shaped. Equally, the sheer volume of public input in the Select Committee on Wood Supply (as noted below) may show that people who were speaking up had faith in the public consultation process. The number of presentations and written submissions may have been as high as they were because the public perceived the venue as a location where change could be made and their voices heard.

### **Changes in Contention:**

Public participation was loud in this era because the political regime chose to consult with the public, mainly about the issue on wood supply. The Jaakko Pöyry report amassed significant public outcry from environmental groups as well as concerned citizens and academics, pitting the overall debate into the camps of forest interests and those concerned for environment and biodiversity (Anderson & MacLean, 2015). This notion is affirmed by an academic expert in a thesis interview<sup>1</sup>:

“it [public outcry] kinda came to a head in the mid 2000’s with the Jaakko Pöyry report...the agenda of the industry was all laid out [in that report] that had to do with moving much more aggressively to industrial plantation-based forestry and high levels of management, including herbicide spraying.”

Public interest on the wood supply issue was so vast that the select committee fielded a total of thirteen public hearings (Erdle & MacLean, 2005). In the media, environmental groups like CCNB were openly critical of the decision to engage an industrial firm like Jaakko Pöyry to study the issue of wood availability. The “Coalition for the Fair Application of the Crown Lands and Forests Act” group comprised of “environmental groups, woodlot owners, woodcutters and community groups” presented to the Legislature on concerns over forestry management at the end of 2001 (Firth, 2001). There were also letters to the editor-style newspaper submissions defending industry, particularly J. D. Irving Ltd, indicating that the debate was being discussed openly in the public (Firth, 2001). Prior to the announcement that the province would

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<sup>1</sup> Personal Interview conducted by author. January 28, 2025, Fredericton, New Brunswick

undertake public consultation, the New Brunswick Federation of Woodlot Owners (NBFWO) wrote their own letter to the Minister of Natural Resources requesting a revision of the Crown Lands Act that would reinstate their role as primary suppliers to the industry (Folkins, 2002). Minister Volpe was cited blaming changes in the market and a lack of supply as the reason why woodlot owners were currently upset (Folkins, 2002). When it was time to engage the select committee, the desire to publicly participate was so popular that the number of hearings grew from seven to thirteen. The final report of the Select committee remarked that the “sheer amount of presenters and written submissions was overwhelming” (Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 2004, p.11). In these thirteen hearings, the committee fielded over 200 in person, formal presentations along with an additional 252 written submissions. There was at least one formal presentation heard by the committee that linked forestry management practices outlined in the Jaakko Pöyry (what the presenter viewed as clear-cutting and more herbicide use) to a decline in deer populations (Berry, 2003). In the end the Select Committee on Wood Supply tabled a total of twenty-five recommendations distributed across twelve key issue areas. In sum, the contention that arose during this period could be labelled as loud considering the amount of public outcry that arose with the Jaakko Pöyry report and the subsequent public hearings. Considering the provincial government’s overall capacity to field this contention the regime at the time fell squarely into the high government capacity/high public input quadrant.

## **Case Study 2: 2010-2018**

### **Changes in Market Conditions**

By 2010, many of the forestry sectors were still suffering significantly from a lack of demand. Mills continued to operate under capacity and in some cases, continued to remain idle. In some instances, these mill closures undercut the production chain resulting in under manufactured wood being sent elsewhere for processing (Bundale, 2010). This seemed to be especially the case in the Northwest portion of the province, who were also having to contend with the realities of a lack of supply. For example, the Northwestern corridor of the province was dealing with a low supply that made meting out the remaining wood supply to all interested parties be it industry or small-scale enterprise, a contentious situation leading to anger and frustration for the small-scale foresters (McDavid, 2010). According to the FPA, the market crashes translated into a loss of 8,000 forestry related positions and half of all forest manufacturing facilities closed (Llewellyn, 2010).

But there was another fluctuation/decline in this time, that being with outdoors groups. There were at least two instances where the outdoors groups were running up against the pulp and paper industry to the point where it effected their market. In one instance, an ATV trail enthusiast club was expressing concerns after Acadian Timber was granted harvesting rights close to their designated ATV trails. For this group, the overarching concern involved a potential decline in membership enrollment (Leclerc, 2013). The other instance was with a decline in deer licenses allotted to hunters in the province, with a drop in harvest from the previous year. The media reported that winter conditions were unduly harsh on the herds and made no mention of glyphosate or the forestry industry at large being a reason for their decline. But connections were already being made by wildlife groups, like the New Brunswick Wildlife Trust Fund (WBWTF)

in their Fall 2014 newsletter, linking low deer numbers to glyphosate spraying, attributing their decline in population to the lack of food sources done away with by the spray (NBWTF, 2014).

### **Changes in Political Regime**

The critical depression of the forest industry had an influence in the shape of the 2010 provincial election. Liberal leader Shawn Graham promised that if re-elected, the government would allocate more Crown land to the Miramichi Lumber Products mill to bolster job growth in the Northwest. On the other hand, the conservatives campaigned on the promise that they would establish an opportunity for public consultation if elected, saying “we need for the largest industry in the province to get back on track after four difficult years of business closures and weak export markets” (“Tories want forestry forum,” 2010). The newly elected PC Alward government held true to its campaign promise to institute a forestry summit. The one-day event, held in the fall of 2010, gathered stakeholders including economists from large scale firms as well as members of industry and government officials. Prior to the year end the conservative government released an action plan highlighting seven key areas of opportunity for regrowth but once again, the points were unclear how small-scale foresters would have an opportunity to bring their lumber to market (GNBa, 2010). It was also unclear how much more crown land would be allocated to industry, leading to frustration both on the end of the public as well as for producers. If the government was listening to the main reports published in the years prior, then it would have been aware that so long as wood supply was secured and that new markets were found, then the pulp and paper industry would rebound (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 2003; Jaakko Pyöry, 2002; Roberts &

Woodbridge, 2008) But, the steps required to bring to fruition these economic benefits would ultimately run in stark contrast to the desires of small-scale operators and the greater public motivated by environmental concerns. Reaching this conclusion influenced a great deal of indecision on behalf of the government. This, at least perceived indecision came from a deluge of task forces and their findings that replaced quick action, leaving few in the province feeling satisfied. The reports sparked ire from industry who were left unsatisfied with the lack of clarity on long term timber objectives (Huras, 2011). They sparked ire from conservationists who cautioned against proposals outlined by the Crown land task force that Crown land be managed by a regulatory board independent from the Department of Natural Resources (Chilibeck, 2011). Finally, the reports, especially that from the task force on private woodlots in 2012, sparked ire from small wood-lot owners who were frustrated that timber objectives from private wood supply were not set (Huras, 2012). Instead of releasing their forestry management plan at the promised time, the government waited until such reports were finalized (Chilibeck, 2011) even though on the face of it these reports were yielding very little in terms of utilitarian solutions. In 2012, the Alward government made a small concession to small-woodlot owners, mandating a ban of wood cut on crown land by pulp and paper “until further notice or until we find an export market” (Macinnis, 2012). But, this drew skepticism from small-scale foresters on how it would be implemented and monitored, and it also inflamed industrial interests who indicated that “these decisions, made in haste and without a full understanding of the consequences, risk jobs and investment opportunities in New Brunswick” (Irving, 2013).

### **Changes in Political Opportunity Structure**

It would be fair to summarize the period of 2010-2014 as one that began with a great deal of effort to understand how the industry could find its legs again, but ended with a forestry strategy that ultimately ran against the wants and needs of the public. The final forestry strategy, officially titled *Putting our Resources to Work: A Strategy for Crown Lands Forest Management* was published in the Spring of 2014 (GNBd, 2018). One of the tensions denoting the constriction on the opportunity structure arose with correspondence that was revealed between James D. Irving, Co-Chief Executive Officer of J. D. Irving Ltd. and David Alward. The letter sent to Alward was in response to statements made to NBEN by then Department of Natural Resources Minister Bruce Northrup, which had been overheard by an employee of J. D. Irving who then relayed the information to James D. Irving. What the employee heard, and then relayed, was an assertion that the Provincial Government had no intention of reducing the amount of protected Crown land. The letter, responding to the alleged claim, clearly threatened a retraction of investment should there not be further access to crown land. “Without the necessary wood supply, we will have to reduce the size and scope of our mill modernization and investment plans” (Howe, 2013). Bruce Northrup replied to the letter after it was forwarded to him by Premier Alward. In summary, his reply refuted what had been heard. “I am not sure if your employees did not hear my response or misunderstood it, however, I can assure you...my response was in fact ‘it was my hope that it [amount of crown land protected] could be maintained” (Howe, 2013). In what was a last minute and perceivably “back door decision,” (Rashid, 2014) the Alward government ceded an additional twenty percent of land to Crown license holders, and reduced protected areas from twenty-eight to twenty-three percent (“Crown Forestry

Deal”, 2014) within the finalized forestry strategy. In the end, choosing to delay decision making was still a choice that the government itself had the capacity to make. What’s more is that, people could be as loud as they wanted about their interests, the government still made decisions that ultimately ran in opposition to those interests. Or in Dr. Tom Beckley’s words: “I have bad news. Your government doesn’t give a damn about public opinion on how Crown forests should be managed. You’ve told them, but they don’t give a damn” (“Hundreds protest Crown forestry,” 2014). During this period, the government still made decisions in a way that we would expect from a high-capacity democratic state. It was the government that the people turned towards to wage their concerns, and it was the government that industry addressed when waging theirs. But with the amount of political capital that J. D Irving was able to exert over the Alward government’s forestry policy, it seems plausible to consider the relationship between industry and the government as a factor in the overall opportunity structure.

