

From Aid to Atrocity:  
U.S. Foreign Policy and Covert Operations in Indonesia,  
1949-1966.

by

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## **Abstract**

Amid the Cold War, the United States engaged in long-term covert programs designed to shift Indonesia into its sphere of influence. Between 1949 and 1966, the United States developed the Indonesian Army and Police Mobile Brigade, which would go on to carry out the 1965–1966 genocide that brought these groups to power. Although the Truman administration initiated the long-term project, each successive administration expanded it by funneling more arms, money, and training to the Indonesian security forces. These forces served as Washington’s bulwark against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the largest communist party outside of the Soviet Union and China. Drawing on recently declassified documents this thesis demonstrates how a sustained aid program contributed to the rise of a three-decade-long anti-communist regime; its legitimacy built upon the destruction of the PKI. Through an examination of these long-term covert action projects, this study provides new insights into the origins of the Indonesian Genocide and U.S. Cold War strategy in Southeast Asia; one rooted in interventionism and Cold War anxieties.

## Dedication

*For Geraldine, Ian, Norman, and Audrey*

## Acknowledgements

No thesis is written in isolation, something I learned through the support of everyone who helped me in countless ways. I am deeply grateful for the kindness, patience, and guidance I received throughout this project. My greatest debt of gratitude goes to Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke, whose mentorship and unwavering belief in my abilities made this thesis possible. As a supervisor you have gone above and beyond. I also want to thank Dr. Jeff Brown for fostering my interest in American history and foreign relations through the courses you taught and candid discussion we shared. I am incredibly fortunate to have learned from both of you, and I hope to carry these lessons into my future research and teaching. I also want to extend a special thanks to Dr. David Charters for sharing both his time and his research file on *Konfrontasi* with me. Unfortunately, the scope of this project meant leaving some material behind, but your expertise provided essential background and deepened my understanding of this complex history.

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# The Republic of Indonesia




Figure 1.

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 km



## Indonesia and Neighboring Countries



Figure 2.

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 km



## List of Abbreviations

AFB	Air Force Base
AUREV	<i>Angkatan Udara Revoluioner</i> (Permesta Revolutionary Air Force)
BRANI	<i>Badan Rahasia Negara Indonesia</i> (Indonesian State Secret Agency)
CAP	Civil Action Program
CAT	Civil Air Transport
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDP	Deputy Director of Plans
DI	<i>Darul Islam</i>
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
ERP	European Recovery Program, a.k.a., The Marshall Plan
EUR	Department of State Bureau of European Affairs
FE	Department of State Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
G30S	<i>Gerakan September Tiga Puluh</i> (September 30th Movement)
ICA	International Cooperation Agency
INR	Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KOSTRAD	<i>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KOTI	<i>Komando Operasi Tertinggi</i> (Supreme Operations Command)
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MOBRIG	<i>Korps Brigade Mobil</i> (Mobile Brigade Corps)
MSA	Mutual Security Act
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAS	Naval Air Station
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NTTU	Naval Technical Training Unit
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
OISP	Overseas Internal Security Program
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OPS	Office of Public Safety
OSO	Office of Special Operations
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party)

PNI	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Party)
PPS	Policy Planning Staff Paper
PRRI	<i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
SESKOAD	<i>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College)
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
TRIKORA	<i>Tri Komando Rakyat</i> (People's Triple Command)
TNI-AD	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat</i> (Indonesian National Military Land Force)
TNI-AL	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut</i> (Indonesian National Military Naval Force)
TNI-AU	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara</i> (Indonesian National Military Air Force)
USAID/AID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIS/USIA	U.S. Information Service, U.S. Information Agency
USOIDP	U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy
WNG	West New Guinea/West Irian

## Introduction

In Indonesia, September 30 and October 1, 1965, marked the end of one era and the violent beginning of another. Overnight, the *Gerakan 30 September* (G30S, or Thirtieth of September Movement), as it later became known, kidnapped six of Indonesia's top generals and murdered them. The events of October 1 sparked a violent crackdown against the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, or Indonesian Communist Party), whom the military branded as the orchestrators of G30S. Over the next few months, the Indonesian Army, with the support of anti-communist militias and civilian groups, orchestrated the mass killing of between two hundred thousand and one million communists and alleged sympathizers.<sup>1</sup> A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) history later described the episode as “one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century.”<sup>2</sup> As General Suharto emerged from the chaos to take control of the state, Indonesia pivoted sharply toward the West. The United States welcomed this outcome.

The scale, coordination, and speed of the violence following October 1 raised questions about how the Indonesian Army acquired the capacity and legitimacy to carry out the mass killing. Many historians have examined the origins of G30S, the degree of PKI involvement, the role of Indonesia's President Sukarno, and the extent to which the movement reflected internal Army rivalries rather than a coordinated PKI coup attempt.

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<sup>1</sup> The true death toll remains unknown. Historian Robert Cribb examined the numbers and argued because of the chaotic nature of the events in Indonesia, the most precise estimate remains somewhere between two hundred thousand and one million. See, Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966,” *Asian Survey*, 42, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 550–63. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.4.550>.

<sup>2</sup> *Indonesia–1965: The Coup that Backfired*, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1968, CIA Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room (CIA FOIA ERR) doc. no. 00186624, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/00186624>, 71.

The scholarship, while still not definitive, presents compelling insights into the events of late 1965 and the aftermath of the genocide. These histories often exclusively focus on the events of G30S and few tackle the broader historical context within which it occurred. While the outcome of G30S remains paramount, this thesis shifts attention away from the origins of coup and the subsequent counter-coup and toward the longer-term policies and processes enabling the Indonesian Army, police, and paramilitary forces to carry out the genocide between 1965–1966.

This thesis argues successive American administrations played a significant role in the origins of the genocide. Thus, I maintain that U.S. complicity in these events extended beyond the Johnson administration's support during the bloodshed. Instead, the violence represented the culmination of a consistent foreign policy designed to prevent a communist Indonesia.<sup>3</sup> From the administration of Harry S. Truman onward, successive Presidents pursued this objective through efforts to strengthen anti-communist elements within the Indonesian military, police, and political institutions. Beginning with the American responses to the leftist Madiun Rebellion, which occurred in 1948, continuing through U.S. involvement in the failed outer island rebellion of 1958, and expanding under President John F. Kennedy administration U.S. policymakers increasingly treated the Indonesian Army and its domestic police force as anti-communist as counterweights to the PKI.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> "Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," March 29, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2, ed. John G. Reid and John P. Glennon, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1976), Document 317.

<sup>4</sup> The Madiun Rebellion erupted as an armed communist uprising against the Indonesian government during the National Revolution against the Dutch. The rebellion ended with a communist defeat at the hands of the Indonesian Army. The outer island Rebellion comprised two separate armed insurgencies on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi sharing similar political goals. Both movements grew from the dissatisfaction of Army officers who felt the Central Government's economic plans ignored the outer islands; negotiated

Though the U.S. provided modest military assistance initially, it significantly increased that support throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. A steady stream of Indonesian officers entering top American military academies and universities anchored U.S. efforts. These programs not only built-up the capabilities of the Indonesian military but directly transferred an American ideology framing communism as an existential threat. And while U.S. officials may not have foreseen the scale or brutality of the anti-communist violence following G30S, nearly two decades of U.S. aid, training, and covert action directly shaped the outcome.<sup>5</sup>

To date no history of U.S.-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno Era has made the explicit argument a coherent foreign policy from Truman to the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson prepared the Indonesian security forces for a post-Sukarno Indonesia.<sup>6</sup> In this thesis I argue U.S. policy, from the Truman to the Johnson administration, shaped the events in Indonesia between 1965–1966. Guided by a Cold War ideology of anti-communism each successive administration played a role in increasing the tensions within Indonesia, through the consistent institutional build-up of

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settlements eventually brought the rebellions to an end.

<sup>5</sup> Nowhere within the National Security Act of 1947, the act which created the CIA, was covert action defined. Rather, the Agency's broad mandate included provisions "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the NSC may from time to time direct." See, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 § 102(d)(5) (1947). While the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, required the president "find" an intelligence operation important to national security, this still did not define covert action. See, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974). Covert action was officially defined with the passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991. See, Pub. L. No. 102-88, § 602, 105 Stat. 429, 443 (1991). Currently covert action is defined as "...an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." See, 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions),

<sup>6</sup> Baskara T. Wardaya has been the closest anyone has come to making this argument see, Baskara T. Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia, 1953–1963* (Pusat Sejarah dan Etika Politik (PUSDEP) in collaboration with Galangpress, 2007).

its anti-communist forces.<sup>7</sup> The Truman administration, pleased with the Indonesian Army and Police handling of the communist uprising during the Madiun rebellion, armed, trained, and funded these groups. Apart from a brief period in 1958, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration further aided these groups. On assuming the presidency John F. Kennedy continued aid sent to the Indonesian Army and police forces. Finally, even with Congress curtailing all other aid, the Johnson administration sustained covert military and police support to bolster its anti-communist allies on the Archipelago. The decade-and-a-half policy aiding the police and the military gave these forces the upper-hand in the final struggle against the PKI. This resulted in the Indonesian genocide that saw anywhere from two hundred fifty thousand to one million killed.<sup>8</sup>

This argument draws upon a close reading of the various histories that emerged since 1965. The earliest histories focused on the Coup and its immediate aftermath. These histories sought to answer how such an event occurred. Much of the focus was placed on explaining how the military, particularly Suharto, wrested control from Sukarno and the PKI.<sup>9</sup> These analyses, while important, scarcely grappled with the underlying structural reasoning for the Coup and the ensuing genocide. With the passage of time and the release of newly declassified American documents these histories shifted from a question

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<sup>7</sup> I define Cold War ideology here as the pervasive fear among U.S. leadership of communist expansion, especially as it relates to the Third World. The Truman Doctrine, Containment, and Domino Theory emerged during this period, though subsequent chapters provide a more exhaustive analysis of their specific applications.

<sup>8</sup> Cribb, "Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings," 559.

<sup>9</sup> These include: Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia* (Pembimbing Masa, 1971 (1968)); Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia* (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971 (1966)); *Indonesia 1965: The Coup that Backfired*, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1968, CIA FOIA ERR, doc. no. 00186624, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/00186624>; Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1971); John Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie; or, Allison in Wonderland* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973).

of how to a question of why. Subsequent historians moved away from a focus of the 1965 Coup toward the preceding years in search of an explanation rooted in the history of US foreign policy in Indonesia.<sup>10</sup>

Indonesia, an archipelago nation of over 13,000 islands, 700 languages, and 1,300 ethnicities had no natural reason for being. Rather, it represented a “nation of intent,” to borrow a phrase from anthropologist and sociologist A. B. Shamsul. A “nation of intent” emerges not only from a shared colonial history among diverse ethnic and religious groups but also from a pluralistic framework where multiple national identities coexist within a single country.<sup>11</sup> While not a constant throughout Indonesia’s long history, it provides a useful framework to understand how the modern Indonesian state developed.

Prior to Dutch colonization, the Majapahit Empire first wove together the archipelago’s rich tapestry of differing groups from about 1290 to 1527.<sup>12</sup> The Dutch colonial presence on the island chain began in the Seventeenth Century with the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in 1602.<sup>13</sup> Resistance challenged the Dutch’s tenuous colonial rule until they finally consolidated control over the islands

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<sup>10</sup> These include: Rudolf Mrázek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945–1965*, Volumes I & II, (The Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978); Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1978); Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (Summer, 1985): 239–64; George McTurnan Kahin and Audrey R. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debauch in Indonesia* (The New Press, 1995); Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia, 1953–1963* (PUSDEP in collaboration with Galangpress, 2007); Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> See A. B. Shamsul, “Nations-of-intent in Malaysia,” in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, eds. Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (RoutledgeCurzon, 1996), 323–347.

<sup>12</sup> Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (Yale University Press, 2003). 88–93, 122.

<sup>13</sup> Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, fourth ed. (Stanford University Press, 2001), 45–46.

around the turn of the Twentieth Century.<sup>14</sup> The Japanese invasion and occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War marked the end of Dutch colonial control. But the defeat of a European imperial power by an Asian power, as well as Japanese propaganda espousing Pan-Asianism, influenced the long-established Indonesian independence movement to proclaim independence after Japan's surrender to the Allied powers in 1945.<sup>15</sup> Despite the proclamation by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, the Dutch sought to regain its lost Indonesian colony. A four-year war of independence followed, ending on December 27, 1949, after international pressure forced the Dutch to halt their police actions against Indonesian Republicans. This led to the Dutch transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch East Indies to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.<sup>16</sup> Yet, internal ideological shifts soon fractured the sovereign identity established in 1949, pivoting the state's focus from external defense toward internal purges. The 1948 Madiun Rebellion foreshadowed this split. Very quickly the Cold War ideological consensus re-framed internal Indonesian nationalist debates into two hostile camps, now deemed communists or anti-communists. By 1965, a campaign of violence replaced the optimism of the post-colonial era, sparking a debate over the nature of these killings that persists among historians and social scientists today.

The debate over how best to characterize the systematic murders remains key to understanding the events between 1965 and 1966. Historians have labeled the atrocities

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<sup>14</sup> Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, 97.

<sup>15</sup> Andre Magpantay, "'Asia for Asians': Revisiting Pan-Asianism through the Propaganda Arts of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere," *Manusya: Journal of Humanities* 26, no. 1 (2024): 1–3 <https://doi.org/10.1163/26659077-26010015>.

<sup>16</sup> Gerlof D. Homan, "The Netherlands, the United States and the Indonesian Question, 1948," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 1 (January 1990): 123–41. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/260724>.

which befell Indonesia as either a mass killing or a genocide.<sup>17</sup> I have chosen to employ the term genocide because this term best captures both the nature and magnitude of the killing. An agreed upon definition of genocide, however, has proven difficult. A brief foray into the sociological foundations of genocide and its contentious history foregrounds the difficulty defining genocide.

Raphaël Lemkin's *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* and his *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphaël Lemkin* defined our understanding of genocide as well as the complications accompanying that definition.<sup>18</sup> Lemkin, deeply affected by the Holocaust, completed *Axis Rule* toward the end of the Second World War and provided a legal

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<sup>17</sup> Genocide has become more widely used, but not exclusively, within the literature since the mid-2010s. For mass killing see: Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, (1966; repr., Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971, 2009); *Indonesia 1965: The Coup that Backfired*, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1968, CIA FOIA ERR; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1978); Ulf Sundhassen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967* (Oxford University Press, 1982); Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (Summer, 1985): 239–264; Frederick Bunnell, “American ‘Low Posture’ Policy Toward Indonesia in the Months Leading Up to the 1965 ‘Coup,’” *Indonesia* 50 (October, 1990): 29–60. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351229>; Paul F. Gardner, *Shared Hopes Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Westview Press, 1997); Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup D'État in Indonesia* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Baskara T. Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia, 1953–1963* (PUSDEP in collaboration with Galangpress, 2007); Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008). For genocide see: Jaechun Kim, “U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences,” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 9, no. 2 (December 2002): 66–85; Robert Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–1966,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, no. 2 (2001): 219–239, <https://doi.org/10.1080/713677655>; Jess Melvin, “Mechanics of Mass Murder: A Case for Understanding the Indonesian Killings as Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2017): 487–511, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393942>; Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder* (Routledge, 2018); *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965: Causes, Dynamics and Legacies*, eds. Katherine McGregor, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Annie Pohlman, “Incitement to Genocide Against A Political Group: The Anti-Communist Killings in Indonesia,” *Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies* 11, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v11i1.3292>; Vincent Bevins, *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2020).

<sup>18</sup> Raphaël Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944); Raphaël Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (Yale University Press, 2013).

analysis of Nazi rule in occupied nations. This book formed the legal basis for the Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, however, the UN Genocide Convention (UNGC) failed to fully incorporate all forms of genocide defined by Lemkin because of the contemporaneous political situation accompanying the Convention.<sup>19</sup> The former colonial powers and settler nations created major stumbling blocks for Lemkin's definition through both groups' opposition the inclusion of political and cultural acts of genocide. Consequently, the UNGC excluded both political and cultural groups from its final text, narrowing the legal definition. This omission has allowed perpetrators of politically or culturally motivated massacres to largely avoid punishment under international law. By anchoring the definition so closely to the specific horrors of the Holocaust, the Convention entrenched a rigid interpretation of a crime that persists today. This, in turn, has hindered efforts to broaden the legal scope of the term, even when atrocities align with Lemkin's original conception.

In his original conception of the term, Lemkin outlined eight categories in which a series of actions can destroy a groups' identity and existence: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.<sup>20</sup> He also defined genocide as having two distinct phases: first, the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and second, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor.<sup>21</sup> By "national pattern" Lemkin meant the things that make a group distinct.

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<sup>19</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Adopted December 9, 1948, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 78, no. 1021, 277–322. <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280027fac>.

<sup>20</sup> Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 79–90.

<sup>21</sup> Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 79.

In the Indonesian context, the campaign against the PKI constituted a deliberate attempt to permanently destroy the party's national pattern. Within Indonesian society, the PKI functioned with an *aliran*, or a massive social ecosystem comprised of millions of members and integrated satellite organizations. These included trade unions (SOBSI), a cultural wing (Lekra), women's groups (Gerwani), and youth groups (*Pemuda Rakyat*).<sup>22</sup> By attacking and then outlawing the PKI and its organizations, the Army and anti-communists not only repressed a political rival but also destroyed the essential foundation of a large segment of Indonesian society. Then, the Suharto regime imposed its new national pattern through his New Order. Through the destruction of the PKI, Suharto's Indonesia redefined its identity through its opposition to communism. Read through this lens, the destruction of the PKI fulfilled the two phases of Lemkin's definition of genocide.

Although the definition of genocide provides a necessary framework for this thesis, my primary focus remains on U.S. foreign policy and covert operations in Indonesia from 1949 to 1966. My research aims to broaden existing scholarship, investigating the role of long-term U.S. strategies in building the Indonesian Army and police; help that result in the 1965–1966 genocide. My methodology combines an analysis of primary sources from various U.S. departments and agencies, volumes from the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, transcriptions of interviews with former embassy staff, and memoirs, with secondary literature from scholars who have a deep familiarity with the history of U.S. foreign relations and Southeast Asian history.

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<sup>22</sup> J. M. van Der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 302–303. “*Aliran*” translates to current, or flow. In this context an *aliran* means a movement of people. The *aliran* system defined Indonesian political parties, functioning as massive social ecosystems rather than simple political organizations.

Finally, while this thesis emphasizes the role of the U.S. in the Indonesian genocide, it maintains that the Indonesians did not yield their agency entirely. It was the Indonesian Army, police, and paramilitary forces that secured the non-communist nation. This outcome aligned with U.S. policy goals as Indonesians achieved the result themselves without the deployment of American troops. The United States represented one important actor among many, and my thesis situates American foreign policy as a contributing factor rather than the sole cause.

The following chapters trace the evolution of U.S. policy in Indonesia from 1948 to 1966, examining how each successive administration cultivated the anti-communist forces and conditions resulting in the 1965–1966 genocide. Chapter one surveys the existing literature focusing on U.S.-Indonesian relations between 1948 to 1966 and the historiographical waves of scholarship in the decades following the Indonesian genocide. This chapter situates my thesis within the broader historical discussion of the role the U.S. played within Indonesia during the Cold War and identifies gaps within the literature this research fills.

Chapter two examines the early Cold War dynamics between the United States and Indonesia, focusing on how American policymakers influenced Indonesia's postcolonial nationalism under Sukarno. It situates Indonesia within the broader context of Southeast Asia, explores U.S. economic and military aid as well as covert interventions, and assesses how fears of communist expansion both guided and complicated American policy. By analyzing Indonesian political responses and the rise of the PKI, the chapter traces the short-term consequences of U.S. interventions leading up to the Kennedy administration.

Chapter three explores the transformation of U.S. policy under the Kennedy administration. It highlights the shift from containment to a more nuanced engagement with Third World nationalism through strategies of modernization and counterinsurgency. The chapter examines the expansion of covert military and police aid to Indonesia, the education of Indonesian officers in the U.S., and the strategic use of these programs to influence the Sukarno's regime. It argues this sustained support strengthened anti-communist forces and helped create the conditions for the 1965–1966 genocide.

Finally, chapter four traces the final phase of the U.S. engagement under Johnson. It focuses on the transition from diplomatic accommodation to covert support for the anti-communist forces. It also examines the emergence of a policy characterized by historian Frederick Bunnell as one of “low posture,” through which the U.S. maintained clandestine ties to the Indonesian Army and police while distancing itself publicly from Sukarno.<sup>23</sup> The chapter demonstrates how these policies finally helped the Army carry out the genocide of the PKI in 1965–1966, completing the long-term objectives of American policymakers and reshaping Indonesia's political future, all while avoiding a quagmire like Vietnam.

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<sup>23</sup> Bunnell, “American ‘Low Posture’ Policy,” 31–33.

## Chapter One: Historiography

The historiography of U.S.-Indonesian relations from 1949–1966 has struggled for recognition for two reasons. First, its expansive timeline has resulted in many scholars relegating it to the background amidst more dominant global crises of the Cold War. Second, histories of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia during this period almost exclusively focus on the region of Indochina, (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In this chapter I discuss the historiography of American foreign policy toward Indonesia between 1949 and 1966. I illustrate how the histories have changed from examining what happened to why it happened. I also explain when and how scholars invoked and then discarded the term “genocide;” in doing so I open a space for my own argument to emerge.

The first histories of the Indonesia coup and counter-coup emerged from sources close to the events. In the days following October 1, 1965, the Army and right-wing press began releasing anti-PKI propaganda blaming the PKI for the deaths and demonizing the party. The Army weaponized the press to justify a violent campaign of reprisal, circulating reports accusing the PKI of torturing and castrating the generals.<sup>24</sup> The official Indonesian history of G30S has a more complicated past. The first state history did not emerge until 1968, with the authors writing in English to combat foreign accounts blaming the Army for orchestrating a coup to purge the PKI.<sup>25</sup> In the intervening time the

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<sup>24</sup> Ulf Sundhassen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967* (Oxford University Press, 1982), 212–15.

<sup>25</sup> Nugroho Notokusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia* (Pembimbing Masa, 1971 (1968)). The Army and right-wing parties of Indonesia told different versions of events through the press, monuments, museums, and speeches, and enforced it through violence and repression. The military banned the PKI and left-wing publications shortly after the G30S movement, effectively silencing any counter-narrative in Indonesia. The Indonesian translation of *The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement* did not appear until 1989. See, Ariel Heryanto, *State Terrorism and Political*

first Western academic analysis emerged from Cornell University graduate students Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey. These two, alongside Frederick Bunnell, another Cornell graduate student, utilized their contacts, which included, Indonesian news sources, and radio broadcasts to try and make sense of the coup.<sup>26</sup> By January 1966 the group produced, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, or more simply, “the Cornell Paper.”<sup>27</sup> They argued the Coup constituted a purely “internal army affair” targeting members of the “Council of Generals.”<sup>28</sup> Their conclusions differed significantly from the emerging official version of events spun by the Suharto regime, placing blame squarely on PKI. The Cornell Paper provided an impressive analysis of the Coup, but it was kept confidential to protect their sources. The authors finally published the study in 1971 to dispel misconceptions caused by years of leaks and fabrications.<sup>29</sup>

In 1968, the CIA compiled its own internal history titled, *Indonesia–1965: The Coup that Backfired*.<sup>30</sup> Less than a decade later, the government declassified and disseminated the report in 1976, as negative public and congressional impressions of the Suharto regime mounted following its invasion of East Timor. The CIA likely

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*Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging* (Routledge, 2006), 13.

<sup>26</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, “Chapter 8: Cornell and the Coup,” in *Southeast Asia: A Testament* (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 178; Anderson and McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis*, v.

<sup>27</sup> Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis*.

<sup>28</sup> Anderson and McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis*, 63–64.

<sup>29</sup> *The Washington Post* first publicized the existence of the paper on March 5, 1966. See, Joseph Kraft, “Insight and Outlook ...: Bloodbath in Indonesia,” *Washington Post*, March 5, 1966, A13. George McTurnan Kahin maintained confidentiality because the views expressed in the paper threatened the safety of students and colleagues in Indonesia during the anti-communist violence. See, George McTurnan Kahin, “Chapter 8: Cornell and the Coup,” in *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, 177–81.

<sup>30</sup> *Indonesia 1965: The Coup that Backfired*.

declassified the report in 1976 to spin a specific narrative.<sup>31</sup> At the time prominent Cornell historian, George Kahin, argued it was the only instance of the CIA declassifying its own study for public consumption.<sup>32</sup> The CIA history supported the Suharto regime's narrative blaming the PKI for G30S. The Party, it argued, had shrewdly staged the events of October first to appear as an internal army matter.<sup>33</sup> Neither the Cornell Paper, nor the CIA history, however, delved into the broader historical context for the mass violence following the failed coup.

The fall of Saigon in mid-1975 left the U.S. with few friends in Southeast Asia, leaving Indonesia as Washington's the largest and most important ally in the region.<sup>34</sup> The CIA report, which placed the majority of the blame for the events of G30S on the PKI and absolved Suharto and his Army, emerged just as Indonesia began its annexation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The rise of the communist FRETILIN movement in East Timor bolstered anxieties of a communist state on Indonesia's borders.<sup>35</sup> So on December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor under the guise of anti-communism. Suharto met with President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the day prior and received the approval for the attack.<sup>36</sup> Shortly after the invasion, reports emerged indicating Indonesian forces had killed between fifty thousand

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<sup>31</sup> See fn. 1 in Justus M. van der Kroef, "The 1965 Coup in Indonesia: The CIA's Version," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 4, no. 2 (Nov-Dec, 1976): 118. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30171459>.

<sup>32</sup> Kahin, *Southeast Asia*, 179.

<sup>33</sup> *Indonesia 1965*, "The Coup de Grace for the PKI," 66-69.

<sup>34</sup> Geoffrey Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 189.

<sup>35</sup> FRETILIN is an acronym for Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (*Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente*).

<sup>36</sup> "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State," 6 December 1975, Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76.

and one hundred thousand civilians.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the brutal Indonesian invasion and occupation saw the deaths of an estimated ten percent of the population, with many scholars classifying it as a genocide.<sup>38</sup>

By approving and supplying American weapons to Indonesian troops, the Ford administration facilitated the genocide. Kissinger, aware that supplying the weapons likely violated U.S. law, sought to keep the whole affair a secret.<sup>39</sup> The administration, feared the potential impact on U.S.-Indonesian relations should Congress cut aid to Indonesia.<sup>40</sup> While Congress suspended new arms sales to Indonesia pending a review, military equipment already “in the pipeline” continued to flow amid the height of the genocide.<sup>41</sup> Notably, the CIA released the declassified report on the 1965 coup just as the Ford administration secretly aided the Indonesian invasion of East Timor which minimized Congressional and public backlash.

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<sup>37</sup> The first major report came from former Australian Consul to Portuguese Timor, James Dunn, stating the figure of one hundred thousand appeared credible according to locals. The Catholic Church corroborated these numbers, with an estimate in the range of sixty thousand to one hundred thousand. Finally, Indonesian officials themselves admitted to large-scale killings; Foreign Minister Adam Malik estimated that the conflict claimed between fifty thousand and eighty thousand Timorese lives. See, James Dunn, “The Dunn Report on East Timor,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7, no. 3 (January 1977): 415. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472337785390411>; James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed* (Jacaranda, 1983), 310; Michele Turner, *Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992* (University of New South Wales Press, 1992), 207.

<sup>38</sup> Simons, *Indonesia*, 189–90.

<sup>39</sup> Simons, *Indonesia*, 188–89. For the full exchange see, Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 1992), 680–81.

<sup>40</sup> “Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger,” March 4, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, eds. Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, David Nickles, (Government Printing Office (GPO), 2010), doc. 120.

<sup>41</sup> William Burr and Michael L. Evans, eds., “East Timor Revisited: Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975–76,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62, December 6, 2001, National Security Archive, George Washington University, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/>.

