A Gendered Approach to Exploring the Social Connections of Misogynist Terrorists

by

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Abstract

Academics and security forces alike have highlighted a recent increase in acts of mass violence based in misogyny. In response, the current thesis aimed to understand how misogynist terrorists were sharing and receiving misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication leading up to their attack. In doing so, these acts were conceptualized as misogynist terrorism. This study involved the use of social network analysis to map the full, misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication networks of three misogynist terrorists: George Sodini, Elliot Rodger, and Scott Beierle. Overall, this exploration highlighted seven primary conclusions regarding how misogynist terrorists communicated their ideologies. From these conclusions, three preliminary intervention recommendations were established. The results of this thesis highlight the importance paying specific attention to the ideological underpinnings of misogyny and provides numerous suggestions for future research.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to:

David Wang	Elizabeth Gannon
Christopher Michaels-Martinez	Heidi Overmier
George Chen	Jody Billingsley
James Hong	Maura Binkley
Katherine Cooper	Nancy Van Vessem
Veronika Weiss	

And all other victims of misogynist terrorism and gender-based violence.

I would also like to dedicate this work to my Uncle Ken, who passed away unexpectedly shortly before I was able to defend my thesis. He had always taken a genuine interest in my studies - wanting to read my assignments (even the long ones), ask questions, and engage in discussions about all types of topics. I miss him and I wish that he was still here to read and discuss this work.

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1.0 Introduction

This thesis provides an empirical, gender-centered analysis of incidents of mass violence in North America. More specifically, the focus of this thesis is on a particular subset of mass murders – those where overt misogyny is the primary ideology motivating the attack. In doing so, this thesis conceptualizes these types of attacks as acts of misogynist terrorism and argues for the importance of employing this term over others, such as lone wolf terrorism or mass murder. The main goals of this thesis research was to understand how the perpetrators of this type of violence share and receive misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication leading up to their first attack.

To accomplish these goals, this thesis uses a mixed methodological approach to explore three cases of misogynist terrorists, George Sodini, Elliot Rodger, and Scott Beierle. Social network analysis methods were used to map full, misogynistic, and violent misogynistic communication networks for each misogynist terrorist. In order to contextualize the social network analysis, case studies were conducted on each misogynist terrorist. Data for each case was collected from primary sources including manifestos, social media postings, and suicide letters and was further supplemented with secondary sources such as news media, academic research, and investigative reports.

While some previous research has been done using social network analysis to map online Incel and manosphere communities (see Papadamou et al., 2020; see also the following Master's theses Fitzgerald, 2020; Zdjelar, 2020) and to map the networks of lone actor terrorists motivated by other ideologies (See Bright et al., 2020; Hofmann, 2018), this thesis is novel, in that it is the first study to employ social network analysis techniques to map the communication patterns of misogynist terrorists leading up to their

attack. As such, it provides preliminary insight into the influence of social connections on the ideological development of misogynist terrorists leading up to their attacks. In turn, this thesis is a starting point to inform the development of effective policies and procedures for government, law enforcement, and security officials. Further, this thesis highlights the importance of studying this type of violence and provides suggestions to help guide future research.

This thesis will begin with a review of relevant literature, including discussions on the definition of misogyny; the link between misogyny, violence, and violent extremism; the online landscape of misogyny; and the role that hegemonic masculinity and male entitlement play in violent extremism and terrorism. This is followed by a description of the theoretical framework which conceptualizes misogynist terrorism as a specific type of gender-based terrorism. Next a detailed methodological outline is provided, including a brief discussion of ethical considerations, followed by a presentation of the results and subsequently a discussion of these results in context of the research questions. This thesis will then finish with a consideration of the limitations involved in the research process and a brief conclusion, which includes a summary of recommended directions for future research.

2.0 Literature review

2.1 Misogyny

At its most basic, the definition of misogyny is the hatred of women (Gilmore, 2001, p. 2). In reality, however, misogyny is significantly more complex, “with many nuances, cognates, and variations” (Gilmore, 2001, p. 9). According to (Holland, 2007),

who conducted an historical analysis of misogyny, "what history teaches us about misogyny can be summed up in four words: pervasive, persistent, pernicious, and protean" (p. 270). Misogyny permeates our society so deeply that many of its manifestations have become normalized (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016, p. 171). It manifests both in overt forms, as well as more subtly throughout society (Smith, 1989). For example, misogyny can be enacted by a man overtly stating that they loathe women and all that they represent, but can also be enacted more subtly through the lyrics of many rap songs (Holland, 2007, p. 270). In another example, Anderson (2015) suggests that modern misogyny is expressed when women that do not conform to traditional gender roles are viewed more negatively than those who subscribe to traditional feminine roles (p. 107). Holland, (2007) also touches on the dualistic nature of misogyny in society, arguing that it is present both at the societal level through social and political discrimination, but that it also emerges in the "hate-filled fantasies of individual men who kill" (p. 271).

It is worth noting that the diversity of misogyny has led to difficulty delineating the scope of misogyny and in many cases, sexism and misogyny have become conflated with one another (Richardson-Self, 2018, p. 260). More recently however, academics have begun to denote the importance of differentiating between misogyny and sexism. In her 2017 book, Kate Manne attempts to reform the theoretical concept of misogyny by going beyond misogyny as a psychological property of individuals (p. 32). In doing so, she views misogyny and sexism as related, but distinct mechanisms that both functions uphold and perpetuate the patriarchy (p. 79). She differentiates between the two by stating that sexism "will tend to discriminate between men and women," where in

comparison “misogyny will typically differentiate between good women and bad ones, and punishes the latter” (Manne, 2017, pp. 79–80). In other words, she views sexism as the societal conditions that allow for discrimination and misogyny to exist and views misogyny as the tool used to police women who go against patriarchal norms.

Interestingly, Pamungkas and colleagues’ (2020) study, which detected misogynistic language on Twitter, was found to empirically demonstrate Manne’s conceptualization of misogyny. Their findings suggested that it was “the individual woman that, violating the patriarchal norms and expectations, triggers the misogynistic verbal attack online” (p. 7). Further, Richardson-Self (2018) builds upon Manne’s work by distinguishing between sexist speech and misogynistic speech, arguing that the latter should be conceptualized as a form of hate speech (p. 267). Ukockis (2019) also acknowledges the overlap between normalized sexism and misogyny, but argues for a distinct differentiation between the two (p. 2).

The definition of misogyny utilized in this thesis to conceptualize misogynist terrorism will be similar to that of Ukockis (2019). She views misogyny as a much stronger word than sexism, which should be reserved for distinct acts of hatred and contempt towards women (pp. 2-3). This definition was selected because it conceptualizes misogyny in a way that will be analytically useful when utilized to define misogynist terrorism. If misogyny is considered to be anything from subtle sexism to an overtly stated hatred of women, an argument could be made for almost anything to be included under the umbrella of misogynist terrorism. This is not to say that addressing sexism in society is not important, but rather, if the concept of misogynist terrorism is extended too far, it is both analytically useless and less easily utilizable by law

enforcement and security officials. However, it should be noted that during the data collection process, a wider conceptualization of misogyny was used in order to understand the full range of misogynistic communication that misogynist terrorists were engaging in. It was determined that expanding the definition of misogyny at this point would allow for more interesting, meaningful, and useful results, as it would allow for the impact of not only overt and violent misogyny, but also for the more societally embedded ways that misogyny was used by these individuals to be captured. A full coding guide for this thesis can be found in Section 4.4.3.

2.2 Misogyny, violence, and extremism

According to a policy brief by Zimmerman et al., (2018) there is "an undeniable link between misogyny and violence" (p. 2). Of particular interest to the current proposal are the findings that misogyny and/or a history of domestic violence or sexual assault have been found to be key precursors to mass violence (Chang, 2018, p. 514; Diaz & Valjii, 2019; M. Hamm & Spaaj, 2015; Marganski, 2019, p. 5). Based on their research, Diaz & Valjii, (2019) suggest that it is possible to "find examples of expressed misogyny or domestic violence in the personal histories of nearly all the perpetrators of the worst terrorist incidents and mass killings in Western countries in recent years" (p. 44). For example, Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people during the Pulse nightclub shootings in Orlando, had a history of beating and controlling his ex-wife (Moore, 2016). In his analysis of school shootings Klein, (2005) found that in eight of the twelve cases studied the perpetrator targeted girls because of either rejection, perceived rejection, or jealousy (pp. 93-95). Additionally, almost two thirds of the 62 mass murderers studied by Silver and colleagues (2018) had a history of abuse, harassment, or stalking (p. 12). While there

is less research on this phenomenon in Canada, real world events point to a similar trend in the Canadian landscape. For example, the perpetrator of the mass shootings in Nova Scotia in 2020 which killed 22 people, began his attack by handcuffing and assaulting his girlfriend (Battis et al., 2020).

Misogyny has also been highlighted as a "gateway, driver, and early warning sign" of violent extremism and terrorism (Diaz & Valjii, 2019, p. 38). As stated by Antonio Guterras, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General at the 2019 UN General Assembly Address, "there is a troubling commonality in terrorist attacks, ideologies, and brutal crimes: the violent misogyny of the perpetrators". Internationally, Johnston and True (2019) found that misogyny was an integral factor to the ideology, identity, and economy of extremist groups in four countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Libya). They also found that in these countries hostile sexism and support for violence against women predicted support for violent extremism more accurately than factors such as age, religion, employment, or level of education (p. 4). Misogyny has also been identified as a dangerous precursor to diverse types of violent extremism, including far-right, far-left, and Islamic extremism (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 5). Many perpetrators who are classified as lone wolf terrorists also have a history of violence against or hostility towards women (McCulloch et al., 2019, p. 439). The restrictive gender roles that are promoted by many terrorist groups have also been found to help these groups recruit individuals who hold similar pre-existing attitudes towards women (Zimmerman et al., 2018, p. 3).

2.3 Misogyny online

According to Ging and Siapera (2018), misogyny is "intensified and amplified in online environments" (p. 518). They further argue that:

> *"digital technologies do not merely facilitate or aggregate existing forms of misogyny, but also create new ones that are inextricably connected with the technological affordances of new media, the algorithmic politics of certain platforms, the workplace cultures that produce these technologies, and the individuals and communities that use them"* (Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 516).

Many others have also highlighted high levels of gendered harassment and hate online, referring to it through various labels, including gendered cyberhate (Jane, 2017a, 2017b); cyber-violence against women (West, 2014); cybersexism (Poland, 2016); online harassment (Hackworth, 2018; Madden et al., 2018; Rubin et al., 2020; Vitak et al., 2017); networked harassment (Marwick & Caplan, 2018), networked misogyny (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016; Bratich & Banet-weiser, 2019); online violence against women (Amnesty International, 2017a; Barker & Jurasz, 2019; Jurasz & Barker, 2017); and online misogyny (Barker & Jurasz, 2019; Easter, 2018; Esposito & Zollo, 2021; Ging & Siapera, 2018; Jane, 2014, 2016b; Koulouris, 2018; Moloney & Love, 2018). Others still have studied this type of online misogyny within the bounds of a hate crimes/hate speech (Barker & Jurasz, 2018; Fuchs & Schäfer, 2019; Saha et al., 2018) or cyberbullying (Sylwander, 2019). The range of misogynistic hate that occurs online is broad, manifesting in numerous ways, including (but certainly not limited to) sexist and misogynistic comments and harassment, misogynistic usernames, memes and images featuring misogynistic or sexually explicit content, doxing, stalking, rape pornography, sexual harassment – including revenge porn and threats of rape or sexual assault – and threats of violence (Amnesty International, 2017a; Jane, 2017a, p. 46; Jurasz & Barker, 2017, p. 3; Moloney & Love, 2018, p. 3; Poland, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, misogyny

online has been identified as a tool of violence and control in situations of domestic and intimate partner violence (Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 520). Its targets are diverse, including high-profile women (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 95), feminists and those perceived to be feminists (Jaki et al., 2019, p. 242; Jane, 2014, p. 560), female gamers (Braithwaite, 2014; Musgrave, 2016, p. 129), women in sports (Kavanagh et al., 2019; McCarthy, 2021); allies to women's movements/feminism (Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 518), and more broadly women and girls regardless of age or background (Amnesty International, 2017a; Kavanagh et al., 2019, p. 553).

In particular many academics have highlighted that feminists, feminist discourse, and women in other highly visible positions (i.e. celebrities or politicians) are highly targeted online (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, pp. 95 & 97; Esposito & Zollo, 2021, p. 2; Fuchs & Schäfer, 2019, p. 3; Jane, 2014, p. 560; West, 2014, p. 13). Women who speak out and/or share opinions, are often faced with hostility, in some cases extending so far as to threats of sexual assault, rape, and other forms of violence (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 95). This is in line with Manne's conceptualization of misogyny being used to police and control women who do not conform to patriarchal norms and values. Additionally, this has been found to have the effect of silencing or censoring women (Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 516; Jurasz & Barker, 2017, p. 3; McCarthy, 2021, p. 4). For example, while one study based in Norway found that more men experienced online harassment than women, the women who were targeted reacted more strongly to aggressive messages and were more likely to be cautious posting online in the future (Nadim & Fladmoe, 2021, p. 256).[1]

[1] Interestingly, while Nadim and Fladmoe's (2021) study found that men were more likely to be targeted based on the opinions they shared, women were more likely to be targeted based on group-based characteristics (i.e. based on their gender, because they were women) (p. 255).

Additionally, a survey from Amnesty International and Ipsos MORI (2017a) on women in the United Kingdom found that almost a quarter of women who experienced online abuse or harassment "stopped posting their opinions on certain issues" (p. 3) . This is a particularly concerning phenomenon, as stated by Leanne Patrick (2021), founder of the Royal College of Nursing Feminist Network "misogyny thrives when women are silenced" (p. 11). Thus, this leads to a type of feedback loop where misogyny and threats leads to women being silenced online, in turn less women's voices are able to be accessed. This further disables women's voices in online spaces, which in turn creates an online environment which continues to enable misogyny.

Misogyny is also rampant in online social media sites and chatrooms, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and many discussion forums (Bartlett et al., 2014; Boyle & Rathnayake, 2020; Döring & Mohseni, 2019; Mantilla, 2013; Rego, 2018; Wotanis & McMillan, 2014). Misogyny on these sites is often directed at women in positions of power (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 97), but is also frequently directed at the 'average' internet user, or is put on the internet with no specific target at all. For example, one study by Meyer and Cukier (2006) put a number of bots (fake accounts) into online chatrooms and found that those with female names received significantly more malicious messages than those with male names or ambiguous names (p. 4).[2] In another example, Amnesty International's (2017a) study of women in the United Kingdom found that roughly 20% women experienced some form of harassment or misogyny on social media

[2] The female-named bots received on average 100 malicious messages per day, while those with male names received on average 3.7 per day and those with ambiguous names received on average 24.9 per day (Meyer & Cukier, 2006, p. 4).

sites,[3] and that this number increased (37%) when only looking at women aged 18 to 24 (p. 4).This finding held relatively constant when the study was extended to include seven other countries.[4] Twenty-three percent of women in all eight countries were found to have experienced some form of harassment online, ranging from 16% in Italy to 33% in the United States (Amnesty International, 2017b, p. 1).

The use of misogyny in online spaces is often conceptualized as an expression of power and control (Poland, 2016, p. 3). It is seen as a continuation of misogyny offline, but brought into a new domain (Nadim & Fladmoe, 2021, p. 246). For example, a report by Amnesty International (2017a) argued that "deep rooted patriarchy and negative gender stereotypes influence the way some individuals communicate online" (p. 2) Additionally, according to Poland (2016), "cybersexism often has a goal of creating, enforcing, and normalizing male dominance in online space" (p. 3). When women attempt to move into traditionally male dominated areas online (such as video games) or express opinions that threaten male dominance or the patriarchal order, they are met with threats and hatred (Mantilla, 2013, p. 568; Moloney & Love, 2018, p. 4). This is again, in line with Manne's conceptualization of misogyny, where women are punished for going against the patriarchal order.

While the roots of misogynistic communication online may be similar to that offline, this new domain offers challenges that are not seen in the offline world. For one, sites enable nearly instantaneous communication of misogynistic ideas to with a wide audience, including across national and global borders (Nadim & Fladmoe, 2021, p. 246).

[3] The social media sites mentioned in their study were Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat.
[4] In addition to the United Kingdom, the other seven countries were: United States, New Zealand, Spain, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark.

Furthermore, the ability for misogynistic content to be left up online (i.e. in the form of comments, posts, pictures, or videos, for example), enables different social media sites to act as echo chambers (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 98). According to Salojärvi (2020):

> *"By filtering and gravitating toward like-minded people online, we are insulating ourselves from differing opinions. This alone is not necessarily dangerous, but in some cases, it leads to extremism. If individuals are only exposed to arguments from like-minded people, it easily leads to individuals adopting more and more extreme positions"* (p. 198).

This becomes especially true as women's voices continue to get pushed out of these online spaces, and replaced with males who "shout the loudest" (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 98). Another problem in online spaces is the anonymity (or at least perceived anonymity) of online spaces, which offers a sense of security and impunity to users (Moloney & Love, 2018, p. 6; West, 2014, p. 2). This has been found to embolden individuals online, enabling them to participate in more frequent and more intense misogynistic discourse (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016, p. 171; Döring & Mohseni, 2019, p. 512; R. Lewis et al., 2017, p. 1464; Musgrave, 2016, p. 141; Vitak et al., 2017, p. 1240).

Most concerningly, misogyny online is often ignored or trivialized (Barker & Jurasz, 2019, p. 104). It is often viewed as not being as serious as misogyny and violence against women in the real world, despite the boundaries between the online and offline worlds becoming increasingly blurred (Jurasz & Barker, 2017, p. 4). In fact, numerous studies have highlighted that the abuse and harassment that women face online manifests in various very real ways offline, including lower self-esteem, anxiety, loss of sleep, fear (Amnesty International, 2017a, p. 7; Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 520; Jane, 2017a, p. 48). In more severe cases it can also cause financial loss or can lead (and has led) women to

change jobs, addresses, and even their name (Jane, 2017a, p. 48). Furthermore, misogyny and threats of violence online can later become acts of physical violence (Jane, 2017a, p. 48; Jurasz & Barker, 2017, p. 4). Overall, this underscores the need to continue to push for a better understanding of misogyny online, as well as for better policies and procedures to help combat this pervasive type of hate.

2.3.1 The Manosphere and the Incel movement

Male interest and anti-feminist sites and the misogynistic discourse that occurs within them are of particular interest to the current thesis. Broadly, the manosphere is subsection of the internet that involves multiple men's rights and interest groups (See Diaz & Valjii, 2019, p. 42; Ging, 2019, p. 653; Ging & Siapera, 2018, p. 516; Glace et al., 2021, p. 1; Jaki et al., 2019, p. 243; Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 147; Moonshot CVE, 2019, p. 15; Morton et al., 2021, p. 2; O'Malley et al., 2020, p. 19; Ong, 2020, p. 4; Preston et al., 2021, p. 3; Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 1; Williams & Arntfield, 2020, p. 3; Zimmerman et al., 2018, p. 3). They inhabit "a myriad of interconnected organizations, blogs, forums, communities, and subcultures" online (Ging, 2019, p. 639). A central idea in the manosphere is the concept of the red-pill, which harkens to the movie 'The Matrix' (Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 147; O'Malley et al., 2020, p. 7; Parent, 2020, p. 8). A uniting theme among members of the manosphere is that they believe they have 'taken the red pill' and become awakened to the ugly reality that "men have been subjugated to feminist programming" and that they must revolt against this injustice (Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 147).

The exact philosophy and agenda of the manosphere varies by groups, which have formed around different 'men's rights' and anti-feminist issues (Brzuszkiewicz, 2020, p.

2; Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 147). There is some variation in the literature as to exactly which groups are a part of the manosphere, though the most commonly highlighted groups are the following:[5]

Men's Rights Activists (MRAs): MRAs center themselves on social and institutional issues that they believe discriminate against men, such as circumcision, domestic violence laws that protect women, and family law issues such as child custody and child support (Gotell & Dutton, 2016, p. 71; Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2). They are distinctly anti-feminist, believing that it is an outright lie that women and girls face structural inequality, instead purporting narratives of male victimization (Gotell & Dutton, 2016, p. 72; Marwick & Caplan, 2018, p. 554). Sites established and frequented by MRAs have been found to feature highly misogynistic and often violent rhetoric (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 167; Marganski, 2019, p. 7). Additionally, a relatively recent paper from the University of Alberta suggests that MRA activism has by and large shifted its focus from familial issues to sexual ones (Gotell & Dutton, 2016, p. 65). Based on their cyber-ethnographic and discourse analyses of three MRA websites, Gotell and Dutton (2016) found that MRAs are becoming increasingly preoccupied with protecting men from what they believe is "a climate where false [rape] allegations are rampant" (p. 72).

Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW): Individuals who are members of MGTOW forums and sites believe that society is rigged against males (Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2). According to Lin (2017), who conducted one of the only academic studies

[5] Some academics also consider Traditional Christian Conservatives (Tradcons) as a part of the manosphere (Lin, 2017; Tomkinson et al., 2020). Tradcons "hold conservative views about marriage and family life" (Tomkinson et al., 2020, p. 154).

focused specifically on MGTOW, individuals in these groups believe they are victims of gynocentrism and:

> *"Unlike other antifeminist groups, MGTOW espouse the abandonment of women and a Western society that has been corrupted by feminism. The existing system, to them, is impossible to amend, so MGTOWs are 'going their own way'"* (p. 78).

Members of this movement believe they are capable of getting women (i.e. see themselves as attractive and desirable enough), but choose not to, in order to avoid what they consider negative consequences, such as false rape accusations or family court bias (Lin, 2017, p. 86; Preston et al., 2021, p. 3). Based on her research, Lin (2017) suggests that there were between 20,000 to 30,000 members of MGTOW sites at the time of its publication in 2017 and that many of these members demonstrate "pent up emotion, cynicism, and resentment towards women" (p. 84). For example, one member of a MGTOW site stated "The women they encounter demand attention, loyalty, resources, and undue privilege, while offering very little in return", while another stated that "The young man has finally learned that men and women share the same inherent character flaws, but not the same consequences. He has sinned, and he has paid dearly. She has sinned, and she has been exalted" (Roose, 2020, p. 91).

Pick-Up Artists (PUA): Pick-up Artist sites and forums are online spaces where men learn manipulative seduction techniques in attempt to have sex with large numbers of women (Jane, 2018, p. 666). Their beliefs and techniques are underlined by the misogynistic notions that women should always be sexually available for men (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 13). Thus, many of the seduction techniques taught by high figure members of these movements involve treating women as inferior. For example, negging is a technique that is often taught, which involves subtly insulting women and

treating them with little respect in order to destabilize their confidence and keep them interested (Bratich & Banet-weiser, 2019, p. 5020; Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2; Roose, 2020, p. 93). Other PUA techniques include gaslighting and drugging women (Bratich & Banet-weiser, 2019, p. 5018). Additionally, a prominent member of the PUA community has argued for the legalization of rape, if it is done on private property (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 3; Jane, 2018, p. 666)

Incels: The Involuntary Celibate (Incel) Movement is a particularly troubling section of the manosphere. Broadly, Incels are a loosely organized 'group'[6] of males who believe that they deserve sex, but are unable to have it. They blame their lack of sexual success on the rise in feminism, as it has allowed women to choose their sexual partners (Jones et al., 2020; Tomkinson et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2018). They believe that this has made it impossible for some men (Incels) to enter into sexual relationships, because they are situated too low in the natural hierarchy[7] and are not desirable to women (Parent, 2020, p. 9). This perceived rejection leads many Incels to feel anger, and in response many advocate online for rape and other forms of violence against women (Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2). It is important to note that not all members of Incel sites discuss violence, display violent tendencies, or go on to commit violence (Morton et al., 2021, p. 27). However, to date, attacks by individuals associated with the Incel movement have claimed the lives of at least 50 people and both academics and security forces have highlighted Incels as a significant and growing threat to national security which requires

[6] Incels are not a specific group in that they do not have a clear structure or specific membership. Rather they are an undefined and loosely organized group of people that use social media and internet forums to communicate and spread their ideology (Van der Veer, 2020, p.1)

[7] Incels believe in a hierarchy based on physical traits, with alpha males (considered to be the most attractive) at the top, beta males in the middle, and Incels at the bottom.

further attention and research (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 565; Tomkinson et al., 2020, p. 164).

As described above, groups of the manosphere operate from different perspectives in regard to their views on women and relationships. However, what remains constant throughout their narratives is a male-centric view, which vilifies women and positions them inherently inferior to men (Baele et al., 2019, p. 6; Ging, 2019, p. 649; Jane, 2018, p. 667). It is important to note that these groups operate almost entirely online, where they coalesce and dissolve around issues that matter to them (Ging, 2019, p. 653). Recent research by Ribeiro and colleagues (2020) have found that individuals online are tending to gravitate towards MGTOW and Incel sites (and less so to MRA and PUA sites) (p. 2) . This is relatively concerning, as these groups are generally considered to be the more extreme corners of the manosphere (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 567; Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2).

Another important consideration with these sites is that they act as echo chambers for misogynistic rhetoric (Casey, 2019, p. 97; Ging, 2019, p. 653; Salojärvi et al., 2020, p. 205). While it is difficult to accurately determine the gender (and other personal characteristics) of users on these sites, they are generally understood to hold a predominately heterosexual male userbase, thus creating a highly homogenous space (Preston et al., 2021, p. 2). In fact, these spaces have been found to actively exclude women (often in sites/group rules) and to display aggression towards other users with dissenting opinions (Jaki et al., 2019, p. 259; Salojärvi et al., 2020, p. 204). The misogynistic vitriol on these sites is thus able to spread relatively unchecked, contributing to increasingly extreme misogynistic and violent misogynistic views.

2.4 The role of hegemonic masculinity and male entitlement in violent extremism and terrorism

Authors examining mass murder, violent extremism, and terrorism from a gendered perspective argue that the current expectations of hegemonic masculinity in society create a sense of entitlement among males, which is conducive to violence (See Kalish & Kimmel, 2010; Kennedy-Kollar & Charles, 2013; Madfis, 2014; Marganski, 2019). Hegemonic masculinity is the current idealized standard of masculinity in society, which sets the standard for normative male behavior (Anderson, 2008, p. 604; Kennedy-Kollar & Charles, 2013, p. 65; Messerschmidt, 2004, p. 42). It is the type of masculinity performed by the dominant group, characterized by attributes such as domination, aggressiveness, athletic prowess, and stoicism (Cheng, 2008, p. 297). In other words, "the hegemonic definition of manhood is a man *in* power, a man *with* power, and a man *of* power" (Kimmel, 1994, pp. 24–25). While many masculinities exist, men who do not or cannot conform to the dominant standard of hegemonic masculinity (aka those with subordinated masculinity) are devalued and are more likely to view themselves as "unworthy, incompetent, and inferior" (Goffman, 1963, p. 128; See also Cheng, 2008, p. 300;)

Perpetrators of mass violence have been found to feel entitled to the prestige and dominance associated with conforming to hegemonic masculinity, yet simultaneously feel unable to achieve it (See Kalish & Kimmel, 2010; Madfis, 2014; Marganski, 2019, p. 9). Many have been unable to attain the standards of hegemonic masculinity or have experienced life stressors (such as job loss, breaking up with a significant other, or downward mobility) which have left them feeling emasculated and subordinate to other

males (Madfis, 2014, pp. 79–80). Further, many perceive themselves as victims and feel as though they had no control over their subordination in society and instead place the blame on others (Kalish & Kimmel, 2010, p. 10; Marganski, 2019, p. 10). These feelings of inadequacy and emasculation push perpetrators towards violent acts in order to regain a sense of power and dominance, enact revenge on those they perceived have wronged them, and/or to create a new masculine identity (Madfis, 2014, p. 80; Marganski, 2019, p. 8).

Many online male supremacist groups (such as those in the manosphere) also hold this narrative of male victimization. In particular, some academics have specifically looked at the masculinities present in Incel communities online (See Brzuszkiewicz, 2020; Ging, 2019). According to Brzuszkiewicz (2020), Incels display a hybrid masculinity, where they "distance themselves from hegemonic masculinity while simultaneously reproducing it through their nostalgia narratives of a utopian pre-feminist past and their derogatory, violent rhetoric against women and non-Incel men" (p. 5). The case of Elliot Rodger provides an excellent example of this kind of narrative. In his manifesto,[8] Elliot Rodger referred to himself as 'a supreme gentlemen', who deserved to attract and have sex with the most beautiful women. Yet, in the same manifesto, he also expresses how he feels unworthiness, for example he stated that "After being bullied so much in Eighth and Ninth Grade, I became more shy and timid than I ever was in my life. I felt very small, weak, and above all, worthless" (Rodger, 2014, p. 47) and "it will be a scar in my memory forever, to remind me that girls think I'm unworthy compared to

[8] Elliot Rodger's manifesto is a 141-page autobiographical manifesto which does not include page numbers. The page numbers included in any reference in this document are based on the specific copy of the manifesto that I have accessed. Other copies, which have altered the font or size of the text, may have different corresponding page numbers.

other boys" (Rodger, 2014, p. 91). These feelings of inadequacy lead him to seek revenge on the women he perceived as rejecting him, as well as the men they chose over him. He stated: "I would either fulfill my dream of becoming wealthy at a young age in order to be worthy enough to attract beautiful women, or exact my revenge upon the world and die in the process to escape punishment. There was no other path for me" (Rodger, 2014, p. 110), demonstrating his intense desire to conform to the standards of hegemonic masculinity and to be perceived as dominant and powerful, as well as his willingness to employ violence to achieve it.

3.0 Theoretical framework

The following theoretical framework will conceptualize misogynist terrorism as a type of gendered violence. First, a brief review of the literature that combines misogyny and terrorism will be discussed, including the perspectives of both those who agree and disagree with conceptualizing a type of terrorism based in misogyny. Next, the conceptualization of misogynist terrorism for the current thesis will be developed, beginning by defining violence more broadly, followed by developing an understanding of terrorism as a specific act of violence. Then misogynist terrorism will be conceptualized as gendered form of terrorism, which is directed primarily against women. The section will end with a discussion of the benefits of developing a conceptualization of misogynist terrorism.

3.1 Other combinations of gender and terrorism

A number of academics have already attempted to conceptualize misogyny as a specific ideology underlying terrorism, though there is little consensus throughout the

literature on a specific label or conceptualization for this type of violence. See Table 1 for an overview of the different conceptualizations of this type of violence throughout the literature. DiBranco, (2020), for example, argues that "misogyny/male supremacism should be recognised as a motivating ideology in and of itself—not just as a "gateway" into violent extremism" (p. 1). Additionally, in 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) began to include male supremacy as one of the ideologies they study (DiBranco, 2020).

In another approach, Bratich and Banet-weiser, (2019) used the term 'honor terrorism' to describe the attacks that occur when individuals involved in networked misogyny (such as online harassment and mutual encouragement in different internet forums) take their actions offline, as they "would rather die than lose any patriarchal foundation" (p. 5019). This term was further used by Witt (2020) to describe Elliot Rodger's attack in Isla Vista California in 2014 (See below, Section 4.1.2 for more details about this case).

The recent rise in popularity of the Incel movement has also pushed many academics to consider attacks by Incels a specific type of terrorism (See Brzuszkiewicz, 2020; Cottee, 2020; Duriesmith et al., 2018; Hoffman et al., 2020; Norris, 2020; Parent, 2020; Tomkinson et al., 2020; van der Heide & Bergema, 2019; Van der Veer, 2020; Ware, 2021; Wilson, 2020). According to Tomkinson and colleagues (2020), Incels often advocate for the use of violence or participate in violence in pursuit of ideological, political, or social goals, thus making it possible to consider their attacks as violent extremist or terrorist attacks (p. 154). This has also been reinforced by recent decisions

by law enforcement officials. In a report published in 2020, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) listed Incels as a type of ideologically motivated violent extremism (CSIS, 2020, p. 26). Further, in May of 2020, a 17-year-old connected to the Incel movement was charged with terrorism in Ontario, after he murdered one woman and attempted to kill another in a massage parlour (Cousins, 2020). This is the first time in Canadian history that an attack related to the Incel ideology has been charged with terrorism (Van der Veer, 2020).[9]

While these attempts to include Incel violence under the umbrella of ideological extremism and terrorism are a promising step forward, they lack in their ability to consider attacks that do not include the Incel movement. By conceptualizing 'Incel' as the main ideology, other instances of misogynistic violence are at risk of being ignored. Additionally, this has another potential consequence of placing all Incels under the label of terrorism when in reality only a small number of those in the Incel community go on to engage in violence. Developing a conceptualization of misogynist terrorism, as opposed to the label of Incel terrorism looks to rectify some of these issues, as it encompasses violent attacks committed by Incels, while simultaneously acknowledging that misogynistic violence can be perpetrated by individuals outside of these communities.

Furthermore, there is a growing movement within feminist and critical terrorism literature to conceptualize domestic and intimate partner violence as a form of gendered terrorism known as everyday terrorism (which is also referred to as intimate terrorism or patriarchal terrorism, depending on the author). Overall, these authors argue that domestic violence, while traditionally being viewed as a more intimate form of violence

[9] This specific case will not be included in the proposed thesis (due to a lack of accessible data because the perpetrator is a minor).

fits the framework of global terrorism (See Pain, 2014, Morgan, 2014). For example, Morgan (1989/2014) argued that "the spectrum of violence and terror ranges from all the way from the fist in the face to the nuclear bomb. *It is the same spectrum, differing in degree, but not in kind*" (p. 6, emphasis original). Pain (2014), argues that both "everyday terrorism (domestic violence) and global terrorism are related attempts to exert political control through fear" (p. 531). Pain's (2014) paper is arguably one of the most comprehensive attempts to directly connect intimate partner violence and global terrorism, but it is not the first to do so. Johnson (1995) was the first to identify patriarchal terrorism, conceptualizing it as "a product of patriarchal traditions of men's right to control 'their' women, is a form of terroristic control of wives by their husbands that involves the systematic use of not only violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolation, and other control tactics" (p. 284).

Finally, a few academics have suggested the use of the term misogynist terrorism.[10] The first is Tim Squirrell, who holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh, has written on his website about the importance of labelling Incel violence as acts of misogynist terrorism (2021).However, beyond making this assertion Squirrel has not developed the concept of misogynist terrorism further, nor has he published any peer-reviewed articles to that regard. Secondly, Musgrave (2016) utilized the term misogynist terrorism in her article about female gamers online. While her work was titled, *Gamer Girls: Going Online in the Age of Misogynist Terrorism*, she only mentioned the concept of misogynist terrorism once in her article (p. 130) and did not elaborate or develop the concept further. Finally, Carol Gentry provided a fully developed conceptualization of

[10] It is of note the term misogynist terrorism has also been mentioned in news media (Valenti, 2018).

misogynist terrorism in Chapter Five of her book *Disordered Violence* (2020), however she did not employ it in the way that it will be utilized in this thesis. Rather, she employs the term to encompass all types of violence against women, including harassment, rape and sexual assault, domestic violence, and mass violence (p. 176). While this standpoint is important in terms of bringing attention to the widespread problem of gender-based violence in all of its forms, from a security perspective, it is potentially less useful to label all these types of violence as terrorism. As will be seen below (section 3.6), one of the main advantages of labelling an attack as terrorism is the increased monitoring and securitization that can be employed to prevent violent attacks. As will also be seen, securitization methods are often highly criticized and controversial. It then follows that employing similar security procedures to all men who commit, or are at risk of committing, domestic violence or sexual assault, will likely be met with strong resistance. Thus, while not discounting the dangers posed by other types of violence against women, the current thesis employs a more traditional approach to defining misogynist terrorism.

3.1.1 Those who disagree

Despite the growing support to label acts of misogynistic mass violence as terrorism, there are still some academics who disagree or harbour hesitations about this approach. For example, based on their study of seven Incels who committed or attempted to commit mass murder, Williams and Arntfield (2020) argue that Incels have more in common with sex offenders than terrorists (p. 36). They argue that:

> *"recognizing the blackpill incel ideology as being more accurately paired with that of the violent sex offender versus some amorphous definition of radical or terrorist will significantly assist in not only consolidating the various and often wildly divergent tracks of scholarship on the topic but also, in a more practical sense, assist in identifying, interdicting, and perhaps even correcting incels"* (p. 35).

While this is an interesting perspective, another study that conducted a linguistic analysis of the online Incel forum Incels.me found indicators to classify the Incel ideology as a form of violent extremism, as they suggest that it was "widespread in the forum that the situation can only improve by harming one of the out-groups" (Jaki et al., 2019, p. 259). Additionally, while the Incel ideology does revolve around the concept of access to sex, to date attacks by Incels have not featured a sexual assault component. Thus, while the ideology may, as stated by Williams and Arntfield (2020) align with violent sex offenders, the physical attacks align more closely with acts of mass murder and terrorism. Furthermore, while Williams and Arntfield (2020) argue that Incels fit an 'amorphous' or unclearly defined form of terrorism, it will be seen below that it is entirely possible to create a definitive framework of terrorism which can encompass attacks by both Incels and other acts of extreme misogynistic violence.

Secondly, Morton and colleagues (2021) conducted surveys with approximately 400 members of the website Incel.co to understand how their feelings of isolation and resentfulness changed after 1) the Covid-19 pandemic and 2) the charges of terrorism placed on the youth in Toronto (pp. 6-7). Their findings indicated that the charge of terrorism lead a majority of respondents to perceive an increase in either isolation, resentfulness, or both. They argue that focusing on the small number of Incels who have committed violence, over the large numbers who do not is problematic and that conceptualizing Incels as terrorists may actually have a negative impact, as it "may inadvertently propel and/or compound Incel radicalization" (Morton et al., 2021).

While it may be true that Incels feel increased resentment after the terrorist designation and while it is true that many Incels do not commit violence, analyses of the

online Incel sites demonstrate that they are highly misogynistic spaces, where violence is often encouraged (Chang, 2020; Jaki et al., 2019) and also one where past terrorists are made into heroes and martyrs (Moonshot CVE, 2020, pp. 9–11). For example, a report by Moonshot Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) found users on Incels.co (the same studied by Morton et al, 2021), who praised mass murderers Chris Harper Mercer and Scott Beierle, as well as a poll posted on the site that asked users who their favourite 'Saint' (mass murderer) was (pp. 8, 10, 11). Additionally, while it is true that most individuals that frequent Incel sites do not go on to commit largescale acts of violence, it is also true that many of the recent attacks based in misogyny, the perpetrators have been at least peripherally related to the manosphere and online Incel communities (Casey, 2019, pp. 80–81; Moonshot CVE, 2020, pp. 8–10), thus pointing to the need for at least some type of monitoring on these communities. Extrapolating from this, conceptualizing these acts as misogynist terrorism, rather than Incel terrorism provides a potential solution to this problem. This would continue to allow space to prosecute Incel attacks as terrorism, while placing the attention less specifically on the Incel community, as it would open up the consideration that individuals outside of the Incel community are also capable of engaging in a similar type of violence.

Table 1: Different conceptualizations of misogynist terrorism throughout the literature

Term	**Academic Usage**
Male Supremacist Terrorism	DiBranco (2020); Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); Roose (2020)
Honor Terrorism	Bratich and Banet-weiser (2019); Witt (2020)
Incel Terrorism	Duriesmith et al., (2018); Van der Heide (2019); Brzuszkiewicz (2020); Cottee (2020); Hoffman et al., (2020); Norris (2020); Parent (2020); Tomkinson et al., (2020); Van der Veer, (2020); Wilson (2020);

Misogynist Terrorism	Musgrave (2016); Gentry (2020); Squirrell (2021)
Unlabelled[11]	Eglin and Hester (1999); Chang (2018); Zimmerman et al., (2018); Diaz and Valjii (2019)
Everyday/intimate/patriarchal Terrorism	Morgan (1989/2014); Johnson (1995); Pain (2012 & 2014)

3.2 Conceptualization of misogynist terrorism

3.2.1 Violence

Etymologically, the word violence is derived from the Latin word *violentia*, which means 'vehemence', or a passionate uncontrolled force (Bufacchi, 2005, p. 194). In fact, most attempted definitions of violence involve the concepts of force and violation (Bufacchi, 2005, p. 194). Garver (1968) for example suggested that "violence in human affairs comes down to violating persons" (p. 259, as cited in Betz, 1977). In another example, Honderich (2002) defines violence as "a use of physical force that injures, damages, violates, or destroys people or things" (p. 91). Expanding on this, different academics have suggested that violence can be physical (Garver, 1968, p. 259, as cited in Betz, 1977), psychological (Garver, 1968, p. 259, as cited in Betz, 1977), as well as committed against objects (Bufacchi, 2005, p. 198).

Further from this, structural violence occurs when people are "harmed, maimed, or killed by poverty and unjust social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or structures" (Kohler & Alcock, 1976, p. 343). According to Galtung (1969) structural violence is a more indirect from of violence, one where "there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure

[11] These authors identified the link between gendered factors and terrorism, but did not elaborate on a specific label.

and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" (p. 171). For example, sexism is a type of structural violence which harms women by constraining their agency (Ho, 2007, p. 9). While structural violence is an important factor in society, in order to best address the research questions, the proposed thesis will only analyze acts of physical violence directed at people.

3.2.2 Gender-based violence

Gender-based violence is an umbrella term which "includes a host of harmful behaviors that are directed at women and girls because of their sex" (Heise et al., 2002, p. 6). This includes acts such as domestic abuse, sexual assault, and female genital mutilation. Another type of gender-based violence is femicide, which, according to the Canadian Femicide Observatory for Justice and Accountability (CFOJA) is generally understood as "the killing of women and girls on account of their gender" (Dawson et al., 2018, p. 12). Salient examples of femicide in Canada include the 1989 Montreal Massacre, where 14 women were killed, as well as the significant and disproportionate number of missing and murdered Indigenous women (Dawson et al., 2020). Below, misogynist terrorism will be conceptualized as a form of gender-based terrorism.