In 2017, another instance of a shift in the political opportunity structure availed itself when Moncton Mayor Dawn Arnold announced her concern for the need for herbicide spraying within the boundaries of the Turtle Creek Watershed area. Arnold issued a letter to the environment minister calling for an end to the spray (Steeves, 2017). This occurrence provided the movement with “the availability of an influential ally” (Tilly & Tarrow, p. 103). “If multiple independent centres of power exist within a regime, the chances increase that at least one power centre will support a set of identity, (which means that political opportunity structure is more open in that regard) standing or program claims (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, pp. 111-112).

### **Changes in Contention**

Frustration from small woodlot owners was palpable as early as 2010 when the Alward government announced its forestry stakeholder summit. By then, the understanding within forestry circles was that there had been a great deal of dialogue in the previous decade and that the emergent issues were clearly stated and well known (Penty, 2010). A protest of the strategy, spearheaded by the Conservation Council of New Brunswick and the New Brunswick Federation of Woodlot Owners was waged in front of the New Brunswick Legislature in May, 2014, drawing “hundreds of supporters” (Rashid, 2014). Speakers included “representatives from the Conservation Council, the NB Federation of Woodlot Owners, biologists, social scientists, and an economist” as well a representative speaking on behalf of St. Mary’s First Nation (Rashid, 2014). The strategy also galvanized ex-government officials and high-profile stakeholders, including former Department of Natural Resources Ministers Jeannot Volpé and Morris Green and former presidents of the New Brunswick Federation of Woodlot Owners (NBFWO), who criticized the deal for ignoring small-scale foresters and private woodlot owners. Volpé was cited questioning the way in which the agreement to cede Crown land for industrial use was made saying “I don’t know who is controlling everything right now. It doesn’t even seem to be the politicians to tell you the truth” (“New Crown deal criticized,” 2014). One of the main emergent themes from the task force reports was how to maximize total efficiency of the forest, and how to receive the best return on investment.

There was also at least one instance of dissent from the academic community was voiced in the form of a letter to the editor in the Fredericton Daily Gleaner by University of New Brunswick forestry professor Rodney Savidge; disheartened by the Department of Natural Resource’s commitment to the use of herbicides in the forestry sector (“If

only we could”, 2013). Within the piece, Savidge pointed to “the manufacturers of herbicide [who] wish to foster continuing dependency” (presumably with the forest industry) but that in the face of mounting scientific evidence, the program means more harm than good both for the forest and also for the New Brunswick taxpayer (“If only we could”, 2013). The issue also reached a degree of political salience at this time with then unelected People’s Alliance leader, Kris Austin, called for a ban on herbicide spraying urging to replace it instead with “more than 1,000 jobs to continually thin the province’s softwood forests” (Mazerolle, 2014). And noted the \$13 million a year invested into the spraying program by the provincial government (Mazerolle, 2014). This time, the political regime did not seek public consultation, instead relying on closed door industry meetings and task force reports. This did not temper public frustration, as the forestry strategy triggered ownership claims among broader groups in New Brunswick, and it is here where we see the first instances of scale-shift amongst previously under-connected groups.

The public then began igniting the debate about the link of Glyphosate spraying and the decline in the Province’s White Tail Deer Population, a point of contention spearheaded by ex-Department of Natural Resources Biologist Rod Cumberland (Morris, 2013). In 2014, the topic grew louder with ENGO’s developing campaigns on the topic and chasms began to emerge in the debate with members of the scientific community feuding over the validity of the science being cited by each camp. In February, a coalition of “biologists, hunting, fishing and outdoors recreation groups” drafted an open letter decrying herbicide spraying and presented it to the Department of Natural Resources (Glynn, 2014). On the other hand, R. A. Lautenschlager, the executive

director for the Atlantic Canada Conservation Data Centre based in Sackville, New Brunswick gave an interview that month expressing confusion over the locust of concern around glyphosate and its effect on the deer population. He cited scientific data pointing to the spray having negligible effects on food sources stating “we know deer foods are not affected in any significant way by herbicide spraying. That’s just the way it is...I’m not saying that’s good or bad or whatever. Repeated studies have shown that” (Berry, 2014). The following week Rod Cumberland in the New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal responded to Lautenschlager’s claims, denouncing the applicability of the scientific studies Lautenschlager cited and casted doubts on Lautenschlager’s claims regarding hardwood growth (Cumberland, 2014). The debate was then recapped by Moncton Times & Transcript columnist, Everett Mosher, a New Brunswick hunter and angler (Mosher, 2014a). That fall, Mosher, in his column, wrote on the Whitetail deer decline and the toll that it would take on hunter trapper organizations. Mosher cited a newsletter released by the New Brunswick Wildlife Trust Fund’s (NBWTF), a non-government agency dedicated to supporting conservation efforts (NBWTF, 2023). where it spoke on declining white-tailed deer numbers in the Caanan-Washademoak Watershed (Mosher, 2014b). Said newsletter directly attributed species decline in the watershed to herbicide spraying that had been conducted in the area the previous year and that “as a consequence, adequate food for 4,550 deer was eliminated” (NBWTF, 2014, pp. 3). In October of 2014, First Nations chiefs representing the Assembly of First Nations heard the dismissal of a previously sought legal injunction against Alward’s forestry plan in where they cited lack of consultation and irreparable harm. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Queen’s Bench based on lack of evidence (Berry, 2014).

From a global perspective, the safety of Glyphosate was being called into question, with the World Health Organization in 2015 citing the herbicide as “probably carcinogenic to humans” (Sirois, 2016) a classification that retrenched the risks to public health for certain anti-spray advocates in New Brunswick. While some organizations did not adopt the health framing into their overall message<sup>2</sup>, groups like the NBEN, the Crown Lands Network, and the Conservation Council of New Brunswick (CCNB) rallied around the classification as a tool to reinvigorate their demands to end the spray of Glyphosate on the Acadian Forest (NBEN, n.d.). The re-classification spurred the OCMOH to conduct an internal study on the health impacts of the spray. Released in 2016 to the public, the report indicated that it “found no increased risk for New Brunswickers exposed to glyphosate in our province” (GNBc, 2016). While the findings were heavily debated by environmental organizations, the OCMOH held firm on their stance that the findings were indicative of use well within reasonable exposure limits. Key wording in the report, combined with international and other jurisdictions instituting bans on the herbicide, still allowed for a certain degree of skepticism to percolate. Everett Mosher again raised concerns over glyphosate in his column on March 31, this time in reference to low salmon returns in the Miramichi River (Mosher, 2015). In April, Mike Legere then the executive director of Forest NB, an industry organization representing forestry in the province, came out in support of the practice (Marsden, 2015). Legere pointed to the industry’s overall higher than average productivity both in employment and yield (Marsden, 2015). When asked about glyphosate, Legere highlighted that “two thirds [of the working forest] is allowed to regenerate naturally”

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<sup>2</sup> Personal Interview conducted by author. January 24, 2025, Fredericton, New Brunswick.

and that “around a third of the remaining 20,000 hectares would be sprayed once or maybe twice in its 80-year growing cycle,” denouncing anti-spray advocates who “only gets to hear one side of an issue” (Marsden, 2015). That summer, the New Brunswick Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health [OCMOH], released a long-awaited report on the effects of glyphosate on public health but concluded in a news release that the “review found no increased risk for New Brunswickers exposed to glyphosate” (Anderson, 2015). In December, president of the Moncton Fish & Game Association, Robert Snider, wrote in to the Moncton Times & Transcript suggesting that a moratorium be put in place on herbicide spraying until further studies could be done on its impact on biodiversity. He commented on the revenue generated by hunters and anglers in the province insinuating that the forestry practice is less cost effective in total for New Brunswick and pointed to Nova Scotia and Quebec who continue generating revenue in their forestry sectors despite not using herbicides in their practices. (Snider, 2015). The continued decline of White-Tailed Deer populations in the 2015 hunting season remained a predominant driver for public dissent and spurred the creation of Stop Spraying New Brunswick (SSNB), a group exclusively dedicated to ending the aerial herbicide spray in the Acadian Forest. Quickly after its establishment, the group created a petition to stop the spray of glyphosate. Their petition amassed an initial 11,000 signatures representing “communities from every part of the province including francophone, anglophone and Indigenous communities” (Lubbe-D’Arcy, 2016) and was presented to the legislature May 18, 2016 (Lubbe-D’Arcy, 2016).