In the end given its secrecy, the circulation of the Cornell Paper and the CIA report had little immediate impact on the historiography of U.S.-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno era. As a result, the memoirs of former Ambassadors to Indonesia, Howard Palfrey Jones and John Allison, became the first historical accounts of importance. Their memoirs predated the first volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* written on Indonesia by several years.<sup>42</sup> Jones, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from March 1958 until April 1965 and released the first orthodox account of the events, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* in 1971.<sup>43</sup> His memoir represented the first major history of this period that a U.S. official released to the public. A liberal foreign service officer, Jones painted a broadly sympathetic picture of Indonesian nationalism and President Sukarno. Like other orthodox accounts of the era, Jones's narrative utilized a Cold War framework to remind readers constantly that the United States aimed to keep Indonesia from falling to the communists. He may have disagreed with the decision-making process and methods used to carry out policy, especially during Eisenhower's administration, but he nonetheless toed the American line.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Between 1974 and 1977, the government published the initial volumes concerning the Truman administration's relationship with Indonesia. See, *FRUS*, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VI, eds. John G. Reid and David H. Stauffer (GPO, 1974); *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 1, ed. John G. Reid (GPO, 1975); *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 2, eds. John G. Reid and John P. Glennon (GPO, 1976); *FRUS*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. VI, eds. Neal H. Petersen, et al. (GPO, 1976); *FRUS*, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, vol. VI, pt. 1, eds. Paul Claussen, et al. (GPO, 1977); *FRUS*, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, vol. VI, pt. 2, eds. Paul Claussen, et al. (GPO, 1977). The first *FRUS* volumes covering the periods during which Ambassador Allison and Jones served were not released until the 1990s. See, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, ed. Robert J. McMahon (GPO, 1994); *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, ed. Edward C. Keefer (GPO, 1994).

<sup>43</sup> Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1971).

<sup>44</sup> Jones, *Indonesia*, 78–79.

Two years later John Allison, who served as Ambassador from March 1957 until January 1958, published his own memoirs titled, *Ambassador from the Prairie; or, Allison in Wonderland* in 1973.<sup>45</sup> Although Allison held the post for only a year, significant events marked his tenure as the United States supported the outer island rebellions against Sukarno's central government through the CIA-led covert action Project HAIK. Unfortunately, his memoirs dedicated only a single chapter to Indonesia. There Allison lamented his failure to move Jakarta into alignment with the West. He believed Washington refused to provide the tools he required to convince Jakarta to align with the West. Instead, U.S. policy focused on covert action and regime change.<sup>46</sup> Allison interpreted President Sukarno's eccentricities not as an obstacle to meaningful diplomacy, but representative of a cultural gap between Asia and the West. Retrospectively, Allison expressed satisfaction with Suharto's rise to power and praised the U.S. role for restoring Indonesia under Suharto's New Order.<sup>47</sup> Overall, his memoir reflected the core tenets of Cold War orthodoxy: a belief in the righteousness of "containment", a dismissal of Indonesian nationalism, and tacit approval of anti-communist repression.

These two memoirs formed the orthodox understanding of U.S.-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno era. Both accounts emerged from former ambassadors who, to varying degrees, held sympathetic views toward Indonesian nationalism and President Sukarno. Still, Allison and Jones consistently upheld the U.S. Cold War policies of

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<sup>45</sup> John Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie; or Allison in Wonderland* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973).

<sup>46</sup> Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 341–42, 311–15.

<sup>47</sup> Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 344.

“containment” and anti-communism. This led to friction with Indonesian leaders and within their own government. Finally, both ambassadors claimed they were excluded from the backroom planning of clandestine operations, and thus key information that they were entitled to receive as U.S. Ambassadors was withheld from them. In the following years, this thread would become a major topic within the historiography.

Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, policymakers viewed foreign aid as a tool to modernize, develop, and recruit allies across the Third World. “Modernization theory” served as the guiding principle behind this aid. This theory suggests all countries follow a similar linear path of development, driven by industrialization, technological advancement, and adoption of Western-style political values. Theorists believed modernization could transition a “traditional” or “underdeveloped” state to a “modern” Western-style society on a condensed timeframe through Western assistance programs.<sup>48</sup> These models sought to produce a universal system of development readily replicable for regions deemed underdeveloped by theorists and policymakers. Though Modernization theory likely reached its zenith under the Kennedy administration thanks to economists like Walt W. Rostow and John Kenneth Galbraith, the process had been underway since the end of the Second World War. The Marshall Plan and the Economic Cooperation Administration provided the initial impetus for this. Washington framed its foreign aid programs as a dual-purpose strategy to counter Soviet influence and nurture emerging democracies in the Third World. Walt Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*<sup>49</sup> likely exerted the most influence on the Kennedy administration,

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<sup>48</sup> For an in-depth analysis of Modernization Theory see, Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation-Building” in the Kennedy Era* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

<sup>49</sup> Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge University Press, 1960).

though his work incorporated decades of social theory from Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim regarding the linear development of societies. Other social theorists like Talcott Parsons, Seymour Lipset, Max Millikan, and Clifford Geertz, among others, produced works throughout the 1950s and 1960s which suggested the imposition of American best practices would help modernize and democratize Third World nations and thereby create reliable allies willing and able to wage the Cold War.<sup>50</sup> A subset of these social theorists, like Lucian W. Pye and Guy J. Pauker, viewed the armed forces as a stabilizing force capable of carrying out this development process within the Third World.<sup>51</sup>

These modernization theorists garnered wider public cachet after the publication of William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* in 1958, which portrayed a stagnant and out-of-touch American diplomatic corps in the fictional Third World Southeast Asian nation of Sarkhan.<sup>52</sup> In this context, American influence waned while the Soviets deepened their involvement with the Sarkhanese people. The book became a cultural touchstone among the American political and diplomatic scene with Inspector General of the CIA, Lyman Kirkpatrick, sending a copy to the Director of Central

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<sup>50</sup> See, Talcott Parsons, *The Social System: The Major Exposition of the Author's Conceptual Scheme for the Analysis of the Dynamics of the Social System* (Free Press, 1951); Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105; Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (Harper Brothers, 1957); *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy*, eds. Max Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (Little, Brown and Company, 1961); Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (University of California Press, 1963).

<sup>51</sup> *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries: Latin America, the Middle East, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Israel, and Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton University Press, 1962); Guy J. Pauker, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia*, (RAND Corporation, 1960); Guy J. Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management* (RAND Corporation, 1963).

<sup>52</sup> William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (W. W. Norton Company, 1958).

Intelligence, Allen Dulles.<sup>53</sup> So swayed by the message of the book, John F. Kennedy joined several other Senators in placing an advertisement for the book in the *New York Times*.<sup>54</sup> The novel's heroes were the Americans who immersed themselves in Sarkhanese language and culture to spearhead modernization efforts.

Between 1974 and 1977, the State Department published the first volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* documenting U.S. involvement in Indonesia. These volumes covered the Truman administration's handling of Indonesian independence from 1945–1952. Though lacking groundbreaking evidence, these volumes constituted the first public record of U.S. policymaking regarding Indonesia. The volumes proved valuable reference materials. Historians no longer needed to rely upon the memoirs of former ambassadors but had now actual documentation to support their arguments. The release of the *FRUS* volumes coincided the Watergate Scandal (1972), the release of the CIA's "Family Jewels" (1974), and the formation of the Church Committee (1975), critical events in the 1970s shattered Americans' trust in their institutions.<sup>55</sup> The combination of the release of new documents and a changing political

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<sup>53</sup> Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum to Allen Dulles, "The Ugly American by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick," October 1, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R003200170007-4, CIA FOIA ERR, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r003200170007-4>.

<sup>54</sup> Advertisement, "The Ugly American: The Best-Selling Novel that had become an Affair of the State," *New York Times*, January 23, 1959; See also, John Hellmann, "Vietnam as Symbolic Landscape: *The Ugly American* and the New Frontier," *Peace & Change* 9, no. 2–3 (July 1983): 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0130.1983.tb00494.x>.

<sup>55</sup> The Watergate Scandal refers to President Richard M. Nixon's use of former CIA officers and Cuban exiles to burglarize and plant listening devices at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Complex in Washington, D.C., Ralph L. DeFalco III, "Plumbers, Watergate (1971–1972)" in *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies* vol. 1, ed. Jan Goldman (ABC-CLIO, 2016), 296–97. The Family Jewels refers to the commissioning of a report on potentially illegal and inappropriate activities conducted by the CIA at the behest of DCI James Schlesinger. He commissioned the report considering the Watergate Scandal after new reports surfaced hinting at the involvement of CIA officers. Although the government did not officially release the Family Jewels until 2007, journalist Seymour Hersh published leaked portions of the report in the *New York Times* in 1974. Nicholas M. Sambaluk, "'Family Jewels' (Mid-1970s)," in *The Central Intelligence Agency: An*

environment encouraged a new generation of scholars to re-evaluate US foreign policy in Indonesia. Consequently, a new wave of revisionist historiography emerged, critiquing the U.S. role in foreign affairs. Edited collections like *Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power* and *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid* focused on the notion of American benevolence abroad, especially when it came to the portrayal of U.S. foreign aid programs.<sup>56</sup>

Prompted by the failed war in Vietnam, the rise of authoritarian states, and the “Year of Intelligence,” these scholars began to question the validity of Modernization theory and U.S. hegemony.<sup>57</sup> Books, articles, and essays examined the agenda behind modernization and developmental philosophies. Essays critical of American foreign aid emerged from New Left academics like Peter Dale Scott, Malcolm Caldwell, Cheryl Payer, David Ransom, Steve Weissman, Nancy Stein, and Mike Klare.<sup>58</sup> These scholars often characterized aid as duplicitous, claiming the United States advanced its own anti-

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*Encyclopedia*, ed. Jan Goldman, 139–42. Finally, the Church Committee refers to the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This Senate committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, investigated abuses and violations by the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, FBI, and NSA. James F. Siekmeier and Tim J. Watts, “Church Committee,” in *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Jan Goldman, 67–70.

<sup>56</sup> *Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power*, ed. Mark Selden (Pantheon Books, 1974); *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, ed. Steve Weissman (Ramparts Press, 1974).

<sup>57</sup> The Year of Intelligence refers to 1975. The allegations from Watergate and the Family Jewels spawned three separate Congressional committees to investigate intelligence abuses: a Presidential appointed panel (the Rockefeller Commission), a Senate select committee (the Church Committee), and a House of Representative Committee (the Pike Committee).

<sup>58</sup> Peter Dale Scott, “The Vietnam War and the CIA-Financial Establishment,” in *Remaking Asia*, ed. Mark Selden, 91–156; Cheryl Payer, “The International Monetary Fund and Indonesian Debt Slavery,” in *Remaking Asia*, ed. Mark Selden, 50–70; Malcolm Caldwell, “Oil Imperialism in Southeast Asia,” in *Remaking Asia*, ed. Mark Selden, 21–49; Cheryl Payer, “The IMF and the Third World,” in *The Trojan Horse*, ed. Steve Weissman, 61–72; David Ransom, “Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia,” in *The Trojan Horse*, ed. Steve Weissman, 93–116; Steve Weissman, “Introduction—Inside the Trojan Horse,” in *The Trojan Horse*, ed. Steve Weissman, 11–14; Steve Weissman, “Foreign Aid: Who Needs It?” in *The Trojan Horse*, ed. Steve Weissman, 15–34; Nancy Stein and Mike Klare, “Police Aid for Tyrants,” in *The Trojan Horse*, ed. Steve Weissman, 221–35.

communist goals at the expense of Third World nations struggling under authoritarian regimes. None of these histories, however, fully engaged with the U.S.-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno era; rather, these essays investigated other aspects of American foreign aid abroad.

A more complete history emerged from Czech scholar Rudolf Mrázek in 1978. He analyzed the attempts by the United States to influence the Indonesian Army. Mrázek differed from the New Left academics at the time. Instead of viewing the military as easily manipulated, Mrázek argued that American officials misunderstood an Indonesian nationalism forged in revolution, which ultimately undermined their strategic goals. He argued that the two countries, aligned on certain issues, diverged on others. For example, the Indonesian Army's assessment of the PKI mirrored the alarm felt by U.S. policymakers. Strategic interests clashed over *Konfrontasi*, as the Indonesian Army's expansionist zeal alarmed U.S. policymakers, who saw the conflict as a threat to regional stability and an attack on Western allies.<sup>59</sup>

The same year, political scientist Harold Crouch released *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*.<sup>60</sup> Crouch's analysis contended that the Army acted primarily to defend its own institutional and economic interests. Since the 1949 Revolution, Indonesian officers filled the void left by failing civilian institutions, assuming administrative and economic roles that cemented their ties to the conservative urban elite. Officer training programs in the United States augmented this trend by bringing Indonesian officers to elite U.S. civilian and military schools. The 1965 Coup served as an inflection point for the Army

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<sup>59</sup> Rudolf Mrázek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945–1965*, Volumes I & II, (The Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978).

<sup>60</sup> Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1978)

which, until that point, had been rife with factionalism and competition for resources between different divisions. The deaths of the six Indonesian generals at the hands of the G30S coup plotters decapitated the Army leadership, and allowed Suharto, then commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*KOSTRAD*) headquartered in Jakarta, to assert control in the chaos.<sup>61</sup>

The next wave of scholarship focused on the involvement of the CIA in the overthrow of Sukarno. With intelligence agencies on the mind in the Year of the Spy, in 1985, Peter Dale Scott released his article “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno.” Scott argued the CIA played a significant, though indirect role in the 1965 genocide. He stated the CIA created anti-PKI propaganda inflaming tensions between the differing political factions in Indonesia during and just after October 1965. More crucially, Scott argued a U.S. policy had existed for a least a decade by 1965. This policy sought to heighten tensions within Indonesia, influencing right-wing political parties, as well as the military, to prevent a communist takeover of Indonesia. The CIA funneled millions of dollars in financial aid and propaganda support to the right-wing *Masjumi* party, while various American sources provided the military with training, funding, and arms. Scott names the U.S. military, the CIA, the RAND Corporation, and the Ford Foundation among those who encouraged and directly supported military “*Putschism* and mass murder” in Indonesia.<sup>62</sup>

Though Scott echoed earlier scholars like Mrázek in alleging CIA culpability, his focus on covert operations defined the direction of the historiography for the next fifteen

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<sup>61</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. 135–38, 346–47.

<sup>62</sup> Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (Summer, 1985): 245.

years. Kathy Kadane's 1990 article, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesia Bloodbath in '60s," bolstered this trend after the *Washington Post* and other major outlets syndicated her findings.<sup>63</sup> Kadane argued that senior U.S. Embassy and CIA officials compiled a list of five thousand communists and delivered it to the Indonesian Army, fully aware that the military had already begun massacring PKI members. Kadane cited declassified embassy cables and interviews with former embassy staff to back up her claims. Her work initiated a controversy within the American press. The *New York Times* refused to run her article and instead its journalist, Michael Wines, investigated her claims and eventually published an article titled "C.I.A. Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge." Wines dismissed Kadane's argument as erroneous and he claimed that she had inflated both the list's significance and the degree of U.S. approval. Wines re-interviewed Kadane's embassy sources, and contended one man, Robert Martens, compiled the list from open-source materials. He further stated Martens acted alone when providing the list to the Indonesian Army, without any approval from Embassy officials.<sup>64</sup> In either case, an embassy official provided a list of some five thousand names to the Indonesian Army just as it began purging PKI members from the nation.

The disclosure of a "kill list" by Kadane, alongside the release of two new *FRUS* volumes, which focused on the late Eisenhower and Kennedy years, renewed interest in the covert actions of the U.S. in Indonesia.<sup>65</sup> The 1990s witnessed a surge in publications investigating the American covert role in Indonesia. Notable works during the period

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<sup>63</sup> Kathy Kadane, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesia Bloodbath in '60s," *Washington Post*, May 21, 1990. A5.

<sup>64</sup> Michael Wines, "C.I.A. Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge," *New York Times*, July 12, 1990.

<sup>65</sup> See, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, ed. Robert J. McMahon (GPO, 1994); *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, ed. Edward C. Keefer (GPO, 1994).

include Frederick Bunnell's article "American 'Low Posture' Toward Indonesia," and the following three books: George and Audrey Kahin's *Subversion as Foreign Policy*; Paul Gardner's *Shared Hopes, Separate Fears*; and finally Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison's *Feet to the Fire*.<sup>66</sup> Each of these works explored one aspect of the role covert operations played in U.S. foreign policy toward Indonesia and sought to explain why the situation in Indonesia did not escalate into a quagmire like the war in Vietnam. As argued by Bunnell, and in contrast to the escalating conflict in Vietnam, the U.S. pursued a "low posture" strategy in Indonesia which saw restrained overt behavior and a reliance on covert policy and action.<sup>67</sup>

The focus on covert action did not materialize into a full-fledged post-revisionist literature until the release of George and Audrey Kahin's *Subversion as Foreign Policy*. Published in 1995, the Kahins presented a more thorough and complete analysis of the role covert action played in U.S. foreign policy toward Indonesia. They argued the simplistic Cold Warrior prism through which President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles viewed Indonesia failed to account for the complex social and political systems driving the nation.

They also illustrated that the U.S. sought to work with the Sukarno government during the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. Citing National Security Memorandum 171/1: "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to

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<sup>66</sup> Frederick Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy Toward Indonesia in the Months Leading Up to the 1965 'Coup,'" *Indonesia* 50 (October, 1990): 29–60. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351229>; George McTurnan Kahin and Audrey R. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (The New Press, 1995); Paul F. Gardner, *Shared Hopes Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Westview Press, 1997); Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958* (Naval Institute Press, 1999).

<sup>67</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy."

Indonesia,” which established U.S. policy toward Indonesia in late 1953, they noted that the United States required strong economic and military aid to build ties with the military elite. Policymakers viewed the Indonesian military as a reliably anti-communist force following its successful suppression of the Madiun Rebellion in 1948.<sup>68</sup> The 1955 Indonesian elections, however, revealed a meteoric rise of the PKI, despite the time, money, and effort the U.S. had spent training the Indonesian security forces. President Sukarno also hosted the 1955 Bandung Conference which saw the participation of twenty-nine African and Asian countries brought together to oppose colonialism and foster closer economic ties. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles looked with disdain upon the Conference, which served as a precursor to the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961.<sup>69</sup> This sect of Cold Warriors viewed neutrality negatively and covert actions against Sukarno’s Indonesia began.<sup>70</sup>

According to the Kahins, Sukarno continued to antagonize the Eisenhower administration throughout 1956 and 1957. He signed \$100 million aid packages with the Soviet Union and suspended liberal democracy in Indonesia in favor of a reformed government under what he called “Guided Democracy.” The new political system of Guided Democracy anchored itself on the NASAKOM triad defined by nationalism, religion, and communism.<sup>71</sup> The Eisenhower administration sought to stem this perceived

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<sup>68</sup> “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council,” November 20, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, eds. Carl N. Raether and Harriet D. Schwar, (GPO, 1987), doc. 255.

<sup>69</sup> Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 58; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (Simon Schuster, 1995) 155–58.

<sup>70</sup> Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 316–17.

<sup>71</sup> NASAKOM is an acronym for the three pillars of Indonesian society as envisioned by Sukarno, *nationalisme, agama, and komunism*; Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 66–67.

leftward drift and tasked the CIA with developing a solution to the problem. The plan envisioned breaking Indonesia into several smaller, less threatening countries and became known as Project HAIK. Despite the Kahins' well-researched arguments into the minutiae of the Eisenhower-Dulles debacle, the books drew the ire of former CIA officers stationed in Indonesia. Bernardo Hugh Tovar and J. Foster Collins felt the Kahins unfairly blamed the Agency and Eisenhower administration for the events in Indonesia in 1958 and 1965.<sup>72</sup>

The 1990s marked a turning point for Indonesia, as the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili ignited a global wave of scrutiny toward Suharto's human rights record. Internal political struggles also erupted between Suharto and the military as he tried to diversify his base of support, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis finally broke the back of the New Order Regime. By 1998, Suharto had resigned, ending his thirty-year-long rule of Indonesia.

The following year Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison's *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958* provided a poignant reminder of the first U.S. attempt at regime change in the nation.<sup>73</sup> They focused their study entirely upon Project HAIK, the CIA's ill-fated attempt to stem Indonesia's leftward drift. Building on the Kahins' brief treatment of HAIK, Conboy and Morrison traced the intelligence operation from its inception to its ignominious end. Unlike the Kahins, *Feet to the Fire* offered no introspection into the policy-level decisions leading to or guided by this project. Rather, Conboy and Morrison noted the Eisenhower administration feared the

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<sup>72</sup> J. Foster Collins and B. Hugh Tovar, "Sukarno's Apologists Write Again," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 9, no. 3 (1996): 337–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609608435322>.

<sup>73</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*.

loss of Indonesia to communism and sought to use the dissident forces to bring Indonesia into the U.S. camp of the Cold War.<sup>74</sup>

The 2000s also marked a turning point in the literature. The end of Suharto's New Order meant previously repressed voices could emerge, although not entirely without fear as thirty years of anti-communist violence and repression had left an indelible mark on Indonesian society. New scholars began to examine U.S. foreign policy in Indonesia with the benefit of newly released documents from U.S., British, and Australian archives. Texts like Mathew Jones' *Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia*, Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg's *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia*, David Easter's *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia*, John Roosa's *Pretext for Mass Murder*, Baskara T. Wardaya's *Cold War Shadow*, and Bradley Simpson's *Economists with Guns*, reflected historians of US foreign relations' new preoccupation with "international history" and the use of multi-national archival sources.<sup>75</sup>

While Matthew Jones and David Easter focused on Britain and Malaysia during *Konfrontasi*, their histories demonstrate how these events were intertwined with U.S. regional calculations. Jones' *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia* deftly weaves

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<sup>74</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 12.

<sup>75</sup> Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949* (Amsterdam University Press, 2002), <https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048505036>; David Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960–1966* (St. Martin's Press, 2004); John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup D'État in Indonesia* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Baskara T. Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia, 1953–1963* (PUSDEP in collaboration with Galangpress, 2007); Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008).

a range of primary sources from the British and American archives, presidential libraries, and oral histories underscoring the complex nature of the Confrontation crisis that threatened a regional war, not unlike the quagmire in Vietnam.<sup>76</sup> While Jones did not offer any groundbreaking arguments, his analysis of the primary sources and his outline of events conveyed a clear evolution of U.S., British, and Malaysian policies toward Indonesia. Similarly, David Easter's *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia* dealt far more with the British side of the story, tracing the balancing act Whitehall faced in Southeast Asia. Easter's book derives its real strength from its exploration of British covert actions that helped weaken or remove Sukarno from power.<sup>77</sup> Both Jones and Easter added depth to the historiography on Western policy toward Sukarno's Indonesia built upon by later scholars.

The publication of three key texts between 2006 and 2008 transformed the historiographical understanding of U.S. policy toward Sukarno's Indonesia. In 2006, John Roosa released his *Pretext for Mass Murder* which remains the most detailed study of the 1965 coup attempt. Roosa compared and contrasted the competing narratives of the October 1965 Coup, from the initial news reports out of Jakarta, the Cornell Paper, and the CIA analytical estimate through to academic arguments and the official Indonesia account.<sup>78</sup> His analysis also introduced new evidence providing a more complete history of the Coup and why it led to the mass killings.<sup>79</sup> In 2007, Historian Baskara T. Wardaya released *Cold War Shadow* which remains the only book to draw a through-line of U.S.-

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<sup>76</sup> Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation*.

<sup>77</sup> Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia*, 1–4.

<sup>78</sup> Roosa, "Interpretations of the Movement," in *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 61–81.

<sup>79</sup> Roosa, "Assembling a New Narrative," in *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 202–25.

Indonesian policy from the Truman administration through to the Kennedy administration. Returning to some of the tenets appearing in the orthodox historiography on both the Cold War and President Kennedy's effectiveness as President, Wardaya argues the primary motivation for U.S. policy was the fear of communism expansion, that was determined by a Cold War logic which persisted across all three administrations.<sup>80</sup> Even President Kennedy, who appeared pragmatic and more neutral toward Indonesian aspirations, continued to enact policies motivated by a fear of losing Indonesia to the communists.<sup>81</sup> Complimenting Wardaya's study, Bradley Simpson's 2008 publication *Economists with Guns* focused squarely on U.S. policy toward Indonesia from the late 1950s until 1968. Chief among these policies was modernization which was pursued by both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in many areas of the Third World as a means of political and economic development.<sup>82</sup> Simpson argued these administrations viewed military led governments in Third World Nations like Indonesia as a means to develop the nation, accelerate its modernization, and foster trade relations with the U.S. In doing so, he argued the U.S. sought to counter Soviet and Communist Chinese influence in Indonesia advanced by President Sukarno and the PKI.<sup>83</sup>

Both Simpson and Wardaya's books solidified in my mind the centrality of understanding the events in Indonesia during these years as developing from a long-term

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<sup>80</sup> Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow*, 4, 126, 428.

<sup>81</sup> Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow*, 3–5, 429–430; Kennedy's presidency remains far more complex than these simple historiographical descriptors. The historiography has remained a source of contention within the literature see, Burton I. Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," 17, no. 3 (July 1993): 447–70, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1993.tb00590.x>; For a more recent analysis, see Michael J. Hogan, *The Afterlife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, A Biography* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

<sup>82</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 3.

<sup>83</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 10–11, 29–30, 154–55.

process across several administrations. Simpson posited U.S. officials saw their policies toward Indonesia, containment and anti-communism, as the means not the ends.<sup>84</sup> His work posited economic factors primarily motivated the policies of U.S. leadership, especially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Similarly, Wardaya argued U.S. policymakers thought in Cold War terms and sought to “win” against communism, but anti-communism was instrumental rather than an end goal.<sup>85</sup> His work posited ideology anxiety primarily motivated U.S. policymakers from Truman to Johnson. U.S. foreign policy toward Indonesia was not aimed at fostering democracy in Indonesia, but anti-communist responses by each administration perceiving, and conflating, Sukarno’s neutralism as a drift toward the Communist bloc.

I seek to unify these perspectives and argue that the Indonesian Genocide was not limited to the Johnson administration’s support during the bloodshed. Rather, it represented the culmination of a long-term, consistent U.S. foreign policy aimed at preventing a communist Indonesia. From Truman through to Johnson, U.S. policy consistently sought to create a stable, non-communist state.<sup>86</sup> While strategies between administrations differed, each one continued to strengthen anti-communist elements within the Indonesian security services without fail. When tensions boiled over in 1965, the genocide functioned as the logical output of fifteen years of anti-communist

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<sup>84</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 16.

<sup>85</sup> Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow*, 3–5, 10–11.

<sup>86</sup> Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia,” March 29, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 2, eds. John G. Reid and John P. Glennon (GPO, 1976), doc. 317; “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the National Security Council,” December 30, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 2, doc. 387; “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council,” November 20, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, eds. Carl N. Raether and Harriet D. Schwar, (GPO, 1987), doc. 255.

institution building. From Truman's initial training programs to Eisenhower's covert operations and from Kennedy's expansive training programs to Johnson's diplomatic pressure, the U.S. constructed the repressive capacity of the Indonesian state.

No book has quite matched the breadth and depth of analysis of U.S. policy toward Indonesia between the 1950s to late 1960s since that of Simpson and Wardaya; however, several studies have built upon topics covered by the two scholars. In *Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*, former Asian Studies Center analyst, Kenneth Conboy, traced the origins of Indonesia's intelligence apparatus to 1948, demonstrating how the CIA actively fostered its development.<sup>87</sup> International politics scholar, Inderjeet Parmar's *Foundations of the American Century* dedicated an entire chapter to the role of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia. Parmar argued the Ford Foundation's overt and covert activities in Indonesia helped to undermine and destabilize Sukarno's Indonesia.<sup>88</sup> His neo-Gramscian study demonstrated the transnational networks of ideas and power helped shaped American hegemony in the Twentieth century. While these works expanded the existing literature on lesser-known aspects of U.S. foreign policy towards Indonesia, the events surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the Indonesian genocide marked a fundamental shift in the literature.