3.3 What is terrorism?

The challenge of attaining a consistent definition of terrorism continues to plague scholars in variety of fields (i.e. sociology, criminology, law), as well as law enforcement and government officials, making a universal definition elusive and difficult to achieve (Combs, 2006, p. 11; Lutz & Lutz, 2011, p. 2). This is not to say, however, that a definition is impossible. Rather quite the opposite is true, as hundreds of definitions have been created both in academia and beyond (Ramsay, 2015, p. 212). For example, in

Canada, terrorism is defined in section 83.01 (b) of the *Criminal Code* as an act committed "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause" that is committed “with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regards to its security". This act must intentionally cause death, serious injury, endanger a person’s life or cause substantial property damage or interruption to an essential service or facility. Combs (2006), on the other hand defines terrorism as “a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence – that which is perpetrated on innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear for political purposes” (p. 11). In yet another example, Doosje and colleagues (2016) conceptualize terrorism as “an act of violence (domestic or international), usually committed against non-combatants, and aimed to achieve behavioral change and political objectives by creating fear in a larger population” (p. 79).

While the plethora of definitions of terrorism is problematic for academics, some studies have highlighted that commonalities can be pulled from each definition to establish key criteria for an event to be considered a terrorist attack (see for example Marsella, 2005; Ramsay, 2015; Shanahan, 2016; Weinberg et al., 2004). After reviewing definitions of terrorism from three prominent journals, Weinburg and colleagues (2004) found that ‘violence’, ‘threats’, and ‘politically motivated tactics’ were the most commonly employed descriptors (p. 782). Further, Marsella (2005) had similar results, but also argued for the inclusion of ‘coercion’ and ‘fear’ as key markers of terrorism (p. 16). In line with this, Shanahan (2016) identified the following components as important to the definition of terrorism: the use of violence; generating terror or fear; and a political (or another type) motivation (pp. 106-110). Based on these identified factors he defines

terrorism as "the strategically indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group in order to influence the psychological states of an audience group in ways the perpetrators anticipate may be beneficial to the advancement of their agenda" (Shanahan, 2016, p. 110).

A similar approach will be employed in order to define terrorism in the proposed research. Based on the above identified similarities in terrorism definitions, three aspects will be synthesized to conceptualize misogynist terrorism. These three factors are: 1) the act being committed for political, religious, social, or ideological purpose; 2) the use of violence; and 3) that the attack must generate fear in the public or in a segment of the public.

3.4 Developing misogynist terrorism

What will follow is an attempt to formally develop the concept of misogynist terrorism, by working misogyny into the three common aspects of terrorism identified in the previous section. Based on these factors, misogynist terrorism is conceptualized as a violent act inspired by a political, social, religious, or ideological goal related to overt misogyny, which generates fear in women or a subsection of women. Below, this definition is explored in greater detail. Also, consult Figure 1 for a visual summary of the conceptualization of misogynist terrorism.

3.4.1 The importance of overt misogyny

In order to be considered an act of misogynist terrorism in the proposed thesis, the political, religious, or ideological goal or cause underlying the attack must be overt misogyny, rather than just structuralized violence, such as sexism. It is important to note, however, that the overt manifestations (i.e., a direct statement of hatred towards women)

and the more subtle manifestations (i.e., sexism) are not mutually exclusive, nor are they isolated from one another. Thus, in cases of misogynist terrorism, the perpetrator may have a history of both overt misogyny and more normalized misogyny and sexism. However, an act cannot be considered misogynist terrorism if the perpetrator only displays subtle misogyny or normalized sexism.

3.4.2 Violence

In order to be an act of misogynist terrorism in the proposed thesis, the attack must involve violence (death and/or serious injury) against human beings. This is in line with section 83.01 (b) of the *Criminal Code*, as well as most academic definitions of terrorism (See for example Combs, 2006; Marsella, 2005; Ramsay, 2015; Shanahan, 2016; Weinberg et al., 2004). Schmidt and Jongman (1988, as cited in Ramsay, 2015) reviewed 109 definitions of terrorism and found violence to be the most common component (included in 83.5% of definitions). While their review was admittedly conducted prior to 9/11, violence continues to remain an important and necessary component of any terrorism definition in the post 9/11 era. Beyond violence against people, numerous academics suggest that destruction of property (Combs, 2006, p. 11), threats of violence (Combs, 2006, p. 11; Lutz & Lutz, 2011, p. 4; Weinberg et al., 2004, p. 782) and unsuccessful attempts at violence (Goodin, 2006, p. 38) also constitute terrorism.

All of this considered, the goal of this thesis research was to analyze the communication patterns of misogynist terrorists who committed acts of misogynistic violence. As such, only attacks where violence is directed towards human beings will be considered for inclusion in the proposed thesis. Neither acts where there is substantial

property damage or interruption to essential services where no one is injured or killed, nor cases where violence is threatened or an attack is planned, but not undertaken will be considered for inclusion. However, as will be explored below, the attack must in addition to physical violence, also have a component of psychological violence used with the intention of causing fear in a larger group of individuals.

3.4.3 Direct victims of the attack and goal beyond the immediate victims

Terrorist attacks involve both direct victims of the attack and the indirect victims of the attack (Pfefferbaum, 2003, p. 180). Direct victims are those at the physical site of the attack, those who witness the attack, are injured or killed. However, the real intention behind an act of terrorism is considered to generate a psychological impact (i.e. fear) beyond the direct victims (Richards, 2014, p. 230). As stated by Fromkin (1975):

> *"The consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a stepping stone toward objectives that are more remote . . . Terrorism is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else – not the terrorist – to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires"* (pp. 692–693).

These widespread psychological ramifications are often the main goal of the attack, as this is what helps the terrorists in accomplishing their wider political, social, ideological, or religious goals (Richards, 2014, p. 230). In the case of misogynist terrorist attacks, the direct victims do not necessarily need to be women. It is likely that the direct victims will be women, as this is in line with Combs (2006), who argues that in order to generate the most fear in a target group, the immediate victims are most often representatives of that group (p. 13). However, this is not always the case, and the immediate victims of a misogynist terrorist attack could be gender minorities or men.

From this, however, it is argued that the larger goal must be to cause fear in women. In other words, the larger target population of the attack must be women, though any gender can be an immediate victim. This is in line with theorizing by Kaufman (1987), who argues that the strain and pressure to attain the ideals of hegemonic masculinity is also influential in the violence men commit against other men, as well as violence men commit against themselves (p. 5).

Additionally, it is worth a brief consideration of intersectionality at this point. Women are a diverse group, made up of differing sexualities, abilities, races, ethnicities, and classes, among others. It is argued here that the goal of the attack may be to instill fear in a subset of women, such as feminists (i.e., the Montreal Massacre) or women of a specific race or religion, rather than in women as whole. Additionally, this framework includes the Trans community. According to Gentry, transmisogyny is an intersectional problem that encompasses "the hatred not just of (cis) women, but of those who identify and perform femininity" (p. 176). The important distinguishing factor for the conceptualization of misogynist terrorism is that these individuals are targeted specifically due to their gender, which does not conform with the ideals of hegemonic masculinity.

In summary, in order to be considered an act of misogynist terrorism, the act must conform to the following points:

1. Must be inspired by a political, religious, or ideological goal related to overt misogyny.
2. There must be an aspect of attempted or completed violence direct towards human beings.

3. There must be a larger overarching goal of generating fear in women or a specific subset of women.

Figure 1: Overview of misogynist terrorism



3.5 Differentiating misogynist terrorism

Having developed a conceptualization of misogynist terrorism, it is now important to differentiate it from other forms of violence, more specifically from femicide. As discussed above, femicide involves killing women because of their gender (Dawson et al., 2018, p. 12). Based on this, femicide is simultaneously narrower and broader in scope than misogynist terrorism. Femicide is more narrow in that it focuses only on the killing of women and girls. As was seen above, immediate victims of misogynist terrorism can be both male and female. Femicide is broader than misogynist terrorism, however, in the reasons that the violence can be committed. For example, femicide can be the result of things wider than just a political or ideological goal, as it is

inclusive of things such as domestic homicide or murders that are associated with human trafficking or organized crime (Dawson et al., 2018, p. 12).

Furthermore, with the increased amount of attention being paid to Incel violence as a form of terrorism, it is worth a brief discussion of differentiating misogynist terrorism and the Incel movement. According to the developed conceptualization, some (arguably most) attacks committed by Incels will be conceptualized as misogynist terrorism. However, it also demonstrates that some attacks by individuals affiliated with Incel communities will not meet the criteria for misogynist terrorism, and would then need to be conceptualized in other ways (i.e., hate crimes, mass murders etc.). For example, Nikolas Cruz, who killed 17 and wounded 17 others at a school in Parkland, Florida was peripherally related to Incel communities, as he posted "Elliot Rodger will not be forgotten" online prior to his attack (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 571; D. J. Williams et al., 2021, p. 7). However, there was no further evidence from his attack that it was inspired by misogyny or that there was a greater goal to cause fear in women – and as such, his attack does not meet the criteria for misogynist terrorism. Further this conceptualization acknowledges that some misogynist terrorist attacks that occur will not be perpetrated by Incels. For example, Marc Lepine's anti-feminist attack, which took the lives of 14 women at the Ecole Polytechinque in Montreal would be an act of misogynist terrorism not connected to the Incel movement.

3.6 Benefits of conceptualizing misogynist terrorism

Currently, many violent attacks that are inspired by misogyny are not recognized as terrorism, and rather are labelled as lone wolf attacks or mass murder incidents (Duriesmith et al., 2018, p. 1). The focus of investigations into these events remains

consistently centered on factors such as the mental health of the perpetrators or how they accessed firearms, diverting attention away from the underlying ideological misogyny inspiring these events (Marganski, 2019, p. 3). Even when the perpetrators provide clear evidence of their misogynistic ideology and clearly identify misogynistic factors as integral to the planning and execution of their attack, other factors are often more readily considered during investigations (Marganski, 2019, p. 3). For example, Marc Lepine (perpetrator of the Montreal Massacre) made it clear, both during the execution of his attack and in his suicide note, that women were the target of his attack and that he hated feminists and wanted to punish them all (Eglin & Hester, 1999, p. 256). Yet, it took 30 years for the attack to be formally recognized as an anti-feminist attack (Northcott, 2019). The failure to classify these attacks as based in misogyny is problematic for both academics and security officials, as underlying patterns are not accounted for, which can consequently effect analyses and policy development.

While 'terrorism' has become a buzz-word in the media and in research, it is important to understand that there are numerous practical benefits to labelling something as an act of terrorism (see for example the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, CSIS, 1984). By conceptualizing these acts as terrorism, as opposed to just the result of an individual struggling with mental health, they are then understood to be threats to national security, allowing for more extensive and comprehensive monitoring and prevention systems to be put into place (CSIS, 1984). For example, in the Canadian context, Bill C-51, was (albeit controversially) introduced in 2015 and allowed for the ability to remove content from different websites, to seize terrorist propaganda, lowered the threshold for preventative arrests, as well as allowing the Canadian Security and

Intelligence Service (CSIS) to disrupt terrorist activities (Littlewood et al., 2020, p. 5). This is in line with many academics have highlighted the need to monitor and/or securitize online Incel communities (Casey, 2019, p. 82; Hoffman et al., 2020; J. Lewis & Ware, 2020; Moonshot CVE, 2019; Tomkinson et al., 2020).[12]

Beyond this, Tomkinson et al (2020) argue that addressing this type of violence as terrorism could have benefits beyond just the potential to interrupt impending plots. They argue that "securitising Incel will help limit violence against women and extremist violence in general. Since these issues are clearly not being adequately dealt with at present, securitisation can unlock the tools to address that violence" (Tomkinson et al., 2020, p. 158). Further, Chang (2018) argues that labelling acts of mass murder inspired by hegemonic masculinity as terrorism "would draw greater attention to a significant underlying root of these crimes, and could help our country reframe its response around subverting subordination as a more effective way of preventing mass shootings" (p. 501).

As Incel and other forms of misogynist violence are becoming an increasing threat to national security (Diaz & Valjii, 2019; Duriesmith et al., 2018; Johnston & True, 2019), there is a heightened need to better understand these attacks in order to be able to intervene before they occur. Both policy and academic research are negatively impacted by the lack of a formal conceptualization of misogynist terrorism. By consistently applying the label of misogynist terrorism, better research can be conducted on patterns underlying these attacks. Additionally, conceptualizing these attacks as terrorism would

[12] That being said, it must be noted that there is a significant debate surrounding securitization methods. On one hand, securitization and monitoring methods are often criticized for infringing on rights to privacy and freedom of speech (Littlewood et al., 2020, p. 5). Secondly, some securitization measures have been highlighted as having an inverse effect (Morton et al., 2021, p. 27). While acknowledging the potential pitfalls and cautioning the importance of implementing these measures based on empirical research, the current thesis argues that one of the potential benefits of establishing misogynist terrorism is the increased resources in place to interrupt potential attacks.

allow for more diverse resources to be applied to pre-attack intervention, which is vital to protecting public safety and national security.

4.0 Research methodology

The current thesis aims to develop a preliminary understanding of how the ideology of misogynist terrorists spreads and influences actors within personal communication and online networks. The goal of the current thesis was to answer the following three research questions:

1. What is misogynist terrorism and how does it fit within the larger framework of terrorism?
2. How do misogynist terrorists share their ideology with other actors, both online and in person, prior to their first attack?
3. How are other actors, both online and in person, influencing the ideology of misogynist terrorists prior to their first attack?

A mixed-methodological approach that blends social network analysis and qualitative case study analysis was employed to examine three case studies of misogynist terrorists: George Sodini (perpetrator of the LA Fitness shootings in 2009), Elliot Rodger (perpetrator of the Isla Vista massacre in 2014), and Scott Beierle (perpetrator of the Hot Yoga Tallahassee shootings in 2018).

4.1 Case selection

Cases were selected based on two criteria, in particular that they: 1) fit within the conceptualization of misogynist terrorism, which was developed above in the Theoretical Framework Section (Section 3.0), 2) allow for the collection of a sufficient amount of rigorous and reliable relational data. There are currently no pre-existing databases that

tracks all incidents of mass violence rooted in misogyny. The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society's Canadian Incident Database does track this type of violence, however only Canadian incidents are included in the database. This database was used as a starting point for identifying case studies and from there news media and academic research that discussed the nexus of misogyny and mass violence were utilized to identify potential cases for inclusion.

4.1.1 George Sodini

On August 4, 2009 Sodini entered a Latin Fitness class in an L.A. Fitness club, turned off the lights and proceeded to fire close to 50 shots into the studio (D. J. Williams et al., 2021, p. 4). He killed three women and injured nine others, before committing suicide (Lester, 2010, p. 1; D. J. Williams et al., 2021, p. 4). For 10 months leading up to his attack, Sodini kept a blog that archived his rejection by women, which he described as causing anger and severe sexual frustration. The police also located suicide notes in his gym bag, which further confirmed his hatred of women (Candiotti, 2009). Sodini was also reported to be an active consumer of Pick-Up Artist rhetoric (Bratich & Banet-weiser, 2019, p. 5015). The year before his attack, he had attended 'The Right Attitude Workshop' hosted by a 'relationship guru', where attendees were taught that in order to attract women they must stop being 'the nice guy' (Martinez, 2009). It was determined that Sodini specifically targeted the Latin dance class that evening, as it was known to be frequented primarily by women (Candiotti, 2009). He had also conducted 'practice runs' in advance of his attack, including getting someone to show him how to turn the lights on and off in the studio (Candiotti, 2009).

Sodini's attack qualifies under the definition of misogynist terrorism, as his blog posts and suicide notes demonstrated that his attacks were inspired by overt misogynist ideologies and a desire to punish women for their rejection. In his blog he wrote:

> *"Why do this?? To young girls? Just read below. I kept a running log that includes my thoughts and actions, after I saw this project was going to drag on."* (Sodini, 2009, p. 1 'November 5, 2008').

He further stated:

> *"I dress good, am clean-shaven, bathe, touch of cologne - yet 30 million women rejected me - over an 18 or 25-year period. That is how I see it. Thirty million is my rough guesstimate of how many desirable single women there are. A man needs a woman for confidence. He gets a boost on the job, career, with other men, and everywhere else when he knows inside he has someone to spend the night with and who is also a friend. This type of life I see is a closed world with me specifically and totally excluded. Every other guy does this successfully to a degree. Flying solo for many years is a destroyer. Yet many people say I am easy to get along with, etc. Looking back, I owe nothing to desirable females who ask for anything, except for basic courtesy - usually. Looking back over everything, what bothers me most is the inability to work towards whatever change I choose"* (Sodini, 2009, p. 2, 'December 29, 2009').

Additionally, he stated:

> *"I was reading several posts on different forums and it seems many teenage girls have sex frequently. One 16 year old does it usually three times a day with her boyfriend. So, err, after a month of that, this little hoe has had more sex than ME in my LIFE, and I am 48. One more reason. Thanks for nada, bitches! Bye."* (Sodini, 2009, p. 8, 'June 5, 2009')

While Sodini did not explicitly state his desire to cause fear in women in his blog, police stated that he specifically planned his attack to target and kill the most amount of women possible (Candiotti, 2009; Hamill, 2009a). This was also evidence of this in his blog:

> *"I hope it doesn't snow on Tuesday. Just thought of that. The crowd will be thin so I would postpone. Shit!"* (Sodini, 2009, p. 3)

Additionally, he left two 'suicide' notes in his bag, in which he articulated his hatred for women. While this note was never made available to the public, Allegheny County Police Superintendent Charles Moffatt said that it "talks about his hatred of women" (Candiotti, 2009, p. 1). There is also some precedent in the academic literature to consider Sodini under the umbrella of what DiBranco (2020) refers to as male supremacist terrorism[13].

4.1.2 Elliot Rodger

Elliot Rodger self-identified[14] as an Incel and wanted to punish both women and couples that he found physically attractive. On May 23rd, 2014, he began a rampage across Isla Vista, California during which he killed six people and injured 14 others (Witt, 2020, p. 1). He began his attack by stabbing three men to death in his apartment (two were his roommates and the third was a friend of his roommates). He then drove to and attempted to enter the Alpha Phi sorority but was unsuccessful and instead shot and killed two women who were on the street. His attack finished with a drive-by rampage across Isla Vista, during which he struck several pedestrians with his car and killed one more man when he fired shots inside a deli, before killing himself (Witt, 2020, p. 1).

While he was not specifically targeting women, his attack still qualifies as misogynist terrorism as it was inspired by the extensive misogynistic and sexist ideologies of the Incel subculture (Witt, 2020, p. 5). It is clear, based on Rodger's

[13] According to DiBranco (2020), male supremacist terrorism is violence that stems from a male supremacist ideology, which is comprised of two main misogynistic beliefs: "1) the belief that men are entitled to sexual access to women … and 2) the belief that feminists are a malevolent force controlling society at the expense of men" (p. 1).

[14] Rodger stated the following on PUAHate.com: "*If you're not a virgin you shouldn't be on this forum. how dare you come here and brag about your sex life to us Incels. It's like going up to a starving man and bragging about the feast you just ate*."

manifesto and numerous YouTube postings, that he demonstrated overt misogyny, as well as a desire to instill fear in women more broadly. For example, according to his manifesto, he wanted to wage a "war on women" to "punish all females for the crime of depriving [him] of sex" (Rodger, 2014, p. 132). Additionally, while Rodger wanted to punish individuals of both sexes, his desire to commit violence against men was based entirely on their relationship with or ability to access women, thus being inherently based in the misogynistic notion that men have dominance, control, and entitlement over women. For example, in his manifesto, Rodger stated that he wanted to kill young couples (male and female) because "the males deserve it for taking the females away from [him] and the females deserve it for choosing those males instead of [him]" (Rodger, 2014, p. 87). Additionally, considering Rodger's attack as an act of misogynist terrorism is in line with numerous academics who have already suggested that the label of terrorism (though not specifically misogynist terrorism) applies to his attack (see Bratich & Banet-weiser, 2019, p. 5019; Hunter et al., 2020, p. 9).

4.1.3 Scott Beierle

On November 2nd, 2018, 40-year old Scott Beierle entered Hot Yoga Tallahassee, posed as a customer, and signed up for their evening class (Warren, 2018, p. 4). While registering for the class, he expressed disappointment that not many students were registered for the class and asked the receptionist when the busier classes took place (Hendrix, 2019). He then entered the studio, took a gun out of his bag and began shooting. In less than three minutes he had killed two women, shot four others, and pistol whipped the only male in the class, before committing suicide. Prior to his attack he had a history of inappropriate interactions with women, including two charges for battery (in

2012 and 2016), both for grabbing women's butts (Warren, 2018, p. 55). Both of these charges were eventually dropped, one because the victim decided not to pursue them and the other after Beierle agreed to follow pre-trial interventions (Warren, 2018, p. 55). Additionally, he had a history of misogynistic ideologies dating back as early as his teenage years. In high school, he was elected vice president of his class, by using the slogan "Vote Beierle, because we don't need no woman" while running against a female opponent (Hendrix, 2019). In the years leading up to his attack, Beierle wrote songs and filmed YouTube videos with virulent misogynistic, racist, and homophobic themes.