On December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2016, supporters of the movement touting picket signs watched on and celebrated as the petition’s “third installment” of signatories (now totalling

28,000 and including signatures from three New Brunswick Members of the Legislative Assembly) was tabled at the New Brunswick Legislature by Green MLA David Coon (Lubbe-D'Arcy, 2016). David Coon also wrote an op-ed in the Fredericton Daily Gleaner regarding the practice, linking it again with the overarching issue of forest management in the face of climate change. He recalled a select committee's recommendation from "years ago" to minimize the amount of clearcutting happening in the forest and noted that clearcutting has only increased in recent years (Coon, 2016). Regarding the health effects of glyphosate, Coon mentioned the World Health Organization's statement that glyphosate was a probable carcinogen, replacing the WHO's previous assessment that glyphosate was regarded as a possible carcinogen (Coon, 2016).

By 2017 the issue was firmly entrenched in the public consciousness, with individual acts of contention being discussed in the media. SSNB was advocating at this time for individuals to confront spraying crews in their local areas and to press them on the nature of their work, an act that industry denounced as being unsafe (Chilibeck, 2017c). There was an instance of protesters organizing outside of a town council hall in Petitcodiac, New Brunswick in response to a town hall meeting that was scheduled to hear out the safety and efficacy of the spray (Seeley, 2017a). Because of public interest, the meeting was moved to a larger venue set up exposition-style where industry officials set up kiosks to present to the public the safety of glyphosate and herbicide spraying. An estimated one hundred individuals from the public were in attendance and anti-spray proponents were vocal in expressing their disappointment of what they perceived as the pro-spray nature of the meeting (Seeley, 2017b). Around the same time, the mayor of

Moncton, Dawn Arnold, escalated concerns over Glyphosate being sprayed near the Turtle Creek Watershed and initiated a working group to understand the effects of the spray on the city's water supply (Bateman, 2017).

In reaction to the dissent, proponents of the forest industry once again voiced their support of the spray, noting that herbicide spraying was a necessary component of a robust forest industry. In one op-ed, Mike Legere commented on the anti-spray movement saying "the public has become confused by the diverging opinions expressed by all sides of the issue. Compounding this is fear mongering driven by an activist movement that has irresponsibly conjured up scenarios of forests devoid of trees and wildlife and fear of a global food contamination scare" (Legere, 2017). He cited that scientific consensus is ultimately unachievable, but that mitigated risk was a necessary factor for progress (Legere, 2017). Finally, he discounted Kris Austin's suggestion that spraying should be replaced with physical labour pointing again to New Brunswick forestry's overall higher efficiency compared to forestry in parts of the country who have banned glyphosate, namely Quebec whose policy he said was "guided by politics and not science" (Legere, 2017). Rodney Savidge then squabbled with Legere's article in a letter to the editor the following week bringing into focus the level of threat posed by the surfactants used in the spray, namely polyoxyethylene tallow amines (POEAs). Savidge also spoke on the root of the issue being the province's decision to allow for monocultures ("Letters to the editor", 2017). Considering the amount of influence that industry possessed over the provincial government at this time, it seems logical to assume that the amount of political opportunity that the New Brunswick government was in possession of was less robust at this time. Because of this, it appears that at this

period, the province inches towards the quadrant of low government capacity and high public engagement, while remaining to the left of center in a high/high position. But this marks a shift in public capacity, where, compared to the previous case, vocalization is louder.

### **Case Study 3: 2018-2023**

#### **Changes in Market Conditions**

The forestry market faced challenges at this time that were unique when compared to the conditions in the previous two cases. In the beginning, there was some optimism within industry circles. By the end of 2015, news outlets were reporting that the forest economy was rebounding, citing “the U.S. housing market and the falling Canadian loonie” (Morris, 2015). In the media these indications signaled that manufacturing prospects were on the upswing, at least for the fate for manufacturing. Credit was given to the Alward government by some stakeholders, who indicated that the governments management plan secured investment opportunity to expand existing mills (Morris, 2015). But unsurprisingly given the policy decisions made in by the Alward government, the good fortune did not translate to everyone in the industry. For small-scale operators, the Alward decision to afford additional crown land to pulp and paper added further constraint on their prospects. In the words of woodlot owner Andrew Clark “The lumber industry should be making money hand over fist and laughing all the way to the bank thanks to rising prices and the falling Canadian dollar. But they don’t have to buy my wood, so I am not sharing the wealth” (Morris, 2015). Housing starts in the United States have traditionally been a signal for the health of the maritime lumber

industry but in 2015, trade agreements expired and for the first time since 2006, Maritime producers were facing American tariffs, constraining the relationship with the markets largest exporter (Chilibeck, 2017a). Then, lobbying efforts on the US side were successful in influencing a decision to charge anti-dumping fees to maritime producers on the basis that the industry was unduly benefitting from large government subsidies (Chilibeck, 2017b). The new trade arrangements caused anxiety for the industry, “if this lasts long, shifts will be down, sawmills will close, there’s no doubt about it” (Chilibeck, 2017a).

### **Changes in Political Regime**

In June of 2019, the provincial conservative government responded to the social movement by reducing the amount of herbicide spraying on public lands as well as calling on NB power to reduce the amount of herbicide spraying being conducted on powerlines in ecologically vulnerable areas such as watersheds (Chilibeck, 2019). In an newspaper article published in the Moncton Times and Transcript, the minister of natural resources at the time, Mike Holland, was quoted saying that he wanted “to ensure [there is] a mix of vegetation in the forest to nourish wildlife” (Chilibeck, 2019) insinuating that the concerns raised by protesters—namely access to food for the province’s ungulate populations—reached a detectable level of salience within the provincial government.

And although it was not stated to be done to quell any trade contention with the United States, the Higgs government implemented a cap on wood supply harvested on Crown land by the forest industry. This decision was announced “as part of its effects to increase supply from private woodlot owners” (Waugh, 2019). Green Party leader David Coon expressed dissent over the decision, applying pressure over what his party deemed

an unsatisfactory response to reincorporating small woodlot producers back into the market, calling it “an empty cup.” In response, the Green Party tabled a bill to amend the Crown Lands and Forestry Act, amendments that, if passed would “strengthen the power of the marketing boards” (Waugh, 2019). The government the following year was also having to heed to federally imposed conservation targets, increasing the rate of protected land from 4.5 to 10 percent (Bateman, 2020).

### **Changes in Political Opportunity Structure**

New Brunswick face two general elections between 2018 and 2020, with perhaps the largest shift in the political structure occurring after the outcome of the 2018 provincial election. This is when for the first time in this analysis, the division of elected seats were redistributed and knocked off balance by the election of third-party candidates. Both the New Brunswick Green Party and the People’s Alliance of New Brunswick (PANB) were able to galvanize the vote enough to ascend to the legislature with three seats each. Academics pointed to the unusual nature of this election for New Brunswick, a province that typically known for electing majority governments (Gillies & Bateman, 2020). While the Green party’s success indicated a strong support for environmental causes from voters, it was concluded that the PANB candidates were elected based on linguistic tensions (Gillies & Bateman, 2020). Despite that conclusion with some in academic circles, glyphosate did become an election issue in 2018, in large part due to lobbying efforts from anti-spray groups. PANB leader Kris Austin on the campaign trail did also indicate that he was sympathetic to instituting a glyphosate ban if elected, becoming the third party alongside the greens and NDP to advocate for the end of the spray (Fowler, 2018). These elected minority parties in the legislature were able to

shift the total votes away from both the Provincial Liberal Party and the Provincial Progressive Conservative party, effectively allowing for a chasm to open in the political opportunity structure. Tilly and Tarrow (2015) identify how political opportunity structures often possess multiple “centres of power” (p. 60). In this context, contenders “venue shop” (p.60), and broker relationships within the regime to leverage further influence in the overall movement. This also happened at the municipal level, with glyphosate having gained further traction as a policy issue with Dawn Arnold, the Mayor of Moncton, seeking an outright ban on spraying in the Turtle Creek Watershed (“City’s mayor wants ban,”2018).