Between 2015 and 2016, the International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes Against Humanity in Indonesia, held in the Hague, found Suharto's government, as well as the U.S., UK, and Australia, complicit in crimes against humanity. The tribunal

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<sup>87</sup> Kenneth Conboy, *Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*, (Equinox, 2004).

<sup>88</sup> Inderjeet Parmar, "The Ford Foundation in Indonesia and the Asian Studies Network," in *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (Columbia University Press, 2014), 124–148.

featured a mix of academics, human rights activists, and survivors. The Final Report of the International People's Tribunal 1965 found the state of Indonesia responsible for crimes against humanity, though fell short of finding Indonesia responsible for genocide against the PKI precisely because the PKI fell outside the protections of the UN Genocide Convention.<sup>89</sup> Despite being unable to legally define the activities of the Indonesian State as a genocide, the IPT 1965 meticulously traced each category of human rights abuses committed by the Suharto regime. The IPT 1965 also found the U.S., U.K., and Australia complicit in these crimes against humanity to varying degrees.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, none of the accused nations have admitted to complicity, nor could the IPT 1965 enforce any legal penalties against these nations. While the final report avoided the legal definition of genocide, the project's scholars insisted that the term accurately characterized the mass killings.<sup>91</sup>

The IPT 1965 renewed interest in this dark period of Indonesian history with several books built upon its findings. In 2018, historian, genocide scholar, and contributor to the IPT 1965, Jess Melvin produced *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*. Drawing on secret military documents, she demonstrated

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<sup>89</sup> IPT 1965 Foundation, *Final Report of the IPT 1965: Findings and Documents of the International People's Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity Indonesia 1965* (IPT 1965 Foundation, 2016). See especially, "B8 – Genocide," 72–78 & "C Findings and Recommendations," 79–82.

<sup>90</sup> *Final Report of the IPT 1965*, 81.

<sup>91</sup> Contributors to the IPT 1965 included, Jess Melvin, Annie Pohlman, Katherine McGregor, Helen Jarvis, and Saskia E. Wieringa whose works have all labeled the actions of the Indonesian Army and paramilitaries as genocide. See, Jess Melvin, "Mechanics of Mass Murder: A Case for Understanding the Indonesian Killings as Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2017): 487–511, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393942>; *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965: Causes, Dynamics and Legacies*, eds. Katherine McGregor, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Annie Pohlman, "Incitement to Genocide Against A Political Group: The Anti-Communist Killings in Indonesia," *Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies* 11, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v11i1.3292>; Helen Jarvis and Saskia E. Wieringa, "The Indonesian Massacres and Genocide," in *The International People's Tribunal for 1965 and the Indonesian Genocide*, eds. Saskia E. Wieringa, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman (Routledge, 2019), 215–36.

that the 1965–1966 killings were not spontaneous, but a “centralized, nation-wide campaign” orchestrated by the Indonesian Army.<sup>92</sup> Historian, Geoffrey B. Robinson’s *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66*, published in 2018, dealt with the 1965–66 mass violence. Like Melvin, Robinson extends culpability to the United States and Britain, arguing that both powers actively encouraged the destruction of the PKI.<sup>93</sup> Finally, and most recently, journalist Vincent Bevins released *The Jakarta Method: Washington’s Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World*. Bevins provided a fresh insight into the 1965–1966 violence and argued the U.S. could afford to lose in Vietnam because it had already won the more important prize, Indonesia.<sup>94</sup> His larger argument, however, posited Indonesia and Brazil, two nations that became the United States’ best allies in the Third World after a coup of its left-leaning leaders, became models to emulate in neighboring countries. To this end, Bevins traced the “Jakarta Method” across the globe, demonstrating how the anti-communist violence homed in Indonesia was replicated in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador.<sup>95</sup> Bevins’ book and the post IPT 1965 scholarship has influenced my understanding of the mass killings in Indonesia as genocide.

The works of historian Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century*, and historian Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American*

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<sup>92</sup> Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder* (Routledge, 2018), 1.

<sup>93</sup> Geoffrey B. Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66* (Princeton University Press, 2018), 179, 183.

<sup>94</sup> Vincent Bevins, *The Jakarta Method: Washington’s Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World* (Public Affairs, 2020), 159–61.

<sup>95</sup> Bevins, “Jakarta Is Coming,” in *The Jakarta Method*, 181–209.

*Policing*, also proved valuable additions to my understanding of American foreign policy toward Indonesia during the Sukarno era.<sup>96</sup> Each demonstrated how the U.S. projected power through police experts sent to developing nations during the Cold War with the express purpose of preventing leftist or communist revolutions.<sup>97</sup> Kuzmarov and Schrader's books influenced my understanding of the effects U.S. police assistance had toward Indonesia. The training and funding of the Police Mobile Brigade underpinned U.S. policy toward the Sukarno era, functioning as a strategic counterweight to both the PKI and Sukarno's leftward drift.

Building on the historiography outlined above over the next three chapters I will demonstrate that the U.S. government's consistent pursuit of a non-communist and U.S.-friendly government in Indonesia during the Cold War significantly contributed to the eventual genocide of the PKI. Since the 1948 Madiun rebellion successive U.S. administrations saw the Indonesian Army and Police as bulwarks against communism and aided these groups by whatever means possible. By arming, training, and funding the military and police, U.S. policymakers prepared the security forces for governance in a post-Sukarno Indonesia and ensured the success of these forces in any confrontation with the PKI. While policymakers did not explicitly seek the genocide of the PKI, the Johnson administration welcomed the total elimination of communism as a political force within Indonesia. The ascent of Suharto to power cemented Indonesia as a staunch anti-communist ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia at a time when American fortunes in the region appeared bleak.

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<sup>96</sup> Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012); Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing* (University of California Press, 2019).

<sup>97</sup> Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*, 1–16, 100–106; Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 1–25, 79–112.

## Chapter Two

In the years following the Second World War, Southeast Asia became a critical frontier in the burgeoning Cold War between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Third World. Among the newly decolonized nations, Indonesia, under the leadership of President Sukarno, stood at the crossroads of Cold War geopolitics. For U.S. policymakers, Indonesia's strategic location combined with its intense nationalist movement presented both an opportunity to curb the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and a challenge to its influence in the region. In this chapter I argue the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower desired to secure Indonesia as an anti-communist ally within the "great crescent of containment."<sup>98</sup> Both administrations, guided by Cold War orthodoxy, pursued foreign policies in Indonesia which produced unintended consequences and contradictory effects. The administrations' focus on the Cold War failed to accommodate for the decolonizing world, as well as the complexity of Indonesian politics. This led to a mixed outcome by the end of Eisenhower's presidency, which foreshadowed future challenges in U.S.-Indonesian relations.

This chapter begins by outlining the Truman era policies which set the groundwork for U.S. policies toward Indonesia until 1966. These policies underscored the importance of a non-communist Indonesia and highlighted the military and police as a means of keeping the nation with the Western orbit. It also examines Truman's covert actions toward Indonesia in support of these policy goals. The following section

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<sup>98</sup> Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," *Journal of American History* 69, No. 2 (September 1982): 402–403. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1893825>.

examines the policies of Eisenhower's first term, which largely mirrored the strategies established under the Truman administration. Eisenhower's second term, however, saw the administration diverge from these policies and adopt a covert action designed to break-up Indonesia. Lastly, this chapter explores how the Eisenhower administration's covert plans failed and as a result it returned to the original policy of providing aid to the military and police.

Two key policy documents guided U.S. strategy with Indonesia during this period. The first, Policy Planning Staff Paper (PPS) 51: "United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," sought to solve the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian Republican government. It also sought to ensure that non-communist Republicans could retain their supremacy over the communists when they gained sovereignty.<sup>99</sup> American strategic goals mandated securing anti-communist allies within the "great crescent" to bolster the containment of Soviet influence across Southeast Asia. The "great crescent," as described by PPS 51 was an arc stretching from Japan, down to the nations of Southeast Asia and Australia, and back up to the nations of the Indian Peninsula.

The second policy document, National Security Council (NSC) 48/2 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," sought to aid the development of these nations. It focused on the development of the military to maintain Indonesian sovereignty against Communist encroachment, and it sought to reduce the power and influence of the Soviet Union in the region.<sup>100</sup> These policy prescriptions became the

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<sup>99</sup> "Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," March 29, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 2, eds. John G. Reid and John P. Glennon (Government Printing Office (GPO), 1976), doc. 317.

<sup>100</sup> "Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the National Security Council," December 30, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VII, pt. 2, doc. 387.

blueprint for later U.S. policies in Indonesia. Whether employing economic, military, or covert means, the U.S. prioritized the maintenance of a non-communist Indonesia.

After the passage of NSC 48/2 and the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty, the U.S. immediately began drafting plans to provide aid to the Indonesian constabulary forces. In January of 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a memorandum to President Harry S. Truman recommending the allocation of five million dollars in military assistance to Indonesia through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (MDAA). Officials sourced this money from the larger seventy-five million dollar fund allocated under Section 303 of MDAA specifically drafted to combat the spread of communism in Asia.<sup>101</sup> Both the State and Defense departments supported the strategy, aimed at supplementing the existing Indonesian resources and establishing a one hundred thousand strong constabulary force.<sup>102</sup> This strategy closely followed the policy prescriptions and counterbalanced the Indonesian communist threat while complementing the broader containment of the Soviet Union and China.

By June 1, 1950, Indonesia had already received a significant amount of military and communication equipment earmarked for the Indonesian Mobile Brigade (MOBRIG), a specialized unit of the Indonesian National Police. This equipment included radios, weapons, cars, and crime investigation tools in addition to the tanks, armored cars, cannons, and small arms already transferred to the Indonesians by the Dutch.<sup>103</sup> Rather than falling under the MDAA, this equipment reached Indonesian Republican civil authorities through U.S. and Dutch aid transferred in the wake of the

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<sup>101</sup> Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714, 716.

<sup>102</sup> Dean Acheson, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman," January 9, 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. VI, eds. Neal H. Petersen et al., (GPO, 1976), doc. 608.

revolution. More MDAA aid arrived after August 15, 1950, with \$4,994,000 of weapons, communication, and transport equipment provided after the United States and Indonesia formally signed the agreement.<sup>104</sup> Delivery of the equipment under the MDAA began in October 1951 after Brigadier General George Olmsted, Director Officer of Military Assistance Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked Congress for three hundred twenty-five thousand dollars to facilitate its delivery and training on supplied equipment for the 1952 fiscal year.<sup>105</sup> The United States initially granted this equipment to Indonesia as a gift without requiring repayment.

The Truman administration's provision of police and military equipment served strategic interests rather than altruistic goals. The generous aid agreements reflected the strategy of U.S. policymakers, who viewed the police and military as tools to sway local forces and strengthen Indonesia's anti-communist movement. The aid functioned as a calculated move within the broader U.S. Cold War strategy of NSC 68, which envisioned an increasingly militarized world.<sup>106</sup> Policymakers used this aid to steer Indonesia into the Western camp and align it with the U.S. struggle against communism. As Dean Acheson pointed out during a 1952 hearing on the Mutual Security Act Extension, the Indonesian government, like others, could afford the aid, but initially doubted its necessity. He

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<sup>103</sup> Memorandum, September 22, 1950, folder 12, box 2, B File, Student Research File, Pacific Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, #31B, Papers of John F. Melby, Harry S. Truman Library, 4–5.

<sup>104</sup> Indonesia: Military Assistance, U.S.-Indon., August 15, 1950, 2 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 2306; Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-329, 63, Stat. 714.

<sup>105</sup> *Mutual Security Program Appropriations for 1952: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 82nd Cong. 667 (1951) (statement of Brig. Gen. George H. Olmstead, U.S. Army, Director, Office of Military Assistance).

<sup>106</sup> Completed in April 1950, NSC 68 served as a key guiding policy document during the early Cold War, outlining the U.S. strategy against the growing threat of Soviet expansionism. Authored primarily by Paul Nitze and his team at the Department of State, this document called for an increase in U.S. military spending and covert operations to counter the spread of communism.

believed that once Indonesia witnessed the aid's success, the nation would assume the costs.<sup>107</sup>

The Mutual Security Act (MSA) replaced the MDAA and much of the Marshall Plan in 1951. It sought to cultivate allies within the developing world and contain the spread of communism through foreign aid. Policymakers specifically designed the MSA to address the broader policy of “containment” toward the Soviet Union.<sup>108</sup> When President Truman signed the MSA into law, his remarks echoed the language of the Truman Doctrine. He emphasized that safeguarding “free nations” and maintaining the peace played an essential role in preventing Soviet expansion and establishing a protective buffer against communist influence.<sup>109</sup>

Although the MSA aimed to cultivate allies within the developing world, its budget prioritized European defense over Asian defense. The original 1951 MSA provided no military assistance for Indonesia, but a 1952 amendment finally authorized economic and technical aid for the nation.<sup>110</sup> Even though policymakers eventually allocated aid, the provisions within the agreement still sparked political turmoil in Indonesia. The MSA departed from the model of the Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration; while the latter provided millions in unconditional aid, the former forced recipient governments to pledge significant resources toward “defending

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<sup>107</sup> *Mutual Security Act Extension: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 82nd Cong. 161–62 (1952).

<sup>108</sup> *Mutual Security Act of 1951: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services*, 82nd Cong. 18–19 (1951) (exchange between Sen. Guy Gillette and Secretary of State Dean Acheson).

<sup>109</sup> Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Upon Signing the Mutual Security Act,” October 10, 1951, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (GPO, 1965), 563–64.

<sup>110</sup> *Mutual Security Act of 1951: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services*, 82nd Cong. 562 (1951); Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1952*, S. Rep. No. 82-1490, at 41 (1952).

the free world.”<sup>111</sup> Indonesians critical of the new agreement’s demands viewed it as a violation of Indonesia’s independent foreign policy. This caused the collapse of Soekiman Wirjosandjojo’s government and prompted the Wilopo government to withdraw Indonesia from the agreement.<sup>112</sup>

As aid agreements moved through Congress, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency began its work in Indonesia. In 1948, Arthur (Arturo) J. Campbell arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) undercover as Treasury attaché for the U.S. Consulate. Campbell served as the CIA station chief, arriving mere months before the September 1948 Communist Madiun Rebellion.<sup>113</sup> During this time he witnessed the use of MOBRIG to suppress the rebellion. He also made frequent trips to the Indonesian Republican capital of Yogyakarta to meet with Republican government officials, and he offered funds and U.S. police training specifically to MOBRIG, in support of the Republican cause.<sup>114</sup>

After seeing the successful use of MOBRIG against the PKI during the Madiun Rebellion, Campbell began interviewing officers to send to the U.S. for a special training

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<sup>111</sup> Mutual Security Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373.

<sup>112</sup> Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia*, (Princeton University Press, 1960), 119–20; Justus M. Van Der Kroef, “Indonesia: Independent in the Cold War,” *International Journal* 7, no. 4 (Autumn, 1952): 284–85. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40197931>.

<sup>113</sup> Campbell’s social calendar at his lavish Jakarta residence routinely outpaced that of the Consul General. A pair of gimlet-drinking orangutans and a three-foot bathtub crocodile greeted guests of the eccentric station chief. See, William J. Rust, *The Mask of Neutrality: The United States and Decolonization in Indonesia, 1942–1950*, (2019), 230–32; Charles T. Cross, *Born A Foreigner: A Memoir of the American Presence in Asia*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 90.

<sup>114</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testimony*, (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 63–66; Frances Gouda, and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949*, (Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 268, 284–85.

program between 1948 and 1949.<sup>115</sup> Of those chosen a smaller number were transferred to study intelligence operations under Projects HALFWAY-SUNBOW and ZRSUNBOW.<sup>116</sup> These Indonesian intelligence officers studied paramilitary and intelligence training under the joint direction of the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and Office of Special Operations (OSO).<sup>117</sup> Civil Air Transport (CAT) amphibious planes picked them up off the peninsula near Mt. Batu Angus Baru on the northeast coast of Sulawesi on October 25, 1951.<sup>118</sup> U.S. personnel then flew these officers to various

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<sup>115</sup> Kahin, *Southeast Asia*, 65–66; George McTurnan Kahin, “Some Recollections and Reflections on the Indonesian Revolution,” *Indonesia* no. 60 (October 1995): 6, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351138>; Achmed Wiranatakusumah, a 1960 CGSC graduate and KOSTRAD Chief of Staff, revealed this information to his brother's friend, according to Kahin. For a list of notable Indonesian CGSC graduates, see Bryan Evans III, “The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesia Army (1956–1964),” *Indonesia*, no. 47 (April 1989): 46–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351074>.

<sup>116</sup> “Director's Log, September 11, 1951,” in *Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress*, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (CIA FOIA ERR), Special Collection, doc. no. 5166d49199326091c6a6007a, 17. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1951-09-01.pdf>; Kahin, *Southeast Asia*, 65; Kahin, “Some Recollections,” 6; Ken Conboy, *Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*, (Equinox Publishing, 2004).

<sup>117</sup> The OSO functioned as the primary intelligence and counterintelligence arm of the early CIA and Central Intelligence Group. After its 1946 creation, the office utilized former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) personnel to leverage their specialized Second World War expertise. The OPC functioned as the covert action wing of the CIA following its 1948 creation and subsequent placement within the OSO. A rivalry existed between the two offices as each competed for the same resources and staff while also executing often overlapping clandestine activities. The CIA merged the OSO and OPC into the Directorate of Plans (DDP) in August 1952. See, Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book IV*, S. Rep. No. 94-775, at 36–38 (1976). Discussions of training foreign police date as far back as December 1948 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation liaison Cartha Deke Deloach, “10 December 1948,” *Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress*, CIA FOIA ERR, Special Collection, Document Number 5166d49399326091c6a604b0, 35. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1948-10-25.pdf>; By July 1950 training was already ongoing when Inspection and Security Staff Director Colonel Sheffield Edwards suggested the DCI get a briefing on the program see, “Tuesday, 18 July 1950 [page] 2,” *Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress*, CIA FOIA ERR, Special Collection, doc. no. 5166d49399326091c6a604c4, 157. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1950-05-01.pdf>; “Director's Log, November 2, 1951,” CIA FOIA ERR, 124; “Director's Log, December 29, 1951,” CIA FOIA ERR, 238.

<sup>118</sup> In 1951 the CIA owned and operated CAT. At the time it only possessed one PBY-5A (tail number B-819) from another CIA-operated airline, Western Enterprises Incorporated (WEI). B-819 was not officially acquired from WEI until July 1952. It's purchase price was \$39,000. Joe F. Leeker, “Working in Remote Countries: CAT in New Zealand, Thailand-Burma, French Indochina, Guatemala, and Indonesia,” in *The History of Air America*, second ed., (University of Texas at Dallas, 2015), 8–10. <https://library.utdallas.edu/special-collections-and-archives/history-of-aviation-archive/leeker-history/>; Joe F. Leeker, “Air America: Consolidated PBY-5A Catalinas,” in *The Aircraft of Air America*, fifth ed.,

military locations, including Fort Benning, Camp George West, Camp Peary, and Fort Gordon.<sup>119</sup> By 1952, training shifted to CIA bases in the Eastern Pacific. Prospective Indonesian intelligence officers were flown to the Naval Technical Training Unit (NTTU) in Saipan, a front for the CIA's intelligence tradecraft, communications, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare training center in the Far East. This program closely mirrored the training CIA recruits received at Camp Peary, also known as "The Farm."<sup>120</sup>

Although the mission of Project HALFWAY-SUNBOW sought to "establish control of Indonesian Intelligence"<sup>121</sup> the Indonesian intelligence community fell into disarray during this revolutionary period. The long-serving intelligence czar and head of the National Secret Agency (BRANI), Zulkifli Lubis, financed his agency through smuggling operations to Singapore; however, Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin rivaled him by seeking to place intelligence under the Defense Ministry's control.

Sjarifuddin then consolidated this new agency, Defense Agency B, with BRANI to form

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(University of Texas at Dallas, 2015), 2–3.

<https://library.utdallas.edu/special-collections-and-archives/history-of-aviation-archive/leeker-history/>; William M. Leary, *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transportation and CIA Covert Operations in Asia*, (University of Alabama Press, 1984), 1, 142; The accounts of Leary and memorandum by CAT pilot Joe Rosbert held at the Air America Archives in Dallas (reproduced in Leeker), match the exact dates and details given in "Director's Log, October 31, 1951," 120.

<sup>119</sup> For Fort Benning see, "Director's Log," October 31, 1951, 120; For Camp George West see, Rudolf Mrázek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military: 1945–1965, Volume I*, (Oriental Institute in Academia, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978), 94; Camp Peary, a.k.a. "The Farm," is the likely location meant by "A small farmhouse in Virginia" in Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, *Report to the President*, (GPO, 1975), 235; For NTTU, Okinawa, and Clark AFB see Conboy, *Intel*; Edward G. Lansdale, "Lansdale Memo for Taylor On Unconventional Warfare," *New York Times*, July 1, 1971. <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/01/archives/lansdale-memo-for-taylor-on-unconventional-warfare.html>; John P. Delury, *Agents of Subversion: The Fate of John T. Downey and the CIA's Covert War in China*, (Cornell University Press, 2022), 171; The Saipan training station and its chief, Lloyd George, are also briefly mentioned by former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith see, Joseph Burkholder Smith, *Portrait of A Cold Warrior*, (Ballantine Books, 1976), 94, 214.

<sup>120</sup> Lansdale, "Lansdale Memo for Taylor on Unconventional Warfare" July 1961, *New York Times*, July 1, 1971; Delury, *Agents of Subversion*, 171.

<sup>121</sup> "Director's Log, October 15, 1951," CIA, 91–92.

Section V during his tenure as Prime Minister, though the agency collapsed alongside his cabinet just one year later in 1948. Later, Lubis again attempted to build an independent agency but encountered resistance from Armed Forces Chief of Staff Tahi Bonar Simatupang, who created the Armed Forces Staff Information Agency (BISAP) in 1952. Sumitro Kolopaking, serving as Defense Minister and Sultan Hamengkubuwono XI's right-hand man for security and intelligence, assumed leadership of the Security Bureau following an appointment by Mohammad Hatta.<sup>122</sup> And while Hamengkubuwono XI and Hatta did not receive funding from the U.S., they did accept a training agreement with the CIA for their intelligence officers. Consequently, the arrival of Indonesian officers via HALFWAY-SUNBOW coincided with Sumitro Kolopaking's 1951 arrival in the U.S., a man whom the OSO courted to "strengthen its control of the Indonesian Intelligence Service."<sup>123</sup>

While covert action, and policies like NSC 48/2 and PPS 51 guided U.S. objectives in Indonesia during the Truman administration, 1952 saw Dwight D. Eisenhower elected the first Republican President in twenty years. During the campaign Democrats faced mounting criticism over the "loss of China" to communism, the Korean War, and the ever-expanding Cold War. Despite the election rhetoric the Truman administration set the mold for the United States policy in Indonesia which every subsequent administration followed. NSC 48/2, NSC 48/5, PPS 51, and the nascent aid programs sought to build a non-communist Indonesia by supporting the military and

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<sup>122</sup> Conboy, *Intel*, 11–12, 15–17.

<sup>123</sup> "Director's Log, November 2, 1951," CIA FOIA ERR, 124; "Director's Log, September 14, 1951," CIA FOIA ERR, 28; Kolopaking's name is spelled in this report as "Kolo Paken."

police. The Eisenhower administration inherited these policy objectives when it took office.

In November 1953, President Eisenhower approved NSC 171/1: “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia,” marking the first formalized U.S. policy toward the nation. The policy emphasized Indonesia’s vital importance to U.S. and global security while noting that its leaders remained wary of Western influence.<sup>124</sup> It reiterated much of NSC 48/2 with its primary policy goals aimed to prevent Indonesia from aligning with Communism, promote cooperation with the West, and build a stable government capable of resisting Communist influence. It also emphasized the need for economic and military aid as tools to build ties with the Indonesian military elite, particularly the Army. U.S. strategy sought to stitch Indonesia into the “great crescent” and make it capable of thwarting communist advances eastward. This also cemented Indonesia as a resource for supplies to Japan and Europe to re-industrialize after the War.<sup>125</sup> However, this early policy underestimated Indonesia’s complex political landscape, most notably President Sukarno’s desire to forge a middle path between U.S. and Soviet interests. Its successor, NSC 171/1 further built the scaffolding for later U.S. actions, including covert action; a strategy that escalated over the course of the Eisenhower administration.

Despite Indonesian reservations after the 1952 MSA affair, U.S. aid to the country continued. Following Prime Minister Wilopo’s term, his successor, Ali Sastroamidjojo

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<sup>124</sup> “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council,” November 20, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, eds. Carl N. Raether and Harriet D. Schwar, (GPO, 1987), doc. 255.

<sup>125</sup> “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council,” November 20, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, doc. 255.

(1953–1955) actively sought U.S. military instructors to train Indonesian Army (TNI) officers. While the U.S. embassy and State Department officials feared these “secret negotiations with the Prime Minister,” might spark another Indonesian cabinet crisis, the State Department saw an opportunity. The Undersecretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, who had previously served as Truman’s Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), replied to Cumming, stating that the State Department believed this initiative could introduce American influence into the Indonesian Army and help achieve broader objectives in Indonesia.<sup>126</sup>

Between 1953 and 1956, Indonesia sent more than two hundred TNI officers to study at U.S. military academies for free. The program grew so significantly it exhausted U.S. capacity, forcing some TNI officers to train at U.S. bases in the Philippines. The program directed most of these officers to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The CGSC educated mid-career officers for higher levels of command and staff responsibilities within the military.<sup>127</sup> Indonesian officers coveted a spot at CGSC. Its prestigious ten-month program only selected the “cream of the crop” to attend.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> “Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Indonesian and Pacific Island Affairs (Galbraith) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal),” April 8, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, doc. 265; Walter Bedell Smith, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia,” April 17, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. XII, pt. 2, doc. 268.

<sup>127</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (The Free Press, 1964), 139; Gordon R. Young, ed., *The Army Almanac: A Book of Facts Concerning the United States Army*, (The Stackpole Company, 1959), 183–84; Evans III, “The Influence of the United States Army,” 39.

<sup>128</sup> Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 174; Young, ed., *The Army Almanac*, 184.

The training program had two main objectives. First, it aimed to provide foreign military officers with the most up-to-date U.S. training. It focused on a “train the trainers” approach where foreign military officer alumni would impart their training to their own troops. Second, it sought to foster an affinity for the U.S. among the military officers.<sup>129</sup> The program encouraged alumni to maintain contact with each other, reinforcing their training and strengthening communication between the two nations’ militaries.<sup>130</sup> This approach succeeded brilliantly; Ambassador Cumming noted that “all lines of command in the Army now flowed through officers who had been trained in the United States.”<sup>131</sup> The officer training program also fulfilled policy objectives set out in NSC 171/1. Primarily, the program strengthened the Indonesian Army and improved its position relative to the PKI, which still struggled to rebuild after the Madiun Rebellion. Many of the Indonesian officers trained at CGSC would remain in the army for many years, with some playing significant roles in the 1965–1966 anti-communist genocide.<sup>132</sup>

In December 1954, the Eisenhower administration developed another program to accomplish its policy goals within Indonesia. NSC Action Number 1290-d established an inter-agency program to develop the police and internal security forces of countries deemed vulnerable to communist subversion. The task force integrated the CIA, with the

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<sup>129</sup> Hovey, *United States Military Assistance*, 174; Amos A. Jordan, *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia* (Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 57.

<sup>130</sup> Hovey, *United States Military Assistance*, 174.

<sup>131</sup> “Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson),” January 3, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, eds. Robert J. McMahon, Harriet D. Schwarz, and Louis J. Smith (GPO, 1989), doc. 132; A perfect example of this is demonstrated by U.S. military attaché to Indonesia Colonel George Benson who graduated CGSC in 1955 and maintained a close working relationship with much of the Indonesian military leadership, including future Commander of the Indonesian Army, Colonel Ahmed Yani who graduated CGSC in 1956 see, Evans III, “Influence of the United States Army,” 29–30.