Beierle fits into the stated conceptualization of misogynist terrorism, as he clearly demonstrated a history of overt hatred of and loathing for women. This was evidenced by the novel he wrote in high school, his song lyrics, and in the video rants he posted to YouTube. For example, the titles of his songs included 'Locked in My Basement', 'Freshly Fried-up Girl' and 'I Will Not Touch You – My Bullets Will'. His songs included lyrics such as "I am pro-death. The more that die the merrier" (Beierle, 'Handful of Bare Ass'). In a YouTube video entitled 'Plight of the Adolescent Male', Beierle likens himself and his situation to that of Elliot Rodger:

> *"I'd like to send a message now to the adolescent males… that are in the position, the situation, the disposition of Elliot Rodger, of not getting any, no love, no nothing. The endless wasteland that breeds this longing and this frustration. That was me, certainly, as an adolescent"* (Beierle, 2014, YouTube).

He also made his motivation to punish women clear in the following two typed notes, which he left behind in his hotel room:

> *"Their arrogance, indifference and treachery will finally be exposed, and punished. If I can't make a living, I will make a killing. I realize now, more than ever, that I don't belong in a society bent on emasculation, mongrelization, and niggerization. I will be successful with females: if I can't be successful at being positive, I will be successful at being negative. This is in their court, however. This is not what I*

> *wanted. No kid sits in their room at night dreaming of this. It has come to this though, and I simply have no choice at this point. It is a moral imperative"* (Beierle, 2018, as cited in Warren, 2018, p. 9).

> *"If I can't find one decent female to live with, I will find many indecent females to die with. If they are intent on denying me life, I will have no choice, but to deny them life. At least I will no longer have to live under the reign of a monkey. America deserves a thousand 9/11s for this outrage."* (Beierle, 2018, as cited in Warren, 2018, p. 9).

The content of his songs, writings, and videos clearly demonstrates his desire to make women feel inferior and to instill fear within them. Further from this, in one of his YouTube videos Beierle rallies against the Affordable Care Act's provision of birth control. During his misogynistic political rant he argues that men should not have to pay for "the casual sex lives of slutty girls" (Beierle, 2014, YouTube).

Furthermore, academic literature supports the notion of Beierle as a terrorist. When writing for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism, DiBranco (2020) argues that Scott Beierle's attack falls under the umbrella of male supremacist terrorism (p. 1). He argues that "A yoga studio is a clear symbolic target for a misogyny based on thwarted male sexual entitlement, just as a synagogue is a symbolic target for anti-Semitism or a Black church for white supremacists" (p. 1). Additionally, a brief for the Center for Strategic and International Studies lists Beierle's attack under the umbrella of right-wing and Incel terrorism (Jones et al., 2020, p. 6).

4.2 Data collection

Data for this thesis were collected from a comprehensive media scan of open-source data available on each misogynist terrorist. Data were first collected from available primary sources (i.e. manifestos, suicide notes, and social media posts), as they

provide the most authoritative and reliable information. Secondary sources were then consulted, including court documents, investigative summaries (i.e. police and coroner reports), news media, biographies, and academic articles[15]. These different sources were systematically analyzed to collect both relational and attribute data on the in-person and online interactions of the misogynist terrorists.

4.2.1 Timeframe

The timeframe data collected ranged from when each specific misogynist terrorist was determined to have radicalized towards violence, until the time of their attack. This was determined by identifying the earliest point the misogynist terrorists indicated their willingness to commit violence against women. This strategy was determined to be better than having a set time frame (i.e. 4 months prior to attack) for each misogynist terrorist because it led to a better understanding of how the ideology of each misogynist terrorist developed and spread leading up to their attack. For Elliot Rodger, data were collected for the time period of July 2011 – May 23rd 2014 (the date of his attack). July 2011 was determined to be the best starting point, as his manifesto indicates that by this time he was in the stages of becoming prepared to commit violence. This was evidenced by 'Part 6' of his manifesto, which he titled "Santa Barbara: End Game", in which he stated:

> *"In truth, the move Santa Barbara was actually a chance that I was giving to the world, not the other way around! I was giving the world one last chance to give me the life that I know I'm entitled to, the life that other boys are able to live with ease. If I still have to suffer the same rejection and injustice even after I move to Santa Barbara, then that will be the last straw. I will have my vengeance."* (Rodger, 2014, p. 83).

[15] Only those sources utilized in-text (i.e. that were utilized to provide qualitative examples) have been referenced throughout this thesis. All other sources are stored on the databases developed during the research process and can be made available upon request.

Furthermore, it was at this point that he began to view violence as a legitimate option, as evidenced by:

> *"It was around this point in my life that I realized I was capable of doing such things. I would happily do such things. I was capable of killing them, and I wanted to. I wanted to kill them slowly, to strip the skins off their flesh. They deserve it. The males deserve it for taking the females away from me, and the females deserve it for choosing those males instead of me."* (Rodger, 2014, p. 87).

Data for George Sodini were collected from June of 2008 until the date of his attack (August 4, 2009). The start date was selected, as in his blog he stated that he had initially planned to commit his attack in the summer of 2008, but that he decided to "stick around to see the election outcome" (Sodini, 2009, p. 1). This is the earliest recorded evidence of his radicalization and willingness to commit violence, and thus was selected as the starting point for data collection.

Data for Scott Beierle were collected from September of 1997 until the date of his attack (November 2, 2018). Beierle was in high school in 1997, when he authored a novel titled *Rejected Youth*. In this novel, a serial killer lured and murdered girls that were representatives of those in his own school (Hendrix, 2019). Also in high school he was disciplined for sexual misconduct, which included touching women inappropriately (Warren, 2018, p. 57). Based on this, he both fantasized about large scale acts of violence towards women and committed acts of sexual violence against women in 1997, and thus this was selected as the starting point for data collection.

Given that data were collected for each misogynist terrorist over a number of years leading up to their attack, the networks that have been constructed are asynchronous. This means that they represent the social dynamics of the misogynist

terrorist across time (Bright et al., 2020, p. 498). Thus, it is important to note that not all relationships identified in the network existed at the same points in time.

4.2.2 Online interactions

When collecting data on online interactions (i.e. social media posts), the following considerations were taken into place. In order for an online forum or online thread to be included in the research:

- The misogynist terrorist must have participated in the forum or content created by them must have been shared.
- The posts must have been made before the misogynist terrorist attack took place.

Threads where the misogynist terrorist or their ideological material was not present, or that were created after the time of the attack were not included in the analysis. Additionally, any comments where the content or the username of the poster was unidentifiable (i.e. had been deleted) were also removed prior to analysis. Overall, threads were included from YouTube, PUAhate.com, Bodybuilding.com, Reddit, and Isitnormal.com. These threads were identified through an online media scan and by corroborating information left in some of the primary content created by the misogynist terrorists.

A common phenomenon within these online communities is posting comments that are referred to as 'trolling'. Witt, (2020) defines trolling as creating content with the goal of provoking responses from a specific target audience (p. 676). Poland (2016) further suggests that trolling is a domination tactic that attempts to disrupt online conversations by "making deliberately inflammatory racist, sexist, or otherwise derogatory remarks or by simply filling chat rooms with spam" (p. 17). The problem with

trolling is that it is often suggested that it should not be taken seriously, as it considered to be committed by "someone casually or jokingly engaging in anti-social behaviors" (Witt, 2020, p. 676; see also Poland, 2016, p. 17).

However, many scholars suggest that trolling posts should be taken seriously and viewed as potentially harmful, regardless of whether the intent of the author was to be serious or in jest. For example, Ortiz, (2020) conducted survey research in which 120 American adults based on their experiences with and perceptions of online trolling (p. 2). The results of her study suggested that respondents considered trolling posts as "a collective form of harassment perceived as having the malicious intent to provoke another user" and even considered certain types of trolling as experiencing racism and sexism (p. 2). This is further reinforced by Poland (2016), who argues that trolling of a cybersexist nature occurs at such a significant and pervasive rate that it cannot be considered to be harmless (p. 17). Additionally, when specifically addressing the online Incel communities, Witt, (2020) argues that all posts on these forums must be taken seriously, as the violent history of the Incel community suggests that at least some part of the online community is reading these posts and taking the content, and the associated potential to act, seriously (p. 677). Based on this, even posts which could potentially be considered trolling were still included in the analysis and these posts were coded based on face value, rather than on the potential implicit attempt to troll or not be taken seriously.

4.3 Social network analysis

Social network analysis is a collection of analytic techniques which allow researchers to visually and mathematically explore the structure of relationships among

individuals and groups (Prell, 2012, p. 1; Whelan, 2012, p. 11). Building upon the principles of graph theory, social network analysis involves the construction and analysis of networks, where networks are "a set of actors (or 'nodes') that have relationships (or 'ties')" (Whelan, 2012, p. 2; see also Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 13). Relational data are used to generate interpersonal networks, as it involves the relationships, ties, and connections that relate one actor to another (Prell, 2012, p. 68; Scott, 2017, p. 4). These networks can then be visually represented using sociograms[16] (Prell, 2012, p. 68). Social network analysis also relies on the collection of attribute data, which are the "attitudes, opinions, and behaviour of agents, in so far as these are regarded as the properties, qualities or characteristics that belong to them as individuals or groups (Scott, 2017, p. 4). Examples of attribute data include an actor's age, gender, country of residence, or socio-economic status, though the specific attributes collected will vary based on a project's research questions and goals (Prell, 2012, p. 8). In other words, attribute data provide information regarding the traits of each actor in the network, which allows for a more in depth interpretation of the network.

Social networks can be constructed to analyze a wide variety of different structures and relationships. For example, a node in a network most often represents an individual, but a node can also be used to represent a collectivity, such as a team or a city (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 2). Ties can also represent a variety of relationships, such as communication, friendship, or citations which impact the type of network that is created and subsequently analyzed (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 4). The type of network that is

[16] Sociograms are diagrams that visually represent the actors and ties, by representing the actors with different shapes and using lines between each shape to represent the ties between actors (Prell, 2012, p. 68).

created, and the types of nodes and ties that are selected depend on the research questions and goals of the research project.

One of the main benefits of utilizing social network analysis is that it allows researchers to understand social structure, social position, and social influence better than traditional research methods (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 11; Malm et al., 2017, p. 222). For example, network theory posits that "an actor's position in a network determines in part the constraints and opportunities that he or she will encounter, and therefore identifying that position is important for predicting actor outcomes such as performance, behavior or beliefs" (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 1). Additionally, social influence theory suggests that actors are involved in a process, through which their own opinions and behaviors alter towards the group norm, "which in essence is a (weighted) average of the other opinions of actors found in the network" (Prell, 2012, p. 63). Thus applying this, in the context of the current thesis, understanding an actor's position in the communication network can allow for an enhanced understanding of the influence their ideology may have over others in the network.

Furthermore, social network analysis has been specifically highlighted as a unique tool to study terrorism and terrorist organizations (See for example Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Borgatti et al., 2009; Choudhary & Singh, 2015; Knoke, 2012; Malm et al., 2017; Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011; Ressler, 2006). Past work using social network analysis to study terrorism have analyzed topics including leadership transition (Wu et al., 2014), social media activity (see for example Klausen et al., 2012), the dynamics of terrorist cells (see for example Azad & Gupta, 2011; Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006) and the radicalization lone actor terrorists (Bright et al., 2020; Gill et al., 2014; Hofmann, 2018).

In line with the goals of the current thesis, Ressler, (2006) has suggested that social network analysis techniques can provide important information on the diffusion of radical ideas (p. 1). Furthermore, based on their study of the lone actor terrorist in Australia, Bright and colleagues (2020) suggest that social network analysis is a valuable tool for those seeking to study the extent to which terrorists rely on their social network for ideological or logistical support (p. 505).

4.4 Data coding

The goal of the current thesis is to develop a better understanding of how the misogynistic ideology of misogynist terrorists was spread and influenced prior to their attacks. Therefore, a communication network was selected for social network analysis, where the nodes represent individuals and the ties represent communication between two individuals. In addition, in order to capture the full scope of communication by the misogynist terrorists, two separate network types were created: 1) personal communication networks and 2) online communication networks. Within each type, three different networks were created (full networks, misogynistic communication networks, and violent misogynistic networks) in order to capture the different levels of misogyny being communicated between actors (see Table 2 for a clarification of the different network types). In each network, the nodes (actors) are individuals and the ties linking actors indicate that communication took place between them. It should be noted that each network in the thesis was coded as an 'egocentric' network, which means that the data

collection and analysis was focused on the social ties around a single central individual - the misogynist terrorist (Scott, 2017, p. 74).

Table 2: Breakdown of network types

Personal Communication Networks			Online Communication Networks		
Full Network	Misogynistic Communication Network	Violent Misogynistic Communication Network	Full Network	Misogynistic Communication Network	Violent Misogynistic Communication Network

4.4.1 Personal communication networks

The personal communication networks included all in-person communication by actors in the network (i.e. face-to-face), as well as communication that happened over e-mail, the phone, or by mail. A tie was coded as present between two actors if there was evidence in at least two unrelated secondary sources (or a single primary source) that there was sustained communication between two actors in one or more of these formats. Since the goal of this thesis is to better understand the ideological influence of misogynist terrorists and who they were influenced by, it was determined to not be analytically useful to include individuals who the misogynist terrorists communicated with only briefly or in passing in the analysis (i.e. a store clerk they talked to for five minutes while paying for their groceries).

4.4.2 Online networks

Online networks focused on communication in social media platforms or online forums. In the online networks, communication was defined as a direct reply to a message on a thread or a post. If an actor posted a message that did not directly reply to a specific comment on a thread, then the tie was coded between that actor and the Original Poster (OP) of the thread (i.e. the person who created the thread). Finally, if the OP of a

thread commented on their own thread, without directly replying to someone, no tie was recorded (but data from the comment was still recorded for attribute data).

4.4.3 Full, misogynistic, and violent misogynistic communication networks

Full networks are networks which included all of the individuals in the network and where the ties indicate communication between actors (as was defined above for either personal communication or online networks). Thus, the full networks are able to serve as comparison points to better understand how misogynistic and violent misogynistic ideologies were transmitted and received.

After the full networks were coded, the content of each communication was then examined for the presence of misogyny and violent misogyny. The criteria used to establish if misogyny was present in an actor's comments was established through a thorough review of the literature regarding the definition of misogyny, as well as literature focused specifically on misogynist identification within online content. In particular, Anzovino and colleagues' (2018) work on Automatic Misogyny Identification had the most detailed criteria for identifying and classifying misogyny. Thus, Anzovino and colleagues' (2018) criteria was adopted as the base of the coding guidelines for the current thesis. It should be noted that Anzovino and colleagues (2018) based their criteria off Poland's 2016 book *Haters: Harassment, Abuse, and Violence Online*. As such, further coding clarifications were made by referring to Poland's (2016) original work. Additional coding information was then added from the assessment of subsequent literature, which allowed for the development of more robust coding criteria. This also allowed for the incorporation of aspects specific to the Incel movement, which were not directly considered in either Poland (2016) or Anzovino and colleagues' (2018) work.

Based on this, a tie of misogynistic communication was coded and the actors were included in the misogynistic network if any of the following was discussed/posted:[17]

- Discredit:
  - "Slurring over women with no other larger intention" (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59).
  - Utilizing demeaning language to refer to women (i.e. bitches, sluts/sloots, whores, bimbos, stupid/idiots, etc.) (Poland, 2016, p. 41).

- Stereotype and Objectification:
  - "Description of women's physical appeal and/or comparisons to narrow standards" (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59; Poland, 2016, p. 39). For example, reference to scoring women out of 10 or according to another scale.
  - "Sexual objectification/gender stereotyping to make women feel unwelcome, subordinated or altogether excluded" (Poland, 2016, p. 41). For example, referring to women as a trophy/prize/something to be won.

- Dominance:
  - "To preserve male control, protect male interests and to exclude women from conversation" (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59).
  - "Essentializing women as inferior to men" (Poland, 2016, p. 42).
  - Reducing or removing women's agency (Glace et al., 2021, p. 5).
  - Sense of entitlement to women or feeling like men have a right to women's bodies/sexual activity (Glace et al., 2021, p. 5).
  - that a women's only value is her sexuality (Glace et al., 2021, p. 5).

- Derailing:
  - "To justify abuse, reject male responsibility, and attempt to disrupt the conversation in order to refocus it." (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59).
  - Referring to women as hysterical, dumb, or inferior in some way in order to make their contributions appear morally or intellectually inferior (Poland, 2016, p. 42).
  - Viewing women as posing a threat to civil order, (i.e. that because they are women they may be disruptive to the status-quo of social and political life) (Gentry, 2020, p. 60).

A tie of violent misogynistic communication was coded and the actors were included in the violent misogynistic network if any of the following was discussed/posted:

[17] The larger categories (discredit, stereotype/objectification, dominance, derailing, and sexual harassment/threats of violence) are attributable to Anzovino and colleagues (2018, p. 59). The individual points underneath each larger category were added based on a review of the literature and citations are provided individually for each point.

- Sexual Harassment and Threats of Violence:
- The physical assertion of power over women or discussions of violence against women (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59).
- "Attempts to intimidate and silence women through threats." (Anzovino et al., 2018, p. 59).
- The punishment or suffering of women, or a revolution/coup/take over against women (Glace et al., 2021, p. 9).
- Rape threats or discussions of non-consensual sex (Poland, 2016, p. 48).

It should be noted that many of the different categories of abuse delineated above have been found to intersect, meaning that different statements often fall into multiple categories (Poland, 2016, p. 57). Classifying the type of misogyny was also a problem that Anzovino and colleagues (2018) highlighted as a difficulty when using these core categories in their machine learning program (p. 63). As such, each message was only coded into either "non-misogynistic", "misogynistic", or "violent misogynistic" and was not further subdivided into the smaller sub-categories. Other coding considerations include that the messages can be directed at any subsection of women (i.e. feminists, women of colour, etc.) and were still considered misogynistic (i.e. *"I want to punish and destroy all feminists"* would be coded as 'violent misogyny'). Additionally, in cases where the same two actors had more than one tie (i.e. the same two actors communicated with each other multiple times over different threads), the highest level of misogyny was recorded. For example, if Actor A and Actor B communicated twice, and one instance contained no misogynistic content, but the other instance contained violent misogynistic content, the tie between the two actors would be coded as violent misogynistic communication. This was necessary because even if two actors communicated multiple times, the communication will only be represented with a single tie – thus a single value is necessary to represent the entire relationship. The decision to use the highest level of

misogyny was based on the research questions and the overall goal of the thesis, which was to better understand how misogynist terrorist spread and are influenced by misogynistic ideologies. Thus, coding for misogynistic communication (when present) over non-misogynistic communication allowed for more valuable insights to be gleaned from the data.

4.4.4. Attribute data

Attribute data were collected for each actor in addition to relational data. For the personal communication networks, data on the gender (male or female), race (Caucasian, Asian, Black, Indian, Mixed, Hispanic, Jewish, and Unknown), age, and relationship to the misogynist terrorist (friend, family, acquaintance, friend/family of alter, transactional, roommate, and romantic interest) were collected when available. Coding criteria and definitions for relationship type were originally taken from Bright and colleagues' (2020) study of lone actor terrorists in Australia and was adapted to fit the larger variety of actors included in the current thesis (see Table 3). For the online networks, attribute data were collected on the number of comments each actor made and which media platform the actor was found to be active on.

Table 3: Coding criteria for relationship type

Relationship Type	Description
Acquaintance	Unrelated to misogynist terrorist, someone that they had spent time with, but did not consider a friend
Family	Related to the misogynist terrorist by birth or marriage (Bright et al., 2020, p. 497).
Friend	Unrelated to the misogynist terrorist, someone with which they had sustained amicable contact or directly referred to them as a friend (Bright et al., 2020, p. 497).
Family/Friend of Alter	an individual that is unrelated to the misogynist terrorist and is not directly their friend, but is the friend or family of another actor in the network
Romantic Interest	Presence of romantic ties
Roommate	An individual that the misogynist terrorist lived with for at least a month and either paid rent with or were assigned as roommates if in college.
Transactional	"The relationship was based on some type of material or financial transaction or transactions. Relationship is based on payment or professional services; i.e. the person is paid to interact with the individual" (Bright et al., 2020, p. 497)

4.4.5 Coding process

Data were manually extracted from all sources and relational data were coded into a preliminary list of communication ties, which listed the actor that initiated the communication (source), the actor that received the communication (target) and the content of the communication (i.e. what was said). For online communication, each thread was individually tracked, including the poster of the message, any direct replies, and the contents of the messages. Creating an initial list of communication data allowed for data sources to be tracked in order to ensure that each relational tie was identified in at least a primary source or two secondary sources. From there, the data was cleaned and any cases that did not conform to the coding guidelines or that was not verifiable across at least two secondary sources was removed. The content of each communication was then reviewed and systematically compared to the coding guidelines to identify the presence or absence of misogyny and violent misogyny. At this point, online messages

were also coded for the presence of racism and homophobia and all other attribute data was recorded for each individual actor in the network. Following this, the data was anonymized (each actor was assigned a number) and formatted to be compatible with the social network analysis software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). First, a node sheet was created, which contains a list of each unique actor, an anonymized identifier for each actor, and the attribute data assigned to each actor. Relational ties were coded into three separate edge lists (full network, misogynistic communication network, and violent misogynistic communication network) and was uploaded to UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) for analysis.