### **Changes in Contention**

In December 2018, the Mayor of Kedgwick was approached by “an environmental group about an effort to have the use of glyphosate banned as a forestry practice” (Jacques, 2018) but stated that careful consideration would be needed to balance the issue against those who rely on the forest industry for their income stating “we need choices to make informed decisions...but I want my people to be able to work. You have to be able to put bread on the table” (Jacques, 2018). Thus further priming the debate as one of jobs vs. environment. Like the case with small woodlot owners in 2004, the anti-glyphosate movement had a chance to vent their concerns in a public forum. In early 2020, it was announced that the provincial government would examine the issue through the Standing Committee on Climate Change and Environmental Stewardship and announced that public hearings would be conducted as part of its examination (Awde, 2020) thus widening the opportunity for feedback from various public actors. Little organized public action was noted during 2020 but it was announced that if elected

the Liberals, following suit from the Greens and their campaign promise, would ban glyphosate application on Crown land (“Liberals vow to ban spraying,” 2020).

Committee hearings began in early 2021 and seemingly galvanised most of the media attention on glyphosate. Despite a lack of organized protest or contention, there were still instances of dissent within ENGOs. In one news article, Lois Corbett, executive director of the CCNB was cited “[calling] the use of the herbicide glyphosate in forestry a ‘symptom’ of the provinces problem: the scope of clear cutting allowed in the province” (Bateman, 2021). Further, SSNB reissued failing grades for the Conservative and Liberal provincial parties in a publicised news broadcast and reaffirmed their organizations commitment to apply pressure on the provincial government to stop the spray (“Group vows to keep pressure,” 2021). Regarding the ongoing contention in the Moncton area with the Turtle Creek Watershed and the city council, the City of Moncton purchased tracts of land in the watershed and called for limits to the spray (“Group vows to keep pressure,” 2021). In all, the case demonstrates a further shifting back further to the left in the left quadrant of high government capacity and high public engagement. This era marked a period for the loudest contention and marked the first time that the opportunity structure was cracked open in favour of the contenders.

## **The Spectrum of Quiet and Loud Politics in New Brunswick**

### **Variation in the Audible Frequency of Expression**

The decibels of expression in New Brunswick seem to increase when two of three conditions are met: a grievance triggers ownership and identity, previously

unrelated groups coalesce, or there exists a venue where people can express their concerns. In this case analysis, we have seen that when the nerves of embedded grievances are plucked, it elicits public response. The volume of this response depends on both internal and external factors. Regarding economic conditions, internal policy decision making has ignored the restoration of key-stone economic linkages. This has left small scale operators outside of the internal wood supply market. This has been done chronically to accommodate the pulp and paper industry benefitting from these market fundamentalist practices. While the environmental and forestry camps sometimes overlap in terms of the claims they make, in the following cases we will see that they have not always coalesced. When they do, contention becomes louder. Yet, no matter how loud the contention becomes, the provincial governments du jour have historically not made concessions big enough to quell the public's concerns. Environmental activists and private woodlot owners alike have historically had Bonafide grievances regarding the management of the public forest. Following the logic, these grievances will become more acute depending on fluctuations in market conditions that act to reopen old wounds and pluck exposed nerves.

## **Chapter 4: Spatial Identities, Slow Justice, and Loud Anti-Glyphosate**

### **Contention in NB**

*“The Maritimes’ love of learning may be bookish rather than materialistic. Their gentle consideration for others, their capacity to find deep satisfaction within themselves and in nature prevents them from turning their talents to single-minded business success”*

*-Fraser Robertson, The Globe and Mail, February 1, 1964*

The previous chapter analyzed how market forces trigger a contentious response by the public regarding their concerns over the use of glyphosate. As the cases demonstrate, the answer to the question of “why are some resource dependent communities mobilizing in some instances and not others” is that market forces trigger responses from the state that then lead to episodes of contention, and while these factors influence small shifts in political opportunity, they have not been successful at changing the current forest management policies that they contend with. This raises another question because from the empirical evidence, the conclusion can be drawn that these resource dependent communities are victims to a slow democratic and ecological violence (Nixon 2011; Waldron 2018). If this is true, then why do communities in the New Brunswick context continue to contend so loudly? I argue that communities contend in New Brunswick because they have organized around two deeply embedded socially-constructed identities, the forester and the environmentalist. The following chapter will give the historical analysis of the forester and the historical analysis of the environmentalist and how these identities emerged over time and continue to influence

mobilization across the province and attempt to answer why New Brunswick communities continue to mobilize in the face of slow violence. This will be done by examining the premise that, while the public and environment in New Brunswick has been exposed over time to a type of slow violence, it has also been exposed to diffuse mobilization pathways that have led to a slow accretion of justice over time (Neville & Martin 2022). In their typology, Neville and Martin (2022) suggest that diffusion occurs dimensionally, and these dimensions can be analyzed across three separate threads. With *people*, key individuals and actors mobilize and form bonds around a specific set of goals or identities. Materials serve to reinforce the identities and goals set out through the first pathway and *processes* are the institutions and institutional mechanisms that are modified over time from the work of organized claimants.

### **The Forester Identity**

The collective identity of the “forester” as I call it, emerges twenty years into the adoption of pulp and paper over lumber as the province’s primary export. This identity is largely in opposition with the provincial government over resource management policies. Historians (McLaughlin & Parenteau, 2023) note the finite nature of the forestry industry itself, where resource scarcity and changes in market demand have altered the type of harvesting that happens in New Brunswick. It is possible that the historical ties of the identity of the “forester” can be traced farther back than this analysis allows. By 1930, New Brunswick’s Forest economy had finalized the transition from lumber to pulp and paper as a primary export. This transition is vital to understanding the rise of the forester identity for a few reasons. For one, the transition facilitated a critical erosion of spread effects affecting secondary harvesters. This was due largely to the redrawing of

ownership rights, whereby control of crown land went from the hands of many local operators to the hands of three pulp companies (Parenteau, 1994, 2013). So acute was this transition that by “the end of the process, the [three pulp and paper companies involved] controlled approximately 70 percent of the industrial forest in the province (Crown and privately owned)” (McLaughlin & Parenteau, 2023, p. 25). This heightened the repercussions of the market collapse during the 1930s. Unemployment affected those near the newly erected pulp mills in the metro cities of Bathurst, Dalhousie and Edmundston. New Brunswickers, in what used to be sawmilling towns and rural townships, were left unable to access crown land for their own enterprises to stave off the impact of the Depression (Parenteau, 2013). Those wishing to resist the pattern of amalgamation into urban centres (a political mandate of the New Brunswick provincial government at the time) relied heavily on the sale of their lumber to the pulp and paper industry to supplement their increasingly constrained sources of income (Parenteau, 1992a).

Most importantly for the material entrenchment of the forester identity, were the rural landowners (farmers, loggers). These individuals, constrained already by changes to the rural economy, relied on selling their lumber to the pulp and paper mills for supplementary income on the side but were left largely vulnerable to the control the pulp and paper industry had on the supply chain (Parenteau, 1992a). Control of the supply chain meant that, throughout the 1940s and the 1950s, it was customary for the pulp and paper industry to depress the price of wood from independent suppliers by leveraging the cheap prices set by the province for Crown land (Parenteau, 1992a).

### **1960s-1970s: Rural Foresters Mobilize**

By the 1960's, a percolating atmosphere of dissatisfaction was present amongst farmers and small-scale foresters frustrated with their economic circumstances (Parenteau, 1992a). Political mobilization of these independent producers began in earnest, resulting in the creation of “producer associations” in different rural areas across the province (Parenteau & McLaughlin, 2009, p. 22), and quickly expanded. By 1963 “there were producer associations representing nearly all producers who wished to participate” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 118). These new associations leveraged the political power of already well-established farmers associations but also relied on a grassroots movement to coalesce around the message that the pulp and paper industry was engaging in an asymmetrical power relationship with the traditional forestry sector. These groups, representing “farmers, woodlot owners, small contractors, woodworkers, truckers and other interested parties” (Parenteau, 1992a, p.119), stipulated that the provincial government should intervene regarding these low sale prices by introducing measures that would ensure woodlot owners and farmers be the primary suppliers of lumber to the pulp and paper industry (Parenteau, 1992). With assistance from varying relationships with existing New Brunswick labour organizations, support for the rural forester movement strengthened and proved to lead to successful avenues of progress. For example, Frank (2013) highlights the creation of a new labour organization founded in 1937 called the Northumberland County Farmer-Labour Union (NCFLU) comprising of agitated labourers, dissatisfied with the oppressive economic conditions that were typical of the time, calling for “higher wages for the longshoremen, mill workers, river drivers, and boom-men who worked on the river” (Frank, 2013, p. 60). Additionally, one of the offshoots of the existing United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America

(UBJCA) incorporated foresters into their union in the 1950s, thus becoming the UBJCA (Lumber and Sawmill Workers) Local 3012 (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 190). Despite “company obstructionism” (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 195), the group was eventually successful in their application as a “bargaining agent for woods workers employed by six of New Brunswick International Pulp’s (NBIP) so-called independent contractors” in 1963 (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 198). Apart from union affiliations were rural political groups created specifically to advocate for better marketing prices for foresters including the Central New Brunswick Pulpwood Producers Association (CNBPPA) and the Charlotte County Woodlot Owners Association (CCWOA). These two, along with four other associations from across the province, organized into the New Brunswick Wood Producers Association (NBWPA) in 1965 (Parenteau, 1992a). That same year, the New Brunswick Federation of Woodlot Owners (NBFWO), was established (McLaughlin, 2013).