<sup>132</sup> Evans III, “The Influence of the United States Army,” 46–48.

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) established in 1954, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) which operated from 1955 to 1961, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.<sup>133</sup> Under NSC 1290-d, Indonesia became the first nation to receive assistance. Indonesia was group together with nations like South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma “where communist subversion has reached a stage in which military-type action is immediately or potentially required.”<sup>134</sup>

Problems plagued the 1290-d program from its inception. First, it lacked centralized leadership. As a result, different departments competed against one another for resources. Bureaucratic conflicts also broke out over strategy. Notably, during the meeting that labeled Indonesia among the nations requiring military-type action, the Department of Defense pushed back against the country’s inclusion. Instead it argued Indonesia “may still be responsive to, police-type measures, including limited forces.”<sup>135</sup> The ICA, on the other hand, viewed police assistance as detracting from economic aid programs and disparaged 1290-d as “running guns to cops.”<sup>136</sup> In direct opposition to the

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<sup>133</sup> President Eisenhower created the OCB as an oversight committee reporting to the NSC. In 1953, the OCB assumed oversight of U.S. covert operations until President Kennedy abolished the committee in 1961, transferring many of its functions to the Planning Coordinating Group (PCG). see, John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 150. The ICA, and its predecessors, coordinated all foreign assistance operations and non-military security programs. President Kennedy abolished the ICA in 1961, replacing it with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). “Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy),” August 1, 1956, *FRUS*, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, vol. VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane et al. (GPO, 1987), doc. 39, fn. 4; “OTR Requirements in Support of the 1290-d Program,” March 21, 1956, CIA FOIA ERR, doc. no. CIA-RDP62-00634A000200050001-2, 2.

<sup>134</sup> Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing* (University of California Press, 2019), 98; “Report of NSC 1290-d Working Group,” February 15, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, vol. X, eds. Robert J. McMahon, William F. Sanford, and Sherrill B. Wells (GPO, 1989), doc. 2.

<sup>135</sup> “Report of NSC 1290-d Working Group,” February 15, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, vol. X, doc. 2.

<sup>136</sup> Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 85–86.

Department of Defense and ICA, the CIA favored the police assistance program because it augmented the Agency's ongoing clandestine training of MOBRIG officers at CIA schools. Second, the broad mandate of the 1290-d program also hamstrung its success. 1290-d sought to assist the internal security forces of vulnerable nations by facilitating better pay, training, and equipment, but its goals also included supporting legislation, judicial systems, and public awareness programs to convince local populations of the dangers of communism, diluting its material aid earmarked for the security forces.<sup>137</sup> By 1957, the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP) succeeded the 1290-d program following a strategic revision. The evolving police training program underscored the difficulties U.S. policymakers faced aligning their strategies within both Indonesia and their own bureaucracies.<sup>138</sup>

Eisenhower's tenure also marked the beginning of direct U.S. competition with the Soviet Union for influence in Indonesia. After the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, the USSR began leveraging the anti-Western and anti-capitalist nature of Third World nationalist and decolonial movements. Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, declared his support for "Wars of National Liberation," dramatically expanding Soviet aid efforts in the developing world.<sup>139</sup> On the heels of Sukarno's 1956 tour of the United States, the Soviet Union extended its first major aid package: a \$100 million loan which carried a

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<sup>137</sup> "Report of NSC 1290-d Working Group," February 15, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, vol. X, doc. 2.

<sup>138</sup> These agencies competed for budget and turf, with each favoring its own methods over a coordinated inter-agency approach. The DOD favored officer training, the CIA prioritized clandestine activities and training, and the ICA feared that both diverted essential economic aid from a nation requiring stability.

<sup>139</sup> Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 112–13. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2008.10.3.110>; Bilveer Singh, *Bear and Garuda: Soviet-Indonesian Relations From Lenin to Gorbachev* (Gadjah Mada University Press, 1994), 24–28.

low two-and-a-half percent interest rate.<sup>140</sup> Other Eastern Bloc countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia also provided military aid, including small arms, jet fighters, and bombers.<sup>141</sup> Between 1957 and 1966, the Soviet Bloc delivered approximately \$1.3 billion in military equipment to Indonesia, establishing the nation as the USSR's largest single debtor.<sup>142</sup> Khrushchev's massive support for Indonesia underscored the nation's importance in the eyes of both the East and West and worried those in Washington who feared a leftward drift of the nation.

Concerns about a communist Indonesia grew not only from the massive amount of Soviet aid, but also from political conditions arising by 1955. In April, Sukarno had hosted the Bandung Conference, the first large-scale meeting of African and Asian nations gathered to discuss issues of decolonization and economic cooperation. The Conference laid the groundwork for what later became the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 among emerging African and Asian states. Then in September to November 1955, Indonesian elections revealed the deep political fractures within the country. Not only did the communists make massive political gains, but no single party

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<sup>140</sup> Sukarno and Cindy Adams, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told by Cindy Adams* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 277–78, 297–98.

<sup>141</sup> Singh, *Bear and Garuda*, 180.

<sup>142</sup> Most Soviet military aid went to the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and Air Force (TNI-AU) in the form of ships, submarines, jets, and bombers. The CIA speculated that the Soviet Union prioritized the TNI-AL and TNI-AU due to their leftist leadership, and contrasted this with the TNI, which received the bulk of U.S. military aid and maintained a generally anti-communist stance. See, "Communist Military Assistance to Indonesia," September 26, 1966, Directorate of Intelligence Report, CIA, in William Morell, Jr., "Memo for Francis M. Bator," October 10, 1966, CIA, Gale *U.S. Declassified Documents Online (USDDO)*, doc. no. CK2349420579, 11, 15.

emerged with a clear majority, necessitating the formation of a coalition government.<sup>143</sup>  
This all despite the CIA spending a million dollars trying to influence the elections.<sup>144</sup>

U.S. policymakers grew concerned over the direction of Indonesia. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles, and President Eisenhower all viewed the Bandung Conference as a troubling development. Employing racist language some in the State Department went as far as referring to it as the “Darktown Strutters Ball.”<sup>145</sup> In their view, these neutral nations that did not align with the U.S., effectively opposed it, regardless of the conference’s stated goals of political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. John Foster Dulles made this sentiment explicit in 1956 during Sukarno’s visit to the U.S., stating, “America’s policy is global. You must be on one side or the other. Neutralism is immoral.”<sup>146</sup> And though U.S. favored non-communist parties came out slightly ahead of the PKI in the 1955 elections, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., relayed “there [is] no question that [the] results are somewhat disappointing from our viewpoint.”<sup>147</sup> The real winners of the 1955 election appeared to

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<sup>143</sup> Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” October 27, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 120; “Memorandum of Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council,” December 22, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 129; “Editorial Note,” *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 136.

<sup>144</sup> Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 62.

<sup>145</sup> Friend, *Indonesian Destinies*, 58; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA*, (Simon & Schuster, 1995) 155–58.

<sup>146</sup> Sukarno and Adams, *Sukarno*, 277; While Sukarno may have a biased recollection of the event, the statement is in line with John Foster Dulles’ character see, Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Little, Brown & Company, 1973), 316–17; This sentiment is further supported by former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder, who stated John Foster Dulles was “apoplectic and Manichean on the subject of neutralism,” see, Smith, *Portrait of A Cold Warrior*, 209.

<sup>147</sup> Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” October 7, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 119.

be the PKI, who only lagged behind the PNI by five percent of the vote.<sup>148</sup> The PKI saw a meteoric rise from its low of around four thousand members after the 1948 Madiun Rebellion to an estimated one million members in 1955.<sup>149</sup>

In May of 1955, U.S. policymakers made their concern over Indonesia's geopolitical alignment clear with the passage of NSC 5518: "U.S. Policy on Indonesia."<sup>150</sup> Written immediately following the Bandung Conference, but before the elections, NSC 5518 stated, "The loss of Indonesia to Communist control would have serious consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the free world."<sup>151</sup> Though this policy superseded NSC 171/1, each shared many goals including a non-communist Indonesia driven by U.S. assistance via economic, military, and police type aid. NSC 5518 differed insofar as it placed far more emphasis on the courses of action related to the provision of aid as the document predicted an anti-communist government in power after the 1955 elections. Policy objectives outlined under NSC 5518 continued uninterrupted through the 1955 Indonesian elections. U.S. policymakers continued to view the military and police

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<sup>148</sup> The PKI secured fourth place in the election with nearly 7 million votes, or 16.4%, trailing only the Indonesian National Party (PNI) at 22.3%, the Masjumi Party at 20.9%, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) at 18.4%. *Pemilu Indonesia Dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun, 1955–1999*, (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), 18; See also, Audrey R. Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (The New Press, 1995), 50, 77. Compare to, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955," October 6, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 118.

<sup>149</sup> Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (University of California Press, 1966), 65; See also, Smith, *Portrait of A Cold Warrior*, 209.

<sup>150</sup> "National Security Council Report," May 3, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 95.

<sup>151</sup> "National Security Council Report," May 3, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 95.

training programs as necessary to prevent communist expansion in Indonesia, maintaining the tradition established by Truman, NSC 48/2, and PPS 51.<sup>152</sup>

Trends within Indonesia soon altered the course of U.S. policy objectives. The first trend arose after the 1955 elections which saw the outer islands of Indonesia come to loggerheads with the island of Java, the cosmopolitan center of the Indonesian archipelago and home to about sixty-five percent of the population.<sup>153</sup> Tensions between the core and periphery emerged for two reasons. First, the Muslim Masjumi party accused the central government of treating the outer islands as “stepchildren,” which only existed to provide for Javanese consumption. Second, the long tradition of smuggling, particularly on Sumatra, began to face increasing scrutiny from the central government as it tried to reform the economy.<sup>154</sup> The same year the government went on the offensive against Darul Islam (DI), a Muslim political faction seeking an independent Islamic state in Indonesia through rebellion. DI had a significant following in the Muslim-majority areas of Sumatra and Sulawesi.<sup>155</sup> Despite the opposition between the outer islands and central government, the latter had no desire to foment a revolution.<sup>156</sup> Regardless, officers

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<sup>152</sup> “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover),” September 20, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 115; “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State,” December 28, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 130.

<sup>153</sup> While a gap in census data for Indonesia exists between the years 1930 and 1961, one can extrapolate a rough expected population data between these two points. For a better picture of Indonesian census data around this period see, Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population Trends in Indonesia*, (Cornell University Press, 1970), 174–75. See, Figure 1, *The Republic of Indonesia*, xi.

<sup>154</sup> Several high-profile cases of military officers smuggling resources meant to generate revenue for the central government had been exposed. Teluk Nibung, Makassar, and Bitung affairs drove animosity between the leaders of the outer islands and the central government. See, Singh, *Bear and Garuda*, 166–67; Boyd R. Compton to Walter S. Rogers, July 13, 1956, Boyd R. Compton Newsletters, Institute of Current World Affairs, <https://www.icwa.org/boyd-r-compton-newsletters/>.

<sup>155</sup> Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 213–14.

at the CIA's Jakarta station saw an opportunity to exploit this division for operational gains within the country.

In the fall of 1956, as the Dulles brothers worried over Indonesia's political trajectory, CIA Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Frank Wisner initiated a new project to influence the nation's direction. Sukarno increasingly adopted an anti-Western rhetoric in his speeches. He also cozied up to the PKI, and intensified his campaign to acquire West Irian from the Dutch.<sup>157</sup> In response, Wisner informed Jakarta station Chief Al Ulmer that the time had come to hold Sukarno's "feet to the fire."<sup>158</sup> Joseph Burkholder Smith, a CIA officer in Jakarta, recalled that Wisner's statement stemmed from a conversation between the Dulles brothers, who forbade putting these orders in writing.<sup>159</sup>

As 1956 rolled into 1957 U.S. relations with Indonesia worsened. In February 1957, Sukarno grew fed up with the inefficiencies of Indonesia's parliamentary liberal democracy and announced a reformed government plan called "Guided Democracy." By enshrining the four major parties (PNI, Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and PKI) within the NASAKOM cabinet, this concept guaranteed that small groups from Indonesian society would guide the administration. Regional military commanders who held *de facto* power on the outer islands protested this action, fearing that Sukarno sought to strip their power

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<sup>156</sup> Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958* (Naval Institute Press, 1999), 33.

<sup>157</sup> John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland* (Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 307.

<sup>158</sup> Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 221.

<sup>159</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 85. C. Douglas Dillon supported Wisner's statement when he testified in front of the Church Committee that Allen Dulles would have translated strong Presidential language into authorization for assassination efforts or coups, see, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rep. No. 94-465, at 59 (1975) (statement of C. Douglas Dillon, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Under Secretary of State)

and centralize it within Java.<sup>160</sup> The issue expanded over the course of 1957 as the PKI saw sweeping victories local elections. Chairman of the PKI, D.N. Aidit, claimed the 1957 vote saw an increase in voter participation of forty-five percent over the 1955 vote.<sup>161</sup> The results made outer islanders more suspicious of Java, as they conflated the central government with communism and made resolving disputes between the two more difficult.<sup>162</sup>

In March 1957, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Hugh Cumming, Jr. transitioned to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), making way for former Ambassador to Japan John Allison to take over in Indonesia as Ambassador. Allison initially dismissed concerns over the PKI's gains or Sukarno's Guided Democracy.<sup>163</sup> He understood the importance of the West Irian issue as a uniting factor among Indonesians across the political spectrum, as well as the central role Sukarno played in Indonesian politics as a balancing force. Allison also remained unconvinced of the merits or risks of CIA operations in Indonesia and frequently challenged the Jakarta station's assessments when messaging Washington.<sup>164</sup> Although Allison did not worry about the PKI's electoral gains, Eisenhower's foreign policy advisors did, and they turned to the outer island dissident colonel movement as a solution<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> NASAKOM is an acronym for the three pillars of Indonesian society as envisioned by Sukarno, *nationalisme, agama, and komunism*; Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 66–67.

<sup>161</sup> Howard P. Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1971), 106.

<sup>162</sup> Daniel Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959* (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), 115–17.

<sup>163</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 84; Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 233.

<sup>164</sup> Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 221.

<sup>165</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 15–16.

The PKI's gains and the shifting U.S. diplomatic leadership produced a two-track policy toward Indonesia. On the one hand, Ambassador Allison, the ICA, and U.S. Army sought to pursue the policy objectives set forth by NSC 5518 designed to train the Indonesian Army and police. On the other hand, the Dulles Brothers and the CIA sought to diverge from official policy and develop a strategy to break up the Republic of Indonesia. This shift marked a new period of instability for US foreign policy as the State Department, the military, and the CIA began to undermine each other's strategies in Indonesia. This bureaucratic conflict in Washington also inflamed tensions in Indonesia.

On one side, the U.S. Army and its Chief of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, supported Ambassador Allison. Taylor and his Jakarta attachés favored working with TNI officials like General Abdul Haris Nasution, with whom they maintained an ongoing relationship through the army officer training programs. Allison and Maxwell, however, grew frustrated with John Foster Dulles because he refused to soften the U.S. stance on the West Irian issue, which supported the Dutch claim to the island. These two kept to U.S. policy and insisted on sending military equipment to the TNI.<sup>166</sup> On the other side, the State Department, the CIA, and the U.S. Navy identified an opportunity to break up Indonesia by supporting the dissident colonels' movement on the outer islands. By doing so, these departments argued the central island of Java would become less threatening. During the March 14, 1957, meeting of the NSC, DCI Allen Dulles ramped up the case for action using specially curated intelligence from the Jakarta station to argue, "the process of disintegration has continued in Indonesia to a point where only the island of

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<sup>166</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 82.

Java remains under the control of the Central Government.”<sup>167</sup> Despite the pressure Dulles brought to bear, debates over US strategy continued over the course of 1957.

The March 14, 1957, NSC meeting resulted in Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson, tasking Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Gordon Mein, to assess the possibility of an Indonesian break-up.<sup>168</sup> Mein completed his report by May 17, reinforcing Ambassador Allison’s assessment of the situation. It concluded “a break-up of the Republic of Indonesia would not serve U.S. policy objectives in the area. It could succeed only with substantial material assistance from the United States.”<sup>169</sup> Despite the report, which clearly supported the anti-interventionists, the local election of 1957 stoked further fears of Indonesia falling to communism.

The 333rd NSC meeting on August 1, 1957, reflected these anxieties, and the council agreed a group consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and ICA prepare a new report on the implications of the recent elections in Indonesia as it pertained to American security and the possible actions the U.S. might take pursuant to NSC 5518.<sup>170</sup> This group, formed under NSC Action No. 1756, became known as the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia for the National Security Council; Hugh Cumming, the former Ambassador to Indonesia and current State Department Intelligence advisor to John Foster Dulles,

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<sup>167</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council,” March 14, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 221.

<sup>168</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 87.

<sup>169</sup> “Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson),” May 17, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 230.

<sup>170</sup> “Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council,” August 1, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 240.

chaired the committee.<sup>171</sup> The Committee operated in such secrecy that neither the serving U.S. Ambassador, Allison, nor the State Department's Indonesia Desk Officer, Francis T. Underhill, were initially aware of its existence. By the time they discovered the committee its operations had already advanced considerably.<sup>172</sup>

On September 3, 1957, the committee submitted its "Special Report on Indonesia" to the NSC, without any input from the Jakarta embassy.<sup>173</sup> The report adopted an alarmist tone, arguing that the best course of action involved establishing "a government able and willing to pursue vigorous anti-Communist domestic policies and actions."<sup>174</sup> On September 23, the NSC met again with the President to discuss the committee's report and approved it with several amendments.<sup>175</sup> The document spelled out the two-track policy the administration sought to pursue: an overt track pursuing normal diplomatic relationships with Indonesia and a covert track seeking to subvert Sukarno's central government by aiding the dissident colonels on the outer islands.<sup>176</sup> The covert program, known as Project HAIK and headed by the CIA's Jakarta station began its work, unbeknownst to the Jakarta Embassy.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> "Indonesian Operation," May 15, 1958, CIA FOIA ERR, doc. no. CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040006-9, 1.

<sup>172</sup> Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 90-91.

<sup>173</sup> "Report Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia for the National Security Council," September 3, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 262.

<sup>174</sup> "Report Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia for the National Security Council," September 3, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 262.

<sup>175</sup> This included paragraph nine which was, and remains, redacted. See: "Memorandum of Discussion at the 337th Meeting of the National Security Council," September 23, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 268.

<sup>176</sup> "Report Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia for the National Security Council," September 3, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 262; See also, Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 93.

<sup>177</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 31-32.

Despite Ambassador Allison's cables back to Washington warning that the reduction in U.S. aid and failing to support Indonesia on the issue of West Irian would push the nation further toward the communists, his messages fell on deaf ears. John Foster Dulles trusted his brother's intelligence far more than the U.S. Chief of Mission, particularly because the intelligence played into his monolithic worldview.<sup>178</sup> The information chain between Jakarta and Washington virtually bypassed Allison, as the CIA's Jakarta station maintained its own direct line to Washington through the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee.<sup>179</sup> The CIA station chief, hostile toward Allison's oversight, frequently deceived the ambassador about the true nature of its work. As Joseph Smith stated, "The most efficient way to handle ambassadors who demand their rights as heads of U.S. missions abroad to be informed of CIA operational activities was to tell them plausible lies."<sup>180</sup> This secrecy left Allison entirely in the dark regarding the operations of his own government within his host nation. Debates over U.S. strategy in Indonesia continued to shape American covert and overt operations in the country, even though the two approaches often conflicted.

In April 1957, the Jakarta station opened formal channels with the dissident colonels. Through his contact with Central Sumatran TNI commander Lt. Col. Achmad Hussein, CIA officer Joseph Smith discovered a rebel force struggling without adequate equipment or supplies. Smith and the Jakarta station began sourcing funds and munitions for the rebels. The Jakarta station dedicated the summer of 1957 producing reports for the

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<sup>178</sup> Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 307.

<sup>179</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 97.

<sup>180</sup> Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 221.

Special Group, eventually gaining authorization to back the rebels by early October.<sup>181</sup> Once approved, the CIA opened the floodgates of aid, with arms and equipment discreetly delivered to the rebel forces in Sumatra at the port of Padang on the west coast. Keyes Beech, an American reporter at the time, recorded that a freighter originally carrying arms for the U.S. military advisory group in Thailand instead offloaded its shipment at Padang for Lt. Col. Hussein.<sup>182</sup> U.S. Navy submarines also supplied the dissident colonels farther south at the port of Painan and transported some of Hussein's men for training in Okinawa, Saipan, and Guam. Others were picked up by a PBY-5A Catalina and transported for training.<sup>183</sup> A more obvious supply drop of arms and ammunition arrived in early 1958. In a humorous aside, Keyes Beech recorded a CIA friend of his saying during the first few months of 1958 "you [could not] go outdoors at night for fear of getting hit on the head with a bazooka."<sup>184</sup> The interventionist side of the U.S. government, embodied by the Dulles' brothers, had gotten its way.

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<sup>181</sup> Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 232; Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 120.

<sup>182</sup> Keyes Beech, *Not Without the Americans: A Personal History* (Doubleday & Company, 1971), 270; Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison refute the claim of a CIA operation, asserting that the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* originated the misinformation. Though they do agree the freighter was stopped, boarded, and had arms removed from the vessel by Hussein see, Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 180–81.

<sup>183</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 121; While this pattern aligns with the prior HALFWAY-SUNBOW and ICEBOX/HAVERSACK missions flown by the CIA's CAT, the operations recorded by Joe Leeker for the three PBY-5As owned by CAT do not reflect being used in this time or place. Either the records remain incomplete, or the flights took place in early 1958 while both CAT PBY-5As flew in support of HAIK see, Leeker, "Consolidated PBY-5A Catalinas," in *The Aircraft of Air America*, 2–5; The literature disagrees over how the CIA supplied arms to the rebels in Sumatra. Kahin and Kahin asserted it began in November to December 1957 as U.S. freighters and submarines began supplying arms covertly and continued with airdrops in January. Conboy and Morrison disagree and argue the USS *Thomaston* and USS *Bluegill* were the first U.S. vessels to render covert aid see, Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 181.

<sup>184</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 122. Beech, *Not Without the Americans*, 270.

Emboldened by U.S. support, the rebellious factions of the outer islands quickly amassed strength. While the CIA shipped arms covertly to the Sumatran rebels through the port of Padang, other rebels whom Washington spurned, sourced aid from the British. For example, Permesta rebels in Sulawesi, headed by Lt. Col. Herman Nicolas Ventje Sumual, traveled to Malaya where he met with British intelligence officers to purchase scout cars and a minesweeper ship.<sup>185</sup> But despite his purchase of arms, Sumual decided to take another chance at diplomacy. Alongside Indonesian military attaché to Beijing, Col. Joop Warouw, Sumual met with Sukarno and Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja in Tokyo to present them with an ultimatum. The pair demanded Sukarno, “get rid of the Reds [PKI] or quit,” and relayed “this is the point of no return.”<sup>186</sup> Similarly, the Sumatran rebels issued an additional ultimatum to the central government in Jakarta on February 10, 1958, demanding the government institute three changes. First, the rebels demanded the dissolution of the Djuanda Cabinet, which they denounced as communist-dominated. Second, they proposed that Mohammad Hatta and Hamengkubuwono IX lead an interim cabinet until the next election. Finally, they demanded Sukarno rescind his unconstitutional NASAKOM Cabinet and plans for Guided Democracy. The Sumatran rebels gave the central government five days to comply, in the event the government did not follow through, the rebels stated “prudent steps” would follow.<sup>187</sup> After the passage of five days, the dissidents announced the formation of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). In response, the central government dishonorably discharged all the rebelling Sumatran rebel leaders, issued warrants for their arrest,

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<sup>185</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 36.

<sup>186</sup> “INDONESIA: Brink of Revolt,” *Time*, LXXI, no. 7, February 17, 1958 (quoting Col. Joop Warouw).

<sup>187</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 136–40.

severed communication with the island, and began military preparations to destroy the rebellion.<sup>188</sup>

Back in Washington, the Dulles brothers placed great faith in the rebel leaders. On January 31, 1958, Allen penned a memorandum to Eisenhower and many of those from the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee predicting the Sumatran rebels would deliver their ultimatum on February 5. His prediction missed the actual date by only five days.<sup>189</sup> The Secretary of State shared this sentiment. During a news conference concerning the French bombing of a Tunisian town, he misheard a reporter and remarked on the Indonesian situation instead, stating, “There is a kind of ‘guided democracy’ trend there now which is an evolution which may not quite conform with the provisional constitution and apparently does not entirely satisfy large segments of the population.”<sup>190</sup> He later doubled down on his statements in a House hearing, stating, “we would be very happy to see the non-Communist elements who are really in the majority there [security deletion] exert a greater influence in the affairs of Indonesia than has been the case in the past.”<sup>191</sup> The brothers’ frame of mind mirrored the thinking of all groups within the

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<sup>188</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 140; Singh, *Bear and Garuda*, 178; Tillman Durdin, “Indonesia Keeps A Tight Blockade,” *New York Times*, March 3, 1958.

<sup>189</sup> “Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence,” January 31, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, ed. Robert J. McMahon (GPO, 1994), doc. 11.

<sup>190</sup> John Foster Dulles quoted in “Transcript of Dulles News Conference on Summit Talks and Bombing of Tunisia,” *New York Times*, February 11, 1958; Before its public release, the edited transcript suppressed comments regarding the deep-seated tensions between the central government and the outer islands. see, “Doubt on Sukarno Voiced By Dulles,” *New York Times*, February 12, 1958; Keyes Beech commented the following week stating this “slip of the tongue” was a carefully crafted remark to encourage the rebels see, Keyes Beech “Decision on Indonesia,” *Washington Post and Times Herald*, February 17, 1958.

<sup>191</sup> *Mutual Security Act of 1958: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 85th Cong. 219 (1958) (statement of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State); See also, “Dulles Sees Red Trend,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1958.

Interdepartmental Committee; they believed Indonesia teetered on the brink of the communist orbit and viewed the revolt as evidence of a true anti-communist movement.

The CIA's strategy in Indonesia rested on a fundamental misinterpretation of the island dissidents' goals. While these dissidents focused primarily on smuggling, the Dulles brothers and the Interdepartmental Committee believed they intended to stage an armed uprising.<sup>192</sup> PRRI Minister of Home Affairs Col. Dahlan Djambek echoed this sentiment, stating, "We were all actors. Take me, for example. Only a few months ago, I was Sukarno's fair-haired boy. I had his ear any time I wanted it. Now look at me. I'm the minister of interior of the revolutionary government."<sup>193</sup> The miscalculation compounded when Ambassador Allison, the only voice questioning the Dulles' strategy, was reassigned to Czechoslovakia and replaced by Howard Palfrey Jones.<sup>194</sup> In addition to ignoring their own Ambassador, the Dulles brothers also ignored direct orders from the President not to involve "any U.S. Government personnel or persons detached from the U.S. Government ... for the purpose of taking part in any operations of a military character in Indonesia."<sup>195</sup> Allen Dulles specifically planned to use the CIA's proprietary airline company, CAT, to undertake various parts of Project HAIK, a disastrous decision in hindsight.

Despite the flawed plan, all agencies and governmental bodies involved with Project HAIK pressed onward. By late February 1958, CAT C-46 cargo planes dropped

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<sup>192</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 33 (quoting James M. Smith, Jr.).

<sup>193</sup> Beech, *Not Without the Americans*, 271 (quoting Col. Dahlan Djambek).

<sup>194</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 98 (quoting John Allison); John Allison details his sudden, surprise dismissal in Allison, *Ambassador From the Prairie*, 338–39.