4.5 Analysis

All data analysis and visualization were completed using the Social Network Analysis Software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). The analysis stage began by using UCINET's Netdraw tool (Borgatti, 2002) which was used to generate sociograms in order to visualize the overall structure of each network. Attribute data were also added to the sociograms in order to visually assess patterns in the data. For the personal communication networks, the relationship type of each actor was visualized using colour and the gender of each actor was visualized using shapes. For the online networks, the different media platforms used for communication were visualized using colour.

Next, sociometric tests were conducted using UCINET and the results were summarized in table format. Network size was calculated including the number of actors in each network, as well as the number of ties between actors. Network level properties were also calculated in order to provide an overview of the structure of the network,

including average degree scores,[18] network density,[19] global clustering coefficients, and transitivity scores. These measures provide an overview of the interconnectedness of each network (Prell, 2012, p. 167). Furthermore, the global clustering coefficients and transitivity scores provide an indication of the clumpiness of a network or in other words, the extent to which a network has areas of high and low density (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 180). Reciprocity scores were calculated for each directed network.[20] As the name suggests, reciprocity scores provide a measure of the number of ties that are being reciprocated between actors. For example, in the online networks, if Actor A left a comment on Actor B's post and Actor B responded to the comment by Actor A, the tie would be reciprocal. If Actor B did not respond to the comment, the tie would not be reciprocated.

The sociometric measurements discussed above analyze the networks as whole networks (a single entity where the misogynist terrorist is treated the same as all other actors in the network). It must be acknowledged, however, that the networks in the current thesis were coded as egocentric networks (networks that are focused around a specific individual, and are comprised of the individual of interest and their identified connections), which presents a potential skew in the data towards the misogynist terrorists, who by the nature of the coding process occupy a disproportionately central

[18] Average degree is a measure of the average number of nodes that each actor in the network is connected to, and thus can provide an overview of how connected a network is.
[19] Density offers a measure of the connectedness of a network, or a measure of the extent that all actors in a network are linked together (Prell, 2012, p. 167). Density scores are calculated by considering the number of ties present in a network as a proportion of the number of possible ties in that network, which represents the probability that a tie will exist between a randomly selected pair of nodes (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 174).
[20] Reciprocity scores were not calculated for the undirected networks (personal communication full networks), as by definition, all ties are reciprocated in an undirected network.

location within their networks. In order to account for this skew, egonet scores[21] of size, average degree, and density were also calculated.

Centrality measures highlight the individuals that are most central or important to a network based on their position in that network (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 190; Prell, 2012, p. 96). For the current thesis, measures of degree centrality[22] were included. Next, subgroup level measurements, components[23] and cliques[24] were calculated. Analyzing subgroups allows for a better understanding of how different individuals are grouping together in each network.

For the personal communication networks, homophily measures[25] were employed to look at how different types of communication were occurring across and amongst males and females. These measurements were not conducted in the online networks, as it was not possible to obtain data on the gender of most individuals. Finally, attribute data was included into the analysis to assess patterns of communication and misogyny across different actor attributes. In the personal correspondence networks, communication was analyzed across different relationship types. In the online networks, communication was analyzed across media platform type. This provided an indication of where misogynistic communication was most and least commonly occurring.

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[21] Egonet scores provide a hypothetical calculation of what the different measurements would be if the ego (the misogynist terrorist) was removed from the network. In other words, it provides a measure of how the alters in each network are connected, without taking the ego into account (Prell, 2012, p. 121)

[22] Degree centrality scores represent the number of direct contacts that an actor has in a network (Prell, 2012, p. 97. In a directed network (the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks), degree centrality scores can also be expanded to indicate the number of ties that are directly given (outdegree centrality) or received (indegree centrality) by an actor (Prell, 2012, p. 78).

[23] Components are subgroups in the network through which all the actors are connected to each other by at least one path (Prell, 2012, p. 153).

[24] Cliques involve a subset of actors in which every actor is connected to one another (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 213).

[25] Homophily is the sociological concept that actors prefer to form social relations with those that are similar to themselves (Prell, 2012, p. 129).

4.6 Ethical considerations

There were no live participants in the current thesis, which greatly reduced the ethical considerations associated with the proposed research. Additionally, all data included in the project were collected from publicly available sources and did not require deception or any special accounts or permission to access. That being said, data security was still a concern for the current thesis, as stated by Denscombe (2012) ethical considerations are particularly important in cases where the research is "about humans where the individuals involved are personally identifiable", even if the data is publicly accessible (p. 122). He further argues that this still applies when documentary sources are being used and if the subject of the research is no longer alive (p. 122). The social network aspect of this research means that not only was data collected on the perpetrators of misogynist terrorism, but also on their family, friends, and acquaintances. Additionally, the usernames of hundreds of individuals on different online accounts were identified, some of which are still active and linked to personal information. In response to this, data on all actors in the network (with the exception of the misogynist terrorist) was anonymized. Non-anonymized data was password protected and stored on a secure server which the University of New Brunswick offers for graduate student use. After the completion of the thesis, data will be stored on an external hard drive for potential use in other projects or publications. The external hard drive will be locked in a secure location and all other copies of the data will be deleted.

5.0 Results

The following section presents the results of the current thesis, including the generated sociograms and summary tables of each sociometric measurement. First, the results of the personal communication networks will be presented, organized according to the different sociometric measurements that were conducted. This will be followed by a presentation of the results of the online networks, presented in a similar order according to the sociometric measurements. Each section (5.1 and 5.2) will begin with a presentation of the different sociograms that were generated to visually represent the networks in the thesis.

5.1 Personal communication results

5.1.1 Network structure and cohesion

Figure 2: Legend for personal communication networks



Figure 3: Sodini's full personal communication network



Figure 4: Rodger's full personal communication network



Figure 5: Beierle's full personal communication network



In total, eight networks were coded to represent each misogynist terrorist's personal communication. Rodger and Beierle had three different networks (full, misogynistic communication, and violent misogynistic communication) and Sodini had two networks (full and misogynistic communication) coded for this research. There was no violent misogynistic network identified for Sodini. This could be because Sodini did not engage with violent misogyny prior to his attack or it could be attributable to difficulties in the data collection process (see limitations, Section 7.0). Sociograms were generated for each misogynist terrorist's full network in order to provide a visual overview of their network structure (See Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5). The colour of each node represents the relationship of the actor to the misogynist terrorist and the shape of each node represents the gender of each actor in the network. Additionally, the

thickness of the line represents the type of communication that occurred between actors – either non-misogynistic, misogynistic, or violent misogynistic (See Figure 2 for a legend of network attributes). Due to the nature of the ties being analyzed, the full networks are undirected networks, meaning that every tie in these networks was reciprocated (as indicated by arrows at both sides of each line). Both the misogynistic communication networks and the violent misogynistic communication networks of each misogynist terrorist are directed networks, with the direction of the tie flowing from the actor discussing misogyny to the actor receiving the misogyny.

Table 4: Network structure across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Size	Number of Ties
George Sodini	Full	33	80
	Misogyny	19	19
	Violent Misogyny	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	41	138
	Misogyny	8	7
	Violent Misogyny	3	2
Scott Beierle	Full	31	90
	Misogyny	9	8
	Violent Misogyny	6	5

Table 5: Network level characteristics across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Average Degree	Density	Global Clustering Coefficient
George Sodini	Full	2.424	0.076	0.551
	Misogyny	1.000	0.056	0
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	3.366	0.084	0.787
	Misogyny	0.875	0.125	0
	Violent Misogyny	0.667	0.333	0
Scott Beierle	Full	2.903	0.097	0.792
	Misogyny	0.889	0.111	0
	Violent Misogyny	0.833	0.167	0

The measurements for network-level properties provide interesting insights into the personal communication networks of each misogynist terrorist (see Tables 4 and 5). The full networks are the largest for each misogynist terrorist, with 41 actors in Elliot Rodgers' full network, 33 actors in George Sodini's full network, and 31 actors in Scott Beierle's full network. The full network average degree centrality scores reveal that on average, individuals within Rodger and Beierle's full network are connected to approximately three other actors (avg deg: 3.366 and 2.903, respectively). In comparison, individuals within Sodini's full network are on average connected to approximately two other individuals (avg deg: 2.424).

In terms of measurements of network cohesion, the full network density scores suggest that the full networks of all three misogynist terrorists have an overall diffuse structure, suggesting that there is a low level of connections between alters in the network. Further, the global clustering coefficient scores indicate that the full networks of all three misogynist terrorists have high levels of local clustering, suggesting that there are a number of small, tightly connected groups of individuals. When comparing the full

networks of all three misogynist terrorists, Beierle's full network is the most cohesive (density: 0.097) and contains the highest level of local clustering (GCC: 0.792), while Sodini's full network is the least cohesive (density: 0.076) and contains the lowest level of local clustering (GCC: 0.551). The density score (0.084) and global clustering coefficient score (0.787) for Rodger's full network falls in between the other misogynist terrorists.

While Rodger's full network was the largest of all the misogynist terrorist networks, only 19.5% (n = 8) of his full network is present in his misogynistic communication network. In comparison, slightly more than half (57%, n = 19) of Sodini's full network and slightly less than on third (29%, n= 9) of Beierle's full networks are present in their respective misogynistic communication networks. Compared to the full networks, average degree scores dropped in each misogynistic communication network. In Sodini's misogynistic network the average degree score indicates that on average individuals in the network are connected to one other individual (avg deg: 1). In both Rodger and Beierle's misogynistic network individuals are on average connected to less than one other individual (avg deg: 0.875 and 0.889, respectively).[26]

In comparison to their full networks, density scores dropped slightly for Sodini (density: 0.056) in his misogynistic communication networks. The density score for Rodger and Beierle's (density: 0.111) misogynistic communication network increased slightly (density: 0.125) in comparison to his full network. This increase in density could

[26] It is possible for an average degree score to be less than zero because average degree calculations take the direction of a tie into account. As a result, maximum scores can only be achieved when every tie is reciprocated. (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 228). Thus if a tie is going from Actor A to Actor B, but not from Actor B to Actor A it is not counted as a complete tie, according the average degree calculations.

be a result of their being less actors in their respective misogynistic network in comparison to their full network, as density calculations are dependent on the size of the network (Scott, 2017, p. 85). Global clustering coefficients dropped to zero for all three misogynist terrorists. This suggests that while non-violent misogynistic material was spread across portions of a misogynist terrorists' full network, it was shared primarily with single individuals, rather than in groups.

The violent misogynistic networks are smaller than both the full and misogynistic networks for each misogynist terrorist. Only 7% (n = 3) of Rodger's full network and 19% (n = 6) of Beierle's full network are present in their respective violent misogynistic networks. The average degree scores for Rodger (avg deg: 0.667) and Beierle's (avg deg: 0.833) violent misogynistic network dropped slightly in comparison to their misogynistic communication network. Density scores increased slightly for both Rodger (density: 0.333) and Beierle (density: 0.167), indicating that their violent misogynistic networks are slightly more cohesive than their misogynistic networks (though again, this could be a function of the decreased size of each violent misogynistic network). Similar to the misogynistic networks, the global clustering coefficients for both Rodger and Beierle's violent misogynistic network were zero, indicating that there was little to no clustering in their network.

5.1.2 Ego network measurments

Table 6: Egonet scores across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Size	Average Degree	Density
George Sodini	Full	12	1.167	0.106
	Misogyny	1	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	30	1.600	0.055
	Misogyny	7	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	2	0	0
Scott Beierle	Full	26	1.077	0.043
	Misogyny	8	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	5	0	0

When looking at the egonet scores for each misogynist terrorist, average degree scores (Table 6) dropped from two (Sodini) or three (Rodger and Beierle) to approximately one (GS: 1.167; ER: 1.600; SB: 1.077). This indicates that when only accounting for the ties between alters (all nodes who are not ego) within each egonet, the remaining actors in that network are on average connected to one other individual. The average degree for the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks for each misogynist terrorist dropped to zero. For Rodger and Beierle, this indicates that all alters in these networks were connected only to the misogynist terrorist, suggesting that they were both highly central to their respective misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks. This is expected, given the decision to code these networks as ego networks. Sodini, however, is not connected to all the alters in his misogynistic network. In his case, the low average degree score is due to these networks being coded as directed and a lack of reciprocated ties in the networks.

When only accounting for the alter ties in the network, Sodini's full network density score increased slightly (density: 0.097, egonet density: 0.106), while Rodger (density: 0.084, egonet density 0.055) and Beierle's (density: 0.097, egonet density: 0.043) full network density score decreased slightly. Egonet density scores for the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks of each misogynist terrorist dropped to zero. This provides further support for Rodger and Beierle being highly central and connected in their misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks. Though it is important to note that this is also a function of these networks being coded as directed and there being a lack of reciprocated ties in the networks.

The size column (Table 6) provides an overview of the number of actors that each misogynist terrorist is directly connected to across each network type. Sodini is directly connected to approximately 39% (n = 12) of his full network and approximately 5% (n = 1) of his misogynistic communication network. Sodini's lack of connections in his misogynistic network suggest that he did not play a central role in spreading misogyny and that there were other actors that were more critical to the dissemination of misogyny. In comparison, Rodger is directly connected to 75% (n = 30) of his full network and Beierle is directly connected to approximately 86% (n = 26) of his full network. Additonally, both Rodger and Beierle are connected to every actor in their misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks. Overall, this indicates that while Sodini was a peripheral actor in his misogynistic network, both Rodger and Beierle were critical to the spread of misogyny and violent misogyny in their respective networks.

5.1.3 Centrality

Table 7: Full network centrality scores

Actor	Degree Centrality	nDegree
George Sodini	12	0.375
GS Actor 17	18	0.563
Elliot Rodger	30	0.750
Scott Beierle	26	0.867

Table 8: Misogynistic and violent misogynistic network centrality scores

Actor	Network Type	Size	Outdeg	nOutdeg	Indeg	nIndeg
George Sodini	Misogyny	1	0	0	1	0.056
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-	-	-
GS Actor 17	Misogyny	18	18	1.000	1	0.056
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Misogyny	7	5	0.714	2	0.286
	Violent Misogyny	2	2	1.000	0	0
Scott Beierle	Misogyny	8	8	1.000	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	5	5	1.000	0	0

Full network degree centrality scores (Table 7) indicated that both Rodger and Beierle were directly connected to a large portion of their full networks (75% and 86%, respectively). This finding is expected, given that the networks were coded as egocentric networks, with the misogynist terrorists as the focal actors. In comparison, Sodini was directly connected to only 37.5% of his full network, indicating that other actors in his network were more highly connected. For example, Actor 17 in Sodini's network had a higher degree centrality score (n = 18) than Sodini and is connected to approximately

56% of the actors in Sodini's full network, suggesting that he is the most central and important actor to this network.

Degree centrality scores for the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks (Table 8) provide a clearer picture of how misogyny and violent misogyny were spreading throughout each network. Both Rodger and Beierle spread more misogynistic content and ideology than they received from their network. Rodger's misogynistic network has eight actors in total (Table 1). Rodger shared misogynistic communication with five of these actors and received misogynistic communication from two of them, indicating that Rodger was involved in all misogynistic communication in his network. Beierle' misogynistic network consists of nine total actors with eight total ties between these actors (Table 4). Degree centrality scores indicate that Beierle spread misogyny to every other actor in his misogynistic network (n = 8) and that he did not receive any type of misogynistic communication from any actor in his network. Similar to Rodger, this suggests that he was involved in every exchange of misogyny that took place in his network, and that there was no alter-to-alter misogynistic communication.

On the other hand, Sodini was involved in very little of the misogynistic communication that took place in his network. Sodini's misogynistic network had 19 total actors with 19 total ties (Table 4). Sodini received misogynistic content from one actor and did not initiate misogynistic communication with any actors. Degree centrality scores indicate that Actor 17 in Sodini's network was responsible for spreading misogyny to all 18 other actors in Sodini's misogynistic communication network (including Sodini). Additionally, Actor 17 received misogynistic communication from one actor. This suggests that Actor 17 played a more significant role in spreading misogyny than Sodini.

Violent misogynistic degree centrality scores indicate that both Rodger and Beierle were the only actors sharing violent misogynistic communication in their respective networks. Rodger shared violent misogyny with two other actors and Beierle share violent misogyny with five other actors. There was no alter-to-alter violent misogynistic communication, nor did any alters communicate violent misogyny to Rodger or Beierle. No actors in Sodini's network communicated or received violent misogyny.

Overall, the degree centrality and normalized degree centrality scores indicate that two of the three misogynist terrorists (Rodger and Beierle) were involved (either as senders or recipients) in all the misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication in their networks. Indegree and outdegree centrality scores[27] further indicate that both Rodger and Beierle were responsible for sharing more misogyny content than they received. Beierle and Rodger were also the only two actors in any network to share violent misogyny. On the other hand, degree centrality scores demonstrate that Sodini was involved in only a very small portion of the misogynistic communication being shared in his network and that Actor 17 was more central in both the full and misogynistic networks. These results point to Actor 17's importance in spreading misogyny, though it should also be noted that the lack of misogynistic ties connected to Sodini could be attributable to difficulties in data collection (see limitations, Section 7.0). It is worth noting that Actor 17 is a prominent member of the Pick-Up Artist community. He is the author of several books that supposedly teach men how to attract younger women and he also runs in-person workshops with the goal of coaching men towards the

[27] In a directed network, degree centrality scores can also be expanded to indicate the number of ties that are directly given (outdegree centrality) or received (indegree centrality) by an actor (Prell, 2012, p. 78).

woman of their dreams. His lessons include misogynistic rhetoric such as the importance of keeping conversations with women simple; not to talking about things that are 'above women's heads'; that women do not care about or understand technology; and that all attractive women are promiscuous (Steele Ball Press, 2014).

5.1.4 Transitivity and reciprocity

Table 9: Transitivity and reciprocity scores across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Transitivity	Reciprocity
George Sodini	Full	0.108	-
	Misogyny	0	0.105
	Violent Misogyny	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	0.188	-
	Misogyny	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	0	0
Scott Beierle	Full	0.177	-
	Misogyny	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	0	0

Full network transitivity scores (Table 9) indicate that the full networks of each misogynist terrorist are weakly transitive, meaning there was an overall tendency for the misogynist terrorists full networks to have incomplete triads.[28] Both Rodger and Beierle's transitivity scores (0.188 and 0.177, respectively) are slightly higher than Sodini's transitivity score (0.108), indicating that there are more closed triads in both Rodger and Beierle's full network than Sodini's full network. In comparison, transitivity scores for the misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication networks are either zero,

[28] Triads are groups that involve three different actors. A complete triad indicates that the three actors take on a triangle like structure, where each actor in the network is connected to the other two actors. On the other hand, incomplete triads or intransitive triads are where only two sides of the triangle are connected. For example, Actor A is connected to Actor B and Actor C, but there is no tie between Actor B and C (Prell, 2012, p. 144).

indicating that there were no ties between alters in these networks. This further indicates that there was a tendency for misogyny and violent misogyny to be shared with individual actors and not in small groups, as well as the tendency for misogynist terrorists to be selective with who they shared their ideology with.

Reciprocity scores (Table 9) indicate that ties are reciprocated only in Sodini's misogynistic network (reciprocity: 0.105). In this network Actor 17 and Actor 18 each communicated misogyny to the other. It is worth noting that neither of these actors are Sodini. Actor 17 is the self-proclaimed 'dating guru', who hosts workshops to teach men how to attract younger women. Actor 18 was one of many actors who attended a workshop hosted by actor 17. Except for Sodini's misogynistic network, misogyny and violent misogyny were not found to be reciprocated in any other misogynist terrorist's networks. The lack of reciprocity in the network indicates that ideological discussions were not taking place between actors in the network. It should be noted that there were no reciprocity scores for the full networks, as they were all undirected networks (resulting in 100% reciprocity between all actors).

5.1.5 Cliques

Analysis of cliques (Table 10) indicate that Rodger's full network has the largest number of cliques (n = 17), followed by Sodini's full network (n = 6), while Beierle's full network has the least number of cliques (n = 5). Overall, the misogynist terrorists were members of majority of the cliques in their full network. Sodini was a member of approximately 83% (n = 5) of the cliques in his full network, while Beierle was a member of approximately 80% (n = 4) of the cliques in his full network, and Rodger was a member of approximately 76% (n = 13) of the cliques in his full network.