Due in part to the mobilizing successes of these rural organizations, “the issue of pulpwood prices made it to the provincial legislature in late February 1963” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 120). The response of the provincial government, led by Louis Robichaud (1960-1970) resulted in the creation of the Royal Commission on Primary Forest Products led by Louis Seheult (1964). The Seheult Commission was an instrument, or in Neville and Martin’s (2022) typology, a *process* that served to reinforce the forester identity in that it “provided farmers and woodlot owners with a forum in which to focus their efforts” (Parenteau, 1992a, pp. 120-121). The commission drew much attention from producer associations across the province. One such brief submitted by the Miramichi Federation of Agriculture, highlighted the role of the Pulp and Paper

companies in driving elements of degeneration, “limit[ing] average income to subsistence standards [and leading] to an exodus of young people who seek more lucrative employment elsewhere” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 191). The Seheult Commission also served as a legitimizing agent for the forester, reiterating amongst other things, their far-reaching economic challenges including extenuating market conditions, a lack of bargaining power, market dependency and poor forestry management practices rendering unproductive Crown land harvests (McLaughlin, 2013, pp. 237-238). The recommendations outlined by the Commission pointed not only to the creation of marketing boards but also that the role of government be to assist with the development of community forestry initiatives with the goal of diversification (McLaughlin, 2013). Although the commission’s findings did not result in meaningful policy shift during the 1960s, the movement achieved degrees of success as it elicited the establishment of the NBFWO, therefore legitimizing the “forester” as an emergent political identity. Further, the role of one individual was instrumental in shaping the policy debate in the following decade. The NBFWOs first president, William E. Hart, had historically been reluctant about state involvement in supply negotiations. However, Hart witnessed firsthand the progressive relationships between industry, small producers and the state and their implementation of “compulsory” marketing boards during a trip to Scandinavia. Upon his return to New Brunswick, he shared with the provincial cabinet his findings and the importance of “some sort of state intervention...to create a similar state of affairs in New Brunswick” therefore solidifying his organizations stance on the need for external marketing boards (McLaughlin, 2013, pp. 243-244) to better the plight of the rural forester.

### **1970s-1980s: Forester Identities and Violent Episodes**

Despite these gains, the lack of response from the Robichaud government to implement effective policy change, even after the findings of Seheult Commission, demonstrated an unwillingness “to alter the power dynamics of the pulpwood market through state-sponsored marketing boards for fear of hindering economic growth within the forestry sector” (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 242), ultimately meaning that the movement was unsuccessful due to an closed opportunity structure: “strategies on the part of the industry, the inaction of the New Brunswick government, and the inherent problem of keeping small producers involved under favourable economic conditions kept the movement in a holding pattern during the second half of the 1960s” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 125). But by 1970, another market downswing re-intensified an offshoot of the “forester” identity, the “non-land-owning forester,” whose activation contributed to episodes of violent contention in 1972, an identity that was at the heart of a violent contentious episode in 1978. These accentuated responses by both groups of foresters, as well as by other political protesters were largely a result of the extent of economic tensions plaguing New Brunswick at the time. The 1970s was a period of significant economic crisis, both for the pulp industry as well as for the resource sector worker. The North American pulp and paper market was undergoing wider structural changes at this time making the Canadian industry less globally competitive. Additionally, mills that were once considered state of the art when they were first built in the province were facing productivity challenges exacerbated by years of chronic underinvestment. These factors led to numerous closures and lay-offs with companies left without provincial stimulus, a customary practice the decade before during Robichaud's tenure between 1960 and 1970 (Parenteau, 2013).

At the same time, New Brunswick was facing an employment crisis with a workforce unable to meet the demand for the increasingly technologically sophisticated jobs emerging from the resource industry. In 1967, the *Globe and Mail* reported that the education gap was preventing seasonal workers, largely from the Acadian Northeast, from obtaining long-term employment in the resource sector; therefore, exacerbating their dependency on social assistance programs (Mortimore, 1967). These sectors of rural New Brunswick were some of the most economically depressed in all of Canada (Mortimore, 1967). The unemployment crisis was underpinned by the cycle of mill closures, eroding the spread effects introduced to individuals capable of working in the mills. Meanwhile, the attempt to modernize the province and concentrate workers into the city centres isolated rural inhabitants from the traditional spread effects present within the subsistence economy. This process reinforced the identity of the rural forester over that of the urban worker, therefore serving to forge new identity links across seemingly disparate groups. Reports from a Toronto-based firm tasked with assessing the economic situation in New Brunswick reported that “again and again we are confronted with convincing evidence that, for many primary products, discriminatory market power is in the hands of middlemen and processors, while the primary producer himself remains in a weak bargaining position” (Mortimore, 1967). In 1972, over 20,000 people rallied in protest at Bathurst College. Organized by the New Brunswick Federation of Labour (NBFL), the event became known as the “day of concern.” Sit-in demonstrations ensued, along with “other public demonstrations, one of which erupted in riot” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 127). Aggravating the non-land-owning forester further, the economic conditions of the 1970s coincided with the mechanization of the pulp industry,

which led to the introduction of the “Koehring–Waterous Short Wood Harvester,” (Clow & MacDonald, 2001) a mechanized harvesting tool capable of replacing “as many as 30 [forestry] workers” (McLaughlin, 2015). In July 1978, the provincial minister of natural resources met with over “two-hundred unemployed woods workers” (McLaughlin, 2015) upset over the introduction of five said harvesters in the Miramichi area. Following the meeting which had left the workers unsatisfied, a portion of the attendees trespassed and vandalized three of the five harvesters, leaving one beyond repair (“Vandal’s toll put at \$1 million,” 1978). The impact of these episodes offers a clear diffusion of justice for the forester as it has been noted that harvesting practices in the Miramichi area continue to employ far more individuals in their harvesting practices than what would be considered industry standard. Researchers attribute this asymmetry in some part to community resistance efforts at the local level (Clow & MacDonald, 2001). Speculatively, it is possible at this point that the “forester” identity took on additional dimensions related to pride largely associated with rurality. Undoubtedly, the forestry identity adopted dimensions of Acadian pride, a movement which was celebrating a resurgence at this time (Forest, 1972; Parenteau, 1992a).

As for the forestry movement that had become entrenched a decade prior, the decade was marked by intense organizing efforts. In 1971, the Hatfield government finally responded to the crises by passing the *Forest Products Act* (1971) introducing as part of the act the NBFPC. ultimately, the NBFPC was meant to be a negotiating body in price agreements between industry and producers. The introduction of the FPC was met with initial optimism by foresters but quickly dissolved to disappointment as it became evident the commission would not prove to be an effective entity for price negotiation

without the implementation of marketing boards. For their efforts, the forestry associations continued to grow in sophistication, implementing large scale, coordinated effort aimed at spurring the introduction of a marketing board. This was done using consistent messaging, confrontational episodes and government outreach. One of the more active producer associations, the North Shore Forestry Syndicate (NSFS), became an epicentre for the movement. By the summer of 1971, the NSFS was awarded federal grant funding, which allowed the association the ability to hire a full-time campaign organizer who set about “constructing local councils of wood producers and forging links between the syndicate and other organizations in the region that were concerned with the crisis in the resource-based industries” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 133). The success of this wave of mobilization led to a response from the Hatfield government, who offered the foresters a small concession, with an amendment to the Forest Products Act that would in theory, facilitate price negotiations between producer associations and industry. Further, then Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development promised his assistance in the establishment of a marketing board for the FSPS, but only under the condition that “the FSPS [be able] to prove...that they had the support of a ‘strong majority’ of producers in the region” (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 135). In an example highlighting the extent of the movement’s sophistication, the ensuing plebiscite was able to garner approval from “over 98.6 percent” of those who cast ballots (Parenteau, 1992a, p. 137). The movement proved successful during this period, and between 1973-1984 sale of wood from private lots increased significantly thanks in part due to the enactment of the *Crown Lands and Forests Act* (1980) (deMarsh, 1990) that stipulated the “management of private lands as primary source production” (Ross, 1997, p. 30).