<sup>195</sup> "Memorandum of Conversation with President Eisenhower," April 15, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 62; This conversation referred to an earlier planning phase.

tons of weapons, ammunition, and cash to the PRRI rebels in Sumatra.<sup>196</sup> The CIA designed these drops to covertly assist its rebel allies, but the operation's secrecy ended when General Nasution discovered the air-dropped arms during the Sumatran campaign.<sup>197</sup> By March 10, 1958, Indonesian forces under Nasution's command began full-scale air, sea, and land combined operations to unseat the PRRI rebels. TNI officers, known as "the sons of Eisenhower," from their time training in the United States, commanded the tactical operations. These officers included Ahmed Yani, Rukmito Hendraningrat, Andi Mohammad Jusuf, and H.H.W. Huhnholz, who instructed operations in Sumatra and Sulawesi.<sup>198</sup> In one instance, Col. Yani sought advice from his former CGSC classmate and U.S. military attaché to Indonesia, Col. George Benson, on the situation in Sumatra. Oblivious to CIA plotting in the nation, Benson dutifully supplied Yani with maps of Sumatra and provided reports to Gen. Maxwell Taylor that contradicted those emanating from the CIA.<sup>199</sup>

Many rebel forces in Sumatra surrendered within the first days of the central government invasion, while others loyal to the cause dispersed into the jungles of Sumatra to wage a guerrilla war. As a result, by April 18, the central government captured the rebel capital city of Padang, ending the majority of PRRI resistance in Sumatra. Remnants of these forces retreated to the jungles and continued to fight until

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<sup>196</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 56–59; Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Anchor Books, 2008), 171.

<sup>197</sup> Singh, *Bear and Garuda*, 179.

<sup>198</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 176.

<sup>199</sup> The CIA reports framed the anti-communist rebels as challengers to the communist-oriented central government, whereas Benson's reports described two non-communist factions fighting one another. See, Evans III, "Influence of the United States Army," 28–29.

1961.<sup>200</sup> In Sulawesi, CIA support shifted to support the Permesta rebels who held firm against the central government.

Amid the fighting in Sumatra and Sulawesi, and to render further support to Project HAIK, the CIA launched an aerial reconnaissance mission utilizing the U-2 spy plane. Operation ROBIN HOOD relocated U-2s from Detachment C at Japan's Atsugi Naval Air Station to Cubi Point NAS in the Philippines. Two Photo-Intelligence Division employees reached nearby Clark Air Force Base (AFB) by March 28, 1958, to begin processing the U-2 footage.<sup>201</sup> The following day, U-2 mission C 1714 overflew the Sulawesi and Maluku islands, gathering intelligence on airbases, communications hubs, and infrastructure targeted by the Permesta Revolutionary Air Force (AUREV) during their bombing raids on central government positions.<sup>202</sup> CAT maintained actual control of AUREV, employing a motley crew of CIA agents consisting of stateless Poles, Filipinos, and rebel Indonesians to fly missions using mothballed aircraft from Clark AFB.<sup>203</sup> Pilots flew these planes from Clark AFB to a forward operating base in Mapanget, located in the far northeast corner of Sulawesi, allowing them to strike within Indonesia.

From Mapanget, AUREV/CAT used the U-2 overflight intelligence to guide sorties against central government targets across Sulawesi and Maluku. While AUREV

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<sup>200</sup> "Hundreds of Rebels Surrender, Java Says," *Washington Post and Times Herald*, March 12, 1958; Bernard Kalb, "Jakarta Announces Capture of Padang," *New York Times*, April 18, 1958.

<sup>201</sup> Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, *The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974* (History Staff Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 211-15; "Policy and Procedure for Overseas Handling, Processing and Reporting on Photographic Results of AQUATONE Operations Far East (URPIC-2)," CIA FOIA ERR, April 22, 1957, doc. no. CIA-RDP61S00750A000300180060-2.

<sup>202</sup> The "mothballed" fleet consisted primarily of B-26B variants. "Mission Coverage Summary: Mission C 1714," CIA FOIA ERR, March 29, 1958, doc. no. CIA-RDP89B00551R000400350020-7.

<sup>203</sup> Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 84-91.

set out to destroy central government targets, it did not restrict itself to military installations; instead, the group often attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure to scare away merchant ships and sabotage the Indonesian economy.<sup>204</sup> These sorties ended abruptly on May 18, 1958, with the capture of CIA/CAT pilot Allen Lawrence Pope. That day, Pope departed the rebel base at Mapanget in a B-26 and carried out an attack against the Maluku provincial city of Ambon. During the raid, fire from the *KRI Sawega* and an Indonesian Air Force (AURI) P-51 converged on Pope's plane. The combined firepower downed the B-26 and forced Pope and his co-pilot, Jan Harry Rantung, to bail out. Central government forces apprehended both men shortly after they landed. Once captured, the pair carried enough documentation to confirm the suspicions of Indonesian government officials that the U.S. covertly supported the Permesta rebels.<sup>205</sup> Sukarno made no immediate public announcement regarding Pope's capture, a silence Ambassador Jones attributed to a desire for rapprochement with the U.S.<sup>206</sup>

The capture of Pope led to a decline in enthusiasm for Project HAIK, both from the CIA director and the Interdepartmental Committee, signaling a shift away from U.S. efforts to pursue regime change in Indonesia. The NSC learned of Pope's capture on May 21. Given Sukarno's May 20 speech alluding only briefly to foreign intervention, the Indonesian leader clearly intended to use Pope's capture and the potential exposure of

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<sup>204</sup> CIA, CAT, and AUREV bombers struck several foreign cargo ships during the spring of 1958: the *Flying Lark* (Panama), *Moro* (Panama), *Aquila* (Italy), *Armonia* (Greece), and *San Flaviano* (United Kingdom) see, "Editorial Note," May 1, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 76; Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 115–16; Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 173, 290.

<sup>205</sup> "Indonesia: The Man From Florida," *Time* LXXI, no. 23, June 9, 1958; Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 138–41; Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 179–82.

<sup>206</sup> "NSC Briefing: Indonesia," CIA FOIA ERR, May 21, 1958, doc. no. CIA-RDP79R00890A001000010021-2.

U.S. covert involvement as diplomatic leverage.<sup>207</sup> Sukarno's tactic succeeded; on May 22, the U.S. and Indonesia signed a \$5.5 million P.L. 480 agreement for rice surpluses, and the U.S. granted export licenses for small arms shipments to the official Indonesian military after over a year of denials.<sup>208</sup> The U.S. Ambassador disavowed Pope as a "soldier of fortune," while Allen Dulles, after consulting his brother, told the Jakarta Station, "we're pulling the plug" on Project HAIK.<sup>209</sup> Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the DCI at the time, later remarked, "the operation was, of course, a complete failure."<sup>210</sup>

In a few short days, nearly a year of preparation for regime change in Indonesia collapsed, forcing the policymakers behind the attempted coup into a quick about-face. Arms and food equipment denied to the central government during the planning and execution of HAIK quickly resumed as the U.S. returned to the previous policy objectives of NSC 5518. The failure of HAIK forced the administration to return to the Indonesian military and police to prevent a communist takeover. Within Indonesia, the failed Project HAIK only strengthened the positions of the TNI, the PKI, and President Sukarno. On the one side, President Sukarno and the TNI continued to dominate the political and economic scenes in the aftermath of the rebellion which only further

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<sup>207</sup> "NSC Briefing: Indonesia," CIA FOIA ERR, May 21, 1958, doc. no. CIA-RDP79R00890A001000010021-2.

<sup>208</sup> P.L. 480 refers to Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454. See also, "Editorial Note," May 22, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 106; "U.S. to Allow Arms for Java," *Washington Post and Times Herald*, May 22, 1958; "Memorandum of Conversation," May 27, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 115.

<sup>209</sup> "Indonesia: The Man From Florida," *Time* LXXI, no. 23, June 9, 1958; Conboy and Morrison, *Feet to the Fire*, 143.

<sup>210</sup> Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Dr. Thomas Soapes, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, November 9, 1976, 16.

legitimized these two in the eyes of the nation. On the other side, the PKI's long-standing criticisms of U.S. meddling in Indonesian domestic matters finally found vindication.<sup>211</sup>

In the wake of HAIK, the Dulles brothers faced uncomfortable questions from senior State Department officials behind closed doors.<sup>212</sup> Analysts questioned how flawed intelligence and grandiose interpretations of the dissident movement led by the colonels came to dominate U.S. foreign policy in Indonesia. The answer laid within a report authored by David K. E. Bruce and Robert A. Lovett, both members of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. The Bruce-Lovett report critically evaluated the Agency's role in the planning, approving, and conducting of covert operations and placed blame on it for monopolizing covert operations while eschewing oversight. Bruce and Lovett singled out the Dulles' relationship for criticism, noting that it "arbitrarily set 'the U.S. position'" in certain cases. The report also faulted the CIA for undermining the official role of the Ambassador and other U.S. agencies, causing a confused, and often, duplicitous U.S. foreign policy.<sup>213</sup> In December 1960, this report informed a briefing for President-elect Kennedy and key members of his incoming

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<sup>211</sup> "Special National Intelligence Estimate," August 12, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 141.

<sup>212</sup> The U.S. public became aware of Pope's capture and connections with CAT see, "U.S. Flier Faces Indonesian Trial," *New York Times*, May 29, 1958, 7; "Indonesia: The Man From Florida," *Time* LXXI, no. 23, June 9, 1958.

<sup>213</sup> The Bruce-Lovett Report has proven elusive for many researchers. First mentioned by Arthur Schlesinger in his *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), 490–91, and then again by Allen Dulles' biographer Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 445–54, 497–98, 598, who cited Schlesinger. Schlesinger noted he saw the report in the Robert F. Kennedy Papers deposited at the JFK Library. The report has yet to be found. See, Central Intelligence Agency "The Elusive 'Bruce-Lovett Report,'" *Center for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter*, no. 3 (Spring 1995). <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps19742/www.cia.gov/csi/bulletin/csi3.htm#report>; A 'declassified' version of the report is contained within Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes*, though Weiner presented the text without provenance see, Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, 667–71.

cabinet. The CIA's failure in Indonesia served as a cautionary tale regarding how distorted intelligence from reporting officers can mislead policy planners.<sup>214</sup>

By August 1958, U.S. policy in Indonesia had fully shifted support back to the central government and Sukarno. The day following the release of a Special National Intelligence Estimate on August 12, 1958 (SNIE 65-58), which noted the strong position of the PKI within Indonesia after HAIK, the U.S. and Indonesia formally signed an agreement providing the nation with seven million dollars' worth of military assistance.<sup>215</sup> The military cooperation policy, initially proposed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor in 1957 and supported by Ambassador Allison, centered on providing token military aid to the TNI. By August 1958, this approach had become the dominant U.S. policy toward Indonesia, evidenced by the formal agreement for a seven-million-dollar military assistance package.

U.S. policy had now definitively moved away from supporting the Indonesian rebels and back toward military cooperation with the central government. The appointment of Maj. Gen. Russell Vittrup to lead the military mission further reinforced this policy. Vittrup, and by extension the Department of Defense, disagreed with the CIA's and State Department's covert plotting and sought to take the lead on U.S. policy in Indonesia after HAIK's failure.<sup>216</sup> The Department of Defense and Gen. Vittrup

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<sup>214</sup> Robert A. Lovett, interview by Dorothy Fosdick, September 14, 1964, 40–41, John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkoh-roal-03>.

<sup>215</sup> "Editorial Note," *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 142.

<sup>216</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed a breakup of Indonesia and clearly stated their disagreement with the recommendations of the Special Report on Indonesia. See, "Memorandum: From the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs (Triebel) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)," February 10, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 15.

opposed both the Dulles brothers' support for the outer island rebels and the State Department's cautious maneuvering with the Dutch.<sup>217</sup> The Pentagon had a good reason to return to the original NSC 5518 policy; it had already established the framework to train Indonesian officers in the U.S. since the early 1950s. In fact, many of those trained in the U.S. had returned to positions of influence within Indonesia and maintained contact with American officers, forming strong bonds between the two nations' armies.<sup>218</sup> As a result, the Pentagon held the strongest position to dictate the relationship between Indonesia and the U.S. by August 1958.

By January of 1959, the Pentagon now led U.S. strategy toward Indonesia. The new year brought additional military assistance packages to Indonesia, with millions of dollars' worth of aid allocated for each branch of the military.<sup>219</sup> Beyond the generous assistance, the U.S. provided covert aid by selling "excess stocks" of equipment for a nominal percentage of their actual worth. The U.S. government made twenty F-51 fighter aircraft, fifteen B-25 bombers, and all additional spare parts available to the Indonesian government for only \$22,055 after categorizing the planes as surplus. The administration hid the gift from Congress.<sup>220</sup> To head off the policy mistakes of supporting the rebels, the American foreign policy apparatus fell in line behind the Pentagon. The continuation of

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<sup>217</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 193–94, 297; "Editorial Note," *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 142.

<sup>218</sup> "Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)," January 3, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, vol. XXII, doc. 132.

<sup>219</sup> "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles," January 9, 1959, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Indonesia, vol. XVII, doc. 170.

<sup>220</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 207.

military aid not only bolstered the U.S. relationship with the Indonesian military, but it would go on to help the Army eliminate the PKI in 1965 and 1966.

In Indonesia, on July 5, 1959, and under pressure from Gen. Nasution and the Indonesian officer corps, Sukarno announced Decree No. 150 which returned Indonesia to its 1945 constitution. This shift effectively dissolved the Indonesian parliament and gave Sukarno direct control of the cabinet, something he announced after revealing his plan for Guided Democracy in 1957. Gen. Nasution originally proposed shifting to the old constitution, a move the Javanese officer corps welcomed as they concluded their campaign against the PRRI rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi.<sup>221</sup> The TNI favored the return to the 1945 constitution because it solidified its power after the declaration of martial law and the suspension of elections announced in March of 1958, coinciding with the beginning of outer island rebellion. Consequently, the suspension of elections for six years in 1958, and the declaration of Decree No. 150 in 1959 ensured the military's dominance within Indonesian society, a position now only rivaled by Sukarno and the PKI. Eisenhower's tenure ended with his administration essentially back at square one in Indonesia. The Dulles brothers' plotting failed to secure a non-communist Indonesia; instead, the PKI had become more popular than ever by 1961, boasting over one and a half million members.<sup>222</sup>

Picking up on this theme in the next chapter, I examine the John F. Kennedy administration's policies toward Indonesia. I argue policies largely followed those

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<sup>221</sup> Kahin and Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, 202–205; Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008), 32–33, 35.

<sup>222</sup> In 1959 the PKI reportedly boasted one and a half million members and over two million members in the second half of 1962 see, Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 65, 99.

developed by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations; however, Kennedy's focus on foreign aid and the Third World resulted in overhauled bureaucracies; making these agencies, departments, and programs far more efficient than before. The Kennedy team also embraced new ideas like modernization and counterinsurgency to meet the challenges of the Third World. As such, I argue the administration massively expanded foreign aid programs designed to build the institutional capacity of the anti-communist forces of Indonesia, many of whom participated in the 1965–1966 genocide.

## Chapter Three

John F. Kennedy prosecuted the Cold War differently than his predecessor, especially in the context of Southeast Asia. The incoming Kennedy administration brought new outlooks to improve the position of the United States, resulting in major shifts to U.S. Cold War strategy. Truman and Eisenhower tailored their policies to the Soviet Union and their specific interpretations of a monolithic communist movement; however, their plans failed to account for emerging Third World nationalism, particularly in Indonesia. Kennedy's "best and the brightest" viewed the Third World as the central theater for U.S. Cold War strategy. The Kennedy "whiz kids" saw the communist threat in Chinese terms, i.e., Maoist revolutionaries waging an intractable people's war from the village level.<sup>223</sup> This led to a reevaluation of U.S. policy and its corresponding strategies defining the Kennedy presidency. The Eisenhower era policies of the "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation" gave way to Kennedy's "New Frontiers" and "Flexible Response."<sup>224</sup> Both provided responses moving away from rigid confrontation to a more

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<sup>223</sup> Maxwell Taylor, memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, August 13, 1962, box 338, folder "National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM): NSAM 182, Counterinsurgency Doctrine," National Security Files (NSF), Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers (PP), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/338/JFKNSF-338-010>.

<sup>224</sup> Eisenhower's "New Look," or NSC 162/2, established a national security policy seeking to balance global U.S. military commitments with the nation's financial resources. Rather than rely upon a large and expensive standing army, the administration instead relied upon nuclear weapons and covert operations. Military planners viewed these two strategies as an effective replacement for a large conventional force, offering a smaller, less expensive, and equally potent deterrent against the Soviet Union. The reliance on a nuclear arsenal evolved into the "Massive Retaliation" policy. For NSC 162/2 see, "Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)," October 30, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, pt. 1, eds. Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen (Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984), doc. 101; For a greater analysis of Eisenhower's New Look and Massive Retaliation see, Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61* (St. Martin's Press, 1996). Kennedy's "New Frontiers" and "Flexible Response" policies represented significant strategic shifts to Eisenhower era policies. The New Frontier encompassed a vast array of programs for the U.S., both domestic and foreign, but for defense purposes it placed a priority on countering communist subversion in the developing world. Flexible Response sought to address the inflexibility of Massive Retaliation which left only two choices in the event of a war: defeat on the ground or resort to nuclear weapons. Through Flexible Response, the Kennedy administration returned to conventional forces, placing importance on special forces, counterinsurgency, and civic-action programs. For New Frontiers Policy within the context of U.S. foreign

adaptable approach emphasizing diplomacy and development aid to the decolonizing Third World rife with communist subversion.

Building on the precedent set by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations which cultivated and supported the anti-communist forces in Indonesia, the Kennedy administration significantly expanded clandestine aid to the same groups. Eisenhower's failed Project HAIK and subsequent deterioration in relations with President Sukarno created a difficult situation for Kennedy. This chapter argues that despite Kennedy's well-documented reservations about the CIA, especially following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the clandestine training and aiding of anti-communist Indonesian officers intensified under his leadership. Kennedy's continuation of this aid directly assisted the anti-communist forces, many of whom participated in the 1965–1966 genocide. To illustrate how the situation developed, this chapter examines the difficult position the Kennedy administration inherited and the plans it developed to turn its fortunes around. Second, this chapter explores the evolution of U.S. policy from the "New Look" to the "New Frontier" as it turned to academia to find novel approaches to American foreign policy issues.<sup>225</sup> In this section, I argue that modernization theory and counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrines guided the administration's views on U.S. foreign aid programs. In Indonesia, developmental aid served as a Trojan Horse, allowing the U.S. to funnel martial aid and COIN programs into the country. Third, I argue when U.S. Congress threatened to shut down aid programs over Sukarno's increasing intransigence toward the

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policy toward Indonesia see, Timothy Maga, "The New Frontier vs. Guided Democracy: JFK, Sukarno, and Indonesia, 1961-1963," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 91–102. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20700116>; For Flexible Response see, Walter S. Poole, *Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013).

<sup>225</sup> Maga, "The New Frontier vs. Guided Democracy," 91–102.

West, the Kennedy administration sought every conceivable way to continue the flow of supplies to Indonesia. Finally, I conclude this chapter arguing aid to the anti-communists set the stage for the eventual showdown between the PKI and the Army, with the anti-communists ultimately reaping the benefits.

Since Indonesian independence in 1949, the United States directed its policy toward strengthening anti-communist elements, primarily the military and the police, to fight against communist subversion. While Eisenhower's New Look prioritized the Soviet threat, it utilized covert actions to address regional instabilities. These successes often only protected Western commercial interests against liberal nationalists, as seen in Iran and Guatemala. Indonesia posed a distinct challenge. The failure of Project HAIK exposed the U.S. national security establishment's inability to counter communist expansion within a large, non-aligned nation. This failure validated the criticisms of John F. Kennedy and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who argued that Massive Retaliation lacked the flexibility necessary for the Third World.<sup>226</sup> It left the U.S. with no effective tools to address growing Third World nationalism, something which U.S. policymakers often conflated with communism and Soviet expansionism.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> General Maxwell Taylor commanded an Army that suffered significant budget cuts under the "New Look" policy. The government reallocated the Army budget cuts to favor the nuclear arsenal and the newly formed U.S. Air Force. Kennedy used Maxwell's arguments for his own political advancement and agenda. On the first front, Kennedy criticized the inflexibility of massive retaliation while appearing more hawkish than the Republicans by claiming a "missile gap" existed between the U.S. and USSR. Secondly, after visits across the developing world while a congressman, Kennedy noted the importance of counterinsurgency strategies to help fight communism in the Third World.

<sup>227</sup> For a greater discussion of Cold War and Eisenhower historiography see, Stephen G. Rabe, "Cold War Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon: The New Scholarly Literature," in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, second edition, eds. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 131–66, especially 136–39.

John F. Kennedy sought to continue the longstanding U.S. policy toward Indonesia, i.e., aiding the police and military. Kennedy, however, first needed to mend the relationship between the two nations. The Eisenhower administration had deeply damaged its relationship with Sukarno during its final years. Project HAIK not only exposed the “hidden hand” of U.S. regime change in 1958 but also revealed the personal contempt both Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles held toward Indonesian leader.<sup>228</sup> For example, Eisenhower failed to visit Indonesia during his 1958 Pacific tour, leaving Sukarno to interpret his actions as a personal snub.<sup>229</sup> After he accepted an invitation to visit Washington in 1960, Sukarno again felt insulted by the lack of attention the President and Secretary of State paid to him. Both men refused to meet him at his plane or at the front door of the White House. Nearly an hour passed before anyone finally saw him.<sup>230</sup> In contrast, to how he was treated by Eisenhower and Dulles Sukarno arrived at the White House in 1961 as one of John F. Kennedy’s earliest foreign guests. Their meetings featured all the pomp and circumstance that the vain and prestige-conscious Sukarno enjoyed.<sup>231</sup>

Before the Kennedy-Sukarno meeting, U.S. policy had already shifted behind the scenes. On Eisenhower’s way out, the NSC furnished a report analyzing the situation in

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<sup>228</sup> For a detailed study of Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” presidency see, Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

<sup>229</sup> Robert H. Johnson, “Past U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia: An Interpretation,” memorandum, April 20, 1961, box 119, folder “Indonesia: Security, Sukarno Visit, April 1961,” Presidential Office Files (POF), Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 73–75, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkpof-119-004>.

<sup>230</sup> Sukarno and Cindy Adams, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told by Cindy Adams* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 295.

<sup>231</sup> Office of the Chief of Protocol, “Administrative Arrangements for the Arrival at Washington of His Excellency Dr. Sukarno President of the Republic of Indonesia,” April 18–25, 1961, box 119, folder “Indonesia: Sukarno Visit, April 1961,” POF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 4–13, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/119/JFKPOF-119-003>.

Indonesia and recognized the failure of HAIK. The administration, reeling from its mistakes, laid the groundwork for the next several years through NSC 6023: “Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Indonesia.”<sup>232</sup> NSC 6023 echoed the policy objectives of NSC 5518 but struck a far more urgent tone. HAIK and the imposition of “Guided Democracy” in Indonesia made the central government in Jakarta far more powerful than it had been before. As a result, NSC 6023 continued to provide a substantial amount of military assistance to the Indonesian Army and its police force.

Five days after Kennedy’s inauguration, a pressing cable from Ambassador Howard Jones to Secretary Dean Rusk reinforced and expanded the policy goals of NSC 6023. The “time has come,” Jones argued, to reassess the “situation in Indonesia and review our policy and courses of action.”<sup>233</sup> Within this telegram, Jones presented the incoming Kennedy administration with a seven-point plan to prevent Indonesia from falling under communist control. He urged the incoming administration to pursue a pragmatic, flexible approach toward Indonesia by facilitating the resolution of the West New Guinea (WNG) dispute in Indonesia’s favor, building a direct Kennedy-Sukarno relationship, expanding and speeding economic aid and technical assistance with fewer restrictions, providing more meaningful military assistance, and preparing for a major psychological war campaign.

In a stark contrast to Jones’ treatment during the Eisenhower years, Kennedy heeded his advice. The president launched a charm offensive aimed at mending the

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<sup>232</sup> “National Security Council Report,” December 19, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XVII, Indonesia, ed. Robert J. McMahon, (GPO, 1994), doc. 293; See especially para. 12.

<sup>233</sup> “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” January 25, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, ed. Edward C. Keefer, (GPO, 1994), doc. 143.

fractured relationship with Sukarno. Unlike Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, Sukarno and Kennedy possessed a shared passion for womanizing. During their April 1961 meeting, the White House spared no effort, even involving the Secret Service to meet Sukarno's "insatiable demand for call girls."<sup>234</sup> Following these initial discussions, the two leaders addressed the WNG dispute. Sukarno clarified his stance by offering to secure Indonesia against communist influence provided the U.S. backed his claim to WNG.<sup>235</sup> Sukarno also demanded the Dutch relinquish WNG, its protectorate, to the Indonesians. In early 1961, the Dutch staunchly opposed the Indonesian demands and instead worked toward setting WNG up for self-rule. The new Kennedy administration carefully weighed its options, initially neither fully supporting the Dutch nor the Indonesians.<sup>236</sup> While the discussions with Kennedy fell short of meeting the Indonesian point of view, Kennedy's hospitality opened the door for further friendly exchanges<sup>237</sup>

WNG emerged as a flashpoint, splitting the administration over whether to cede the territory to Indonesia. The pro-Sukarno faction included Ambassador Howard Jones and National Security Staffers Robert Komer and Robert Johnson, who sought input from academic specialists, like National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, MIT political scientist

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<sup>234</sup> Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008), 51–52; C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945–62* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 335; Ben Koster, *Een Verloren land: De Regering Kennedy en de Nieuw-Guinea Kwestie, 1961–1962* (Anthos, 1991), 33.

<sup>235</sup> Dean Rusk, memorandum for John F. Kennedy, "Visit of President Sukarno," April 22, 1961, box 119, folder "Indonesia: Security, Sukarno Visit, April 1961," POF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 3–4, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkpof-119-004>; "Conversation Between President Kennedy and President Sukarno of Indonesia," April 24, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 172.

<sup>236</sup> Harry Gilroy, "New Guinea Vote Hailed by Dutch," *New York Times*, March 6, 1961, 14; "Hollandia Urged to Set Its Aims," *New York Times*, April 6, 1961, 11.

<sup>237</sup> Allen Dulles, report for Chester V. Clifton, May 2, 1961, box 119, folder "Indonesia: Security, Sukarno Visit, April 1961," POF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 103–105, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkpof-119-004>.

Lucian Pye, and RAND analyst Guy Pauker.<sup>238</sup> It also included the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FE). This group favored a more muscular foreign policy in Southeast Asia, marrying economic development philosophies, or modernization, with military assistance to align Indonesia with the West.<sup>239</sup>

Conversely, the pro-Dutch faction included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, and the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs (EUR). Finding Indonesia's threats of force unacceptable, this group maintained that a surrender to Sukarno's demands necessitated a break with the Dutch, a primary U.S. ally within NATO.<sup>240</sup> This group also viewed WNG's annexation by Indonesia as merely a transfer of colonialism from the Dutch to the Indonesians, rather than true Papuan self-determination.<sup>241</sup>

The EUR position also found an ally within the CIA's leadership ranks, which had still not given up on its strategy to remove Sukarno. On March 27, 1961, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, drafted a searing anti-Sukarno memorandum, asserting, "President Sukarno will be found neither appeasable nor susceptible to more tangible inducements. Only his removal from power would offer some hope that trends

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<sup>238</sup> "Pro-Sukarno" here does not mean these policymakers held any adoration of Sukarno as a leader, rather, he represented the best option available to maintain stability in Indonesia. On the issue of WNG, the "Pro-Sukarno" group was demonstrating cold and calculated *realpolitik*.

<sup>239</sup> "Memorandum to Walt Rostow," March 20, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 154; "Memo to McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow," March 27, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 156; "Record of Conversation," March 31, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 157.

<sup>240</sup> The EUR naturally supported the longstanding and NATO ally's interests over the newly emerging Indonesian nation as the Bureau, alongside many others during this era, viewed Europe as more important than Asia. See, Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 56.