Table 10: Cliques identified in full networks

Misogynist Terrorist	Actors	How Actors in Each Clique are Related
George Sodini	1,2,4	Family
	1,2,3	Family
	1,4,5,6	Family
	1,31,32	Neighbours
	1,15,17	All connected to 'The Right Attitude Workshop'
	31,32,33	Sodini's neighbours and their daughter
Elliot Rodger	1,3,5,6,8	Family
	1,3,5,8,16	Family
	1,3,7,8	Family
	1,8,16,17	Family
	1,3,5,16,28	Family + Rodger's Psychologist
	1,5,13	Family and Friend of Family
	1,2,14	Roommates
	1,18,19	Roommates
	1,26,27	Roommates
	1,30,31	Roommates
	1,9,15	Friends
	1,10,11	Friends
	1,20,22	Friends
	4,5,16	Family
	3,23,24	Rodger's mother and her friends
	3,8,33	Family and Friend of Family
	30,31,35	Roommates and Friend of Roommates
Scott Beierle	1,2,3,4,6	Family
	1,4,5	Family
	1,26,27	Friends/Acquaintances
	1,28,29,30,31	Work Colleagues
	23,24,25	Friends

Note. Gray columns indicate cliques that did not contain the misogynist terrorists

The tendency for the misogynist terrorist to be found in a majority of the cliques is not surprising, as the networks were coded as egocentric, with the misogynist terrorists as ego.

When analyzing the actors that make up the identified cliques, it was found that cliques were generally founded based on the type of relation between actors, with the most common types being between family, friends, and roommates. This pattern held true for all three misogynist terrorists. A few exceptions to this trend include cliques based on similar attendance at an event (Sodini), and work colleagues (Beierle). No cliques were identified in the misogynistic or violent misogynistic networks for any of the three misogynist terrorists. This is in line with the results of the cohesion measurements (Section 5.1.1) and centrality scores (Section 5.1.3), which suggest that there is a lack of connections between alters in the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks.

5.1.6 Homophily

Table 11: Communication by gender across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Males	Females	Male to Male	Male to Female	Female to Male	Female to Female
George Sodini	Full	19	14	36	19	19	6
	Misogyny	15	4	15	4	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	32	9	76	22	22	18
	Misogyny	7	1	6	1	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	3	0	2	0	0	0
Scott Beierle	Full	16	15	34	20	20	16
	Misogyny	3	6	2	6	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	5	1	4	1	0	0

Homophily measurements (Table 11) indicated that all three misogynist terrorists have more men in their networks than women, and this held true across all network types.

The full networks of all three misogynist terrorists followed a similar pattern, with the highest number of communication ties occuring between male actors, followed by communication ties between male and female actors, and the fewest number of communication ties occuring between females.

Results from the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks indicate that men were solely responsible for spreading misogyny and violent misogyny throughout each network. No women were involved in sharing misogynisitc communication in any form. In the misogynistic communication networks, the gender of the recipients of the misogynistic communication varies based on the misogynist terrorist. In both Sodini and Rodger's misogynist communication network, the majority of the recipients of miosgynistic communication were male. For Sodini, 79% (n = 15) of the recipients of misogynistic communication were male and 21% (n = 4) were female and for Rodger, 86% (n = 6) were male and 14% (n = 1) was female. An opposite trend was found in Beierle's misogynistic communication network, where only 33% (n = 4) of the recipients of misogynistic communcation were male and 66% (n = 8) were female. It is worth noting that Beierle was the only actor communicating misogyny in his network and when communicating misogyny to women he primarily used it to attack or insult them, rather than as a form of misogynistic signalling or discourse. Results from the violent misogynistic communication networks suggest that violent misogyny was more frequently communicated to men than to women. Violent miosgyny was only shared with a female once, which was initiated by Beierle. It is important to note that in this case he was not threating her with violent misogyny, but rather he mailed postcards and writings

containing themes of rape and gang rape to his brother and sister-in-law. Rodger shared violent misogyny only with men.

5.1.7 Group level characteristics

Table 12: Number of actors by relationship type across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Relationship to MT	Full	Misogynistic	Violent Misogynistic
George Sodini	Friend	-	-	-
	Family	5	-	-
	Acquaintance	20	17	-
	Friend of Alter	4	-	-
	Transactional	2	1	-
	Roommates	-	-	-
	Romantic Interest	1	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Friend	6	-	2
	Family	7	2	-
	Acquaintance	2	-	-
	Friend of Alter	10	-	-
	Transactional	6	2	-
	Roommates	9	3	-
	Romantic Interest	-	-	-
Scott Beierle	Friend	5	2	1
	Family	6	-	2
	Acquaintance	10	5	-
	Friend of Alter	3	-	-
	Transactional	2	-	2
	Roommates	2	-	-
	Romantic Interest	2	-	-

Group-level characteristics (Table 12), which incorporate data on actor attributes allow for a better understanding of the structure of each misogynistic terrorists' networks, as well as patterns to the flow of misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication throughout these networks. Full network scores indicate that for the most part the misogynist terrorists were connected to all different types of people. The exceptions to this include that no friends or roommates were identified in Sodini's network.

Additionally, no romantic interests were identified in Rodger's full network. Sodini's misogynistic network contained primarily acquaintances (n = 17) and one transactional actor (n = 1). It is worth noting that Sodini was only directly tied to the transactional actor, who was Actor 17 - the 'relationship guru' who mentored Sodini and others during a dating workshop focused on how to attract young women. In Sodini's case, this suggests that the misogyny was being shared to more peripheral parts of his network, those individuals who were outside the realm of his close personal contacts. Rodger's misogynistic network consisted of roommates (n = 3), family (n = 2), and transactional (n = 2). The transactional actors both acted as counsellors for Rodger, providing mental health and social skills counselling. Two of the roommates shared misogyny with Rodger and Rodger shared misogyny with the other five actors. Beierle shared misogyny with friends (n = 2) and acquaintances (n = 5). Rodger shared violent misogyny with friends (n = 2). Beierle also shared violent misogyny with a friend (n = 1), as well as with family (n = 2), and transactional actors (n = 2). In Beierle's case, the two transactional actors were individuals who helped Beierle create some of his misogynistic content.[29] One actor designed Sodini's website, which contained misogynistic and violent misogynistic themes and the other actor rented out a studio space to Sodini and put the music in the background of Beierle's misogynistic and violent misogynistic songs. None of the misogynist terrorists shared misogyny with friends of friends/family of alters or romantic interests. Neither Rodger or Beierle shared violent misogyny with accquaintances, alter ties, roommates, or romantic interests.

[29] Note: These two actors were not involved in the actual generation of Beierle's misogynistic ideologies. Rather they were involved more peripherally in helping Beierle release his ideologies in different formats online. For this reason, even though they interacted with violent misogynistic content created by Beierle, they were not coded as communicating misogyny or violent misogyny themselves.

5.2 Online networks

Next, the results of the online networks will be presented, beginning with the relevant sociograms. The online networks were created in order to provide an additional source of information about the communication of misogynist terrorists. This will be followed by the presentation of the relevant sociometric measurements, including summary tables.

5.2.1 Network Structure and Cohesion

Figure 6: Legend for online networks



In total, six networks were coded to represent the data collected on each misogynistic terrorist's online communication. Three networks (full, misogyny, and violent misogyny) were coded for both Sodini and Rodger. No information about online communication was able to be identified for Beierle. It should be noted, however, that this does not mean such communication did not exist. Rather, the opposite is likely true, as police reports indicated that Beierle communicated over a number of social media platforms (See Warren, 2018). However, this information was never publicly released by the police and thus was not able to be included in this research.

Figure 7: Sodini's full online network



Figure 8: Sodini's online misogynistic communication network



Figure 9: Sodini's online violent misogynistic communication network



Figure 10: Rodger's full online network



Figure 11: Rodger's online misogynistic communication network



Figure 12: Rodger's online violent misogynistic communication network



Sociograms were generated for each of the six included networks (See Figures 7-12). The colours of each node represent the different media platforms that each actor was active on (See Figure 6 for a legend of network attributes). All of the actors in Sodini's

network communicated on the website Isitnormal.com and actors in Rodger's networks were from four different sites: Bodybuilding.com, PUAHate.com, Reddit, and Youtube. It is of note that PUAHate.com is a website that is part of the manosphere, and has been referred to as an 'Incel-adjacent' site (Witt, 2020, p. 5). While bodybuilding.com is not directly situated in the manosphere, it has been highlighted as a site that Incels tend to frequent, particularly the miscellaneous section (Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 162), which is where all data was collected from for the current thesis. In comparison, Reddit (with the exception of some subreddits)[30] and Youtube are generally considered more mainstream social media sites that are frequent by a large population of the general public. In the full network sociograms, the thickness of the line represents the type of communication that occurred between actors (non-misogynistic, misogynistic, or violent misogynistic).

Table 13: Components and component sizes across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Number of Components	Size(s)
George Sodini	Full	1	143
	Misogyny	5	6 / 4 / 4 / 4 / 3
	Violent Misogyny	1	2
Elliot Rodger	Full	1	414
	Misogyny	10	105 / 21 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 3 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 2
	Violent Misogyny	5	11 / 4 / 2 / 2 / 2

Both Sodini and Rodger's full networks contained only one component (Table 13). Sodini's misogynistic network was composed of five separate relatively small

[30] Note: No data was identified in these subreddits and thus these subreddits were not included in the thesis. Thus while certain literature has highlighted Reddit as a home for the manosphere (see Ging, 2019, p. 641; Preston et al., 2021, p. 3), the subreddit thread included in the current thesis (r/cringe) has not been identified as a central part of the manosphere.

components and Rodger's misogynistic network contained ten different components. Of these ten components, one contained 105 actors, including Rodger. The second largest component contained 21 actors, all from Bodybuilding.com, and the remaining eight components contained three actors or less, from either Bodybuilding.com or PUAHate.com. Sodini's violent misogynistic network was composed of a single component of only two actors. On the other hand, Rodger's violent misogynistic network was composed of 5 different components, the largest of which contained eleven actors (nine from PUAHate, one on YouTube, and Rodger). Overall, the presence of different components suggests that there pockets of misogyny and violent misogyny occuring in the online networks. It also indicates that not all misogyny and violent misogyny in the networks is going through the misogynist terrorists.

Table 14: Network size across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Size	Number of Ties
George Sodini	Full	143	163
	Misogyny	21	16
	Violent Misogyny	2	1
Elliot Rodger	Full	414	691
	Misogyny	146	155
	Violent Misogyny	21	17

Table 15: Cohesion measures across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Average Degree	Density	Global Clustering Coefficient
George Sodini	Full	1.14	0.008	0.089
	Misogyny	0.762	0.038	0
	Violent Misogyny	0.500	0.500	0
Elliot Rodger	Full	1.669	0.004	0.222
	Misogyny	1.062	0.007	0.057
	Violent Misogyny	0.810	0.040	0

Measurements of network size (Table 14) indicate that the online networks followed a pattern similar to that of the personal communication networks, where the full networks were the largest and contained the most ties, followed by the misogynistic networks and then the violent misogynistic networks, which had the least number of actors and ties. Rodger's full network was the largest of the two misogynist terrorists with 414 actors. In comparison, Sodini's full network had 143 actors. The significant difference in the size between the two actor's full networks is likely due to Sodini's attack taking place in 2009 (five years earlier than Rodger's attack). At this time, computer technology was less developed and social media was less ubiquitous than later years, making it likely that Sodini was less involved in social media forums. It is likely that this also affected data collection, as due to the passage of time, less of Sodini's online footprint was preserved online and thus was inaccessible.

Network cohesion measurements (Table 15) also offer interesting structural insights into each misogynist terrorist's networks. Full network average degree scores indicate that an average actor in Sodini's network is connected to approximately one other actor (avg degree: 1.14). In comparison, average degree scores indicate that an average individual in Rodger's full network (avg degree: 1.669) is slightly more connected than an actor in Sodini's network. Full network density scores indicate that both Rodger (density: 0.004) and Sodini's (density: 0.008) full networks are highly diffuse. This suggests that the actors in each network are not highly connected to each other. Additionally, global centrality scores indicate that Sodini's full network has very low levels of network clustering (GCC: 0.089). In comparison, the global clustering coefficient for Rodger's full network is higher than Sodini's, but still indicates low levels

of local clustering (GCC: 0.222). Overall, these measurements indicate Sodini's full network is highly diffuse and contains almost no clusters of tightly knit individuals. Rodger's full network is also highly diffuse, however it contains a small number of tightly knit clusters of individuals.

Using their full networks for comparison, Rodger's misogynistic network (n = 146) is slightly more than one-third of the size of his full network. In other words, 35% of Rodger's full network either communicated misogyny or received misogynistic communication (or both). Sodini's misogynistic network (n = 21) is slighly less than one-sixth of the size of his full network, meaning that approximately 15% of the actors in his full network either communicated or received misogyny. Average degree scores dropped slightly for both actors in comparison to their full networks. An average individual in Rodger's misogynistic network is connected to approximately one other individual (avg degree: 1.062), while an average individual in Sodini's misogynistic network is connected to less than one other individual (avg degree: 0.762). Density scores for Sodini's misogynistic network indicate a slightly more cohesive network than his full network (density: 0.038). Rodger's density scores also increased in comparison to his full network, though it was an extremely small increase (density: 0.007). Overall, the density scores for both misogynist terrorists still indicate a highly diffuse network structure, suggesting a lack of connection between alters in the network. The global clustering coefficient in Sodini's misogynistic network dropped to zero, indicating that there were no smaller groups of tightly connected individuals. This suggests that misogyny was primarily shared with individual actors and not in groups. Further, in the online context this suggests that misogynistic actors did not group together on Isitnormal.com. Rather,

misogyny appears to have been spread more sporadically by individual actors. The global clustering coefficient for Rodger's misogynistic network is lower than his full network, but still indicates the presence of some local clustering (GCC: 0.057). This suggests that there were some, though not many, smaller pockets of misogynistic discussion occuring in Rodger's online network.

The violent misogynistic networks are smaller than both the full and misogynistic networks for each misogynist terrorist. Only 1% (n = 2) of Sodini's full online network and 5% (n = 21) of Rodger's full network are present in their respective violent misogynistic networks. In the violent misogynistic networks, both Sodini and Rodgers's average degree scores are lower than their misogynistic and full networks (avg degree: 0.500 and 0.810, respectively). Density scores increased for both actors in comparison to their full and misogynistic networks (GS density: 0.500; ER density: 0.040), but still indicate an overall diffuse network structure. It should be noted that the increase in density is likely a result of the decreased size of these networks, especially in Sodini's network which contained only two actors (Scott, 2017, p. 85). The global clustering coefficients for both Sodini and Rodger's violent misogynistic network are zero, indicating that there were no smaller groupings of alters in the network. Overall, the violent misogynistic network structure suggests that violent misogyny was being spread by individual actors rather than within small groups. In the online context, this suggests that when a violent misogynistic comment was posted by an actor, there was a tendancy for it to receive no violent misogynistic responses. It is important to note that this does not mean that individuals online were not reading these violent misogynistic comments, rather it suggests that there was a lack of violent misogynistic communication taking

place between actors (i.e. commenting on violent misogynistic posts with more violent misogyny).

5.2.2 Ego network measurments

Table 16: Egonet scores across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	Network Type	Size	Average Degree	Density
George Sodini	Full	24	0.292	0.013
	Misogyny	3	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	136	0.721	0.005
	Misogyny	43	0.093	0.002
	Violent Misogyny	9	0	0

Egonet scores were also calculated for the online networks (Table 16) in order to account for the bias towards the misogynist terrorist that originated from the way each network was coded. The size column (Table 16) indicates that Sodini is directly connected to approximately 17% (n = 24) of the actors in his full network and that he is directly connected to approximately 14% (n = 3) of the actors in his misogynistic network. This is suggestive that Sodini was involved in misogynistic communication online, but was not the only actor communicating it. It should be noted that while there was a violent misogynistic network present for Sodini, he was not an actor in it, as there was no evidence that he discussed or received violent misogynistic communication online.[31]

In comparison, Rodger is connected to approximately 33% (n = 136) of his full network, to approximately 30% (n = 43) of his misogynistic network, and to 45% (n = 9)

[31] This was possible due to the way the networks were coded. By including any thread that the misogynist terrorist as a part of, but coding ties based on direct replies it was possible to identify ties outside of just the misogynist terrorists.

of his violent misogynistic network. Overall, this indicates that Rodger was heavily inolved in the misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication in the sites he visited online. It further suggests that Rodger was less selective about how he shared both his misogynistic and violent misogynistic ideologies with online, compared to in person.

The egonet average degree scores (Table 16) for both Rodger and Sodini dropped for all network types in comparison to non-egonet average degree scores (Table 15). Sodini's egonet scores suggest that if Sodini was removed from his full network, an individual left in the network would be connected, on average, to less than one person[32] (avg degree: 0.292). Removing Rodger from his full network results in an average individual being to slightly less than one individual (avg degree: 0.721). These scores suggests that both misogynist terrorists were connected to a large portion of their full networks.

The misogynistic networks' egonet average degree scores also suggest that the misogynist terrorists were highly connected in their respective networks. If Rodger were removed from his misogynistic network, on average the remaining actors would be connected to slightly more than zero other actors (egonet avg degree: 0.093). When considering only the ties between alters in Rodger's violent misogynistic network egonet average degree scores indicated that the average alter was connected to no other actors. The same was found for Sodini's misogynistic network (egonet avg degree: 0). It is important to note that while this suggests that the misogynist terrorists were important to and highly connected within their misogynistic networks (and Rodger in his violent misogynistic network), it does not mean that they were the only ones through which

[32] It is possible for an average degree score to be less than zero because average degree calculations take the direction of a tie into account (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 228).

misogyny (and violent misogyny) was communicated. Rather, the calculations for the egonet average degree scores take direction into account, meaning that a low level of reciprocity between actors would also lead to lower egonet average degree scores. This is confirmed by looking at Sodini and Rodger's misogynistic sociograms (Figures 8 and 11), as well as Rodger's violent misogynistic sociogram (Figure 12), which visually demonstrate the ties between other actors.

Full network egonet density scores (Table 16) increased slightly for Sodini (density: 0.008, egonet density: 0.013) and Rodger (density: 0.004, egonet density: 0.005) in comparison to their non-egonet density scores (Table 15). While the increased density suggests that removing the misogynist terrorists would increase network cohesion, it is important to note that the increase in density is so small as to be negligable. This suggests that only consider the ties between alter in the network would have little effect on overall network density. In comparison to the non-egonet density scores, egonet density scores in the misogynistic networks dropped for both Sodini (density: 0.038, egonet density: 0) and Rodger (density: 0.007, egonet density: 0.002). Egonet density score also dropped to zero in Rodger's violent misogynistic network (density: 0.040; egonet density: 0). It should be noted however, that an egonet density score of zero does not mean that there are no connections between alters in the network. Rather, density scores are dependant on both network size and reciprocity of ties in directed networks (Borgatti et al., 2018, pp. 175 & 228). Thus, given that the density scores were low to begin with (i.e. in the non-egonet measurements) and that there was very few reciprocated ties in the network, removal of the ego (the central actor) combined with the mathmatical properties of density calculations resulted in egonet scores of zero.

5.2.3 Centrality

Table 17: Misogynist terrorist degree centrality scores across networks

Misogynist Terrorist	*Network Type*	*Outdeg*	*nOutDeg*	*Indeg*	*nIndeg*
George Sodini	Full	12	0.085	13	0.092
	Misogyny	1	0.050	2	0.100
	Violent Misogyny	-	-	-	-
Elliot Rodger	Full	58	0.140	105	0.254
	Misogyny	21	0.145	27	0.186
	Violent Misogyny	8	0.400	1	0.050

Degree centrality scores (Table 17) indicate that, of the 142 other actors in Sodini's full network, he initiated communication with 12 actors and received communication from 13 actors. Degree centrality scores further indicate that of the 21 actors in Sodini's misogynistic communication network he shared misogynistic communication with one actor. It is worth noting here that while Sodini was not found to be involved in any misogynistic communication in his personal communication network, he did engage with misogyny online. Comparing Sodini's degree centrality scores to other actors in his network suggests that he communicated misogyny at the same rate as others in his network, as fifteen other actors engaged in misogynistic communication once and no actors communicated misogyny more than once. In terms of receiving misogynistic communication, Actor 93 received misogynistic communication from five different individuals; Actors 89 and 91 received misogynistic communication from three different individuals; and Sodini received misogynistic communication from two other individuals. All of these actors were original posters (the individuals who started the threads), so the higher levels of misogynistic comments on their posts could be indicative

that the content of their posts contained subject matter that was more conducive to misogynistic discourse than the other original posters.

Of the 145 other actors in Rodger's full network, Rodger communicated with 58 actors and received communication from 105 actors. When compared to other actors, Rodger had the highest out-degree centrality score across all network types. This means that he left the most comments in his full network and communicated more misogyny and violent misogyny than any other actor in his network. In total, Rodger shared misogynistic communication directly with 21 actors in his network, which was larger than the next highest number of misogynistic ties made by a single actor (Actors 2, 22, 58, 303, 353, 374, and 402 all communicated misogyny to three other actors). All of these actors were from PUAHate.com. Looking at Indegree centrality scores, Rodger received misogynistic communication from approximately 27 actors in his network. The actors with the next highest in-degree centrality scores received misogynistic communication from 19 (Actor 361) and 10 (Actor 261) actors, respectively.