Although the movement was successful in gaining their status as primary resources in the 1980s, an amendment in 1992 to the *Crown Lands and Forests Act* (1980) removed the stipulation that woodlot owners be used as primary suppliers (Roberts, Ritchie & Rotherham, 2012)The amendment recapitulated the language, from “primary source of supply” to “proportional source of supply.” The change was reflective of the sound market environment of the 1990s. As described by Roberts, Ritchie & Rotherham (2012) “at the time, demand for pulpwood, studs, and logs was strong, and there seemed little need to develop an administrative mechanism to enforce the new language. Although required by the law, no new policy was implemented” (p. 26).

### **The Environmentalist Identity**

This chapter argues that the environmental collective identity within environmental movements in New Brunswick consists of three (often competing) subcategories, possessing unique beginnings and divergent evolutions. For the sake of categorization, there has historically included a fourth sub-group, that of the citizen action group. One citizen action group, the Concerned Parents Group (CPG), was an instrumental political actor in the fight to end the aerial spraying of pesticides in the 1970s as will be discussed in the following section. Those who have coalesced into citizen action groups in the past have either stopped engaging or have diffused into the three sub-categories of conservationists, ecologists and true environmentalists. Today, the one citizen action group in the glyphosate debate comprises of Stop Spraying New Brunswick but because the bulk of their members are concerned with hunting, they fall neatly into the category of conservationists.

For this reason, the environmentalist identity is diffuse by nature and requires parsing to understand where the dimensions emerge in a contemporary sense within glyphosate debates. Conservationists are those who engage in hunting and fishing for pleasure, whose groups emerge over time, but whose mandate originates in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with early attempts at Atlantic Salmon conservation policy. This angling “fraternity” as Bill Parenteau aptly describes it (2004) have historically been in competition with groups or individuals who hunt and fish as a means of subsistence (Parenteau, 2004). This is because, early conservationist policies often acted to dispossess locals who, due to the seasonal odd-job nature of the resource economy, relied heavily on hunting and fishing to feed themselves but whose indiscriminate harvesting techniques ran counter to those who wished to preserve a species for sporting and leisure (Parenteau, 2004). As mentioned in Chapter 3, I place the scientific and academic community into the sub-group I refer as ecologists. The term ecologist is chosen here because it most aptly encompasses the key players associated with the early successes of the movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the third group I refer to as the “true environmentalists.” This group emerges in the 1970s with the creation of the Conservation Council of New Brunswick, and who quickly adopt political agendas aimed at broadly tackling environmental concerns through political lobbying. This group takes on many dimensional components quickly after its creation. As Mark McLaughlin (2019) articulates, CCNB as a group was heavily influenced by the notion of the “conserver society” that emerged as a global orientation in the 1970s whereby opening their mission to multiple environmental causes. Their creation, however, was highly influenced by the act of DDT aerial spraying (McLaughlin, 2011) and the group

continues to maintain a robust presence in the realm of provincial forestry politics today. It should be of note that CCNB has historically held a reputation of being largely urban, anglophone and middle-class (McLaughlin, 2019). Because of this perception, it has a capacity to undermine the participation of rural hunters and anglers who feel unaligned with the group's message. This sentiment is echoed in the following interview with a current glyphosate activist:

Environmentalists in New Brunswick you can count them on a few hands. I'm kinda, joking but do you know what I mean? That's sadly what it is. It's a minority, they tend to be in cities... and in the rural communities there are tons of people who care a lot about the environment, but they don't identify themselves as an environmentalist because an environmentalist has kinda... a "lefty" connotation to it. And the rural population tends to be overwhelmingly much more conservative, but they care about the environment, yeah? But they don't want that label.<sup>3</sup>

By the 1950s in New Brunswick, Atlantic Salmon populations across the province were facing serious decline, and much research was devoted to understanding the cause. Research of the subject was spearheaded by fisheries scientists at the St Andrews Biological Station (SABS). Initially—highlighting the way the scientific community perceived nature prior to the ecological paradigm shift—it was common to attribute salmon decline to individual waterfowl species like the Merganser, and culling programs were implemented towards that species on specific watersheds in the province

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<sup>3</sup> Personal Interview conducted by author. January 24, 2025, Fredericton, New Brunswick.

(Peterson, 2016). In the interest of species preservation, research on DDT and its effects on the fish had begun in earnest the year prior by fisheries scientists at SABS.

Meanwhile, New Brunswick's forests consisted of chronically un-managed, over mature trees. Abundant, over-mature, balsam fir created ideal conditions that precipitated the rise of a Spruce Budworm outbreak in 1951. The eastern Spruce Budworm (*Choristoneura fumiferana*) is a lepidopteran species known for its voracious consumption of coniferous tree species in its larval stage. Outbreaks occur cyclically and increase in severity in the presence of over-mature softwood stands (Government of Canada, 2024). A flurry of activity amongst forestry scientists ensued at the onset of the 1951 outbreak to find a solution to eradicate the presence of the Spruce Budworm in the forest. Echoing the ethos present in the fishery science communities, forestry scientists led with the understanding that the forests were emphatically regarded as a crop, and it was in the best interest of the forestry sector to protect its investments by eradicating the budworm. Dr. Reginald E. Balch, an entomologist with the federal government, was an early proponent of the spray, and "one of the first people to suggest the possibility of using chemical insecticides sprayed from airplanes to control the budworm" (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 8).

The following year, NBIP, in partnership with the provincial government and sponsored by other forestry interests, established the company Forest Protections Limited, which oversaw the spray of DDT on Crown land (Rashid, 2003). The application of DDT was wildly successful at killing the budworm larva whilst protecting the forestry stock and the aerial spray was enthusiastically adopted as standard practice and implemented over wider tracts of land (Rashid, 2003; McLaughlin, 2011). At this

time, Dr. C. James Kerswill and Dr. Paul F. Elson from SABS were leading a study on the Miramichi River dedicated towards improving salmon conservation regulations. Amidst their research on prey species, they observed that DDT from nearby spraying increased mortality rates amongst juvenile salmon, and the conclusion was drawn that the chronic nature of the yearly DDT application was beginning to have a compounding effect on returning salmon rates (Peterson, 2016). The discoveries made by Kerswill and Elson triggered the participation of outdoor enthusiasts, who began to elicit protest in national newspaper and publications (McLaughlin, 2011). In 1955, the Miramichi Salmon Association (MSA) contacted the Minister of Lands and Mines demanding comprehensive conservation policy including the prevention of further impacts on the fish from the budworm spraying program (McLaughlin, 2011).

The following year, on the ninth of June, FPL planes conducted a spray over “forests surrounding the federal Northwest Fish Hatchery in the Parish of South Esk” (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 12). Precipitation in the following days caused the insecticide to run off into the ponds as well as permeate some of the nearby stocks of fish food. On the twentieth of June, the incident made the headlines in the Fredericton Daily Gleaner: “800,000 killed, hatchery waters sprayed”—the publication announced—“massacre of trout, salmon described” (Morrison, 1956). The incident galvanized the angling organizations into establishing a firm stance against the continued application of insecticides and reignited debate in local news publications (McLaughlin, 2011). The incident also reached national attention, with the president of the MSA contacting the federal Fisheries Minister notifying him of what had occurred. By August, it was revealed that the Government of Canada was suing FPL over the high rate of mortality,

citing negligence (Morrison, 1956). By the time the South Esk incident occurred, angling associations were already espousing the rhetoric of conservation originating from the scientists at SABS. It was also clear, whether through outreach or other means, that there was wider public awareness of the issues plaguing the species (“Miramichi Salmon Association winning essay,” 1956). One interesting anecdote highlighting this fact was a yearly high school essay contest hosted by the MSA. In 1956, the winning essay pointed out exactly the rhetoric that was customary within the angling and scientific communities: mergansers and poachers were a threat to salmon populations; fishery hatcheries were key to the success of conservation and “it is felt that [DDT] is also a contribution to salmon decrease in that it kills the aquatic insects which are the food of the young salmon” (“Miramichi Salmon Association winning essay,” 1956).