<sup>241</sup> "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare)," February 13, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 146.

that now seem inexorable can still be reversed.”<sup>242</sup> Bissell, alongside EUR, thought an Indonesian victory over the Dutch in WNG would bolster Sukarno among the conservatives within the military and leave the U.S. without a counterbalance. However, Bissell offered no alternative strategy whereas the Pro-Sukarno side argued for a shift to a pro-Indonesian policy on WNG and continued aid as a stop-gap solution to the perceived leftward drift of Indonesia.<sup>243</sup>

President Kennedy stood at a crossroads. According to Arthur Schlesinger, who wrote one of the first orthodox accounts of the administration’s foreign policy, Kennedy was “anxious to slow up [Indonesia’s] drift toward the communist bloc.”<sup>244</sup> Again, Sukarno already turned to the Soviet bloc for military and development aid and Kennedy recognized the need to strengthen the anti-communist forces to prevent the PKI from taking over the country. Robert Komer, a key Kennedy NSC advisor weighing in on whether to accede to Sukarno’s demands over WNG, contended that a communist Indonesia posed a far greater threat to the Dutch and U.S. than the Indonesian acquisition of “...a few thousand square miles of cannibal land.”<sup>245</sup> On the one hand, some members of the State Department and Kennedy’s key national security advisors argued that the

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<sup>242</sup> *FRUS* contains only a partial version of the memo, the quote was found in Attachment A, 7–8 in the full version, found via Gale *U.S. Declassified Documents Online (USDDO)*. “Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” March 27, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 155; Richard Bissell, memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, March 27, 1961, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349349637, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349349637>.

<sup>243</sup> “Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” March 27, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 156.

<sup>244</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Houghton Mifflin, 1965).

<sup>245</sup> Robert Komer, “Why Trusteeship Won’t Work,” National Security Council, February 17, 1961, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349414124, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349414124](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349414124).

administration ought to forge closer ties with Indonesia in the hopes of influencing its political outcomes. On the other hand, State Department Europeanists and the CIA sought to maintain the U.S. relationship with the Dutch. This group interpreted Sukarno and his dedication to the Non-Aligned Movement as pro-communist and incompatible with the goals of the U.S.

By December 1, 1961, Walt Rostow, Kennedy's National Security Advisor, nudged the President into a more pro-Indonesian position on the issue of WNG. Rostow argued that Indonesia might get the territory one way or another. He also surmised U.S. support for the Indonesian position preempted a Soviet outflanking on the issue.<sup>246</sup> So on December 10, Kennedy sent a letter to Sukarno demonstrating he had moved towards the views of Rostow and others in the pro-Sukarno group. In the letter, JFK informed Sukarno that a Dutch withdrawal from WNG remained a realistic possibility, though he pleaded with Sukarno not to use force to resolve the issue.<sup>247</sup>

NSC advisor Robert Johnson stressed the need for the U.S. to find a "face-saving solution" to the WNG issue, he advised the President not to support the Dutch militarily against the Indonesians. Kennedy agreed. The Indonesians, however, already begun preparations to seize the area by force. Sukarno informed Ambassador Jones of this in early December. He declared his intent publicly on December 19, 1961, in his TRIKORA (*Tri Komando Rakyat* or his People's Triple Command) speech which called for an end to

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<sup>246</sup> "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy," December 1, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 205.

<sup>247</sup> "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia," December 9, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 210; See also, doc. 208 and doc. 209.

Dutch rule.<sup>248</sup> Over the rest of 1962 Indonesia launched several incursions into Dutch controlled territory on WNG.

In an effort to solve the crisis that same year, U.S. diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, at the request of UN Secretary General U Thant, mediated a series of multi-lateral negotiations which led to the UN administration of WNG. The plan mandated a gradual transfer of power to Indonesian administrators, culminating in a 1969 plebiscite to decide the territory's ultimate future.<sup>249</sup> The signing of the New York Agreement in August 1962 formalized this plan. The agreement solved the immediate crisis, but Indonesia revived its tactic of diplomatic confrontation the following year; launching *Konfrontasi* against Great Britain and its former territories of Malaya, Brunei, and Singapore.<sup>250</sup>

*Konfrontasi* marked an inflection point where the Kennedy administration sought to bridge the gaps in U.S. national security policy through "Flexible Response." While the Truman and Eisenhower administrations viewed the communist threat as monolithic and driven by the communist government in the Soviet Union, i.e., communism expanded through means short of violence and focused on Europe, the Kennedy team saw the communist threat in Chinese terms, i.e., Maoist revolutionaries waging an intractable people's war from the village level across the Third World.<sup>251</sup> For the Kennedy

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<sup>248</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 56; David Webster, "Regimes in Motion: The Kennedy administration and Indonesia's New Frontier, 1960-1962," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 1 (January 2009): 112–113, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00748.x>.

<sup>249</sup> United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), "Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)," A/5170, August 20, 1962, <https://docs.un.org/en/A/5170>.

<sup>250</sup> See Figure 2, *Indonesia and Neighboring Countries*, x.

<sup>251</sup> Thomas R. Seitz, *The Evolving Role of Nation Building in US Foreign Policy: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost*, (Manchester University Press, 2012), 97–98.

administration, the decolonizing Third World emerged as a key battlefield in the Cold War. This area had posed the greatest challenge to the previous two administrations. From “The New Look” emerged a strategy of “Flexible Response.” While it encompassed far more than just defense, “Flexible Response” sought to address communist subversion and the wars of national liberation in the decolonizing Third World through modernization theory and civic action programs (CAP). The administration pursued a twofold strategy toward Indonesia. First, the U.S. overtly supplied developmental assistance through various agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the successor to International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Second, the U.S. co-opted anti-communist elements within Indonesian society, such as the police and military, to create a “state within a state,” a group waiting for the moment to seize power. Through “modernization,” the “best and brightest” of Kennedy’s administration sought to bring the nations of the Third World into its fold on an accelerated timeline.

The Civic Action Program (CAP) functioned as a key component of modernization theory. The Kennedy administration defined it as “using military forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development.”<sup>252</sup> It emphasized the role of the military and internal security forces in modernizing their countries through economic and social development. The administration sought to integrate the program with other developmental measures,

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<sup>252</sup> McGeorge Bundy, “National Security Action Memorandum No. 119: Civic Action,” December 18, 1961, folder “NSAM 119: Civic Action,” Meetings and Memoranda (MM), NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 1–2, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-333-010>.

including the military assistance programs (MAP), political reforms, and the Peace Corps. On the one hand, the U.S. could publicly claim that these projects served the cause of development; as Roger Hilsman stated, “rehabilitating canals, draining swampland to create new rice paddies, building bridges and roads, and so on,” increased the viability of these countries.<sup>253</sup> On the other hand, later private communiqués between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Lyndon Johnson revealed the primary purpose for this sought to maintain contact with “key elements in Indonesia that are interested and capable of resisting Communist takeover.”<sup>254</sup> While the U.S. government publicly framed CAP as development initiatives, these programs also strengthened the institutional capacity of the Indonesian Army. The U.S. policy of supporting the military through such programs inadvertently empowered the very forces who facilitated the subsequent genocide.

The Kennedy administration championed development assistance initiatives, especially entities like the Peace Corps and USAID, to foster economic development and social progress in the Third World. As historian Thomas Seitz argued, “virtually all categories of foreign aid were employed as instruments of US security policy in the developing world.”<sup>255</sup> Indonesia demonstrated that the strategic deployment of foreign aid and U.S. military and economic assistance professionalized the Indonesian Army and police into reliable anti-communist fighting forces. The exigencies of the Cold War

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<sup>253</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Doubleday, 1967), 377.

<sup>254</sup> “Memo from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President Johnson,” July 20, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, ed. Edward C. Keefer (GPO, 2000), doc. 264.

<sup>255</sup> Seitz, *The Evolving Role of Nation Building in US Foreign Policy*, 7.

subsumed the administration's developmental rhetoric; aid served as the Trojan horse for waging a global counterinsurgency against communism.

In mid-December 1961, around the same time Sukarno began mobilizing for the Indonesian confrontation with the Dutch, the Special Group, a Presidential oversight committee for covert CIA programs, approved significant funding for civic action and anti-Communist activities in Indonesia for the following two years. In 1962 it approved funding for CAP and additional anti-Communist efforts through certain Indonesian groups. It also agreed to provide more funds during fiscal years 1962 and 1963 for the covert training of military and civilian personnel, whom the administration planned to install in key roles within Indonesia's civic action programs.<sup>256</sup> CAP for Indonesia only began in earnest following the "Humphrey Mission" of August 1961, primarily driven by public-private partnerships that already trended in that direction for years through NGOs and academia.<sup>257</sup>

The administration's focus on "modernization theory" produced the marriage between counterinsurgency and economic development. The era of "Massive Retaliation" ended. In its place, Kennedy created the U.S. Army Special Forces trained in counterinsurgency tactics. This enabled the U.S. to flexibly respond to the "wars of

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<sup>256</sup> "Memo Prepared for the 303 Committee," February 23, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 110, footnote (fn.) 2.

<sup>257</sup> The "Humphrey Mission" refers to an economic mission sent to Jakarta. Donald Humphrey of Tufts University and Walter Salant of the Brookings Institution headed the group. The administration tasked them with evaluating conditions in Indonesia and recommending specific aid packages. During their stay in Jakarta, General Nasution briefed them and provided a glowing report on the Indonesian Army's capacity for nation-building through CAP aid. See, Bryan Evans III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954–1964)," *Indonesia* 47 (April 1989): 34, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351074>.

national liberation” across the globe.<sup>258</sup> While the U.S. Special Forces played an important role in COIN, foreign police, military, and paramilitary forces carried out these programs in most cases. The nascent foreign police and military training program of the Truman and Eisenhower era lacked inter-agency cooperation and Project HAIK hamstrung any coordinated effort between different agencies.<sup>259</sup> The compartmentalization of foreign aid information forced individual agencies to develop often conflicting policies based on divergent views of U.S. interests. This resulted in foreign aid programs with no overarching strategic framework.<sup>260</sup> The problem of inter-agency competition continued until Kennedy made foreign assistance the centerpiece of his foreign policy.

Though the change occurred gradually, the creation of USAID greatly assisted the Kennedy administration’s effort to coordinate aid programs across departments. Like its predecessor, it continued the training of foreign police and security forces. In the eyes of Robert Komer, this program offered a cost-effective solution to wage COIN operations on a global scale.<sup>261</sup> Two other Kennedy advisors, NSC staffer McGeorge Bundy and

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<sup>258</sup> Robert D. Dean, “Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 49–50. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00100>.

<sup>259</sup> “Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy),” August 1, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean*, vol. VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts, Sherrill B. Wells (GPO, 1987), doc. 39, fn. 4; “OTR Requirements in Support of the 1290-d Program,” memorandum, March 21, 1956, CIA-RDP62-00634A000200050001-2, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (CIA FOIA ERR), Central Intelligence Agency, 2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp62-00634a000200050001-2>.

<sup>260</sup> Seitz, *The Evolving Role of Nation Building in US Foreign Policy*, 84.

<sup>261</sup> Jeremy Kuzmarov, “American Police Training and Political Violence: From the Philippines Conquest to the Killing Fields of Afghanistan and Iraq,” *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 2. <https://apjjf.org/Jeremy-Kuzmarov/3319/article>.

General Maxwell Taylor, told the President that USAID police programs played a crucial role in the counter-insurgency effort.<sup>262</sup>

The establishment of the NSC Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), in January 1962, saw a greater push for the training of foreign security forces in the areas of counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare.<sup>263</sup> Unlike the Eisenhower-era 1290-d/OISP, the Special Group (CI) was created with the express purpose of ensuring the smooth operation of inter-agency COIN programs.<sup>264</sup> Eight months after the policy's inception, National Security Action Memorandum No. (NSAM) 182: "Counterinsurgency Doctrine" codified the "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy" (USOIDP) into a comprehensive national counterinsurgency doctrine.<sup>265</sup> The USOIDP represented a single unified COIN doctrine and it provided a framework for U.S. departments and agencies to coordinate and implement counterinsurgency strategies in foreign countries threatened by subversive insurgencies.

On November 1, 1962, the Kennedy administration created the Office of Public Safety (OPS) within AID, following the directives of NSAM 177, "Police Assistance

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<sup>262</sup> McGeorge Bundy, memorandum for the President, February 19, 1962, folder "NSAM 114: Training for Friendly Police and Armed Forces in Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Subversion, Riot Control and Related Matters," MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 16, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-332-016>.

<sup>263</sup> Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 10; "National Security Action Memorandum No. 124," January 18, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon (GPO, 1996), doc. 68.

<sup>264</sup> "National Security Action Memorandum No. 124," January 18, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, doc. 68.

<sup>265</sup> "National Security Action Memorandum No. 182," August 24, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, doc. 105.

Programs,” which the President had approved that August.<sup>266</sup> OPS, the successor to the ICA’s 1290-d/OISP, provided a coordinated and centralized training program with “powers greater than any other technical office or division in AID.”<sup>267</sup> OPS sought to prevent both the spread of foreign communist movements in Third World nations and the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence through the training of secret police. Beyond receiving an internal security budget separate from economic development projects, OPS commanded more USAID technicians than the agency’s health and sanitation programs combined.<sup>268</sup>

The creation of OPS formed an essential part of the Kennedy administration’s COIN framework to combat the proliferation of communism in emerging nations. OPS initially targeted fifty-eight countries in-line with the COIN doctrine. In the 1963 Fiscal Year Indonesia received the second most funding for its police assistance program at \$3,165,000. Its aid program trailed only Vietnam in scale.<sup>269</sup> This money not only financed the training of Indonesian police officers within the U.S., or at U.S. bases in friendly nations, but also continued to equip these forces with modern police technology. OPS, like its predecessors, specifically targeted the elite, counter-guerrilla, 23,000-

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<sup>266</sup> Agency for International Development (AID), “Office of Public Safety (O/PS),” general notice, November 1, 1962, folder “NSAM 177: Police Assistance Programs,” MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 26–27, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-338-004>; Frank M. Coffin, memorandum for the President, December 1, 1962, folder “NSAM 177: Police Assistance Programs,” MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 11–18, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-338-004>.

<sup>267</sup> AID, “Measures to Strengthen AID’s Police Assistance Program,” n.d., folder “NSAM 177: Police Assistance Programs,” MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 28–29, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-338-004>.

<sup>268</sup> Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

<sup>269</sup> AID, “Regional Programs FY 1963 Public Safety,” n.d., folder “NSAM 177: Police Assistance Programs,” MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 22–25, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-338-004>.

member strong, MOBRIG. Previously, the Eisenhower administration utilized 1290-d/OISP training to position MOBRIG as a check on an Indonesian military that it perceived as compromised by communists; this continued under Kennedy.<sup>270</sup> U.S. Air Force Major Melville “Buck” Fruit, a 1290-d police trainer, admired the unit and reported that MOBRIG “had its own intelligence organization for the main purpose of identifying communists” and “could deal effectively with an attempted uprising or coup d’état.”<sup>271</sup> While the military received counterinsurgency training from the U.S. Army, the police received training through the 1290-d, OISP, or OPS programs.

While the exact number of Indonesian police trained through U.S. overseas police training since 1949 remains unknown, estimates have placed the number at over three hundred officers.<sup>272</sup> USAID figures offered a more conservative estimate, placing the total number of individuals trained in the U.S. and allied nations at two hundred and eighty-five.<sup>273</sup> In either case, the training of MOBRIG fulfilled the goals outlined in the 1961 report entitled “Elements of US Strategy to Deal with ‘Wars of National Liberation,’” which called for the Kennedy administration to employ both overt and covert means to obtain its foreign policy goals, in “imaginative” ways.<sup>274</sup> It accomplished both a

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<sup>270</sup> Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*, 103.

<sup>271</sup> Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*, 103.

<sup>272</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 81.

<sup>273</sup> See Appendix, Number of Indonesian Police Trained in the U.S., 145.

<sup>274</sup> Directed by Richard Bissell in his dual role as Task Force chairman and CIA Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P), the Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force produced this strategic report for the NSC. see, “Persons,” *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/persons>; “Elements of US Strategy to Deal with ‘Wars of National Liberation,’” December 6, 1961, in Walter Elders, memorandum for Special Assistant to the DDO, August 26, 1975, 19, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040002-3, CIA FOIA ERR, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040002-3.pdf>.

coordinated and centralized inter-agency police training program through OPS, but also fostered the development of “specially-trained and highly mobile counter-guerrilla units of the police and the uniformed conventional military forces.”<sup>275</sup>

While the Indonesian police received training from USAID advisors, the Department of Defense (DOD) also sought to continue strengthening its key allies within the Indonesian military, particularly the Indonesian Army. The training of the Indonesian Army served as a key COIN counterpart to the OPS program. General Maxwell Taylor, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, joined Ambassadors John Allison and Howard Jones in successfully advocating for the resumption of military aid after Project HAIK, a move that also saw the return of Indonesian officers to the U.S. for training.

Starting in the early 1950s, non-governmental organizations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations also invested heavily in Indonesia’s social scientific development through educational programs.<sup>276</sup> These organizations established Southeast Asian Studies Centers at Cornell University and the University of California–Berkeley, as well as Harvard University’s Development Advisory Service and the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. CIA official Max Millikan headed CENIS, which housed influential professors like Walt Rostow and Lucian Pye, both of whom maintained close contacts within the administration.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> “Elements of US Strategy,” December 6, 1961, CIA FOIA ERR, 32, 44.

<sup>276</sup> For a far more in-depth analysis of the role NGOs played in Indonesia see, David Ransom, “Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia,” in *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, ed. Steve Weissman (Ramparts Press, 1974), 93–116.

<sup>277</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 20–23; For an in-depth analysis of the Ford Foundation’s role in Indonesia see Inderjeet Parmar, “The Ford Foundation in Indonesia and the Asian Studies Network,” in *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*, (Columbia University Press, 2014), 124–48.

CENIS also produced influential interdisciplinary research aimed at crafting a comprehensive theory of development through its Indonesia project. It brought together economists, anthropologists, and political scientists to explain Indonesia's developmental challenges, and it speculated on why it had failed to create an entrepreneurial class. Shifting blame away from the country's colonial history, social scientists like Clifford Geertz argued that cultural factors drove underdevelopment. Their perspectives aligned with the wave of modernization thinking sweeping across the social sciences during this period. These social scientists then shaped the views of policy makers and advocated for programs focusing on technical training, agricultural modernization, and cultural transformation.<sup>278</sup> Modernization aimed to develop countries like Indonesia to a point where communism no longer appeared as an attractive alternative to joining the free world.

In addition to the scores of American social scientists working on theories of development, hundreds of Indonesian army officers attended U.S. institutions where these projects had been set in motion. Through USAID, these men attend schools such as Harvard, Syracuse, and Pittsburgh Universities, where they studied "industrial enterprise management, business administration, personnel management, and executive leadership."<sup>279</sup> Through their education at these American schools, these officers learned how to administer a state. This continued to build the army's institutional capacity and provided them with the skills necessary to take political power.

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<sup>278</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 21–23.

<sup>279</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 227; Evans, "The Influence of the United States Army," 37.

Another institution, the RAND Corporation, a U.S. Air Force-and CIA-subsidized think tank, contributed to academic research promoting CAP. It enlisted the expertise of Guy Pauker, a professor at Harvard and UC-Berkeley, to leverage his insights into Indonesia and his connections with influential military figures to steer the country toward a focus on counterinsurgency and anti-communism. This included the resumption of Indonesian officer training at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The program paused between 1955 and 1958, a period marked by massive PKI growth and U.S. support for the Permesta and PRRI rebels during Project HAIK. In 1959, the program resumed, and forty-one Indonesian officers attended. The following year that number increased to two-hundred and one, then to four-hundred and ninety-eight the year after. By 1965 the CGSC had trained nearly 2,800 Indonesian officers, primarily within American military doctrine and COIN tactics.<sup>280</sup> The CGSC had such a profound impact on returning Indonesian officers that General Suwanto, a close friend of Pauker's reshaped the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) into a center for counterinsurgency in 1958.<sup>281</sup>

By 1962, SESKOAD became a bastion of anti-communism in Indonesia. Partnerships with U.S. institutions facilitated the military's growing influence. Pauker credits the shift to General Suwanto who fully embraced the COIN doctrine espoused by every U.S. establishment. Suwanto, who worked alongside Pauker at RAND, learned to organize academic resources and incorporate them into SESKOAD training. This led to economists lecturing at SESKOAD and effectively becoming the top civilian advisors to

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<sup>280</sup> Evans, "The Influence of the United States Army," 44.

<sup>281</sup> David Ransom, "Ford Country," 101; David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," *Ramparts*, October 1970, 42; Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 32–33.

the army.<sup>282</sup> The shift to counterinsurgency and the rise of SESKOAD's prominence not only shaped the events of 1965–1966, but the shift also legitimized the military's increasing role in Indonesian public life through civil-military relations.

The production of the “Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management” at SESKOAD provided a striking example of this shift. This doctrine, created between 1958 and 1962, emphasized civil-military relations “...which would legitimize the increasingly important role that the officer corps intends to play in all sectors of Indonesian public life.”<sup>283</sup> After translating the document into English in May 1962, Pauker likely used it to argue for increased aid for the Indonesian CAP. As historian Peter Dale Scott has stated, “the most significant focus of U.S. training and aid was the Territorial Organization's increasing liaison with [civilian groups].” He noted these civil-military liaisons created the structure under which the Indonesian Genocide occurred.<sup>284</sup>

A CIA report from October 1966 highlighted the extensive impact of U.S. training programs on the Indonesian Army. The report noted that approximately 2,800 Indonesian personnel attended U.S. service schools, while only a few hundred army personnel traveled to the Soviet Union. During this period, the Indonesian military also widely circulated U.S. military manuals.<sup>285</sup> Through CAP, MAP, and OPS the militaries and

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<sup>282</sup> Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia,” 42.

<sup>283</sup> Guy J. Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, Research Memorandum RM-3312-PR (RAND Corporation, November 1963), v, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_memoranda/RM3312.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM3312.html).

<sup>284</sup> Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (1985): 249, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2758262>.

<sup>285</sup> William Morell, Jr., memorandum for Francis M. Bator, October 10, 1966, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349420579, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349420579](http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349420579).

internal security forces of Third World nations became the guardians of stability and development and bastions of anti-communism. This position was, as historian William Walker contended, “precisely what the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had intended”<sup>286</sup>

In addition to the three million dollars earmarked for the Indonesian police forces, the Indonesian military saw a significant bump in U.S. funding. From 1949–1961, military aid to Indonesia totaled \$28.3 million. In contrast, from 1962–1965, military aid skyrocketed to \$39.5 million, with \$16.3 million in 1962 alone; coinciding with the peak year of Indonesian officers attending U.S. institutions.<sup>287</sup> The State Department’s plan under NSAM 179, “U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia,” aimed to direct Indonesia away from nationalist expansion toward modernization and strengthening the army, stating, “these are the two major elements of a longrun [sic] strategy to keep Indonesia non-Communist and to begin to give that country some forward momentum.”<sup>288</sup> Kennedy sought to capitalize on his diplomatic maneuvering, placating Sukarno with development assistance while injecting substantial funding into the Indonesian Army and security forces to counter the growing power of the PKI and the President himself.

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<sup>286</sup> William O. Walker, III, “Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin America,” in Diane B. Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s*, 62, (Columbia Univ. Press, 1994); See also, Igor Oganessoff, “‘Asian Cuba’: Indonesia Builds Forces with Soviet Arms Aid, Menaces Its Neighbors,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1963.

<sup>287</sup> Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno,” 253; See also, Bundy, memorandum for Ralph A. Duncan, “Military Assistance Deliveries to Indonesia,” May 17, 1961, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349349875, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349349875](http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349349875).

<sup>288</sup> “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy,” October 10, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 291; “National Security Action Memorandum No. 179: U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia,” August 16, 1962, folder “NSAM 179: U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia,” MM, NSF, Papers of John F. Kennedy, PP, JFKL, 2, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-338-006>.

Discussions in closed-door meetings emphasized the strengthening of the army and anti-communist elements. For example, in a taped meeting on September 23, 1962, Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor discussed the Indonesian Army's role as a stabilizing force against communist elements. President Kennedy expressed interest in maintaining the officer training program after learning of General Nasution's commitment to using the Indonesian Army as a shield against communist elements. Taylor notified him "that program has never stopped. We ought to give them just as many spaces as they can use."<sup>289</sup>

Cognizant of the situation unfolding in his country, Sukarno sought to head-off a political showdown with the military. The Indonesian confrontation with the Dutch over WNG had bogged the military, in guerrilla campaigns far from the central government in Jakarta. Its resolution, however, left the army idle so Sukarno expanded his territorial ambitions to the British possessions of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, and North Borneo between 1962, and 1963 through *Konfrontasi*.<sup>290</sup>

For the U.S., *Konfrontasi* presented a challenging dilemma. Once again, U.S. policymakers had to decide between a NATO ally, the UK, and its regional interests in Indonesia. A war between Britain and her allies against Indonesia served only to strengthen the PKI's position, likely pushing Sukarno towards the Soviet and Chinese blocs and thereby undermining U.S. programs aimed at funding and training anti-communist elements in Indonesia. Supporting Sukarno, however, meant endorsing a

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<sup>289</sup> "Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip," September 25, 1962, Tape 23, POF, JFKL, in *The Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*, eds. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow (University of Virginia Press, 2014–), <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8020012>.

<sup>290</sup> Oganessoff, "'Asian Cuba': Indonesia Builds Forces with Soviet Arms Aid, Menaces Its Neighbors."; Seth King, "Indonesia Still Backs Rebels," *New York Times*, August 11, 1963.

regime in direct conflict with a NATO ally, and losing support in Congress.

Consequently, Kennedy strongly advocated for negotiation and pursued a position of neutrality in 1963, arguing he did not want to fight another guerrilla war.<sup>291</sup>

By 1963, U.S.-Indonesian relations had begun to sour again. Beyond Sukarno's burgeoning ties with the PKI, *Konfrontasi* directly undermined U.S. interests in the region.<sup>292</sup> Sukarno began threatening to nationalize the foreign controlled oil industry in Indonesia, an industry, full of U.S. oil corporations, that previously negotiated a "hands-off" agreement with Sukarno in 1957 during his first round of nationalizations.<sup>293</sup> During the breakdown in oil negotiations, NSC advisor Michael Forrestal noted to President Kennedy, "the Indonesian Government has stupidly put a gun at its own head in an attempt to bulldoze the oil companies (Stanvac and Caltex) into concessions which they...cannot make. We are most worried about the effect of a complete breakdown on Congress."<sup>294</sup> The administration feared a possible violation the Hickenlooper Amendment which would cause an uproar in Congress and curtail its CIA-infiltrated aid

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<sup>291</sup> For an overview of the dilemma the U.S. faced on the Malaysian Archipelago, see Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 205–7; For Kennedy's neutrality, Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 269; "The Text of President Kennedy's News Conference," *Wall Street Journal*, February 15, 1963; "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy," February 17, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 329; "Memorandum of Conversation," October 2, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 338.

<sup>292</sup> Charles Taylor, "Jakarta: Indonesia Talks of Confrontation," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 11, 1963, A3.

<sup>293</sup> Richard Rutter, "Politics Complicates Operations of Petroleum Companies in Asia," *New York Times*, April 5, 1963, 91; Warren Unna, "Java and Oil Firms Deadlocked on Profit Sharing," *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, May 12, 1963, A11.

<sup>294</sup> "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy," n.d., *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 306.

programs in Indonesia.<sup>295</sup> Even as a last-minute Kennedy administration deal spared the Indonesian oil industry from nationalization, resistance to the President's foreign aid policy mounted within Congress.