Of the 20 other actors in Rodger's violent misogynistic network, Rodger shared violent misogyny with eight actors. The actor with the next higest out-degree centrality score (Actor 361) made two violent misogynistic comments and seven other actors made a single violent misogynistic comment. This suggests that although Rodger was not the only one communicating violent misogynistic content and ideologies, he was responsible for a large portion of the violent misogynistic communication that was taking place online in the spaces where he participated. In comparison, he received violent misogynistic communication from only one actor. It is worth noting that while 17 other

actors received violent misogynistic communication once, no actors recived more than one violent misogynistic comment.

5.2.4 Transitivity and reciprocity

Table 18: Transitivity and reciprocity scores across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	*Network Type*	*Transitivity*	*Reciprocity*
George Sodini	Full	0.03	0.086
	Misogyny	0	0
	Violent Misogyny	0	0
Elliot Rodger	Full	0.030	0.287
	Misogyny	0.006	0.116
	Violent Misogyny	0	0.118

Full network transitivity scores (Table 18) indicate that both Sodini and Rodger's full networks have very little transitivity (transitivity: 0.03), suggesting that there were very few closed triads in their respective networks. In comparison to his full network, Rodger's misogynistic network has a slightly higher transitivity score, though it still indicates a very low level of transitivity in the network (transitivity: 0.006). Transitivity scores for Sodini's misogynistic network, as well as both Rodger and Sodini's violent misogynistic network were zero. This was expected for Sodini's violent misogynistic network, as it only contains two actors, making it impossible to have a complete triad. In Rodger's network, a transitivity score of zero indicates that there was no communication amongst alters in the network.

Full network reciprocity scores (Table 18) indicate that there is a very low level of reciprocity (~9%) in Sodini's full network, suggesting that very few actors were replying to one other, rather actors were more likely to leave a comment that went unanswered. It is important to consider here that just because a comment was unanswered does not necessarily mean that it was not read by different actors on the sites. The potential

implications of this are discussed further below. Reciprocity scores for Rodger's full network are higher than Sodini's, but still indicate a low level of reciprocity among actors (~29%, reciprocity: 0.287), indicating that these sites had an overall low reply rate between actors. The reciprocity scores in Rodger's misogynistic network are slightly lower than in his full network, indicating a low level of reciprocity in the network (reciprocity: 0.116). This suggests that there were some instances where misogynistic exchanges occured between actors, but that a large portion of misogyny in the network was posted by an actor without attracting other misogynistic responses.[33] Reciprocity scores in Rodger's violent misogynistic network are slightly higher than in his misogynistic network, but lower than in his full network (reciprocity: 0.118). Overall, however, Rodger's violent misogynistic reciprocity score is low, and indicates that while there was a small number of actors that engaged in violent misogynistic communication, the majority of violent misogyny was sent out by an actor, without receiving a violent misogynistic response. Reciprocity scores in both Sodini's misogynistic and violent misogynistic network are zero. This suggests that misogynistic communication on Isitnormal.com was not taking place in groups, but rather was being sent out by individual actors, without receiving misogynistic responses. It should be noted that the reciprocity scores do not account for communication between misogyny and violent misogyny. For example, if an actor in the network posted violent misogynistic material and another actor reponded with misogynistic material that was not violent, this would

[33] It must be noted that the way the data were coded only allowed for reciprocity to be measured between the same type of communication (i.e. misogynistic responses to misogynistic communication and violent misogynistic responses to violent misogynistic communication). Future studies should look to address this limitation.

not be recorded as a reciprocal tie in either the misogynistic or the violent misogynistic networks.

5.2.5 Attribute data

Table 19: Number of actors by media platform across network types

Misogynist Terrorist	*Media Platform*	*Full*	*Misogynistic*	*Violent Misogynistic*
Elliot Rodger	BodyBuilding	178	55	4
	PUAHate	210	86	15
	Reddit	20	2	0
	YouTube	5	2	1

Incorporating attribute data into the analysis allows for a better understanding of the intersection between different characteristics and the transmission of misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication. Firstly, patterns in how the different types of communication occurred across different website and forum types was examined (Table 19). The most actors were identified on PUAHate (n = 210), followed by Bodybuilding (n = 178), with less actors on both Reddit (n = 20) and YouTube (n = 5). Though it should be noted that the large difference in size between the different sites is likely a result of data collection, as the most archived material[34] was able to be identified from these sites, while less archived material was able to be collected from Rodger's YouTube account.

The misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks followed a similar pattern, with the most actors being from PUAHate, followed by Bodybuilding, while Youtube and Reddit having less actors. Looking proportionally, of the total number of PUAHate

[34] Archived material was identified online primarily in the form of screenshots of original conversations that were saved by different internet users following the attacks. Some data from Reddit and Youtube was still available and was accessed directly on the sites.

members, almost half (41%, n = 86) of them engaged in some form of misogynistic communication and approximately 7% (n = 15) engaged in some form of violent misogynistic communication (either receiving, sending, or both). Of all the actors in Bodybuildling.com, approximately 31% engaged in misogynistic communication and approximately 2% engaged in violent misogynistic communication. For Reddit, 10% (n = 2) of all actors the actors on Reddit were involved in misogynistic communication (one communicated misogyny and the other received the misogynistic communication). On Youtube, approximately 40% of the actors (n = 2) received misogynistic communication and 20% (n = 1) received violent misogynistic communication. This actor received either the misogynistic communication from Rodger, and no other misogynistic or violent misogynistic communication was identified on Youtube. Overall, this suggests that both PUAHate and Bodybuidling.com were hotspots for misogyny and violent misogyny. These two sites had the greatest proportion of actors participating in misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication. Additionally, actors on these were both spreading and receiving misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication independent of the misogynist terrorists.

It is worth noting that all the actors in Sodini's networks were active on Isitnormal.com, a site not known to be related to Incels or the manosphere. It is likely, however, that Sodini had other social media interaction that was unable to be identified during data collection. For example, there is evidence that Sodini as a member of a private pickup artist forum, as an inidvidual must become a member of the forum before attending any dating workshops. However this data was not able to be located without the

use of deception to enter the site and thus was not able to be accessed for the current thesis.

Table 20: Number of actors directly connected to the misogynist terrorists across media and network type

Misogynist Terrorist	*Media*	*Full*	*Misogynistic*	*Violent Misogynistic*
George Sodini	Isitnormal.com	24	3	-
Elliot Rodger	Bodybuilding.com	72	19	0
	PUAHate.com	58	21	8
	Reddit	1	1	0
	YouTube	5	2	1

Secondly, the misogynist terrorists' direct connections were analyzed across media type (Table 20), in order to develop a better sense of how each misogynist terrorist was communicating online. As stated above, all of Sodini's identified communication occurred on isitnormal.com. Rodger communicated directly with 72 actors on Bodybuidling.com and 58 actors on PUAHate.com. In comparison, he communicated directly with only five actors on Youtube and only one actor on Reddit. It should be noted that Rodger was not identified as having an account on Reddit, rather another user located one of Rodger's videos and shared it to Reddit. In this case, while Rodger himself was not directly a member of Reddit, his ideological material was still spread to and consumed by actors on Reddit. Rodger's misogynistic ties were also largely concentrated in Bodybuidling.com (n = 19) and PUAHate.com (n = 21). This indicates that most of the misogynistic comments that Rodger was either sending or receiving came from sites associated with the manosphere. Rodger's violent misogynistic ties were primarily on PUAHate.com (n = 8), with one actor tie to an actor on Youtube. Overall, these findings

suggest that PUAHate.com was an important locale for the transmission of misogyny and violent misogyny in Rodger's network.

6.0 Discussion

The thesis has yielded a number of relevant findings, which are discussed in detail below. When reading these conclusions, it is important to note that it is not possible to draw generalizable conclusions from only three case studies. However, given the preliminary nature of this research these conclusions should be taken as an initial foray into understanding the networks and ideological transmission of misogynist terrorists and thus a beginning platform from which to conduct future research.

6.1 Personal communication networks

6.1.1 The full personal communication networks of misogynist terrorists tend to be normal

The misogynist terrorists' full personal correspondence networks were diffuse, with smaller pockets of clustering. They were comprised of a wide variety of relationship types, including family, friends, acquaintances, roommates (except Sodini), and romantic interests (except Rodger). Additionally, the clusters in the network tended to be comprised of individuals of the same relationship type (i.e. family clustered together, friends clustered together), with little overlap between the different types of relationships. Comparing this network structure to the extant literature on personal community structure indicates that the misogynist terrorists had overwhelmingly normal personal correspondence networks. For example, pioneering research on the personal communities of individuals living near Toronto found that an average person's personal community

tend to be sparsely knit and have lower density scores – very similar to the misogynist terrorists full networks (Wellman, 1982, p. 9). Wellman (1982) also provided some explanation for the small areas of local clustering, as he identified that "most East Yorkers had a differentiated set of intimate community ties" including family, friends, neighbours, and co-workers (p. 9). In a more recent study, Hofmann (2018) utilized social network analysis to map the full, ideological, signalling, and support networks of two lone actor terrorists. The full networks of both lone actor terrorists in his study also had low density scores with high levels of local clustering (Hofmann, 2018, p. 665), further suggesting that the full networks of the misogynist terrorists in the current study are typical of other violent lone actors.

Overall, this implies that the misogynist terrorists were not socially encapsulated leading up to their attack. From a terrorism and security perspective, this is important, as it demonstrates that there are potential avenues for identification of radical behavior and subsequent intervention. In particular, research has highlighted that those close to the individual developing violent extremist beliefs are in the best position to notice warning signs and behavior changes (Muna, 2020, p. 20; Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 3). A handful of researchers argue that family members are in the best position for early identification that a person is becoming involved in violent extremism (See Harris-Hogan, 2014; Muna, 2020). In contrast, Williams and colleagues (2016) have argued that friends are best positioned (over family, counsellors, or clergy) to notice early signs of violent extremism (p. 50).

In fact, all three misogynist terrorists included the current thesis had contact with law enforcement in the weeks or months leading up to their attacks. In two of these cases,

the misogynist terrorists were reported to the authorities after a member of their network became aware of and concerned by their ideological material.[35] In April of 2014, Rodger uploaded several videos to YouTube "in order to express [his] views and feelings to the world", including one entitled "Why do Girls Hate me so Much?" (Rodger, 2014, p. 133). Reportedly, his parents[36] watched the videos and were concerned enough with the content to report the videos to police, requesting a welfare check be conducted on Rodger (Rodger, 2014, p. 134). Upon responding to call, the police found no reason to take further action, however in his manifesto Rodger wrote:

> *"If they had demanded to search my room…That would have ended everything. For a few horrible seconds I thought it was all over. When they left, the biggest wave of relief swept over me. It was so scary."* (Rodger, 2014, p. 134)

In a similar manner, Beierle was reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in August of 2018 by a friend and his wife, after Beierle sent his friend a copy of his novel (Warren, 2018, p. 31). The FBI, however, determined the tip unactionable, as nobody was directly targeted in the novel.[37] While these reports may have been futile in the hands of law enforcement, these findings demonstrate that the close contacts of the misogynist terrorists that were studied also played an important role in the identification and reporting of problematic behavior and ideological content.

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[35] Sodini was reported to law enforcement after bringing an inert grenade onto a bus and asking the person sitting beside him if he wanted to hold it (Hamill, 2009b), however it is worth noting that he was not directly reported by any member of his personal communication network and was not reported because of any of his ideological misogyny

[36] There are conflicting reports throughout the media as to who exactly contacted the police in this instance. However, a statement by a family lawyer suggested that it was Rodger's parents who alerted authorities to the videos (Candea & Mohney, 2014).

[37] Beierle was in contact with law enforcement four other times: twice for groping women's buttocks (once in 2012 and once in 2016), once for trespassing (2014), was once investigated for destruction of property (2004), and was once investigated for inappropriate contact with a female student (2006) (See Warren, 2018, p. 55).

Furthermore, family members have been highlighted as important in not just the identification of a person with radical ideologies, but also as potential sources of protection and rehabilitation (Spalek, 2016, p. 1, see also Muna, 2020, p. 19). Family-based programs have already been developed across the globe in attempt to counter radicalization to Islamic extremism. For example, in Australia a program sponsored by the Norway Action Plan Against Violent Extremism was developed in attempt to prevent youth from travelling to Iraq and Syria (Muna, 2020, p. 22). This program focused on facilitating conversations between at-risk youth and their parents. Another program attempting to intervene in youth travelling to join Islamic extremist groups abroad is the German program HAYAT, which is a family counselling program with the goal of facilitating families and communities to create an environment to help dissuade youth from radical ideals (Koehler, 2013, pp. 191–197). Without commenting on the specific content that would be required to facilitate similar programs, the results of this thesis do offer promising preliminary evidence that personal contacts also play a role in identification of those that are becoming radicalized by misogynistic and/or violent misogynistic ideologies and by consequence the potential usefulness of these programs to combat misogynist terrorism.

One problem identified in this line of research is that while family, friends, and potentially other close contacts may be able to identify warning signs of extremism, they may also be less willing to report these warning signs (Williams et al., 2016, p. 51). Williams and colleagues (2016) further suggest that the close contacts of an individual are often reluctant to intervene, due to fear of getting their family/friend into trouble or fear of damaging the relationship with their family/friend (p. 51, see also Neo et al., 2018,

p. 181). This was further highlighted by the former assistant to the US President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Lisa Monaco, who stated that "in more than 80 percent of cases involving home-grown violent extremists, people in the community – whether peers or family members or authority figures or even strangers – had observed warning signs a person was becoming radicalized to violent. But more than half of those community members downplayed or dismissed their observations without intervening"' (Monaco, 2014, as cited in Neo et al., 2018, p. 177). Neo and Colleagues (2018) have also identified a similar trend, but posit that reluctancy to report may also be a result of difficulties in understanding what the red-flags or warnings signs of radicalization are (pp. 186-187). They suggest that there is a vital need "to educate the bystanders that the threat posed by radicalised individuals is severe" (Neo et al., 2018, p. 187). This stresses the importance of bringing awareness to misogyny as a precursor and ideological underpinning of violence.

6.1.2 Misogynist terrorists tend to be selective with who they share their ideology with in-person

The findings from the personal communication networks indicated that the misogynist terrorists had a tendency to be selective with who they shared their misogynistic ideologies in person. This is indicated by the size of each network and degree centrality scores, which indicated that the misogynist terrorists were communicating misogyny with approximately 20% - 50% of the actors in their terrorists full networks and that they were communicating violent misogyny with even fewer.[38] At first consideration, it is not entirely surprising that the misogynist terrorists were selective

[38] It is important to note that Sodini presents a unique case, as he communicated no misogyny in the network, which will be further discussed below.

in initiating misogynistic communication, given the overtly deviant nature of their misogynistic and violent misogynistic ideologies. However, this finding does suggest that the misogynist terrorists were, at least in part, cognizant of the contentious nature of their ideology. This is particularly evident in Rodger's manifesto, where he stated:

> *"I enjoyed having conversations with [Actor 22] about a wide variety of subjects, including politics, history, business, and architecture. I wisely refrained from revealing any of my political views, of which disturbed most people"* (Rodger, 2014, p. 93).[39]

Additionally he stated:

> *"As I watched all of those obnoxious boys walking around with their beautiful blonde girlfriends, I wanted to run them all over with my father's Mercedes SUV. I fantasized about how delightful that would be. To literally crush their lives to a pulp, just like they had crushed mine. I tried as hard as I could to hide my envy-fueled rage from [Actor 10 and Actor 11]. [Actor 11] was easy to fool, but [Actor 10] could tell how enraged I was. [Actor 10] knew me all too well"* (Rodger, 2014, p. 117).

Furthermore, breaking communication down by group characteristics revealed that the misogynist terrorists did not broadly broadcast their ideology within a single relationship-type (i.e. communicate misogyny or violent misogyny to all their friends or all their family members). For example, in two instances, Rodger had ties with two friends (i.e. a group of Rodger and two other friends all with ties between them). However, despite the three actors being a unified friend group, Rodger only shared misogynistic or violent misogynistic content with one of his two friends. There was evidence in his manifesto that this was a strategic choice. For example, he indicated that he was close friends with two actors (Actors 10 and 11) and they often hung out together as a group. However, Rodger strategically waited until he was alone with just Actor 10 before sharing his ideology, as indicated by:

[39] Note: throughout his manifesto, Rodger referred to his misogynistic ideologies as his political views.

> *"When we arrived at a beach park in Palos Verdes that overlooked the ocean, [Actor 11] had fallen asleep, so it was just me and [Actor 10] who went out to walk around … [Actor 10] told me more about his experiences among the popular kids of Malibu, in which I still envied him greatly for. I told him about all of my newfound philosophical views regarding women, and how I believe they are mentally flawed and need to be contained"* (Rodger, 2014, p. 127).

Additionally, in one case, Beierle demonstrated his intent to share his material with those he thought (or hoped) would agree with or enjoy it. E-mail correspondence between Beierle and a friend stated the following:

> *"[Actor 11], I am wondering, would you have any remote interest in reading any of my novels? I wrote 4 in my late teens, in addition to a screenplay (which may or may not exist in completed form , in my parents' basement, but I only possess a few random scenes). I have them all on a disc here, and have not even looked at any of them in the longest time. Gedney has read Chapter 1 of '18 and life', but other than that, none of them have seen human eyes. Let me know. – Scott"* (Tallahassee Police Department, 2018, p. 164)

Overall, these findings point to a tendency for misogynist terrorists to share their ideology selectively, with those that they believed would be receptive to it. This is in line with findings from Hofmann's (2018) study on two lone actor terrorists, which found that "*who* and *how* the lone- actor connected with others across their various networks was determined strategically by the type of interaction sought by the lone-actor" (p. 671, emphasis original). However, what indicated receptivity to the misogynist terrorists was not able to be uncovered by the current thesis (i.e. did they perceive that those they trusted the most or those they were closest to would be most receptive? Was it those with whom they have had similar discussions with before?). Future research on this topic would be useful in order to inform intervention or deradicalization programs.

One caveat to the above discussion is that Sodini was not identified as communicating misogyny or violent misogyny to anyone in his personal communication network. On one hand, this could be a function of extreme selectivity and occlusion on

the part of Sodini, mixed with difficulties collecting data. In other words, he shared misogynistic or violent misogynistic communication with very few people in his network, and that was not uncovered during data collection. However, it would be erroneous to ignore the possibility that Sodini was simply not vocal with his misogynistic ideologies leading up to his attack. Malthaner and Lindekilde (2017), for example, argue that "lone terrorist actors not only vary significantly with respect to the degree of social isolation in which they operate, but also with respect to the specific ways in which they interact with other militant activists, radical milieus, or virtual communities during the process of radicalization" (p. 2). As such, it is entirely possible that Sodini was different than the other two misogynist terrorists in how he shared his ideology. That being considered, given Sodini's involvement in the pick-up artist community and his decision to attend a 'dating' workshop in-person, it is likely that Sodini engaged in at least some misogynistic communication that was unable to be captured during data collection. Future studies, perhaps with access to the sealed police documents[40] or interviews of close contacts of Sodini (which was outside the scope of the current thesis) would likely help to clarify these results.

Furthermore, with the exception of Sodini, this demonstrates the misogynist terrorists engaged in leakage (or signalling) prior to their attacks. Leakage is defined in the literature as a warning behavior, where individuals communicate to others, either intentionally or unintentionally, the intent to do harm to a target (Meloy & O'Toole, 2011, p. 514). Several studies have identified that lone actor terrorists of both right wing and Islamic origin engage in leakage or signalling prior to their attack (Bright et al., 2020,

[40] Police documents offered invaluable information on the networks and contacts of both Rodger and Sodini.

p. 495; Ellis et al., 2016, p. 38; Hofmann, 2018, p. 658; Khazaeli Jah & Khoshnood, 2019, p. 30).

An analysis that was conducted using the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) database,[41] found that 46% of the 98 cases included in the study leaked some form of their extremist ideology or attack plans (Ellis et al., 2016, p. 38). Ellis and colleagues (2016) further found that religiously inspired lone actors were more likely to leak information to close contacts (i.e. family and friends) than those inspired by right-wing extremists ideologies. Rather, they suggest that lone actors inspired by right-wing extremist ideologies were more likely to leak information on the internet leading up to their attacks (p. 38). This finding contradicts the findings of the current thesis, as two of the three misogynist terrorists leaked information to multiple of their close contacts. However, in line with their results, Rodger also leaked information online. Further, in line with the results of this thesis, a qualitative case study conducted on Rodger identified that he engaged in leakage to friends (White, 2017, p. 39). It is also worth noting that while Sodini was identified as an exception in the current thesis, it is not necessarily abnormal or uncharacteristic that he was not identified as engaging in leakage. Many of the aforementioned studies also identified lone actors that did not engage in any form of leakage (See Ellis et al., 2016, p. 38; Bright et al., 2020, p. 501). Overall this in line with literature that suggest there is no unified profile of lone actor terrorists (Khazaeli Jah & Khoshnood, 2019, p. 30). Further research with more misogynist terrorists (including from other countries outside the United States) would help to further parse out the

[41] The CLAT database was developed through open source data (i.e. news media) on lone actor terrorists in Europe (Elis et al., 2016, pp. 33-34).

intricacies and patterns in their tendencies to share their ideology and leak information prior to their attack.