By the 1960s, the controversy had reached hunting groups. Bruce S. Wright, a forestry professional, an outdoorsman, and the founder of the Northeast Wildlife Station at the University of New Brunswick brought attention to the impact of DDT on American Woodcock, a migratory bird species highly susceptible to exposure due to its foraging habits (Dawson, 1962) in 1960. Wright was connected to the greater movement through his membership with the FGPA and leveraged his scientific expertise in educating both “the public and government officials on the effects of DDT” (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 17). Not only was he influential in shifting perceptions in the province, but he was also influential on bringing the effects of DDT to a wider national audience. Through the early 1960s he corresponded with Rachel Carson and helped influence the publication *Silent Spring* in 1962 (McLaughlin, 2011). By the fall of 1962, hunters were beginning to experience the effects that Wright noted in his study on the

American Woodcock. There were growing concerns over the latent health impacts of consuming a bird species known to absorb so much toxin. In the United States, regulations had begun to be implemented to limit the amount of DDT exposure in species meant for consumption, with the United States Food and Drug Administration regulating exposure to “seven parts per million,” a ratio that Wright mentioned would be exceeded for “three-quarters of the Woodcock in New Brunswick” (Dawson, 1962). Refusing to end the spray altogether but realizing the external pressures mounting against DDT, FPL began conducting experiments on the viability of phosphamidon, an insecticide thought as a potential replacement. While the experimentation with phosphamidon revealed lower harm in fish species, it had the inverse effect for other species. In a newspaper article in the *Globe and Mail*, Wright reported the spray experiment had “drastic effects” on migratory bird species and he again expressed concern over the number of American Woodcock succumbing to insecticide exposure (“safer than DDT for fish,” 1964). In sequence, the destruction that DDT was causing in ecosystems throughout the province influenced Dr. Reginald Balch to recalibrate his previous stance on the need for an intense insecticide regime in the forest, advocating instead for the conservative application of insecticide in concert with silviculture practices (McLaughlin, 2011). In coordination with CBC Radio, he hosted a five-part series broadcast across the nation. The series, titled *The Ecological Viewpoint*, was widely successful to the point where it was subsequently published in print. Balch’s *The Ecological Viewpoint* proved to be a seminal text for the wider ecological movement, “an essential book for anyone wishing to understand the development of environmental thought and action’ in Canada” (McLaughlin, 2011, citing Hatheway (1991), p. 18). The

narrative, however, is important for understanding how the material processes of scientific research helped to spur a collective identity organized around the “true environmentalist”. This shift in attitude culminated in the creation of CCNB in 1969 (McLaughlin, 2011).

The provincial government and FPL ended the use of DDT in their spray programs in 1968, replacing it with an organophosphate known as fenitrothion. Ending the use of DDT was less to do with the provincial government acquiescing to vocalized dissent, but more to do with the controversy that the chemical had amassed at the national level. Because of changing perceptions over the aerial spray, the federal government in 1968 chose to withdraw their portion of the project funding (Lie, 1980). In a roundabout way, the controversy was established thanks in part to early promoters of environmentalist identities like Reginald Balch and Bruce Wright. And while still unorganized, the sentiment emanating at this time across the province was a “feeling of powerlessness and mistrust amongst some members of the general public over the way in which the forests were being managed” (Miller, 1993). Beginning in 1971, children in rural pockets of the province began exhibiting a mysterious cluster of symptoms. They would fall ill with a viral illness written off as the flu or something similar; and instead of improvement, their symptoms would quickly escalate to high fever, delirium, violent vomiting and would often slip into a coma. Five of the nine children exhibiting these symptoms between 1971 and 1973 succumbed to their illness (Russell, 1976). Through their illness, many of these children were sent to the children’s hospital in Halifax, Nova Scotia to be treated under Dr. J. F. S Crocker, an endocrinologist at the IWK (Russell, 1976). It was soon discovered that these children were suffering from a neurological condition known as

Reye's Syndrome. A parallel was quickly drawn by Crocker and his cohorts that the symptoms exhibited in these cases appeared "suspiciously like classical symptoms of common kinds of chemical or insecticide poisoning" (Russell, 1976). Soon after these associations were made, Crocker and his team conducted a laboratory study in mice and found a correlation with higher mortality in the mice exposed to DDT and fenitrothion compared with mice exposed to a control. These findings were then published in a high profile medical journal in 1974. A subsequent study was published in *Science* in 1976 reconfirming similar findings (Miller, 1993). Following a radio interview with one of the mothers of the children who died, the concrete association to insecticides having a negative impact on human health was spread to the public, galvanizing contenders into action. Only one day after the interview, CGP was created with the intent to lobby for the "immediate cessation of chemical spraying" until research could be conducted to prove its safety. With a specific aim, the group was quick to mobilize their resources and conducted a vigorous campaign comprised of meetings with government officials, "the use of media to influence public opinion," and "litigation...initial charges were laid against [FPL] in March 1977 on the grounds that they had violated sections of two Federal Acts (the Pest Control Products and Fisheries Acts)" (Miller, 1993). The group also conducted citizen watch programs, aimed at generating information from locals accidentally exposed to the spray. The intensive, organized, and often repetitive action of CPG in part, spurred the provincial government to implement a panel to determine the validity of Crocker's studies. The panel, comprised of six external scientists, convened over three days in April 1976. Their findings concluded that they were "unable to find evidence linking the occurrence of Reye's Syndrome in New Brunswick to the forest

spraying program or to Dr. Crocker's experiments on baby mice" (New Brunswick Department of Natural Resources [NBDNR], 1976). Although CPG was ultimately unsuccessful in halting the aerial spray program at the time, they were still able to shift certain policy in the provincial government. They were influential in the province adopting a Pesticide Advisory Board, and "steps were taken to tighten-up the regulations governing pesticide use, especially around habitation" (Miller, 1993). One of their more lasting contributions was the quiet decommissioning of a widespread insecticide program in New Brunswick. After 1993, no insecticide spraying has been undertaken on Crown land (Rashid, 2003). Canada instituted a national ban on fenitrothion in 1998. Since these developments, greater attention has been devoted to the implementation of biological controls to mitigate populations of Spruce Budworm. Bt (*bacillus thuringiensis*) is a bacterial insecticide agent that requires ingestion for it to take effect, therefore mitigating the widespread damage that was caused by DDT's and fenitrothion's efficacy upon contact (Rashid, 2003). It should be noted the environmental movement was ultimately successful in halting the aerial spray of *insecticides* as opposed to *herbicides*, of which glyphosate is currently classified. As an interview with one academic expert confirmed:

"up until then [the 1990's]...from a forest management perspective the huge issue that preoccupied environmental organizations, citizens groups, was the insecticide spraying...so they started spraying DDT in '52-'53 and there was a 40-year aerial spraying for Spruce Budworm" ...so in terms of contention...it was primarily around insecticide spraying."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Personal Interview conducted by author. January 28, 2025, Fredericton, New Brunswick.

This chapter has highlighted the spatial, material and institutional pathways put forward by Neville & Martin (2022) that have contributed to the contemporary understanding of forestry and environmentalism in New Brunswick. As it has been demonstrated, slow effusive justice can be measured over time. In the section on forestry, the role of the NBFWO in establishing provincial marketing boards was due to the mobilizing capacity demonstrated by the land-owning forester spanning decades. Comparatively, this chapter has also traced the evolution of the non-land-owning forester, whose identity aligns more closely with periodic expression of violent dissent and who is intimately tied to sentiments related to rurality and nature.

In tracing the environmentalist collective identity, three distinct sub-categories emerged. In the 1950s and 1960s, key members of the scientific community were instrumental in broadcasting tenants of ecology sensibility to a wider audience. Their personal adoption of ecological orientations evolved through scientific findings, shifting scientific paradigms and progressing their disciplines. These findings in turn, influenced another layer of materiality, allowing for the adoption of more sophisticated resource management strategies over time. These new discoveries have embedded themselves within prevailing institutions. For example, the rise of environmental consciousness supported by scientifically grounded evidence supported the Canadian Government's decision to abandon funding for the New Brunswick aerial spray program, thereby forcing FPL and the pro-spray camp to adopt different measures. Finally, these diffuse pathways, environmental identities, scientific understandings and institutional systems converge in the 1970s with the creation of CPG. Although the group was unsuccessful in

their aim, their work helped to usher these diffusive relations towards informing new eras of more sustainable forestry management and more cohesive forms of environmental justice.

These embedded identities continue to maintain a presence in the contemporary cases analyzed in Chapter 3. For example, in the case between 2000-2010, we see the beginnings of a movement resurgence with the activation of the land-owning forester regarding worries over supply; in turn reinvigorating their frustration associated to their loss of right to primary supply in 1992.

From 2010-2018, the momentum that was gained from the political regime's response to the supply issue as well as the mobilizers reactions of the decade prior enabled other identities, especially that of the conservationist and the true environmentalist to emerge over concerns about White-Tail Deer population and public health. Conservationists and true environmentalists were able to usher that momentum into the 2020's, where we see for the first time a slight opening of the political opportunity structure with the Climate Change and Environmental Stewardship Committee electing to examine glyphosate as its first issue.