Conservative opponents began questioning the value of spending millions abroad on a nation like Indonesia whose leader denounced the West regularly. They argued the modernization of developing nations came at a huge cost to the American taxpayer, and they repeatedly pointed to Sukarno as a key example to justify cutting foreign aid. They viewed Sukarno as a militant nationalist who courted the PKI while disparaging the West and nationalizing private industries.<sup>296</sup> Michigan House Representative William Broomfield became one of the most outspoken opponents of U.S. aid to Indonesia, eventually sponsoring an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to cut all aid unless Kennedy issued a presidential determination deeming such assistance vital to U.S. national security.<sup>297</sup> Administration officials, however, viewed the OPS, CAP, and MAP aid as essential in maintaining a foothold within the military.<sup>298</sup> If the administration cut aid, it would eliminate the support designed to bolster Indonesia's only anti-communist entities, likely driving the nation toward the Communist Bloc for assistance.

The late summer and fall of 1963 saw a further deterioration of the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia. Not only did the Broomfield amendment pass in July,

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<sup>295</sup> Added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Hickenlooper Amendment mandated the cessation of U.S. aid to foreign governments that seized U.S. corporate assets without proper compensation. Felix Belair, Jr., "Aid to Indonesia Queried in House," *New York Times*, August 8, 1963.

<sup>296</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 95.

<sup>297</sup> "House Committee Rejects Restriction On Aid to Indonesia," *New York Times*, July 19, 1963, 3; "Showing Sukarno," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, July 28, 1963, E6; Warren Unna, "IMF Report May Decide Aid Policy on Indonesia," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, July 7, 1963, A16.

<sup>298</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 97.

but a greater blow came from Southeast Asia. In April 1963, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysian leaders came to an agreement that the future state of Malaysia would result from a U.N. finding on popular support in its future territories. By August 29, 1963, Malaysian leaders reneged on the U.N. finding and announced a Federation of Malaysia would come into existence on September 16, 1963. This development incensed Sukarno: he refused to recognize the country and denounced it as a neo-colonialist plot.<sup>299</sup>

Sukarno also became more suspicious of U.S. intentions after the discovery and release of a cache of documents from the British Embassy. In response to the creation of Federation of Malaysia, Indonesian mobs attacked and later entered the British Embassy in Jakarta between September 16 and 18, 1963. The mob allegedly came into possession of authentic British documents outlining covert plans against Indonesia and Sukarno. The British maintained that the Indonesians circulated only crude forgeries; however, British Ambassador Gilchrist failed to destroy sensitive documents until September 18.<sup>300</sup> In early November, telegrams from Ambassador Jones to the Department of State noted Prime Minister Djuanda and Sukarno both approached him, stating they had evidence of “...CIA cooperation with Brit [sic] effort to get rid of Sukarno.” Ambassador Jones categorically denied such charges, but the ransacking of the embassy and the alleged documents clearly altered Indonesia’s relationship with the West.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>299</sup> Rudolf Mrázek, *The United States & the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965, Volume II*, Dissertationes Orientales no. 39 (Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences): 84–85.

<sup>300</sup> Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965*, 212–13.

<sup>301</sup> Howard P. Jones, telegram from American Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State, November 4, 1963, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. EIFRYA753939741, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/EIFRYA753939741>; Compare this to, “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State” November 4, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, doc. 319.

In response to the attacks on September 24, 1963, the U.S. announced it halted all economic aid to Indonesia, but would continue shipments of rice, technical assistance, MAP aid, and assistance to MOBRIIG.<sup>302</sup> This aid provided the Kennedy administration with a lifeline to the only forces capable of salvaging U.S. influence in Indonesia. The lifeline, however, remained tenuous as domestic political pressure mounted. After returning from a trip to Southeast Asia in late October, Congressmen William Broomfield and Clement Zablocki, a Wisconsin Democrat, condemned Indonesian expansionism. This caused Democrat Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire to introduce a new amendment to cut off all remaining aid to Indonesia, unless given a presidential determination denoting the aid as necessary to U.S. national security.<sup>303</sup> Democratic Alaskan Senator Ernest Gruening drafted another amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 seeking to withhold U.S. aid to any country engaging in or preparing for, aggressive military action against the U.S. or any country receiving U.S. assistance.<sup>304</sup> Both amendments passed, forcing the Kennedy administration to defend further aid to Indonesia, a country many in Congress now deemed hostile to U.S. interests in the region.

November 1963 served as a watershed for the future of Indonesia. The death of First Minister Djuanda Karawidjaja robbed the nation of its most effective economic steward, a stalwart supporter of U.S. development programs, and a serious critic of the

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<sup>302</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 122.

<sup>303</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 125.

<sup>304</sup> "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Senator J. William Fulbright," November 11, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963, ed. Nina J. Noring, (GPO, 1995), doc. 357.

PKI.<sup>305</sup> Weeks later, the assassination of President Kennedy abruptly ended the era of high-level personal diplomacy and the prospect of a 1964 presidential visit. Yet, while the diplomatic relationship fractured at the executive level, the structural foundations advanced by the Kennedy administration remained intact.

Through martial and paramilitary assistance programs, the administration had systematically professionalized and crafted the Indonesian Army and police as checks against Sukarno's leftward drift and the PKI's rising influence. By the time the U.S. curtailed formal aid in late 1963, elite military academies had already trained the Indonesian military and police, all while the Kennedy administration had lavishly funded and armed them.<sup>306</sup> The manuals, training, and COIN doctrine originally provided to the officer corps permeated the rest of the army.

The military's preoccupation with British Commonwealth troops during *Konfrontasi* on the outer islands left anti-communist factions without the resources or a viable pretext for a crackdown against the nationally popular PKI. Nevertheless, the covert and overt provision of martial aid during the Kennedy years functioned as a key building block toward the 1965-1966 Indonesian genocide. Despite the initial challenges posed by a strained U.S.-Indonesia relationship, the Kennedy administration dedicated itself to containing communism in Indonesia through its support of anti-communist forces and the rapid expansion of military and paramilitary aid. Covertly funneled through developmental aid programs and aligned with the principles of modernization theory and

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<sup>305</sup> Warren Unna, "Djuanda Death Seen as Loss for Indonesia, U.S.," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, November 8, 1963, B11.

<sup>306</sup> "Probe Shows No Official U.S. Military Aid to Indonesia," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, November 21, 1963, E19.

COIN, the aid provided support to the anti-communist factions within Indonesia the administration wished to support. Even as Congress outlawed further aid to Indonesia, the Kennedy administration demonstrated a determination to continue to support the Indonesian forces they believed were critical to maintaining a communist free Indonesia. Ultimately, Kennedy laid a strong foundation for the eventual violent suppression of communism in Indonesia.

## Chapter Four

The assassination of President Kennedy and the onset of Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* marked a shift away from the "accommodationist" approach the administration had previously pursued. This policy, championed by Ambassador Howard Jones, had already faced resistance in Congress, further fueled by Sukarno's increasingly anti-Western rhetoric and his aggressive confrontation with Malaysia. Outside of the U.S., European and Asian observers shared these anxieties, alarmed by Sukarno's ambitions in WNG and Malaysia. Freshly sworn-in President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the unpopular policy and faced a difficult choice: continue providing aid to Indonesia and maintain vital ties with the Indonesian army, America's best defense against communist expansion, or cut aid and risk losing influence. Rather than choosing decisively, Johnson opted to delay. In this chapter, I argue this delay allowed him to avoid the immediate domestic political fallout while continuing to supply the Indonesian army with aid already committed. Not only did this continue the same basic policy set forth by the Truman administration, but his decision paid off in 1965 when the Indonesian army finally decided to eliminate the PKI.

The seemingly pragmatic move by the Johnson administration to delay a decision on aid set in motion a chain of events driven by the longstanding U.S. support, militarily and financially, helping position the Army as the agent of regime change. Following the events of September 30 and October 1, 1965, U.S. officials tacitly endorsed the Army's crackdown on the PKI and its supporters, providing both moral and material reinforcement for what became a genocidal campaign. By tracing the evolution of U.S. policy from Kennedy's accommodation to Johnson's low-posture interventionism, I

further argue the United States played a key role in facilitating the genocide that reshaped Indonesia's political future and fulfilled a fifteen-year-long objective to replace Sukarno with a staunchly anti-communist regime

Upon assuming office, Johnson faced a Congress firmly opposed to foreign assistance for Indonesia. As Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia heated up, Congress became more vocal in its opposition to aid. Various Congressmen across the political spectrum described Sukarno in harsh terms, calling him "one of the most corrupt men on earth," "the most irresponsible leader," a "lower-case bum," a "dictator," and even a "minor-league Hitler."<sup>307</sup> Many accused his government of harboring pro-communist sympathies and questioned the wisdom of supporting such a regime with American tax dollars. Republican Senator from Oregon, Wayne Morse, shared in the frustration of his colleagues and criticized the large sums of aid already allocated to Indonesia, characterizing it as wasteful and misdirected. He lamented that the U.S. had funneled nearly \$141 million into what he described as a political and economic "rathole," warning even more funding awaited Indonesia in the coming fiscal year despite Sukarno's erratic behavior.<sup>308</sup> The increasingly vocal opposition in Congress placed pressure on the Johnson administration to reconsider ongoing policies with Indonesia.

The passage of the Broomfield, Proxmire, and Gruening Amendments in 1963 also significantly complicated President Johnson's position. These amendments to the

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<sup>307</sup> Felix Belair, Jr., "Aid to Indonesia and U.A.R. Curbed," *New York Times*, November 8, 1963 (quoting Wayne Morse); Belair, Jr., "Aid to Indonesia," (quoting John Sherman); 109 Cong. Rec. A3927 (1963) (Edward Derwinski, "Shades of Hitler and Stalin"); Warren Unna, "Bolton Attacks State Dept. for Aid to Sukarno," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, November 12, 1963 (quoting Oliver Bolton); "Sukarno Branded 'Little Hitler,'" *Washington Post, Times Herald*, March 27, 1964 (quoting William Bloomfield).

<sup>308</sup> 109 Cong. Rec. S21346 (1963) (statement of Sen. Morse).

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 required a presidential determination to authorize continued aid, a decision Kennedy had sidestepped for months.<sup>309</sup> The domestic political climate forced Johnson to acknowledge the difficulty of supporting Indonesia; the unpopular aid program simply lacked the political capital Kennedy had previously commanded.<sup>310</sup> A sudden cut in aid, however, threatened to undermine the Indonesian army which had been the cornerstone of U.S. support in countering communist influence since the Truman administration.

Facing an untenable choice, the President refused to sign the presidential determination. In a phone call with Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, he remarked, “Now I talked to Dick Russell about that and he says that I ought to be impeached if I approve it [aid to Indonesia].”<sup>311</sup> Recognizing the risks of both courses of action, he initially sought a compromise. In a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, those present, unified in their condemnation of Sukarno, agreed that curtailing the aid program would have serious consequences. Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued, “the

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<sup>309</sup> The Broomfield Amendment banned aid to Indonesia. See, “Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development (Janow) to Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff,” August 29, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Southeast Asia, ed. Edward C. Keefer (GPO, 1994), doc. 313; The Proxmire Amendment cut off any remaining aid to Indonesia barring a presidential determination see, “Senate Bars Arms, Economic Aid To Tito, Extends Ban on Indonesia,” *Washington Post, Times Herald*, November 8, 1963, A1; The Gruening Amendment withheld foreign aid to any country engaging in or preparing for military action against the U.S. or country receiving U.S. aid see, “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Senator J. William Fulbright,” November 11, 1963, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, ed., Nina J. Noring, (GPO, 1995), doc. 357, fn. 1; See also, “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” January 6, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, ed. Edward C. Keefer, (GPO, 2000), doc. 4. While the Gruening Amendment passed the Senate under Kennedy, Johnson would sign it into law on December 16, 1963.

<sup>310</sup> For Johnson thoughts on Sukarno, see Vincent Bevins, *The Jakarta Method: Washington’s Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World* (Public Affairs, 2020), 121.

<sup>311</sup> “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara,” January 2, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia; -Singapore; Philippines, doc. 1; Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) stood as one of Johnson’s closest friends in Congress. see, Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1971), 299.

stakes are very high... more is involved in Indonesia, with its 100 million people, than is at stake in Viet Nam [sic].”<sup>312</sup> To buy time and maintain some measure of continuity, Johnson directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to approach Congressional leaders regarding continuing aid already “in the pipeline.” He also dispatched Attorney General Robert Kennedy as an emissary to Indonesia.<sup>313</sup>

Despite these efforts, the situation remained precarious. While Robert Kennedy’s meetings sought to secure an end to *Konfrontasi* and momentarily suspended Indonesian military operations in Malaysia, the underlying tensions remained unresolved.<sup>314</sup>

McGeorge Bundy and McNamara simultaneously prepared recommendations designed to ultimately end aid, further complicating Johnson’s options.<sup>315</sup> The President decided to forestall any final decision until after Robert Kennedy’s visit, a calculated delay intended to appear pragmatic while seeking a resolution. The respite proved short-lived; soon after Kennedy’s departure, Indonesian forces again moved into Malaysian territory.<sup>316</sup> Adding fuel to the fire, Sukarno publicly proclaimed, “Go to hell with your aid!” in front of a

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<sup>312</sup> “Summary Record of the 521st National Security Council Meeting,” January 7, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 8.

<sup>313</sup> “Summary Record of the 521st National Security Council Meeting,” January 7, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 8.

<sup>314</sup> The administration chose Kennedy for this role due to the inroads he made with Sukarno in 1962, particularly his success in securing the release of CIA officer Allen Pope. “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” January 23, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 25.

<sup>315</sup> “Memorandum Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” January 7, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 6; Jones, *Indonesia*, 300.

<sup>316</sup> Jones, *Indonesia*, 305.

crowd of 2,000 Indonesians, further exacerbating tensions between the U.S and Indonesia.<sup>317</sup>

Sukarno's public rejection of U.S. aid effectively silenced his remaining advocates within the U.S. government. The incident signaled a broader shift in sentiment, as the administration sidelined figures like Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, and Michael Forrestal, who had previously championed a more accommodating approach to Indonesia. Individuals like McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk, who favored a more hardline strategy against Indonesia, replaced them.<sup>318</sup> According to historian Frederick Bunnell, the policy of accommodation pursued by Kennedy at the behest of Ambassador Jones had become increasingly unpopular as Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* intensified.<sup>319</sup> Both Jones' staffers and his superiors in the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs had soured on accommodationism. This included Assistant Secretary William Bundy and Deputy Assistant Secretary Marshall Green. The opposition also extended beyond the Department of State to the analytical and covert branches of the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>320</sup> As sentiment shifted away from accommodation, Bunnell described the emerging U.S. policy towards Indonesia as one of maintaining a "low-posture." This approach involved reducing aid to Indonesia, ending efforts to appease Sukarno, prioritizing the continued relationship with the anti-communist Indonesian army, and recognizing its importance in countering communist

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<sup>317</sup> "'Go to Hell with Your Aid,' Sukarno Tells U.S.," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, March 26, 1964; See also, Jones, *Indonesia*, 321.

<sup>318</sup> Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford University Press, 2008), 129-30.

<sup>319</sup> Frederick Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy toward Indonesia in the Months Leading up to the 1965 'Coup,'" *Indonesia* 50 (October 1990): 31-2, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351229>.

<sup>320</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy," 32.

influence.<sup>321</sup> In essence, the Johnson administration reduced aid to the bare minimum to both “keep their foot in the door” and not to burn all of their bridges in Indonesia as American commitments in Southeast Asia ballooned.<sup>322</sup>

Despite a hostile Congress, the dwindling of aid, and Sukarno’s increasingly defiant stance, the Johnson administration continued to maintain as close as possible ties with Indonesia’s security apparatus. Many officials deemed this contact as essential to stem Sukarno’s leftward lurch.<sup>323</sup> Ambassador Jones elucidated the administration’s position in his memoir, noting maintaining support for these groups, “fortified them for an inevitable showdown with the PKI.”<sup>324</sup> The administration attempted to leverage its position by signaling to General Nasution that Pentagon support would expire without a formal presidential determination.<sup>325</sup> This implicit message, intended to motivate the army to pressure Sukarno to abandon *Konfrontasi*, ultimately fell short, as military leaders remained hesitant to openly challenge the president’s authority.

A convergence of crises in August 1964 severely tested the Johnson administration’s foreign policy. It began with the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which quickly escalated U.S. involvement in Vietnam. On August 10, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting President Johnson broad authority to wage war in Vietnam.

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<sup>321</sup> Bunnell, “American ‘Low Posture’ Policy,” 32.

<sup>322</sup> “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson,” August 31, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 67.

<sup>323</sup> “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia,” March 3, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 33.

<sup>324</sup> Jones, *Indonesia*, 324

<sup>325</sup> “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” May 12, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 48.

The same day, Indonesia formally established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, a clear sign of Sukarno's leftward shift. In a subsequent meeting with U.S. Ambassador Howard Jones, Sukarno expressed his disapproval of American policy in the region, stating bluntly, "I think your Asian policy is wrong."<sup>326</sup> Just days later, on August 17, Sukarno's Independence Day address marked his most provocative rhetorical escalation yet. He titled the address "The Year of Living Dangerously," directly referencing a phrase popularized by the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini.<sup>327</sup>

Sukarno's speech coincided with the joint air and sea invasion of the Malaysian Peninsula, intensifying regional tension. Anti-American sentiment reached a fever pitch in August. On the 15th, an angry mob seized the United States Information Service's (USIS) Jefferson Library in Yogyakarta, and in the following days, additional protests spread across the archipelago.<sup>328</sup> These developments signaled not only growing hostility toward the West, but also Sukarno's increasing alignment with the anti-imperialist and pro-communist bloc. The events of August 1964 also convinced U.S. officials that their window for diplomatic influence narrowed significantly.<sup>329</sup> In spite of the worsening relations, Rusk and McNamara penned a memorandum to Johnson to keep the bare minimum aid flowing to Indonesia.<sup>330</sup> To avoid a crisis similar to those in Vietnam and

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<sup>326</sup> Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 134.

<sup>327</sup> The phrase became the title of Christopher J. Koch's 1978 novel described a partly fictionalized account of the events leading up to the 1965 coup and counter-coup. Peter Weir directed a 1983 film adaptation of the novel under the same name.

<sup>328</sup> "The President's Intelligence Review," August 15–18, 1964, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (CIA FOIA ERR), doc. 0005959368, 8. [https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0005959368.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005959368.pdf).

<sup>329</sup> "Current Intelligence Memorandum," August 20, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 62.

<sup>330</sup> "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson," August 31, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore;

Laos, the memorandum proposed a strategic middle ground: reduce formal military aid while preserving influence through economic assistance, CAP, and non-military support for the Indonesian police and security forces.

Overt engagement with Sukarno became politically untenable as he continued to identify with the PKI and advance *Konfrontasi*. While very limited aid continued, Washington turned increasingly toward covert measures to turn the tide away from Sukarno's leftward drift. The events of August 1964 caused U.S. intelligence efforts to gain renewed urgency and momentum. The CIA reported that the United States could still redress the Indonesian situation, noting, that there are still "good [Indonesians] in government, the armed services and the private sector, who are willing to work for the things they believe in, even if it means endangering their livelihood and personal security."<sup>331</sup> The covert action plan developed by the CIA entailed building up the strength of the anti-communist groups within Indonesia and encouraging small scale harassment of the PKI to develop momentum for a larger anti-communist movement. The CIA augmented these activities with "black letter operations, media operations, including possibly black radio, and political action" to combat the PKI domination within the propaganda field.<sup>332</sup> This covert action plan reflected the long-standing American fears of a communist Indonesia and its clear intention to shape the political landscape in favor of the anti-communists. Over the course of 1965, these efforts had evolved into a coordinated covert strategy laying the groundwork for the post-coup regime. The CIA's

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Philippines, doc. 67.

<sup>331</sup> "Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Department of State," September 18, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 76.

<sup>332</sup> "Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee," February 23, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 110.

covert action plan offered a direct link between the overarching U.S. Cold War goals for the nation and the support provided to the anti-communist forces who eventually rose to power following the 1965 counter-coup.<sup>333</sup>

In early 1965, President Johnson gathered several key Congressional leaders in the Cabinet room of the White House at the beginning of the Congressional session.<sup>334</sup> The meeting established procedures for better collaboration between the Administration and Congress, particularly regarding foreign policy and defense matters. Johnson also emphasized the need for candid, private discussions that would not leak to the press and damage national interest. Within this context, Johnson and Rusk discussed the deteriorating situation in Indonesia. Rusk clarified U.S. assistance to Indonesia consisted solely of military training funds. He underscored the U.S. trainees will play a major role in the future political orientation of the country. Johnson furthered the point, stating, “all U.S. military assistance going to Indonesia is being provided because it is in our national interest, not theirs.”<sup>335</sup> In this closed-door session with Congressional leaders, the administration revealed the aid as a tool of covert influence intended to build up the Indonesian Army in opposition to Sukarno and the PKI. The meeting also served as a strategic response by the administration to Congressional pressure and oversight into Indonesian aid that had been the subject of intense scrutiny and resulted in several amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

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<sup>333</sup> “Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Department of State,” September 18, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 76; “Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee,” February 23, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 110.

<sup>334</sup> “Memorandum of Conversation,” January 22, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 101.

<sup>335</sup> “Memorandum of Conversation,” January 22, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 101.

Back in Indonesia, protesters and political groups again ramped up their anti-American activities. Indonesian ire focused heavily on the United States Information Services (USIS), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and their network of libraries across the archipelago. Since August of 1964, these locations have been the subject of protests, attacks, and invasions by anti-American mobs.<sup>336</sup> The mob attacks on US diplomatic establishments caused these agencies, alongside, USAID and the Peace Corps to slowly reduce the size of its missions in Indonesia.<sup>337</sup> This draw-down signaled not a retreat from Indonesia, but rather a strategic shift from overt influence operations to covert influence operations. These included clandestine support for anti-communist forces, expanded intelligence operations, and preparations to support a post-Sukarno leadership. The reduction of public-facing programs masked a deeper and more aggressive political intervention unfolding behind the scenes. What appeared outwardly as disengagement was, in fact, a recalibration of U.S. involvement aimed at quietly influencing the outcome of Indonesia's internal crises.<sup>338</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> "Memorandum From Director of the United States Information Agency Rowan to Secretary of State Rusk," February 18, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 106.

<sup>337</sup> "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia," February 20, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 108; "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)," March 2, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 112; Jones, *Indonesia*, 361; see also, Edward Masters, "The United States and Indonesia: Personal Reflections," in *Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia*, eds. Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 320.

<sup>338</sup> Although many documents concerning covert actions during this period remain classified, it is established that the CIA Station in Jakarta remained well staffed and it actively conducted black operations throughout the coup period. Black operations are covert actions designed to conceal the country in whose name they are being carried out. Because the Agency's infiltration of the Indonesian government and Army reached so deep, Washington avoided disrupting these covert operations by maintaining USIA, USIS, and USAID presence through 1965. While officials framed the continued U.S. presence as a tolerant response to Sukarno's provocations, they maintained the presence as a calculated effort to protect CIA fronts for as long as possible. These priorities clashed with USIA director Carl T. Rowan who sought to reduce his agency's footprint after Indonesian attacks on USIA libraries and institutions; other Johnson administration officials dismissed his concerns as an "overreaction." These sustained influence operations directly

With an increasingly strained relationship between Washington and Jakarta, President Johnson dispatched Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia in April 1965.<sup>339</sup> Bunker's mission required him to assess deteriorating diplomatic ties, recommend policy options to Johnson, and reassure Sukarno of the American commitment to Indonesia. The ensuing "Bunker Report" argued Indonesia needed to save itself and "U.S. policy should be directed toward creating conditions which will give the elements of potential strength the most favorable conditions for confrontation."<sup>340</sup> The report recommended sustaining discreet contact with anti-communist elements within the military and political establishment, reducing the U.S. presence in Indonesia, and advocated for a scaled-down but targeted information program to preserve a channel for U.S. influence. Ultimately, the Bunker Report served to reaffirm and formalize the Johnson administration's "low posture" policy, which prioritized minimizing overt

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facilitated the ensuing genocide, as Malik used his position and resources to support and organize anti-communist groups such as the *Pemuda Pancasila* (Pancasila Youth) and various other Muslim youth gangs who served as the primary executors in the genocide. See, "Electronic Prying Grows: C.I.A. Is Spying from 100 Miles Up," *New York Times*, April 27, 1966; "Memorandum From Director of the United States Information Agency Rowan to Secretary of State Rusk," February 18, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 106; Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Anchor Books, 2007), 299–301.

<sup>339</sup> President Johnson likely selected Ellsworth Bunker for this role because of his successful navigation of the 1961 West Irian dispute for the Kennedy administration.; Jones, *Indonesia*, 362; "Around the World: Bunker Talks to Indonesians; Sukarno Promotes Anti-Red," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, April 1, 1965; Antoine Yared, "Bunker, Sukarno Seek to Minimize Irritations," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, April 5, 1965.

<sup>340</sup> "Report From Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson," n.d., *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 121. Bunker's mission to Indonesia appeared ineffectual to many Indonesians who watched him pivot to the Dominican Crisis just two months later. This crisis saw the intervention of the U.S. under Operation Power Pack to prevent a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic. The optics of the situation, which clearly indicated the U.S. interfering with the internal affairs of another nation, only further muddied the reputation of the U.S. see, Jones, *Indonesia*, 364; Salvador E. Gomez, "The US Invasion of the Dominican Republic: 1965," *Sincronía: Revista electronica semestral de Filosofia, Letras y Humanidades* 1, no. 2 (Spring/Primavera 1997), <http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/dominican.html>; see also, "Around the World: Ambassador to Indonesia Quitting on May 24," *Washington Post, Times Herald*, May 14, 1965.

involvement while covertly supporting groups willing and able to counter the rising power of the PKI.

Bunker's mission also prioritized finding a suitable replacement for Howard Jones to reset the diplomatic relationship. Since November 1964, the Department of State had compiled a list of replacements for Jones. Henry Byroade emerged as the leading candidate among a group of potential replacements including Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., Abram Chayes, Pierre Salinger, Eugene Rostow, Gale McGee, and Wilson Wyatt.<sup>341</sup> Upon Bunker's return meeting with Johnson, he strongly advocated for Byroade, who was then serving as Ambassador to Burma.<sup>342</sup> Despite the long list of candidates Marshall Green, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs replaced Jones in May 1965.<sup>343</sup> While Jones officially retired from the Foreign Service to join the East-West Center in Honolulu, his critics within the CIA and Department of State celebrated a long-sought departure from an Ambassador they deemed too soft on Sukarno. Historian

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<sup>341</sup> "Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)," December 28, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 97; "Note From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)," November 5, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 82.

<sup>342</sup> "Report From Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson," n.d., *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 121.

<sup>343</sup> Marshall Green, *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965–1968* (Compass Press, 1990), 11. Marshall Green secured the ambassadorship to Indonesia despite the complete absence of his name from earlier candidate shortlists. Marshall Green's foreign service career frequently placed him in proximity to regime changes; before serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, he acted as Chargé d'Affaires during the 1961 South Korean coup that brought General Park Chung Hee to power. Following his tenure in Indonesia, Green served as Ambassador to Australia during the 1975 constitutional crisis that ousted Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. Whitlam sought to close the joint CIA, National Security Agency, and National Reconnaissance Office Pine Gap SIGINT facility. Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti later stated, "This threat to close Pine Gap caused apoplexy in the White House ... a kind of Chile [coup] was set in motion." See, John Pilger, "The British-American Coup that ended Australian Independence," *Guardian*, October 23, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/23/gough-whitlam-1975-coup-ended-australian-independence>. See also, Jaechun Kim, "U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 9, no. 2 (December 2002): 77–78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43107065>.

George McTurnan Kahin contended Jones had long been targeted by CIA officers for replacement because they believed him too sympathetic toward Sukarno and insufficiently vigilant against the rising threat of communism.<sup>344</sup> Similarly, Edward Masters, a State Department intelligence analyst stationed in Jakarta, later recalled widespread frustration within the embassy over Jones's unwillingness to fully accept or act on his staff's growing distrust of Sukarno.<sup>345</sup> His departure symbolized the final break from the Kennedy-era policy of accommodation and marked the consolidation of the hardliners who sought covert action and a decidedly anti-communist posture toward Indonesia.<sup>346</sup>

Immediately upon his arrival in late July 1965, Green encountered chants of "Go home Green!" echoing across Jakarta.<sup>347</sup> The change in ambassadors symbolized more than a personnel shift, it marked the end of overt careful diplomacy, characterized by Jones, to the quiet expansion of covert operations, characterized by Green. Even before Green arrived, rumors of assassination and coup plots proliferated during the first half of 1965, especially after the Johnson administration authorized black operations.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>344</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 158.