6.1.3 Rodger and Beierle did not receive large amounts of ideological support from other individuals in their in-person personal communication networks

Three findings from the current thesis suggests that Rodger and Beierle were not situated in a radical-milieu in-person: 1) they were identified as communicating the bulk of the misogyny in their networks; 2) there was low reciprocity scores, indicating that ideological discussions were not taking place between actors; and 3) there was a tendency for misogyny to be communicated with single actors, rather than in groups.

Degree centrality scores indicated that Rodger was responsible for all but two instances of misogynistic communication in his network and for all the violent misogynistic communication in his network. Beierle was the only actor in his network that communicated misogyny in any form. Additionally, this thesis identified a lack of reciprocity between actors in each misogynist terrorists' network, which is suggestive that ideological discussions were not taking place between actors. In other words, when one of the misogynist terrorists was communicating misogyny (or violent misogyny) to another actor, this actor was not identified as responding with misogynistic content (or violent misogynistic content).

On one hand this could suggest that the misogynist terrorists were rigid with their ideology and were not discussing it with others in a way that would promote a misogynistic discussion. For example, Beierle hired two individuals to help create his violent misogynistic content. The first was hired to put music in the background of Beierle's songs and the second was hired to create a website that housed some of his misogynistic and violent misogynistic content. Neither of these two actors was identified

as communicating misogyny of violent misogyny back to Beierle. In these cases his ideology was already rigidly created and presented in a format that likely did not inspire further discussions. Another possibility could be that the actors with whom the misogynist terrorists discussed misogyny were not open to reciprocating that misogyny. The finding that some actors reported the misogynist terrorists to police after they became aware of their ideology is indicative of this explanation. Finally, it is important to consider that this finding could be a result of the ego-centric nature of the networks and the fact that data was collected largely from the perspective of the misogynist terrorist (i.e. material created directly by them or media articles focused specifically on them). As such, there is a chance that alters in the network were communicating misogyny or violent misogyny that was not captured due to a lack of data about the content of these conversations. Further research could help to parse out these intricacies and develop a better understanding of the communities surrounding misogynist terrorists leading up to their attacks.

Additionally, when Rodger and Beierle communicated misogyny or violent misogyny in their network, the results of the current thesis identified that there was a tendency to do so with single individuals and not in groups. This suggests that these misogynist terrorists were not members of a radical group in person and that they are not adopting the cell structure that is typical of group-based terrorism (Krebs, 2002). This has implications for the ways in which these plots can be disrupted. However, more research, such as how misogynist terrorists are signalling their intent or how they are receiving material support leading up to their attacks, would need to be conducted before being able to create specific policy or security recommendations.

Taken together, these findings suggest that Rodger and Beierle did not receive ideological support from other actors in their personal communication networks, in that they were not using other actors to help develop or shape their ideologies. Yet, research has indicated that individuals rarely radicalize to violence in complete isolation. Even terrorists referred to as lone actor terrorists have been identified as receiving ideological and/or logistical support from others (See Bright et al., 2020; Gill et al., 2014; Hofmann, 2018). Extrapolating from this, while Rodger and Beierle may not have received ideological support from their personal network, they were likely engaging with actors and shaping their ideology elsewhere, outside their personal communities. For Rodger, this was found to have been done online (see Section 6.2.4).

Results from Sodini's networks contrast the findings from Rodger and Beierle's networks. Unlike Rodger and Beierle, he was not responsible for the bulk of the misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication in his network. Rather, the misogynistic content in his network was spread by Actor 17 (the self-proclaimed dating guru who ran the dating workshop that Sodini and others attended). Thus, this suggests while Sodini was not identified as being vocal with his misogyny, he was still seeking out areas of misogynistic content, which likely helped to shape his ideology.

6.1.4 There is a gendered component to how in-person misogynistic communications were being shared amongst network actors

Homophily measurements indicated a gendered component to the spread of misogynistic and violent misogynistic ideologies within the personal communication networks. Overall, 22% to 48% of actors in the misogynist terrorists' full networks were women. Despite this relatively even distribution of males and females across the

misogynist terrorist networks,[42] misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication was shared only by males. Most of this was being communicated directly by the misogynist terrorists (Beierle and Rodger), however two other male actors in Rodger's network communicated misogyny. Additionally two other male actors in Sodini's network were also responsible for communicating misogyny. Violent misogyny was exclusively communicated by Rodger and Beierle.

In contrast, both men and women were recipients of misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication. Rodger communicated misogynistic content to more males than females. On one hand, this could be a result of there being many more male than female actors in his network (32 males and 9 females). Another potential explanation could be that Rodger was more comfortable sharing his misogynistic ideologies with men. This is likely the case, as after his attack some of Rodger's friends stated to news media that he was incredibly timid around women and would rarely approach or talk to them in person (Payne & Alleyne, 2014).

In Sodini's network, more men were recipients of misogyny than women, though it is important to note that Sodini did not communicate this misogyny. Rather, all misogyny was communicated by Actor 17. Of the eighteen actors who attended his dating workshop, fourteen were men and four were women. Additionally, it is worth noting that all of the women in attendance were paid by Actor 17 to attend the course, in order to help teach the attendees (and likely to draw males to enroll in the course). Videos of the workshop showed that when these women were frequently interrupted and talked down to by Actor 17 when they attempted to share their opinions.

[42] Rodger's network is the slight exception at 22% female actors. In Beierle's network, 48% of actors were female and 42% of actors in Sodini's were female.

In comparison to Rodger, Beierle communicated misogyny more to women then to men, though in general there were differences in the content of the misogynistic content that each gender received. Misogynistic communication with women tended to be specific, based in sexualization that was targeted towards the individual woman. In one case, Beierle told a female acquaintance that she should become a stripper. In another case, he made sexually inappropriate comments towards four female soldiers that he was on tour with, which eventually lead to him being honourably discharged for unacceptable conduct from the army (Warren, 2018, p. 56). Sharing misogyny this way is in line with Manne's (2018) conceptualization of misogyny as a tool used to police and control women who do not conform to the patriarchal standards (p. 63-64). On the other hand, when communicating misogyny with males in the network, it tended to be more broadly about women and his thoughts on them, and not targeted towards any specific individual. In one example, he complained to a student at the university he attended about women's dating practices, complaining that women were arrogant and needed to grow a backbone.

Both Beierle and Rodger communicated violent misogyny with more males than females. In fact, Rodger communicated violent misogyny exclusively with males and Beierle communicated violent misogyny to four males and one female. The one time Beierle communicated violent misogyny to a female, it was in conjunction with a man. He sent a post card filled with themes of rape and gang rape to his brother and sister-in-law simultaneously.

The finding that the dissemination of misogynistic content by the examined misogynistic terrorists was gendered is not entirely surprising given that misogyny is an inherently gendered concept. In turn, this could suggest the importance of approaching

deradicalization through a gendered lens. Tomkinson and colleagues (2020) have suggested a similar approach, arguing that the primary step to intervene in Incel violence should be to attempt to address the wider societal prevalence of misogyny (p. 160). For example, they suggest strategies such as intervening in the wider political discourse about misogyny, promoting the voices of women in the political and public sphere, and educating community workers (i.e. police, social workers, politicians, etc.) about the threat of misogyny to public security (Tomkinson et al., 2020, pp. 160-161). They argue that these "primary interventions that operate on changing norms have the added advantage that they can reach, however obtusely, all members of a society, even those who anonymously harbour misogynistic views" (p. 161). Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) have also argued for the importance of addressing the underlying societal and contextual factors that legitimate misogyny, as they argued "the focus on technical and legal elements, while important, thus becomes a means to address specific components of networked misogyny, rather than fighting what seems to be an insurmountable cultural and normative battle" (p. 171). While their conclusions came from the study of misogyny online, they further highlight the importance of considering a gendered perspective to intervention and deradicalization.

6.2 Online networks

The results of the online networks offer important preliminary understandings as to how misogynist terrorists use social networks. While the online networks are somewhat limited due to difficulties in data collection, they offer a novel approach and builds upon gaps in previous research that utilized social network analysis to map

terrorists networks, but were not able to access social media data or create online networks (Bright et al., 2020; Hofmann, 2018).

6.2.1 Within the misogynist terrorists' online networks, other actors discussed misogyny between themselves

The findings of the online networks suggest that misogyny was prevalent in the misogynist terrorists' online interactions. Misogynistic communication was identified in all of the websites that were included in the current thesis. Violent misogynistic communication was identified on all of the sites, except Reddit. Additionally, many of the sites had misogynistic and violent misogynistic discussions that were taking place outside of direct contact with the misogynist terrorists, suggesting a wider misogynistic environment on these sites. Misogynistic discussions that did not include the misogynist terrorists occurred on all sites except YouTube and violent misogynist discussions that did not include the misogynist terrorists occurred on all sites except Reddit and YouTube. This finding is not altogether surprising, given the large section of literature that demonstrates the pervasiveness of misogyny online (See Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016; Barker & Jurasz, 2019; Bartlett et al., 2014; Ging & Siapera, 2018; Jane, 2016a, 2016b; Mantilla, 2013; Thompson, 2018).

One interesting pattern to note in the online data is the tendency for misogynistic communication (both with Rodger and outside of Rodger) to take place on sites related to the manosphere (PUAHate.com and Bodybuilding.com). Admittedly, part of this finding is at least partially attributable to more data being collected from these sites. However, this finding is also in line with the bulk of the literature on the manosphere and Incel forums online, which suggest that they are virulently misogynistic and anti-feminist (Ging, 2019, p. 653; Glace et al., 2021, p. 1; O'Malley et al., 2020, p. 7). Additionally,

specific research on Incel communities online has also found that Incels utilize spaces in the manosphere to express their anger and feelings of marginalization (Ging, 2019, p. 653). This finding was not able to be confirmed for Sodini, as only one website that is not considered as a part of the manosphere was included in his data. However, the results of Sodini's online network do demonstrate the pervasiveness of misogyny online, as misogynistic and (one) violent misogynist discussion(s) took place in his network.

The current thesis found that the actors on Reddit were overall identified as not engaging in misogynistic or violent misogynistic communication. This differs from some of the literature on online Incel communities, where Reddit[43] is normally highlighted as being a hotspot for hate and radicalization (Brzuszkiewicz, 2020, p. 3; Pantucci & Ong, 2021, p. 123; Preston et al., 2021, p. 3; Tomkinson et al., 2020, p. 154; Wilson, 2020, p. 7). The discrepancies in these findings could point to the importance of specific subreddits in the radicalization process. For example, it could suggest that while misogyny has been established as being prevalent online, there is a tendency for misogyny to group more specifically in certain subreddits than others.

6.2.2 Within the misogynist terrorists' online networks, actors tended to discuss misogyny with singular individuals rather than in groups

Similar to the personal communication networks, there was a tendency for actors online to communicate misogyny with single individuals rather than in groups. This is in line with literature that characterizes the manosphere and Incel communities online as loosely organized with no central leadership (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 565; Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 1). Additionally, this demonstrates the tendency for leakage of misogynistic

[43] Note: In the literature Reddit is normally highlighted as a hotspot for hate and radicalization in conjunction with other forum type sites, such as 4chan and 8chan.

ideologies to also occur online. Finally, it's important to consider that this could be a result of the way the network data was coded, as ties were only coded based on direct replies. Thus, other who may have seen misogynistic or violent misogynistic posts, but not commented on them were not coded as a tie.

6.2.3 Rodger was responsible for a large portion of the misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication in his online network.

While other actors were identified as communicating misogyny beyond just with Rodger, the results of the current thesis uncovered that Rodger still engaged in more misogynistic and violent misogynistic communication online than any other single actor in his online network.[44] This is in line with the results of numerous studies that have found that extremists and violent ideological groups use the internet, particularly social media sites, as a space to espouse radical beliefs that they may not communicate to individuals in their real life (See Freilich et al., 2015; Hamm & Spaaij, 2017; Holt et al., 2019; O'Malley et al., 2020). Additionally, this is in line with other research that has suggested that terrorists are increasingly relying on the internet (Casey, 2019, pp. 75–77) and that there is a link between online comments and real world violence (Ribeiro et al., 2020, p. 2; see also Patton et al., 2014). For example, Ellis' (2016) analysis of the CLAT database demonstrate that there was "a steady increase in the use of mainstream social media platforms in [lone actor terrorist] plots" (p. 37). Taking this one step further, this finding contributes to other academic works that have argued for the importance of

[44] Note: It is important to remember that the networks were coded as ego-centric, thus inherently biasing results towards the misogynist terrorist.

implementing monitoring and securitization on these sites (See Casey, 2019; Tomkinson et al., 2020a).[45]

6.2.4 Rodger may have used online sites to build, sharpen, and/or confirm his ideology

Rodger's manifesto indicated that he used sites online (specifically PUAHate.com) to build his ideology. According to Rodger's manifesto:

> *"The Spring of 2013 was also the time when I came across the website PUAHate.com. It is a forum full of men who are starved of sex, just like me. Many of them have their own theories of what women are attracted to, and many of them share my hatred of women, though unlike me they would be too cowardly to act on it. Reading the posts on that website only confirmed many of the theories I had about how wicked and degenerate women really are. Most of the people on that website have extremely stupid opinions that I found very frustrating, but I found a few to be quite insightful"* (Rodger, 2014, pp.117-118).

However, this was only partly reflected in the empirical findings of this thesis. On one hand, Rodger received a large amount of misogynistic communication from alters in his network, suggesting that they could have played a role in helping him to develop or refine his misogynistic ideologies. On the other hand, Rodger only received violent misogynistic communication from one individual (in comparison to sending violent misogynistic communication to eight actors). Additionally, there were low levels of reciprocity in both the misogynistic and violent misogynistic networks, indicating that Rodger (and other actors) did not have a tendency to engage in ideological discussions. First, this finding is in line with Ellis and colleagues (2016) analysis of the CLAT database that found that:

[45] The debate surrounding the monitoring and securitization of online spaces is extensive, including considerations of free speech, government intervention, and the best methods for intervention, among others (See for example (Casey, 2019; Norris, 2020; Tomkinson et al., 2020). While the results of the current thesis suggest the potential benefit of implementing such procedures, it must be noted that they are not extensive enough to detail the methods or policies that should be implemented.

> *"where perpetrators have primarily engaged through social media platforms, the information gathered overwhelmingly indicates a one-way relationship – reading and sharing relevant news, and expressing opinions, rather than utilising these platforms to form connections with other people"* (p. 37).

Secondly, the methodology employed when coding the data could help to explain this discrepancy, as this thesis was focused specifically on communication between actors. Thus it is possible that the way the data was coded for this specific project failed to capture the influence of the broader site as a whole. This is in line with what Rodger wrote in his manifesto, as he wrote that *reading* the posts allowed him to confirm his theories about women. This speaks to the larger impact of these sites outside of the direct communication between actors.

Overall, the results suggest that direct communication alone did not account for how Rodger used the internet to develop his ideology. However, considering a combination of his communication with others and the overall misogynistic landscapes of the sites he was participating in provides a more wholistic picture of how the internet shaped his ideological development. Future work pairing content analysis with social network analysis would likely provide a better picture of the role of online environment in the ideological development of misogynist terrorists.

7.0 Limitations

A significant limitation in the current thesis was accessing relational data for each misogynist terrorist's networks. This limitation, however, was expected for several reasons, including that only documentary sources were available for data collection, the

passage of time that occurred between the attacks and data collection,[46] and that the networks being analyzed are dark networks. Dark networks include "all types of hidden and clandestine groups, about whom data are uncertain and ambiguous" (Gerdes, 2015, p. 2). The difficulties involved with studying these networks often lead to missing network data and portions of the overall network being occluded from researchers. This can be a threat to validity because if there is too much missing data the generated network is not an accurate reflection of the real-world network (Prell, 2012, p. 78). Gerdes (2015), however argues that even with missing data, the visible portions of networks can still provide important and crucial insights. In order to mitigate some of the issues with validity presented by examining dark networks, several strategies were used in order to increase validity and ensure that the generated networks were as reflective of the real-world networks as feasibly possible. First, cases were only included in the thesis if enough relational data were available. Several case studies were initially selected for inclusion in the current thesis, but were later discarded due to lack of available relational data. Second, data were collected from multiple different and independent sources, including primary, news media, academic article, and court and police documents, which allowed for a more robust and wholistic picture. Finally, in order to combat the overreliance on secondary data that is common when studying dark networks primary data sought out and was utilized as often as possible in the current thesis. For example, a bulk of the relational data for Elliot Rodger's networks came from his manifesto, as well as by identifying his online social media posts.[47] Additionally, data from secondary

[46] This was a particular hinderance in Sodini's networks, especially when attempting to collect online data.
[47] Primary sources used for Rodger include his manifesto, social media posts, and interviews with family and friends after his attack. Primary sources used for Beierle were his YouTube videos and the songs he

sources were cross-referenced across at least two sources. In order to enhance the validity of the thesis, any data not able to be verified across at least two independent sources was not included in the thesis.

Another study limitation involves the data collection process for the online networks. Due to the anonymity of the internet it was not possible to link a usernames from social media forums online to a real person. Additionally, it was not possible to verify that individuals were in possession of multiple online accounts/personae on the same forum or if that the same individual did not have an account on two separate social media sites (i.e., if they went by one username on PUAHate.com and a different username on Bodybuilding.com). This has the potential to impact the validity of the online networks, as it was not possible to verify that there was no overlap between actors in the network (i.e. that a single person was not represented by several nodes).[48] That being said, there are very few studies that have used social network analysis to analyze the way that specific lone actor terrorists communicated online prior to their attack, so this social media data were still a valuable starting point for future research that have the tools and/or data access to address some of these limitations.

Finally, this thesis is limited by its lack of generalizability. This is a widely acknowledged limitation with case study research (Bryman & Bell, 2019, p. 45; Swanborn, 2010, p. 66). Given that only three case studies were included in this thesis, the findings cannot be generalized to other misogynist terrorists, globally or even within

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wrote. Primary sources identified for Sodini include his journal and videos of him attending a dating workshop.

[48] It is relatively common to have an individual use two accounts to interact with themselves in online platforms (i.e., replying to their own post with a another account to generate positive interest). For example, there were some suggestions in the online data that Rodger had more than one account on PUAHate.com, but this was never able to be verified.

the United States. However, the current thesis is an exploratory study, and one of the first of its kind to examine the personal networks of misogynist terrorists. As such, the results are still useful in providing initial conclusions, as well as for providing avenues to guide future research.

8.0 Conclusion

Acknowledging the host of limitations associated with the current thesis, the results have offered a number of preliminary conclusions that allow for an initial understanding of the ideological and communicative landscape influencing misogynist terrorists, both online and in-person, leading up to their attack. In summary it was found that:

1) Misogynist terrorists tend to have normal personal social networks;
2) Misogynist terrorists have a tendency to be selective with whom they share their ideology with in-person;
3) Misogynist terrorists tend to not receive large amounts of ideological support from their in-person networks;
4) There is a gendered component to how misogynist content was shared among the misogynist terrorist's networks;
5) Misogynist terrorists tend not to be the most central or important figure within online venues that share misogynistic communications. Rodger was the exception to this, as he was responsible for a large amount of online misogynist communication;
6) Misogynist terrorists tend to discuss their ideologies within single individuals, rather than in small groups when interacting online; and
7) Rodger may have used online forums to build and sharpen his ideology.

While admittedly preliminary, these results demonstrate the potential of this type of research to be useful in developing policy and procedures to help protect against misogynist terrorism. The thesis has highlighted potential for intervention programs involving family members and other close contacts, as well as the potential importance of

considering gender approaches to intervention strategies with potential and incipient misogynist terrorists. It also highlights the importance of monitoring sites in the manosphere as loci for the development, sharing, and encouragement of misogynist terrorist violence. Furthermore, by conceptualizing misogynist terrorism as a distinct category of ideological and political violence, the current thesis has highlighted the importance of taking a nuanced and focused approach to understanding the motivations, ideologies, and activities of individuals driven to violence by their hatred of women.

Finally, this thesis has paved the way for future research to continue to examine misogynist terrorism through a variety of different theoretical and methodological approaches. In particular, continuing this type of research from a gendered perspective will allow for new and critical insights to be developed that will help better understand a pervasive and much understudied form of terrorist violence. Furthermore, the results from this study could be augmented through slight modifications or additions to the social network methodology that was employed to examine the case studies. First, expanding the current study to include more cases of misogynist terrorism, as well as including control cases (i.e. terrorism not inspired by misogyny) may allow for more generalizable conclusions to be drawn. Second, going through more complicated channels to access better quality data would allow for more precise results to be gleaned from the data. Additionally, future studies could look to pair different types of analysis, such as social network analysis and content analysis of websites, in order to develop more in depth conclusions. Pursuing these future research directions will be of critical importance in order to keep up with the evolving nature of terrorism and continue to protect national and global security.

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Curriculum Vitae

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Presentations:

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"Right-Wing and Anti-Government Extremism in Rural Eastern Canada," *The 44th American Society of Criminology (ASC) Annual Convention*, (November 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA).

Academic Awards:

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