In many ways, Case 3 (2018-2023) draws the most parallels to where the movement stalled in the 1980s, especially regarding the uptick in concerns over public health. The challenge facing the movement today—if borrowing from lessons of the past—is the way that they have shifted their strategy into firm messaging in the realm of public and ecological safety. This shift has two problems. For one, health framing appears naturally disadvantageous to participation (Miller, 1993). If considering the land-owning forester and the history of forestry practices to which they have been

exposed, it would be reasonable to suggest that from their point of view, they see glyphosate as a necessary component to responsible silviculture practices. Secondly, health effects are difficult to prove. For example, Miller (1993), determined in his analysis that CPG was unable to sustain its momentum in the 1970s and 1980s because of challenges related to validating the CPG's scientific claims. More specifically, the epidemiological and toxicological claims that the CPG waged over the safety of phosphamidon drew inconclusive results when analyzed by the government panel: "trying to prove the detrimental health effects of low-level exposure to environmental toxins is extremely difficult...even in the best of circumstances, with adequate money, time and expertise, the resulting epidemiological and toxicological data will always be ambiguous, open to a variety of conflicting opinions" (Miller, 1993, p.56). When the validity of scientific evidence is difficult to measure with certainty, it opens an opportunity for both sides of a debate to interpret science based on their own political viewpoints (Neville and Weinthal 2016, Millar 2024). In New Brunswick, resource management development is rife with instances where "scientific thinking is influenced by powerful political and economic interests" (Anders & Clancy, 2002, p. 165). And this tradition is being mirrored in the current debate over glyphosate application. To name one example from the second case in Chapter 3, it was observed in the media that Rod Cumberland was debasing the claims that R. A. Lautenschlager was making regarding the White-Tail Deer populations. With each citing "scientific data" as proof of their conclusions, it becomes difficult to parse which side holds the objective truth. The "politics of science" is a widespread phenomenon, and Anders and Clancy (2002) have specifically traced its history within resource management circles in New Brunswick and

Nova Scotia. While wielding the political power that scientific data can afford might be advantageous in the sense that it triggers latent identities (in this case hunters), it is most likely not an effective strategy for a strong, long-lasting, campaign because the message of the organized movement will become obfuscated by rhetorical discourse. Plus, as it has been demonstrated through this thesis, the underlying grievance shared by all identities groups is the perception that too much Crown land has been and is being ceded by the provincial government to industry. With discourse around health, the underlying message regarding Crown land management and distribution is fundamentally lost in the noise.



## Conclusion

This primary question guiding this thesis has been: *why do some communities in resource dependent provinces mobilize at some times but not others?* In examining cases of mobilization around the application of the herbicide glyphosate to Crown land forests in New Brunswick, it has answered this question in the following ways: for one, it has supported the argument that the loss of linkages and spread-effects are contributing factors in the preponderance of community mobilization. This thesis has put forward an argument tying Canadian political economy and contentious politics research together to demonstrate that, in the case of New Brunswick forestry politics, a causal relationship exists in the following sequence. Fluctuations in the pulp and paper market occur that spurs the state to respond by adopting policies that uphold the status quo, while opening up the political opportunity structure. This opening of the political opportunity structure, together with activated grievances, leads to “loud” episodes of mobilization. This relationship was applied across three separate cases spanning the years 2000-2023. Secondly, by employing a historical analysis it has argued that grievances over the way the provincial government has distributed, and the way that the industry has managed, Crown land has a long history. Because of this, my thesis has also posed a secondary question: *in the face of mobilization over time without a political regime that adopts policy changes in the face of organized claim making, why do communities in the New Brunswick context continue to contend so loudly?* The answer to this question lies in the argument that the volume of contention remains louder based on underlying spatial identities that have contributed to a culture of

environmental justice and resiliency in the face of slow environmental harm. In this argument, spatial identities have been forged over time and coalesce around latent injustices from the past. For New Brunswick, these harms arose as a by-product from the transition from lumber to pulp and paper as a province's primary export in the 1920s and was further exacerbated by a period of rural reconstruction combined with failed forestry management strategies in the mid-to-late 20<sup>th</sup> century. The following spatial identities were forged as a result: 1) the foresters, differentiating its subgroups between land owning and non-land-owning individuals; and 2) the environmentalists including its sub-groups of conservationist, ecologist and true environmentalist (with some participation from citizen action groups). I argue that these spatial identities become reinvigorated when episodic market fluctuations spur political regimes to make resource management decisions in favour of the status quo. Thus, glyphosate contention today can be explained by resource management decisions invoked in the early 2000s and 2010s and can be further contextualized by the historical emergence of spatial identities. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the movement is leaning on a long history of resilient community building to spur the volume of their contention.

In this thesis, I have examined the case of forestry in the New Brunswick context by adapting an analytical framework to assess what political opportunity structures look like when operating in mature states with degenerative qualities. Testing this framework against divergent resource industries and divergent jurisdictions in the Canadian context would be an area for further study. For example, would this framework be applicable in the New Brunswick context within another extractive industry like fishing? Equally, would this framework be of use in other Canadian provinces also contending against the

application of herbicides on Crown land? Further, my analysis was limited to the amount of historical research I had at my disposal. There is ample opportunity for the compilation of more historical data to uncover the reasons why communities can tend to these identities with so much resiliency and care. Further research in topics of Canadian environmental history is warranted.

On the other hand, this research is of potential use to environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) in New Brunswick contending against the use of glyphosate. As was articulated in Chapter 4, ENGOS may face or are currently facing challenges associated to the ability to sustain the movement over time when lacking external provocation from market trends. Empirically speaking, this may be due to the decision to focus on messaging and narratives that are hard to quantify. The empirical evidence has also shown that environmental contention in New Brunswick around the application of herbicides is multi-dimensional but organized around one common dissatisfaction with Crown land distribution and management. A suggestion for ENGOS tasked with the goal of maintaining momentum would involve advocating for the use of messaging away from harm and returning it to the unified message of land distribution. Naturally, this would also involve the suggestion that ENGOS involved in this case work more closely with forestry groups under a unified stance. While it may suppress the views of the more ardent “true-environmentalists” who are unilaterally concerned with the elimination of toxic substances in the natural environment, it would be advantageous to the wider goal of land redistribution and mitigating industry decision making power if messaging is able to convince the environmental base that land distribution is a worthy endeavor. For example, a campaign highlighting the need for mixed stand forests to

support ecological resiliency in the face of climate adaptation would be more convincing and less distracting to the broader audience over the elimination of an herbicide that prevailing health agencies have deemed safe to the public in its current application. Another avenue of exploration is the extent to which conservationists who hunt and fish for sport have benefitted from the forest industry and its less than sustainable forestry practices. This notion is raised by environmental historians who note how more invasive logging strategies in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century afforded conservationists with greater access to the woods to hunters than in the past (McLaughlin, 2013). Is this group therefore a Bonafide contender if we examine a justice-based approach? Is the claim over White-Tail Deer populations truly salient considering the invasive nature of the species? (Reeleder, n.d.). Presumably government decision makers in resource related departments are less likely to heed these groups and their claims if they know the scientific research underpinning these claims lacks consensus. CCNB may wish distance itself from the noise generated by these claimants by brokering a closer working relationship with individual small woodlot owners and forestry organizations like NBFWO. Equally, citizen action groups comprising of conservationists like SSNB may need to critically examine their underlying assumptions around their relationship to land should the movement proceed in a distributively just manner.

This brings up another topic related to land distribution, that being the question of Indigenous land rights and title. While it is possible this is already occurring, it would be in the best interest of ENGOs concerned about glyphosate and Crown land management to leverage the ample opportunity to increase salience on the topic by seeking meaningful, impactful input from New Brunswick's Indigenous communities.

Presumably relationship building would be a challenging but rewarding avenue of exploration considering that the identities involved in these groups have originated through various historical mechanisms with elements of dispossession. A greater opportunity is present for the movement to forge an even more resilient eco-psychological political identity.

Ultimately, while it may be difficult to obtain buy-in from the public on a topic that requires a working knowledge of the political economy of the province to understand where injustices were committed, public outreach and relationship building programs that effectively stay on message to the historical loss of linkages would be of benefit, especially ones that focus on the role that industry has played in depressing attempts at community forestry initiatives (McLaughlin & Parenteau, 2009) as well as the net disadvantage that the pulp and paper industry has brought to the province. On the other hand, these types of outreach programs might not be logistically possible considering the amount of political power the pulp and paper industry seems to possess. Finally, further areas of research assessing the influence of the main industrial players on overall state capacity would prove fruitful to determine the extent to which the political regime reinforces the status quo. Have ENGOs been reticent to position their messaging in such a way due to a widely held public perception that the pulp and paper industry provides a net social good to residents of New Brunswick? In this case, independent quantitative study in the realm of contentious politics regarding the public's perception of the pulp and paper industry would be helpful toward a greater understanding of forestry contention in New Brunswick.

In conclusion, this thesis has explained how instances of contention can come from long histories of resistance. It has highlighted that, at least for the case of New Brunswick, communities continue to resist because of a rich history of justice in the face of environmental harm.

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### Publications:

McClure, Meghan, and Heather Millar. Forthcoming. "Holding Space for Transformation: Energy Justice in the Classroom." In *Justice in Canada's Energy Transition*. Laura Tozer, Cheryl Teelucksingh, Julie MacArthur, and Jenny Lieu, eds. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (Accepted for publication).