<sup>345</sup> Masters, "The United States and Indonesia," 318.

<sup>346</sup> Historian Bradley Simpson identified the hardliners consisting of the State Department's European division, the Pentagon, and the CIA's Deputy Directorate for Plans for the Far East. Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 40.

<sup>347</sup> "Life With Sukarno," *New York Times*, July 27, 1965; "1,000 In Indonesia Stone U.S. Mission," *New York Times*, July 31, 1965; Marshall Green and Robert Martens, "Nudging the Tiller: Indonesia Reverses Course," *Foreign Service Journal* 64, no. 11 (December 1987): 22.

<sup>348</sup> Sukarno became convinced of a CIA assassination plot against him in March. see, "Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)," March 13, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 116. Uncertainty remains regarding whether this assassination plot mirrors the one discussed during U.S. Military Attaché Lt. Col. George Benson's farewell meeting with Brig. Gen. Marjadi, though observers generally dismissed the latter as a fabrication. See, "Cable regarding an Alleged Imperialist Plot to Kill President Sukarno and Invade Indonesia from Malaysia," June 7, 1965, Gale *U.S.*

Although the Embassy initially reaffirmed the policy outlined in the Bunker Report, Green's late August reassessment struck a more somber tone. He concluded "there is [a] very useful role for USG to play in Indonesia," he also acknowledged success in the "short-run [was] gloomy."<sup>349</sup> Sukarno identified the U.S. as "public enemy number one in Asia," leaving the U.S. without any means of influence through normal diplomatic channels as long as he remained in power.<sup>350</sup> Sukarno's rhetoric and PKI attacks forced the U.S. mission in Indonesia to operate with a skeleton crew by late summer 1965. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta shrank from over four hundred personnel in April to only thirty-five by August as the government withdrew organizations like the Peace Corps, USIA, and USAID in response to public hostility.<sup>351</sup> Though not all agencies shrank. The CIA station maintained its full staff of twelve, including eight clandestine operatives, ensuring covert action programs remained intact.<sup>352</sup> With Green now in-country, the hardliners could jettison the accommodationist strategy of Jones in favor of covert action programs designed to produce a non-communist Indonesia.

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*Declassified Documents Online (USDDO)*, doc. no. CK2349115983.

[link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349115983](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349115983); Jones also reported back to Washington in April of a coup plot against Sukarno. See, "Editorial Note," n.d., *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 120.

<sup>349</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture,'" 51–52; "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State," August 23, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 135.

<sup>350</sup> "Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Department of State," September 18, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 76; and Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture,'" 52.

<sup>351</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture,'" 50; See also, Edward E. Masters, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 14, 1989, Transcript, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 17–18.

<sup>352</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture,'" 50.

The CIA conducted its covert action programs in Indonesia with such secrecy that even high-ranking Congress members remained unaware of the agency's activities.<sup>353</sup> In a closed-door session of Congress Clement Zablocki (D-WI), head of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Far East, and William Broomfield (R-MI), member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, both failed to understand why the Johnson administration wanted to increase military aid to Indonesia.<sup>354</sup> To them, the military aid appeared to strengthen Sukarno. Each Senator grilled William Bundy over the purpose of the aid. Bundy replied once Sukarno leaves the scene the military will likely take over and the administration wanted to "keep the door open." When Broomfield challenged the assumption that the military would favor U.S. interests, Bundy offered only a coy "we have hopes."<sup>355</sup> Bundy, the State Department's East Asian division, the NSC, the DOD, the CIA, and the White House all tracked the clandestine program to arm, fund, and train the Indonesian military and police following Sukarno's "departure." Congress and the American public, however, remained in the dark.

By 1965 the U.S. had already committed substantial resources to the Indonesian armed forces. Washington's heavy investment in arming, training, and funding the Indonesian army over the preceding fifteen years had established a significant foothold among the nation's officer corps. Consequently, the continuation or cessation of military

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<sup>353</sup> While Johnson's January 1965 meeting with lawmakers predated the formal "Gang of Eight" established in 1975 to review intelligence matters, the gathering functioned as a hollow precursor to modern oversight. It failed to keep leadership truly abreast of intelligence activities, likely because the administration sought to hide escalating covert action in Indonesia from Congressional oversight. See, "Memorandum of Conversation," January 22, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 101.

<sup>354</sup> Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "Attitude Is Cited: Sending Atomic Fuel to Indonesia Opposed," *Hall Syndicate*, in *Fort Lauderdale News*, July 15, 1965.

<sup>355</sup> Allen and Scott, "Attitude Is Cited: Sending Atomic Fuel to Indonesia Opposed," *Fort Lauderdale News*, July 15, 1965.

assistance became less critical as the foundation for U.S. influence had already been laid.<sup>356</sup> With this in place, the Johnson administration pivoted toward psychological operations (psy-ops) approved by the 303 Committee in late 1964 into 1965.<sup>357</sup> These operations leveraged existing relationships and infrastructure to begin an information warfare campaign against the PKI which only inflamed the violence later in the year.

The campaign operated so effectively that the *New York Times* eventually exposed the CIA's exploits, reporting, "It [the CIA] is said, for instance, to have been so successful at infiltrating the top of the Indonesian government and army the United States was reluctant to disrupt the CIA covering operations by withdrawing aid and information programs in 1964 and 1965."<sup>358</sup> The press presented the U.S. as merely tolerating the Sukarno/PKI provocations against the USIA, Embassy, and consulates but this was, in fact, a means of keeping CIA operations intact for as long as possible. Ralph McGehee, a former CIA officer, later supported these claims in an article he submitted to *The Nation* in 1981.<sup>359</sup> Within, McGehee argued the CIA played an essential role in the Indonesian

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<sup>356</sup> By 1965, U.S. training programs exerted an extensive impact as the Indonesian Army adopted U.S. military manuals and texts for widespread use. In fact, Indonesian Army branch schools nearly mirrored their U.S. counterparts in structure and curriculum. See, Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Military Assistance to Indonesia," September 26, 1966, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349420579, 28, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349420579](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349420579); For a more detailed assessment of the influence U.S. military training had on the Indonesian officer corps see, Evans III, Bryan. "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954–1964)," *Indonesia* no. 47 (1989): 25–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351074>.

<sup>357</sup> "Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Department of State," September 18, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 76; "Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee," February 23, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 110. The executive intelligence oversight body under Kennedy, the Special Group, was renamed by the Johnson administration to the 303 Committee.

<sup>358</sup> "Electronic Prying Grows: C.I.A. Is Spying From 100 Miles Up," *New York Times*, April 7, 1966.

<sup>359</sup> Ralph McGehee, "Foreign Policy By Forgery: The C.I.A. White Paper On El Salvador," *Nation*, April 11, 1981. 423–25. McGehee submitted his article to CIA censors prior to publication in *The Nation* who promptly censored much of the Indonesia section. The American Civil Liberties Union sued the CIA on McGehee's behalf, but lost, with the judges' ruling "the C.I.A. classification and censorship scheme protects critical national interests." See, "Censorship By The C.I.A. Challenged in Court Suit," *New York*

Genocide, a byproduct of its covert regime change program. He stated, “The Agency was extremely proud of its successful [one word deleted] and recommended it as a model for future operations [one-half sentence deleted].”<sup>360</sup> In fact, fifteen days before the G30S, Ambassador Green cabled Washington for an increased psychological warfare program in Indonesia.<sup>361</sup>

Beyond disseminating propaganda, the CIA’s efforts in Indonesia involved a more complex strategy of intelligence gathering and collaboration with local security forces. McGehee noted the Agency created a standard practice which involved building relationships with different nations’ security services and then exploiting these ties to advance U.S. interests.<sup>362</sup> Often this involved intelligence sharing activities leading to the CIA developing “Subversive Control Watch Lists.” These lists identified leftists and communists for later distribution to local governments. According to McGehee, the transfer of names often preceded the appearance of death squads.<sup>363</sup> William Colby, CIA Chief of the Far East Division (DDP), later recalled that upon becoming Chief of the Far East in 1962, the CIA lacked comprehensive lists of PKI leaders.<sup>364</sup> He criticized this as a

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*Times*, March 29, 1981, 17; Stuart Taylor, Jr., “C.I.A.’s Censorship Backed on Appeal,” *New York Times*, October 5, 1983, A1, A6.

<sup>360</sup> McGehee, “Foreign Policy By Forgery,” 423–24.

<sup>361</sup> Kim, “U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s,” 76.

<sup>362</sup> Ralph McGehee, “The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA,” *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 35 (Fall 1990): 56–58.

<sup>363</sup> McGehee, “The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA,” 57. McGehee provides the examples of Guatemala (1954), Chile (1971–1973), Bolivia (1975), Iran (1983), Thailand (1966), and Vietnam (Phoenix Program). Just prior to Augusto Pinochet’s coup of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1971, the words “*Jakarta se acerca*” (“Jakarta is coming”) appeared in graffiti in the city and in postcards sent to left-wing officials. In Brazil, in the 1970s, the civil-military junta established the secretive *Operação Jacarta* (Operation Jakarta) as a communist extermination plan. Kim, “U.S. Covert Action In Indonesia in the 1960s,” 78; Bevins, *The Jakarta Method*, 193–95.

<sup>364</sup> Kathy Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians,” *San Francisco Examiner*, May 20, 1990. William Colby later became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

“gap in the intelligence system” and without these lists CIA was “fighting blind.” Though Colby did not recall whether he sent FSO Robert Martens to Jakarta in 1963 to compile these lists, which the CIA lacked in 1962, by 1965 the U.S. possessed a more complete list of PKI membership than even the Indonesians.<sup>365</sup> Colby directly compared the Jakarta Embassy’s intelligence collection campaign to the CIA’s Phoenix Program Colby ran in Vietnam.<sup>366</sup> After the CIA and the Jakarta Embassy compiled the lists, they handed them over to Adam Malik and General Suharto; these leaders then distributed the names of PKI members to the Army, MOBRIG, and paramilitary youth gangs who carried out much of the killing.<sup>367</sup> The lists directly aided the Indonesian Army in its anti-PKI campaign though the identification of key leaders throughout the party.

The anti-PKI campaign began on the night of September 30, 1965, after years of American preparation. It culminated in a dramatic power struggle between the Indonesian Army and PKI. In the early hours of October 1, members of the 30 September Movement (G30S), allegedly linked to the PKI, abducted and murdered six Army generals. The perpetrators disposed of the bodies in a well at *Lubang Buaya*, near Halim Air Force Base in Jakarta. At 7 a.m., a radio broadcast in Jakarta announced that G30S had launched a preemptive operation to thwart an alleged coup by a “Generals’ Council” plotting to

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<sup>365</sup> Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists.”; Kathy Kadane, “The Indonesia Transcripts,” *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, no. 35 (Fall 1990): 59.

<sup>366</sup> Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists.”; McGehee, “The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA,” 57; The Phoenix Program sought to identify and neutralize Vietnamese communists through any available means, including assassination, torture, capture, and interrogation.

<sup>367</sup> Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists.”; Kadane, “The Indonesia Transcripts,” 59; “Editorial Note,” n.d., *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 185. The issue of U.S. compiled lists became a hotly contested issue in 1990 after Kadane released her article featuring interviews from many former Jakarta Embassy FSOs and CIA officers.

overthrow President Sukarno.<sup>368</sup> Throughout the day, additional broadcasts declared that G30S acted to protect Sukarno, dissolved the Cabinet, and established an Indonesian Revolutionary Council to assume authority after abolishing all military ranks above lieutenant colonel.<sup>369</sup> In response, Major General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), mobilized his forces and by 7 p.m. had reclaimed all installations seized by G30S. KOSTRAD secured firm control over Jakarta by October 2, allowing the military to hold a state funeral for the martyred generals on October 5, Indonesia's Armed Forces Day.<sup>370</sup> The events of October 1, 1965, triggered one of the twentieth century's worst mass killings, as Indonesian forces and vigilantes slaughtered hundreds of thousands of suspected communists and leftists in the following months.<sup>371</sup>

Despite the years of aiding the army and psy-war against the PKI, the coup in Indonesia took many U.S. officials by surprise, at least at first. Conversations between Johnson administration officials like Richard Helms, Dean Rusk, George Ball, and Robert McNamara demonstrated that they knew nothing of the coup plot.<sup>372</sup> Upon receiving the first news of the G30S attempted coup on October 1, the State Department recorded George Ball's suspicion that the situation in Indonesia "has a very bad smell."

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<sup>368</sup> John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement and Suharto's Coup D'État in Indonesia*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 35.

<sup>369</sup> Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 47–49.

<sup>370</sup> Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 58–60; Despite 'Reserve' in its title, KOSTRAD was the main warfighting body in the Indonesian army.

<sup>371</sup> The CIA internal history even labeled the mass killings as "one of the worst mass killings of the twentieth century," see Central Intelligence Agency, *Indonesia–1965: The Coup that Backfired*, December 1968, CIA FOIA ERR, doc. no. 00186624, 71, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/00186624>.

<sup>372</sup> Historian H.W. Brands points to their unawareness of the coup as evidence absolving the U.S. role in the overthrow of Sukarno. See, H.W. Brands, "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno," *Journal of American History*, 76, no. 3 (Dec. 1989): 787–88. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2936421>.

Ball increasingly viewed the event as a PKI operation, fearing it represented the “first step toward a Communist takeover.”<sup>373</sup> While Ball and McNamara analyzed regional contingency plans, the U.S. urged Britain and Australia to reinforce Singapore and Malaysia. By the end of October 1, however, officials in Washington recognized that the Indonesian Army held complete control and had gained the upper hand.<sup>374</sup> By way of the German ambassador in Indonesia, Marshall Green learned “[the] Indo Army is now considering [the] possibility of overthrowing Sukarno himself”.<sup>375</sup>

In late October, Norman Hannah, the Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific (CINCPAC), sought Green’s assessment of how the U.S. should respond to an Indonesian Army request for assistance against the PKI.<sup>376</sup> Green immediately cabled Washington, urging the Johnson administration to “explore [the] possibility of short-term, one-shot aid on [a] covert, non-attributable basis.”<sup>377</sup> The following week, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Sukendro, Minister for *Komando Operasi Tertinggi* (KOTI, the Indonesian

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<sup>373</sup> “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara,” October 1, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 143.

<sup>374</sup> “Memorandum for the President,” October 1, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. GIPCNH885251506, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/GIPCNH885251506](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/GIPCNH885251506); “Memorandum from Francis T. Underhill to William Bundy,” October 1, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. BORXSK868395194, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/BORXSK868395194](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/BORXSK868395194).

<sup>375</sup> Marshall Green, “Telegram 971 to Secretary of State,” October 12, 1965, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 4, Folder 7, Record Group 84, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), National Security Archive (DNSA), <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/15700-document-04-us-embassy-jakarta-telegram-971>.

<sup>376</sup> Norman Hannah to Marshall Green, letter, October 23, 1965, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 5, Record Group 84, NARA, DNSA, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/15704-document-8-letter-norman-hannah-cinpac>.

<sup>377</sup> The wording used is from the October 27 Telegram, but it references similar wording of the October 23 Telegram. See, “Telegram 1228 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” October 27, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. WSHSPF707309418, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/WSHSPF707309418](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/WSHSPF707309418); and “Telegram 1164 from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” October 23, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. SFWXRG814182131, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SFWXRG814182131](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SFWXRG814182131).

Army's Supreme Operational Command), approached the U.S. Embassy via an emissary with a formal request for aid, including, rice, communications equipment, medicines, and small arms.<sup>378</sup> In the ensuing months the Johnson administration developed detailed plans to provide covert assistance to Indonesia's military without alerting Sukarno's government, the PKI, or the Indonesian public; any of whom, if made aware of U.S. support designed to tilt the balance in the Army's favor, could have undermined the Army's legitimacy and credibility.<sup>379</sup> By February 1966, the Johnson administration had covertly delivered medical supplies and communications equipment and had also facilitated the provision of rice through a consortium of European and Asian nations.<sup>380</sup> At the same time, U.S. officials explicitly tied conditions to this assistance, seeking assurances from the Army that, once in power, it would pursue policies aligned with U.S. interests in the region and distance itself from Sukarno's anti-American rhetoric.<sup>381</sup>

Even as the Indonesian Army slaughtered the PKI and its ilk, the United States continued funneling covert aid to the military. As reporter Kathy Kadane revealed in 1997 the American Embassy and CIA Station in Jakarta provided the Indonesian Army

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<sup>378</sup> Green recommended the assistance be provided as the Army was "moving relentlessly to exterminate [the] PKI as far that is possible to do." See "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State," November 1, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 165.

<sup>379</sup> To follow the aid decision process, see the following documents in *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, docs. 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179, 180, 187, 192, 193. This tranche of documents features many reactions to the exact type of aid provided to the Indonesian Army. The Johnson administration apparently granted all Sukendro's aid requests except for small arms. Redactions in the *FRUS* volumes makes it impossible to make this point with certainty.

<sup>380</sup> "Briefing Notes for President Johnson," February 15, 1966, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 193.

<sup>381</sup> "Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State," November 19, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 177; "Memorandum from the Director of the Far East Region (Blouin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Friedman)," December 13, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 183.

with names of PKI leaders and members while facilitating the delivery of covert communication, logistical equipment, and small arms essential to the anti-PKI campaign.<sup>382</sup> Jeeps helped the Army navigate the country's difficult terrain, field radios enabled coordination in remote areas, and the United States supplied small arms for close-quarters combat and distributed them to Muslim youth gangs. The radios supplied to the Indonesian Army served a dual purpose as U.S. intelligence services also listened into the Army's transmissions and tracked its campaign against the PKI.<sup>383</sup> Gen. Sukendro confirmed that the CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, delivered all three types of covert assistance to the Indonesian Army.<sup>384</sup> Other covert aid during this crucial period included a fifty million Rupiah payment to Adam Malik, the Cabinet Minister of Political Affairs and CIA asset, for the activities of KAP-Gestapu and its anti-PKI actions.<sup>385</sup> Ambassador Green noted that KAP-Gestapu carried the burden of repressive efforts against the PKI in Central Java and characterized the payment as a symbolic endorsement

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<sup>382</sup> Robert L. Barry, Jeri Laber, and Kathy Kadane, "'Smoldering Indonesia': An Exchange," April 10, 1997, *New York Review of Books* XLIV, no. 6. <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1997/04/10/smoldering-indonesia-an-exchange/>.

<sup>383</sup> Kadane in Robert L. Barry, Jeri Laber, and Kathy Kadane, "'Smoldering Indonesia': An Exchange."

<sup>384</sup> Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy," 59; Kadane also notes that the U.S. military hastily flew radios and jeeps from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. See, Barry, Laber, and Kadane, "'Smoldering Indonesia': An Exchange."

<sup>385</sup> "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, December 2, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 179; Adam Malik became the highest-ranking Indonesian the CIA recruited. Malik formed part of the CIA organized "shadow government," alongside Suharto and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and fed the Agency information on Suharto's thoughts and proposals to remove Indonesia of communism. Fifty million rupiah roughly equates to around ten thousand USD. See, Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Anchor Books, 2007), 299–301.

KAP-Gestapu was a loose syllabic abbreviation for *Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* (Action Command to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement). Indonesian Brig. Gen. Sugandhi specifically chose to label the G30S movement "*Gestapu*" to conflate the movement with the Nazi Gestapo and paint G30S as criminal in public's imagination see, Geoffrey Robinson, "'Down to the Very Roots': The Indonesian Army's Role in the Mass Killings of 1965–66," *Journal of Genocide Research* 19, no. 4 (2017): 472. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393935>; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (1978; reprint, Equinox Publishing, 2007), 140.

of the Army's purge. The \$50 million served to strengthen Malik's influence within the anti-communist movement and ensured the Army remained capable of sustaining its campaign with minimal risk of detection of the covert American hand. While the CIA and the Embassy provided the tools for the campaign, the diplomatic record clarified that Johnson administration officials made a deliberate policy choice and celebrated its outcome.

While this material did not itself constitute direct participation in the genocide, it demonstrated U.S. officials knowingly aided a group actively carrying out a genocide. Ambassador Green delighted in Indonesia's new direction, noted that the "Army has nevertheless been working hard at destroying the PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organization in carrying out this crucial assignment."<sup>386</sup> McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson the events in Indonesia offered "a striking vindication of U.S. policy towards that nation in recent years."<sup>387</sup> Bundy explicitly credited the long-term strategy and the "low-posture" policy with this success. David Cuthell shared Bundy's sentiment, stating "our investment in [the] training of [Indonesian] Army officers under MAP, and civilians under a variety of AID programs will bear fruit."<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State," October 20, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 158.

<sup>387</sup> "Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson," October 22, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 160.

<sup>388</sup> "Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Cuthell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)," November 3, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 167.

The “fruit” of this investment, as Cuthell described it, manifested in the systemic campaign of extermination that swept across the archipelago. The extermination program began soon after the events of October 1 after Army troops arrived in Central Java and word spread to Sumatra. The U.S. and the Indonesian Army compiled lists of PKI members and handed them to armed right-wing Muslim youth groups like *Pemuda Pancasila*; the Army then transported these groups in trucks to villages to commit massacres.<sup>389</sup> Soldiers executed accused communists and their families on sight without verifying the truth of the accusations.<sup>390</sup> Reports from across Indonesia indicated that a wholesale slaughter of the PKI had begun. The U.S. Consulate in Medan reported, “Attitude [of] Pemuda Pantjasila leaders can only be described as bloodthirsty... number and frequency of reports plus attitude of youth leaders suggests that something like real reign of terror against PKI is taking place.”<sup>391</sup> The scale of the killing disrupted sanitation in parts of East Java and Northern Sumatra as bodies of the deceased began to clog rivers.<sup>392</sup> Estimates of the death toll vary wildly, with the KAP-Gestapu campaign claiming the lives of anywhere from one hundred thousand to one million Indonesians.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> Muslim youth groups carried out much of the killing. For more information on the role these played see, Loren Ryter, “Youth, Gangs, and the State of Indonesia,” PhD diss., (University of Washington, 2002).

<sup>390</sup> McGehee, “The C.I.A. and the White Paper on El Salvador,” 424.

<sup>391</sup> “Telegram From the Consulate in Medan to the Department of State,” November 16, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 174.

<sup>392</sup> McGehee, “The C.I.A. and the White Paper on El Salvador.” 424.

<sup>393</sup> The true death toll remains unknown. Estimates from early December 1965 placed the number somewhere between 100,000 to 200,000 based on Military Attaché Col. William Ethel’s conversation with an Indonesian source. See, “Telegram 1651 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” December 4, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349368515, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349368515. In a 1967 conversation with Vice President Hubert Humphrey Ambassador Green said, “most reliable estimates indicate that 300 to 400 thousand Indonesians were slain.” See, “Memorandum of Conversation,” February 17, 1967, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 229. The CIA estimated 250,000 killed. See, Central Intelligence Agency, *Indonesia–1965*, 70–71. More recently, Historian Robert Cribb examined the death toll and argued because of the chaotic nature of the events in Indonesia, the most precise estimate remains somewhere between two hundred thousand and one million.

Green made a cold calculation in a cable back to Washington writing, “far more communists have been killed in Indonesia over [the] past two months” than over the course of the American effort in Vietnam.<sup>394</sup> Whatever the number, rather than halt aid in light of escalating reports of atrocities, U.S. officials chose to continue, and in some cases expand assistance, motivated by the strategic imperative of securing Indonesia as a non-communist ally in Southeast Asia.<sup>395</sup> In doing so, American policymakers made a decision: to prioritize Cold War objectives over humanitarian concerns, even if it meant aiding a military force engaged in a genocide.

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See, Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966,” *Asian Survey*, 42, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 550–63. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.4.550>.

<sup>394</sup> “Telegram 1651 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State,” December 4, 1965, Gale *USDDO*, doc. no. CK2349368515, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349368515](http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349368515).

<sup>395</sup> Kathy Kadane, “U.S. Officials’ Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in ‘60s,” *Washington Post*, May 21, 1990, A5; Carmel Budiardjo, “Letters to the Editor: President Suharto’s Rise to Power,” *Washington Post*, June 13, 1990, A22.

## Conclusion

As illustrated throughout this thesis, U.S. complicity in the Indonesian genocide extended far beyond the few months of covert support between 1965 and 1966. The 1965 violence punctuated a long-standing campaign that originated in the aftermath of the 1948 Madiun Affair. Successive U.S. administrations provided training, funding, and equipment to Indonesia's military and security forces. This aid consistently aimed to strengthen anti-communist factions in Indonesian society, particularly the armed forces. From the suppression of the 1948 Madiun rebellion to the final purges of the PKI, the United States encouraged and enabled the Indonesian Army to serve as a bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia. Whether U.S. policymakers foresaw the scale of the eventual bloodshed, they consistently supported the military's efforts to seize power and eliminate its political rivals. This long-term support made the United States complicit in the genocide that occurred. The genocide that took place eliminated the PKI as a political threat in Indonesia and fulfilled the long running policy goal of the United States since the Truman administration for a "non-communist Indonesia."<sup>396</sup>

Having achieved its strategic goal of destroying the PKI and the sidelining of Sukarno, the U.S. now turned to rebuilding formal ties with the new regime. The transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto marked a pivotal shift in U.S. policy toward Indonesia. Although Sukarno remained president in name, real authority had passed to Suharto and the military, which was actively suppressed the communist threat the U.S. had long sought to eliminate. In the wake of the mass killings, U.S. officials recognized

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<sup>396</sup> "Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," March 29, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, *The Far East and Australasia*, vol. VII, pt. 2, ed. John G. Reid and John P. Glennon, (GPO, 1976), doc. 317.

an opportunity to rebuild relations. A strategic review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) noted that Indonesia's new leadership maintained a vested interest in preventing any PKI resurgence following the recent anti-communist violence.<sup>397</sup> With the situation stabilizing by early 1966, U.S. aid resumed. In April, the Johnson administration approved the sale of 50,000 tons of P.L. 480 Title IV rice to the Indonesian government. This seemingly modest agreement marked a broader policy shift, however. As one internal memo stated, U.S. officials viewed Indonesia as "on the road back to cooperative relations" with Washington, particularly as Sukarno's influence waned.<sup>398</sup>

Indonesia quickly became a Cold War success story in the eyes of American officials, especially when compared to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. During an August 1967 NSC meeting, after much of the killing in Indonesia had subsided, President Johnson noted that he hoped Indonesia would become a "showcase," a model of pro-Western alignment in Southeast Asia. "It is one of the few places in the world," he added, "that has moved in our direction."<sup>399</sup> No longer considered a pariah or an assertive leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia had become a compliant partner, an outcome the U.S. had quietly worked toward for nearly two decades.

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<sup>397</sup> "Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," n.d., *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. X, National Security Policy, ed. David S. Patterson, (GPO, 2001), doc. 188.

<sup>398</sup> "Memorandum From Donald W. Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)," April 18, 1966, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 206; P.L. 480 refers to Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454.

<sup>399</sup> "Memorandum for the Record," August 9, 1967, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, doc. 244.

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## Appendix

### Number of Indonesian Police Trained in the U.S.\*

Year	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
No. Trained	33	16	37	66	46	27	0	0	0	10

### Number of Indonesian Police Trained in Third Country\*

Year	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
No. Trained	N/D	15	18	12	15	N/D	0	0	0	0

### Number of U.S. Police Advisors Sent to Indonesia\*

Year	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Trainers	N/D	N/D	14	12	12	0	0	0	0	0

\* Numbers As of June 30 of every year (End of U.S. FY)

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